Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
6ec746fad2 feat: a word the bot does not know gets an answer, and gets kept
An unrecognised "!word" was dropped in silence, which made a typo
indistinguishable from the bot being down and threw away the best available
list of commands worth writing. Three things now happen at the one place in
dispatcher.py that used to be a bare `return`.

A near miss is corrected -- "!cta" asks whether you meant "!kot". The
distance is optimal string alignment rather than difflib's ratio: a
transposition is the typo people actually make, it costs one edit here, and
it shreds the matching blocks a ratio counts ("!cta"/"!cat" scores 0.75 but
"!cta"/"!kot" scores 0.50, so no cutoff separates them on principle).

A word with no near miss points at !zaproponuj, which files an idea from
inside the group. Either way the word and the message are recorded, and the
management page grows an Ideas tab that lists them.

Three things stay silent, each for its own reason. "!kot ladny" is a real
trigger with words after it and always has been silent. "!!" is punctuation.
And a command claimed in some *other* group is neither answered nor recorded
-- the album's triggers are real people's names, and pack_scoping.yaml says
it out loud: a refusal would itself announce that the album exists. The
existence check is therefore global, which is what pack_add already asks.

Measured rather than guessed, against the shipped aliases.json:

- a minimum candidate length, because "!ja" is one edit from ~40 of the 676
  two-letter words somebody could type; 69 of them got a suggestion before
  the rule and 18 after.
- the two-edit budget starts at six characters, not five. At five it put
  four pairs of *different* commands within reach of each other --
  !pies/!popes, !days/!cats, !dzis/!dni, !mnie/!dni -- and costs nothing to
  give up, because every real typo this was written for is one edit away.
  test_no_two_commands_are_within_reach_of_each_other fails if a future
  alias reopens the gap.

Both new tables are keyed on the envelope's own sent_at_ms, never the wall
clock: signal-cli replays undelivered frames on reconnect, and a clock-keyed
table collects a duplicate row per reconnect instead of ignoring one.

The branch is gated on should_count -- which excludes the bot's own envelope,
and that is the loop guard, since handle() checks is_own nowhere else -- and
wrapped in its own try/except, because it runs above the one that wraps a
handler and Bot.listen has no exception handling of its own.

Suggestions live in SQLite, not in a tracked file, and the export goes to the
state directory. check_personal_data learns the names it refuses from the
live database, so it catches a name somebody has typed and cannot catch a
misspelling of one -- and an unrecognised-command corpus is made of
misspellings. A group-writable file in a public tree is both a leak and a
wedge. The export therefore carries
deliberate !zaproponuj notes in full and unrecognised words as counts only;
bodies stay on the loopback-only page.

Verified on the live bot: restarted, both tables created with every existing
row count unchanged, !cta and !zaproponuj !pogoda delivered through
/_selftest, both rows read back out of the live database, and the journal
names neither the word nor the body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01416TegJ3sa8xL5qGGgrygP
2026-08-31 16:48:26 +02:00
37a27c6dff feat: refuse to commit personal data, learned from outside the repository
The leak this repository had was not carelessness with a secret. It was
somebody reaching for a real name because it was the example in front of
them -- a fixture built from a live database, an envelope pasted out of a
running container, a help text written while looking at the actual group.
Three different people-shaped mistakes, none of which a rule about "be
careful" would have stopped.

So it is a gate. The hard part is that the thing being checked must not
contain the list of what to refuse, or the check *is* the leak. It reads the
names at run time from outside: the photo pack's manifest, the message
database, the local .env. It never prints the word it matched, because this
output reaches CI logs. On a machine with none of that private data it says
"shapes only" out loud rather than passing quietly, and CI enforces the half
that needs nothing -- phone numbers, uuids and Signal group ids, compared
against an allowlist of values invented for the fixtures.

It runs on staged files, on the commit message -- where two of the leaks
actually travelled -- and over the whole tree in CI.

It paid for itself twice before it was wired up. The live test group's id was
in tests/test_config.py in two spellings, and truncated in three more files,
after four rounds of grepping by hand had pronounced the tree clean -- nobody
thinks to grep for base64. Then it refused the commit that introduced it,
because DOCS-privacy.md had used a real name as the example of a name.

An allowlist line may be scoped to one file, which is how the given names
that are also popes stay legal in popes.json and refused in every fixture
that has no business carrying them. The threshold is three characters,
because one of this group's given names is three characters long.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017w1HZ3cZ7neL3rFdQ6VMBA
2026-08-30 23:28:29 +02:00