The decision layer needed a runtime. A polling loop was the obvious design and
the wrong one: Doze can skip a poll indefinitely, and skipping the 05:00
boundary leaves the curfew allowlist applied into the morning -- the user finds
their banking app missing with no obvious cause. The transitions are known
ahead of time, so they get exact alarms. The service wakes, applies, schedules
the next run and stops rather than sitting resident.
BootReceiver takes LOCKED_BOOT_COMPLETED as well as BOOT_COMPLETED, because the
latter does not arrive until first unlock. That is not theoretical: this phone
sat at RUNNING_LOCKED for minutes after an earlier reboot in this session, with
no network and no app able to start. Relying on BOOT_COMPLETED alone freezes
enforcement state across a reboot -- safe for hiding, not for unhiding, which is
the direction that strands you without a dialer. The schedule is re-armed
before unlock; the pass itself waits until storage is readable.
The first on-device run logged "exact alarms not permitted", and dumpsys showed
what that costs: window=+11m14s, maxWhenElapsed=+25m51s, so a 15-minute
fallback could slip to 26 minutes. SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM is user-revocable and
denied by default on Android 16; USE_EXACT_ALARM is the permission for apps
whose function is acting at specific times, and is granted at install. After
the change: window=0, exactAllowReason=policy_permission, whenElapsed equal to
maxWhenElapsed.
The service reports "not DO/PO - no enforcement applied" and does nothing when
unprovisioned, rather than failing quietly, and a failure inside a pass cannot
stop the next run being scheduled -- an enforcement bug should degrade one tick,
not end the chain.
Not yet wired: the service logs a tick rather than calling setApplicationHidden
with the decision. Both halves are tested; joining them is next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL
phone_focus_mode is built for a rooted phone: the hosts layer is a read-only
bind mount over /system/etc/hosts, chosen so that even root-in-a-terminal
cannot overwrite it. None of that ports to a stock locked device. This splits
out the parts that are device-independent so one policy can drive both.
python_pkg/focus_policy parses config.sh rather than copying it, so the shell
config stays the source of truth and the two cannot drift. It rejects the
shipped REDACTED_* coordinate placeholder instead of defaulting to (0,0),
which would move "home" to the Atlantic and quietly disable the location gate.
blocklist.py converts the hosts file to domains for a DoT resolver or a local
VpnService. Three properties of the real 194k-line file make the obvious parser
wrong, and all three are handled: generate_hosts_file.sh *comments out*
deliberate unblocks rather than deleting them, so stripping '#' re-blocks
facebook/messenger/linkedin/4chan; the StevenBlack header carries loopback and
IPv6 housekeeping that would blackhole localhost; and ~1060 upstream annotation
tokens ('#[adware.zeno]', '"spam') render as address=/"spam/, which makes
dnsmasq refuse to start -- taking DNS down rather than blocking anything.
Verified with dnsmasq --test over all 185681 generated domains.
strip_workout_hosts.py had the same class of bug on the live rooted phone:
exact set membership meant the allowlisted googlevideo.com never matched the
dynamic r*---sn-*.googlevideo.com hosts YouTube actually streams from, so the
workout unblock was only partly working. Now suffix-matched (17 lines stripped,
was 14). The three new tests were checked against the original code in a
throwaway worktree; two of them fail there, so they pin the fix rather than
passing vacuously.
focus_owner is a device-owner app that deliberately does nothing yet. It ships
clearDeviceOwnerApp() implemented and tested first, because dpm
remove-active-admin does not work on a device owner: an app that locks the
device down before proving it can let go leaves a soft-brick recoverable only
through fastboot on a locked bootloader. Built, installed and launched on the
Pixel 6a; dumpsys afterwards confirms Device Owner Type -1 and no user
restrictions, i.e. the phone is unchanged.
Measured while scoping this, and not yet reflected in any enforcement code:
on Android 16 both pm suspend and pm disable-user are cleared by a reboot, so
shell-level app blocking is per-session only. setApplicationHidden is assumed
to persist under Device Owner but is untested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL