mirror of
https://github.com/kuhyx/testsAndMisc.git
synced 2026-11-18 20:14:26 +01:00
Let the sweep hide preinstalled apps, one named package at a time
The Device Owner sweep skipped every FLAG_SYSTEM package, which meant it could not touch the apps it exists to block: YouTube ships at /product/app/YouTube as a system app, and so does Chrome. Deleting the filter is not the fix. Measured on the Pixel 6a, that would expose 320 system packages of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no never_disable_prefix -- including com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver (emergency alerts), com.android.credentialmanager and com.android.devicelockcontroller. So system apps stay default-deny and blockable_system_packages is the opt-in. com.android.vending is on the list deliberately: leaving Play reachable makes every other removal a one-tap undo. The list lives in the Python exporter rather than config.sh because it is a safety boundary, and a shell typo should not be able to widen it. The exporter subtracts anything already allowed, so an asset can never state that a package is both allowed and blockable. Kotlin reads the field with a new optionalStringSet: an asset predating the field parses to the empty set instead of throwing, because a throw makes decide() skip the pass and silently disable enforcement. Verified on-device under a profile owner: hid 1 for YouTube, restored 1 when temporarily allowed, and cellbroadcastreceiver, credentialmanager, devicelockcontroller and settings all left hidden=false. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
This commit is contained in:
parent
553c395cff
commit
eeaf9590da
55
docs/superpowers/evidence/flag-system-sweep-2026-08-10.json
Normal file
55
docs/superpowers/evidence/flag-system-sweep-2026-08-10.json
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"intent": "Let the Device Owner sweep hide the preinstalled apps it exists to block -- YouTube and Chrome ship with FLAG_SYSTEM and were skipped entirely -- without exposing the rest of the platform to being hidden.",
|
||||
"scope": [
|
||||
"python_pkg/focus_policy/export.py",
|
||||
"python_pkg/focus_policy/tests/test_export.py",
|
||||
"focus_owner/android/app/src/main/kotlin/com/kuhy/focus_owner/FocusPolicy.kt",
|
||||
"focus_owner/android/app/src/main/kotlin/com/kuhy/focus_owner/EnforcementRunner.kt",
|
||||
"focus_owner/assets/policy.json",
|
||||
"Non-goal: Device Owner provisioning itself, which still needs the factory reset"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"changes": [
|
||||
"Added BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES to the exporter, rendered as a new blockable_system_packages field: chrome, vending, youtube, youtube.music, videos. com.android.vending is included deliberately -- leaving Play reachable makes every other removal a one-tap undo.",
|
||||
"The exporter subtracts anything already allowed, so an asset can never declare a package both allowed and blockable.",
|
||||
"EnforcementRunner.installedThirdPartyPackages became sweepablePackages(policy): third-party apps as before, plus system apps the policy names. System apps stay default-deny.",
|
||||
"FocusPolicy gained blockableSystemPackages, parsed with a new optionalStringSet so an asset predating the field reads as the empty set instead of throwing -- a throw would make decide() skip the pass and silently disable enforcement."
|
||||
],
|
||||
"verification": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "measured blast radius before changing anything: pm list packages -s vs the policy",
|
||||
"result": "pass",
|
||||
"evidence": "320 system packages on the device, of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no never_disable_prefix -- including com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver (emergency alerts), com.android.credentialmanager and com.android.devicelockcontroller. This is why the filter was not simply deleted."
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "profile-owner harness (user 10), tap 'Run enforcement now' with YouTube installed",
|
||||
"result": "pass",
|
||||
"evidence": "'setApplicationHidden(com.google.android.youtube,true)=true' then 'applied LOCATION_UNKNOWN: hid 1, restored 0'; dumpsys confirms hidden=true. Before this change the package was invisible to the sweep."
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "same harness with YouTube temporarily added to the allowlist",
|
||||
"result": "pass",
|
||||
"evidence": "'setApplicationHidden(com.google.android.youtube,false)=true', 'restored 1', hidden=false. Both directions of the system-app path work."
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "dumpsys on safety-critical system packages after the sweep",
|
||||
"result": "pass",
|
||||
"evidence": "com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver, com.android.credentialmanager, com.android.devicelockcontroller and com.android.settings all installed=true hidden=false. All five blockable packages are hidden=true. Default-deny holds."
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "pytest python_pkg/focus_policy/ ; gradlew :app:testDebugUnitTest ; flutter build apk --debug",
|
||||
"result": "pass",
|
||||
"evidence": "125 Python tests pass, 100% branch coverage on focus_policy. Kotlin unit tests BUILD SUCCESSFUL. APK builds."
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"risks": [
|
||||
"Hiding com.android.vending under Device Owner removes the user's ability to install or update ANY app from Play, not just to reinstall YouTube. That is the intent, but it is a large blast radius and should be applied late, after the release path has been re-tested -- consistent with the wipe checklist's 'one restriction at a time'.",
|
||||
"BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES is a hardcoded list in the exporter rather than something derived from config.sh. Adding a new preinstalled distraction means editing Python, not the shell config. Chosen deliberately: this list is a safety boundary, and a typo in config.sh should not be able to widen it.",
|
||||
"Verified under a profile owner, not a device owner. The DPM calls are identical but the package set differs: a work profile does not provision every system app (talkback, for example, is installed=false there), so the real user-0 sweep will see more packages than this harness did.",
|
||||
"An intermediate `comm` on visible-vs-all package lists made it look like the sweep had hidden ~60 system packages. It had not -- those were absent from the profile, not hidden. Distinguishing installed= from hidden= is what settled it; the app logged exactly one setApplicationHidden call."
|
||||
],
|
||||
"rollback": [
|
||||
"git revert. The Kotlin change falls back to filtering every FLAG_SYSTEM package, and the extra asset field is then ignored.",
|
||||
"After reverting, regenerate the asset so blockable_system_packages disappears: python -m python_pkg.focus_policy --config phone_focus_mode/config.sh --redact-home --output focus_owner/assets/policy.json",
|
||||
"Anything already hidden stays hidden until a pass unhides it; on this device the same apps are also removed via distraction_purge.sh, which is independent."
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ class EnforcementRunner(private val context: Context) {
|
||||
return EnforcementDecision.evaluate(
|
||||
effective,
|
||||
EnforcementInputs(
|
||||
installedPackages = installedThirdPartyPackages(),
|
||||
installedPackages = sweepablePackages(effective),
|
||||
minutesSinceMidnight = minutes,
|
||||
latitude = fix?.first,
|
||||
longitude = fix?.second,
|
||||
@ -94,7 +94,18 @@ class EnforcementRunner(private val context: Context) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Third-party packages, the only ones the allowlist sweep considers.
|
||||
* Packages the allowlist sweep considers: every third-party app, plus the
|
||||
* system apps the policy names in `blockable_system_packages`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* System apps are default-deny rather than filtered out entirely, because
|
||||
* the apps most worth blocking are preinstalled — YouTube ships at
|
||||
* `/product/app/YouTube` with `FLAG_SYSTEM`, and so does Chrome — while
|
||||
* most of the rest are platform components. Measured on this device: 320
|
||||
* system packages, of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no
|
||||
* `never_disable_prefix`, including `com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver`
|
||||
* (emergency alerts) and `com.android.devicelockcontroller`. Sweeping
|
||||
* those under Device Owner risks an unrecoverable phone, so eligibility is
|
||||
* opt-in per package.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* [PackageManager.MATCH_UNINSTALLED_PACKAGES] is required, not optional: a
|
||||
* package hidden by `setApplicationHidden` is dropped from the default
|
||||
@ -105,10 +116,14 @@ class EnforcementRunner(private val context: Context) {
|
||||
* on device: after a pass hid three apps, the following pass reported
|
||||
* `hid 0, restored 0` and left them hidden permanently.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun installedThirdPartyPackages(): Set<String> {
|
||||
private fun sweepablePackages(policy: FocusPolicy): Set<String> {
|
||||
val pm = context.packageManager
|
||||
return pm.getInstalledApplications(PackageManager.MATCH_UNINSTALLED_PACKAGES)
|
||||
.filter { (it.flags and android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo.FLAG_SYSTEM) == 0 }
|
||||
.filter { info ->
|
||||
val isSystem =
|
||||
(info.flags and android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo.FLAG_SYSTEM) != 0
|
||||
!isSystem || info.packageName in policy.blockableSystemPackages
|
||||
}
|
||||
.map { it.packageName }
|
||||
.toSet()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ data class FocusPolicy(
|
||||
val workoutUnblockDomains: Set<String>,
|
||||
val curfew: CurfewWindow?,
|
||||
val launcherPackage: String?,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* System apps the sweep may hide, named individually.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The sweep is default-deny for `FLAG_SYSTEM` packages, because most of
|
||||
* them are platform components: on this device 243 of 320 match no
|
||||
* allowlist entry and no prefix, including the emergency-alert receiver.
|
||||
* Only packages named here are eligible, and an asset that predates this
|
||||
* field parses to the empty set, preserving the old never-touch-system
|
||||
* behaviour.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val blockableSystemPackages: Set<String> = emptySet(),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether a package must never be hidden.
|
||||
@ -143,6 +154,7 @@ data class FocusPolicy(
|
||||
nightAllowedPackages = json.stringSet("night_allowed_packages"),
|
||||
neverDisablePrefixes = json.stringSet("never_disable_prefixes"),
|
||||
workoutUnblockDomains = json.stringSet("workout_unblock_domains"),
|
||||
blockableSystemPackages = json.optionalStringSet("blockable_system_packages"),
|
||||
curfew = curfewJson?.let {
|
||||
CurfewWindow(
|
||||
startMinutes = parseHhMm(it.getString("start"), "curfew.start"),
|
||||
@ -163,6 +175,20 @@ data class FocusPolicy(
|
||||
return (0 until array.length()).mapTo(mutableSetOf()) { array.getString(it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A list that may be absent, read as empty.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Used for fields added after assets were already shipped. The strict
|
||||
* [stringSet] would throw, and an unparsable policy makes the runner
|
||||
* skip the pass entirely — safe, but it silently disables enforcement
|
||||
* rather than degrading to the previous behaviour. A present-but-wrong
|
||||
* type is still an error, since that is a real mistake.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun JSONObject.optionalStringSet(field: String): Set<String> {
|
||||
if (!has(field)) return emptySet()
|
||||
return stringSet(field)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun parseHhMm(value: String, field: String): Int {
|
||||
val parts = value.split(":")
|
||||
val hour = parts.getOrNull(0)?.toIntOrNull()
|
||||
|
||||
@ -87,6 +87,13 @@
|
||||
"pl.plksa.portalpasazera",
|
||||
"ws.xsoh.etar"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"blockable_system_packages": [
|
||||
"com.android.chrome",
|
||||
"com.android.vending",
|
||||
"com.google.android.apps.youtube.music",
|
||||
"com.google.android.videos",
|
||||
"com.google.android.youtube"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"browser_packages": [
|
||||
"com.android.chrome",
|
||||
"org.mozilla.fenix"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -27,6 +27,30 @@ SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
|
||||
# rather than left to a hand-edit of the rendered asset.
|
||||
ENFORCER_PACKAGE = "com.kuhy.focus_owner"
|
||||
|
||||
# System apps the sweep is allowed to hide, named one by one.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The Kotlin runner skips every package with FLAG_SYSTEM, which means the
|
||||
# Device Owner path cannot touch the apps most worth blocking: YouTube ships
|
||||
# at /product/app/YouTube as a system app, and so does Chrome. Simply dropping
|
||||
# that filter is not the fix -- measured on the Pixel 6a, it would expose 320
|
||||
# system packages of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no
|
||||
# never_disable_prefix, including com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver (emergency
|
||||
# alerts), com.android.credentialmanager and com.android.devicelockcontroller.
|
||||
# Hiding those under Device Owner risks an unrecoverable device.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# So the sweep stays default-deny for system apps and this is the opt-in.
|
||||
# com.android.vending is included deliberately: leaving Play reachable makes
|
||||
# every other removal a one-tap undo.
|
||||
BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"com.android.chrome",
|
||||
"com.android.vending",
|
||||
"com.google.android.apps.youtube.music",
|
||||
"com.google.android.videos",
|
||||
"com.google.android.youtube",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def policy_to_dict(policy: FocusPolicy) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Return a JSON-serialisable representation of ``policy``."""
|
||||
@ -54,6 +78,12 @@ def policy_to_dict(policy: FocusPolicy) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"never_disable_prefixes": sorted(policy.never_disable_prefixes),
|
||||
"workout_unblock_domains": sorted(policy.workout_unblock_domains),
|
||||
"browser_packages": sorted(policy.browser_packages),
|
||||
# Absent from an older asset, so the Kotlin loader must treat a
|
||||
# missing key as the empty set -- i.e. keep today's behaviour of
|
||||
# never touching a system app.
|
||||
"blockable_system_packages": sorted(
|
||||
BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES - {*policy.allowed_packages, ENFORCER_PACKAGE},
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -71,6 +71,38 @@ def test_enforcer_is_not_duplicated_when_already_present() -> None:
|
||||
assert payload["night_allowed_packages"].count(ENFORCER_PACKAGE) == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blockable_system_packages_names_the_distraction_apps() -> None:
|
||||
"""The sweep is default-deny for system apps; this is the opt-in.
|
||||
|
||||
YouTube and Chrome ship with FLAG_SYSTEM, so without this list the Device
|
||||
Owner sweep skips exactly the apps it exists to block. Play is included
|
||||
because leaving it reachable makes every other removal a one-tap undo.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
blockable = policy_to_dict(_policy())["blockable_system_packages"]
|
||||
|
||||
assert "com.google.android.youtube" in blockable
|
||||
assert "com.android.chrome" in blockable
|
||||
assert "com.android.vending" in blockable
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blockable_system_packages_never_contradicts_the_allowlist() -> None:
|
||||
"""An allowed package must not also be listed as blockable.
|
||||
|
||||
Otherwise the asset would state both at once and the outcome would depend
|
||||
on which check the runner happened to apply first.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
payload = policy_to_dict(
|
||||
_policy(
|
||||
allowed_packages=frozenset(
|
||||
{"pl.mbank", "com.launcher", "com.android.chrome"},
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
assert "com.android.chrome" not in payload["blockable_system_packages"]
|
||||
assert "com.android.chrome" in payload["allowed_packages"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_lists_are_sorted_for_stable_diffs() -> None:
|
||||
"""Sorted output keeps a committed asset's diff meaningful."""
|
||||
payload = policy_to_dict(_policy())
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user