# Security Policy ## Scope of a linked device This bot runs as a **linked device** on an existing Signal account. That means it can read every direct message and every group on that account, and anything it sends is sent **as the account owner**. It is not a separate identity. `GROUP_IDS` is the only thing that narrows this. The bot therefore: - refuses to start when `GROUP_IDS` is missing or blank, rather than defaulting to an empty string that matches nothing predictably; - drops messages with no `groupInfo` (direct messages) explicitly, in `counting.watched_group`, rather than relying on a falsy comparison; - resolves a message's group **once**, and uses that one answer as the reply address and the key for all per-group state, so the scoping gate and the reply router cannot disagree and answer in the wrong group; - ships a `scoping` scenario asserting that direct messages and other groups produce zero outbound messages, run by `scripts/e2e.sh` in CI. If you widen that boundary, the scoping scenario is what should fail. ## Secrets `.env` is gitignored and never committed. `.env.sample` contains no real values. The bot reads no credentials of its own: authentication is the signal-cli data directory mounted into the container, which stays on the host. ## Reporting a vulnerability Open an issue at https://github.com/kuhyx/signal-bot/issues. If the issue would expose message content or account access, say so without a working proof of concept in the public issue. ## Dependencies Every dependency is exact-pinned at its newest stable release and checked by `scripts/check_dependency_freshness.sh` in pre-commit and CI. There are no pre-release pins.