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47371ac9a1
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6836a32b43 |
Let the app set its own home, and lock VPN configuration
Two gaps left from the device owner work. The geofence had no way to be provisioned. push_home_location.sh stages the file through `run-as`, which returns "package not debuggable" on the release build device owner requires, and making the build debuggable to fix that would hand anyone with adb the ability to edit this app's state -- the bypass the whole design exists to close. So the app writes its own filesDir instead, from a button. Deliberately not an exported intent: anything that can set home from outside the app can set it somewhere else, and the geofence would then report AWAY forever with enforcement off. The coordinates are never logged either, since that is a home address and logcat is readable by anyone with adb. DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN is now applied from the app, after the filter was confirmed working rather than before -- locking VPN configuration over a broken setup would pin the broken state in place. The open question was whether it also freezes RethinkDNS's own settings; it does not. Its blocklist selection was changed under the restriction without trouble, which is the answer that matters, because the alternative meant every domain rule had to be final before locking. The status page gained a Geofence row. "no home set - enforcing everywhere" is a large behavioural difference from a working geofence and was previously visible only by inspecting logcat. The widget tests caught a real bug rather than a test-only one: the two new buttons overflowed the column by 4px, and the control that must never be clipped off the bottom of the screen is "Release device owner". The body scrolls now. Verified after a reboot: youtube hidden, all 14 youtube domains at 127.0.0.1, google/gmail/play resolving normally, no_config_vpn still enforced, uninstall still refused. The geofence itself stays untested on hardware until the phone has a GPS fix to record. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC |
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| cc804dd311 |
Run enforcement from exact alarms, and re-arm it before first unlock
The decision layer needed a runtime. A polling loop was the obvious design and the wrong one: Doze can skip a poll indefinitely, and skipping the 05:00 boundary leaves the curfew allowlist applied into the morning -- the user finds their banking app missing with no obvious cause. The transitions are known ahead of time, so they get exact alarms. The service wakes, applies, schedules the next run and stops rather than sitting resident. BootReceiver takes LOCKED_BOOT_COMPLETED as well as BOOT_COMPLETED, because the latter does not arrive until first unlock. That is not theoretical: this phone sat at RUNNING_LOCKED for minutes after an earlier reboot in this session, with no network and no app able to start. Relying on BOOT_COMPLETED alone freezes enforcement state across a reboot -- safe for hiding, not for unhiding, which is the direction that strands you without a dialer. The schedule is re-armed before unlock; the pass itself waits until storage is readable. The first on-device run logged "exact alarms not permitted", and dumpsys showed what that costs: window=+11m14s, maxWhenElapsed=+25m51s, so a 15-minute fallback could slip to 26 minutes. SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM is user-revocable and denied by default on Android 16; USE_EXACT_ALARM is the permission for apps whose function is acting at specific times, and is granted at install. After the change: window=0, exactAllowReason=policy_permission, whenElapsed equal to maxWhenElapsed. The service reports "not DO/PO - no enforcement applied" and does nothing when unprovisioned, rather than failing quietly, and a failure inside a pass cannot stop the next run being scheduled -- an enforcement bug should degrade one tick, not end the chain. Not yet wired: the service logs a tick rather than calling setApplicationHidden with the decision. Both halves are tested; joining them is next. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL |
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| e3d5e1dd18 |
Serve the blocklist over DoT and hand the policy to the app as an asset
Two gaps stopped the unrooted path working end to end. The phone had no way to read the focus policy, and the blocklist was only reachable as a hosts file or over plain UDP/53 on the LAN -- while the rooted enforcer actively rejected every DoT connection, so a self-hosted resolver could not have worked even if one existed. focus_owner now loads a generated policy.json instead of hardcoding anything, so config.sh stays the single source of truth across Python, shell and Kotlin. The committed asset is rendered with --redact-home and a test fails if home coordinates ever appear in it. An unknown schema_version is rejected outright: silently accepting a newer schema means enforcing a policy the app has misread, and a misread allowlist is one that blocks the dialer. dns_enforcer.sh rejected ALL port 853 traffic and pinned Private DNS off, every 20 seconds. That is right when DoT is a bypass channel and exactly wrong when DoT is the enforcement channel, which is what an unrooted phone needs -- it has no hosts file to fall back to. With DNS_TRUSTED_DOT_HOST set it now ACCEPTs the trusted resolver before the blanket REJECT, and pins Private DNS to that hostname so the user cannot pick an unfiltered one. Rule order is load-bearing: iptables takes the first match, so an ACCEPT appended after the REJECT would never be reached. expected_rule_count() counts the new rules, because a mismatch there makes chain_intact() rebuild the chain every 20s -- a silent fork storm that also drops the connection each time. With the variable empty the behaviour is byte-identical, so the rooted phone is untouched until this is deployed. setup_dot_resolver.sh terminates DoT with stunnel rather than Caddy: DoT is a raw TLS stream and stock caddy:2.8 has no layer4 module, so using Caddy would have meant an xcaddy rebuild of a container serving five live sites. It reuses the certificate Caddy already renews, so nothing competes for port 80. It binds to the WireGuard address, not 0.0.0.0 -- a public DoT endpoint is an open resolver, and over the existing tunnel it needs no port-forward, no firewall rule and no rate limiting. Verified: example.com resolves, pornhub.com returns 0.0.0.0, TLS 1.3 against the LE cert, and both the LAN and public addresses refuse. The Device Owner checklist is planning only. Checking the device rather than the config settled the one open risk: Google Wallet is not installed and no NFC payment default is set, so the unconfirmable tap-to-pay question does not apply here. The same check found that Aegis, MS Authenticator, Oracle IDM and PKO IKO are absent -- they are in config.sh's whitelist, which describes the rooted phone, not this one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL |
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| f636d2b21b |
Make focus policy and blocklist usable without root; fix workout CDN unblock
phone_focus_mode is built for a rooted phone: the hosts layer is a read-only
bind mount over /system/etc/hosts, chosen so that even root-in-a-terminal
cannot overwrite it. None of that ports to a stock locked device. This splits
out the parts that are device-independent so one policy can drive both.
python_pkg/focus_policy parses config.sh rather than copying it, so the shell
config stays the source of truth and the two cannot drift. It rejects the
shipped REDACTED_* coordinate placeholder instead of defaulting to (0,0),
which would move "home" to the Atlantic and quietly disable the location gate.
blocklist.py converts the hosts file to domains for a DoT resolver or a local
VpnService. Three properties of the real 194k-line file make the obvious parser
wrong, and all three are handled: generate_hosts_file.sh *comments out*
deliberate unblocks rather than deleting them, so stripping '#' re-blocks
facebook/messenger/linkedin/4chan; the StevenBlack header carries loopback and
IPv6 housekeeping that would blackhole localhost; and ~1060 upstream annotation
tokens ('#[adware.zeno]', '"spam') render as address=/"spam/, which makes
dnsmasq refuse to start -- taking DNS down rather than blocking anything.
Verified with dnsmasq --test over all 185681 generated domains.
strip_workout_hosts.py had the same class of bug on the live rooted phone:
exact set membership meant the allowlisted googlevideo.com never matched the
dynamic r*---sn-*.googlevideo.com hosts YouTube actually streams from, so the
workout unblock was only partly working. Now suffix-matched (17 lines stripped,
was 14). The three new tests were checked against the original code in a
throwaway worktree; two of them fail there, so they pin the fix rather than
passing vacuously.
focus_owner is a device-owner app that deliberately does nothing yet. It ships
clearDeviceOwnerApp() implemented and tested first, because dpm
remove-active-admin does not work on a device owner: an app that locks the
device down before proving it can let go leaves a soft-brick recoverable only
through fastboot on a locked bootloader. Built, installed and launched on the
Pixel 6a; dumpsys afterwards confirms Device Owner Type -1 and no user
restrictions, i.e. the phone is unchanged.
Measured while scoping this, and not yet reflected in any enforcement code:
on Android 16 both pm suspend and pm disable-user are cleared by a reboot, so
shell-level app blocking is per-session only. setApplicationHidden is assumed
to persist under Device Owner but is untested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL
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