# EnforcementRunner on-device verification (profile-owner harness) Date: 2026-08-09. Device: Pixel 6a `23181JEGR08034`, Android 16 (SDK 36). The Device Owner path is still blocked on a factory reset, so this run used a removable managed profile as a stand-in: `pm create-user --profileOf 0 --managed` (user 12) → `dpm set-profile-owner` → `pm install-existing --user 12`. Profile owner and device owner reach the same `DevicePolicyManager` calls, so the wiring under test is identical; what differs is scope, recorded below. ## Verified | Property | Method | Result | | ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Policy loads on device | app status screen | 84 allowed (39 night), curfew 23:00-05:00, radius 150 m, 15 workout domains | | Enforcement pass runs end-to-end | tap "Run enforcement now" | `applied LOCATION_UNKNOWN: hid 3, restored 0` | | Hide is real, not self-reported | `dumpsys package ` per-user `hidden=` | `com.termux`, `org.breezyweather`, `de.duenndns.gmdice` all `hidden=true` | | Hidden app is unreachable | `am start --user 12 -n com.termux/...` | `Error type 3 ... does not exist` | | Self-hide guard holds | same dumpsys sweep | `com.kuhy.focus_owner` stayed `hidden=false` | | **Hide survives reboot** | `adb reboot` → re-check | all three still `hidden=true` | | Next pass is armed | `dumpsys alarm` | `*walarm*:com.kuhy.focus_owner/.EnforcementAlarmReceiver` present | | **Unhide restores access** | after the fix below | `restored 3`; all `hidden=false`, launchable again | | Non-exported service rejects shell | `am start-foreground-service` | `Requires permission not exported from uid 1210324` — as designed; the UI button is the only trigger | The reboot result is the one that matters: it is the property the whole Device Owner design rests on, and it is the one `pm suspend` and `pm disable-user` both fail. ## Not covered by this harness - **The geofence.** Retried after real coordinates were provisioned (see below), and still not reachable: a freshly created work profile has its own location cache, which starts empty and stays empty because nothing in the profile requests a fix. `dumpsys location` showed `user 10: last location=null` against a valid `52.228948,20.951184` fix in user 0. `EnforcementRunner.lastKnownLocation()` therefore returned null and every pass resolved to `LOCATION_UNKNOWN` (fail-closed) regardless. Shell mock injection is blocked (`SecurityException: not allowed to perform MOCK_LOCATION`) and `cmd location force-location-update` does not exist on this build. **The AWAY branch remains unexercised on hardware** and will only be testable under a real Device Owner in user 0. Note the earlier `run-as` failure was mine, not a platform limit: `run-as --user N` works once the app has been launched in user N. Coordinates were successfully written into the profile's `filesDir` on the second attempt. - **The full 373-package sweep.** The profile saw only the packages deliberately installed into it. - **Persisted hysteresis.** `wasEnforcing()` starts fresh in a new profile. - **System packages.** `com.google.android.dialer` is a system app, so `installedThirdPartyPackages()` filters it out; it did not exercise the allowlist branch as intended. ## The bug this run found: hidden apps could never be restored Testing the restore path meant widening the allowlist to cover the three test apps and re-running a pass. Expected `restored 3`. Observed: ``` applied LOCATION_UNKNOWN: hid 0, restored 0 ``` with all three still `hidden=true`. The cause is that `pm list packages --user 12 -3` returned _only_ `com.kuhy.focus_owner` — a package hidden via `setApplicationHidden` is dropped from the default package enumeration entirely, while remaining `installed=true hidden=true` and visible under `pm list packages -u`. `EnforcementRunner.installedThirdPartyPackages()` called `getInstalledApplications(0)`. So once an app was hidden it left `installedPackages`, which meant it could never appear in `EnforcementDecision.packagesToShow`, which meant **nothing this app hid could ever be unhidden again** — the exact failure the show-before-hide ordering in `apply()` exists to prevent. Leaving home would not have restored anything. Fix: query with `PackageManager.MATCH_UNINSTALLED_PACKAGES`. Re-verified on device after the fix: ``` setApplicationHidden(de.duenndns.gmdice,false)=true setApplicationHidden(org.breezyweather,false)=true setApplicationHidden(com.termux,false)=true applied LOCATION_UNKNOWN: hid 0, restored 3 ``` All three then read `hidden=false`, reappeared in the default enumeration, and `cmd package resolve-activity com.termux` resolved to `TermuxActivity` again. The flag also admits packages that are uninstalled with data retained, which would let `packagesToHide` contain ghosts. Measured on this device: `pm list packages -3` and `pm list packages -u -3` both return 49, so there are none. `apply()` wraps both bridge calls in `runCatching` regardless, so a ghost would be a no-op rather than a crash. ## Second finding: the self-hide guard is not redundant `EnforcementRunner.kt:79-80` comments the self-hide check as defence in depth — _"the policy already refuses to hide these"_. Measured against the committed policy, it does not: `com.kuhy.focus_owner` is absent from `allowed_packages`, absent from `night_allowed_packages`, and matches none of the 44 `never_disable_prefixes`. The decision layer therefore places the app in `packagesToHide` on **every** enforcing pass, and the `pkg == context.packageName` check at line 81 is the _only_ thing stopping the app from hiding itself — which would remove the escape hatch and the "Run enforcement now" trigger together. Fix belongs in the exporter (`python_pkg/focus_policy/export.py`), not a hand-edit of the asset, so the guarantee is generated rather than remembered. The line-81 check should stay either way; only the comment is wrong. ## Wiring gap found `EnforcementRunner.decide()` hardcodes `workoutActive = false` (`EnforcementRunner.kt:57`). The decision layer honours the flag (`EnforcementDecision.kt:83`), but nothing feeds it in the Kotlin path — and the Kotlin path is the one that runs at alarm time, since a background service has no Flutter engine. **The workout unblock is currently dead in the deployed path.** Not fixed in this session. The Dart side is thinner than it looks. `lib/workout_signal.dart` defines `ManualWorkoutSignal`, `GuardedWorkoutSignal` and `CombinedWorkoutSignal`, all unit-tested, but none is constructed anywhere in `lib/` — and there is **no Health Connect integration at all**: no `androidx.health` dependency, no `android.permission.health.*` in the manifest, no query. `'health_connect'` appears only as a fixture string in `test/workout_signal_test.dart`. Wiring Health Connect is a from-scratch build, not a port. It is, however, a viable one. Measured on device: `com.stronglifts.app` holds `android.permission.health.WRITE_EXERCISE`, `WRITE_ACTIVE_CALORIES_BURNED`, `WRITE_WEIGHT`, `WRITE_HEIGHT` and the matching `READ_*` grants, all `granted=true`, and `com.google.android.apps.healthdata` is installed. So the workout data the rooted system used to read out of StrongLifts' SQLite file is reachable through a supported API, which is the natural replacement for that lost signal. ## Home coordinates: placeholder found and replaced `config_secrets.sh` still held `REDACTED_LAT`/`REDACTED_LON`, so the policy asset could not be regenerated. Real coordinates were taken from the Pixel 6a's own fix rather than a map lookup — `52.228948, 20.951184`, network provider, `hAcc=21.7 m`, consistent across the fused and network providers. That surfaced a second staleness problem: the coordinates already provisioned into the app's private storage were `52.2297, 21.0122` — Warsaw city centre, a placeholder. **4156 m from the real location, against a 150 m radius**, so the geofence would have read as permanently away from home. Re-provisioned via `scripts/push_home_location.sh` and verified on device. Regenerating `assets/policy.json` then confirmed the exporter fix end-to-end: `com.kuhy.focus_owner` now appears in both allowlists. The regeneration also picked up `com.kuhy.untools`, which was already in `config.sh:365` — the committed asset was simply stale. The committed asset stays redacted: `latitude: null`, `longitude: null`, and zero occurrences of the real values. The unredacted export (stdout only, used by the provisioning script) carries them. ## Teardown (done) `pm remove-user 12` → `Success: removed user`; a clean build (committed policy asset, no widened allowlist) reinstalled into user 0; staged `/data/local/tmp/home_location.json` removed. Verified afterwards: - `pm list users` → user 0 only - `Device Owner Type: -1`, no profile owner - `com.termux`, `org.breezyweather`, `de.duenndns.gmdice`, `com.stronglifts.app` all `hidden=false` in user 0 Three `EnforcementAlarmReceiver` alarms remain registered by the user-0 instance. They are inert: `DevicePolicyBridge.setApplicationHidden` returns early when the caller is neither device owner nor profile owner, which user 0 is not.