The brief's prescribed safety net for this file DOES NOT WORK, and that is
the main finding here. It specifies asdict + json.dumps(default=str) +
sha256 against baseline 1624750c. Four policy fields are frozenset, which
json cannot encode, so default=str stringifies them in SET ITERATION ORDER
-- random per process. Three consecutive runs gave three different digests;
pinning PYTHONHASHSEED=0 gave one. The recipe can never match a recorded
baseline, so it would have flagged every split as a regression regardless
of correctness.
The repo already ships a deterministic serializer. Before trusting it I
checked it was not a weaker proxy: policy_to_json emits all 16 dataclass
fields plus 6 more, so it is strictly stronger than asdict. Baseline
83e05e82, unchanged through all six extractions.
Two audits ran BEFORE any extraction:
- the loader regex-scans config.sh's TEXT ALONE, so the fifteen names it
reads are pinned here. Moving one does not error -- it silently yields
an empty set, and for WHITELIST that reads as "hide everything".
- extractions are variable-scoped, never line-range. A line-range attempt
cut through the WHITELIST string, leaving an unterminated quote; 15
variables vanished from the environment WHILE THE FINGERPRINT STILL
MATCHED, because the loader's regex tolerated the mangled file. That is
why the environment diff exists alongside the hash.
The environment check earned its keep twice: it also caught STATE_DIR being
left behind the source line, which expanded every path against an empty
prefix (/status.json rather than the real path) with the policy hash green
throughout. 79 variables, byte-identical either side, and every parsed list
compared entry-by-entry: 29/16/46/1/1/2/15, all matching.
Rationale prose moves to docs/policy-lists.md with pointers left behind,
including the blocks inside the list strings -- the loader and the shell
both ignore '#' lines there.
All five siblings are in both deploy lists. deploy.sh still sources the
chain from the checkout, run_phone.sh --help exits 0, 379 shell assertions
pass across nine suites, and focus_policy's 137 pytest cases pass.
config.sh is at EXACTLY 250 with no headroom; 184 of those lines are
loader-pinned lists that cannot move. Over-cap count 18 -> 17.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011w2Pj4Ek3ZNMQVYcFHgXDY
Twelve prose violations to zero. Eight files split into per-topic
subdirectories with the original left as an index; both SKILL.md files
keep their frontmatter so discovery still works, with detail moved to
references/.
Deleted docs/cleanup-2026-05/ (7 files) and linux_configuration/docs/
VERIFICATION.md on the user's ruling: unreferenced records of finished
work whose rules are now enforced by the polling, shellcheck and shfmt
hooks. PACMAN_WRAPPER_SECURITY.md was split instead - unlike those, it
documents live guarantees.
Every split verified by a sorted diff against HEAD: zero content lines
lost, only the new headings and index links added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011w2Pj4Ek3ZNMQVYcFHgXDY
This was the last blocker on the Device Owner decision. Checked in the
web panel: "Aplikacja weryfikacyjna" is unconfigured, so no TOTP seed
exists for a wipe to destroy, and only "Wrazliwe" actions are gated --
"Logowanie" is unchecked, so plain login needs the password alone. The
registered SMS number lives on the SIM, which survives.
The browser-login approval tap is a Firebase push prompt
(FirebaseInstanceIdReceiver on the device). Push tokens are per-install,
so a reinstall re-registers; and if that ever misbehaved, SMS is still
the fallback.
Corrects the wipe checklist, which assumed TOTP secrets were "likely"
inside the KeePassDX database and treated the .kdbx as a seed backup.
Neither holds: the canonical .kdbx is on the PC, and there are no seeds.
Earlier advice in this session to fetch inFakt backup codes was likewise
for the OTP-app variant this account does not use.
What still does not survive is unchanged and unrelated to 2FA: the
banking pairing ("Usun powiazanie z telefonem") and the local app PIN,
re-paired via SMS like mBank.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JxNrcMDcizNB3XrrYpZF23
phone_backup.sh captures package lists (including what was purged for
user 0), every third-party APK with its splits, /sdcard, all three
settings namespaces, and the focus-mode state. Verified: 54/54 packages,
126 APK files, 5.1 GB, splits intact.
It is deliberately not sold as a full-device backup, because on an
unrooted phone it cannot be one: /data/data is unreachable, so logins,
in-app data and device pairings do not survive. It writes a
RESTORE-BY-HAND.md naming each of those, with a restore order that avoids
a lockout -- mObywatel last, because activating it on a new device
deactivates the old one.
The first two runs pulled 1 of 54 APKs and then 6 of 54: `while read <
file` with adb inside the loop lets adb drain the same stdin. Reading
into an array first fixes it, and verify_backup now compares package
count against the manifest rather than only checking that the files it
did pull are valid zips -- integrity alone called the 1-of-54 run a pass.
Also documents the uBlock Origin filters, which block YouTube in Firefox
independently of RethinkDNS: force-stopping the VPN still leaves
youtube.com blocked by ||youtube.com^. And records what this is worth --
Play offers a one-tap Install for YouTube, the VPN is a few taps from
off, and the uBlock page has a Proceed button. Three independent layers,
none of them tamper-proof; only Device Owner removes the off switch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JxNrcMDcizNB3XrrYpZF23
`pm uninstall --user 0` unregisters a package for one user while leaving
the APK on the system image. It needs no root and no factory reset, and
unlike `pm suspend` and `pm disable-user` -- both measured to be cleared
by a reboot on this device -- it survives one. Applied to the YouTube
app, YouTube Music, and Chrome; `--restore` puts any of them back with no
download.
focus_owner could not have done this: its sweep filters to third-party
packages, and YouTube ships at /product/app/YouTube with FLAG_SYSTEM, so
the Device Owner path would skip it even after the wipe.
Verified on 23181JEGR08034 across two reboots: all three read
installed=false, and in Firefox m.youtube.com, www.youtube.com, a /watch
URL and a youtu.be short link all fail to connect while example.com
loads. The web half of that is RethinkDNS domain rules, which live on the
device and are not in this commit; docs/youtube-block-unrooted.md records
how to rebuild them, and what this does NOT resist -- the VPN is a few
taps from off, which only Device Owner can prevent.
The trusted-device record becomes one file per device, so managing a
second phone no longer evicts the first. Unenrolled devices still abort,
and a changed model or build fingerprint aborts rather than falling
through to the next record.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JxNrcMDcizNB3XrrYpZF23
