# Blocking YouTube on an unrooted Pixel 6a Applied and verified 2026-08-09 on `23181JEGR08034` (Android 16, SDK 36). No root, no Device Owner, no factory reset. ## What actually works: `pm uninstall --user 0` Unregisters a package for one user while leaving the APK on the read-only system image. | Mechanism | Survives reboot? | | --------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | | `pm suspend` | No — measured | | `pm disable-user` | No — measured | | `dpm setApplicationHidden` | Yes — but needs Device Owner, i.e. a wipe | | **`pm uninstall --user 0`** | **Yes — measured, twice** | Reversible with `pm install-existing --user 0 `: no download, no data loss, because the APK never left the device. ## Why focus_owner cannot do this job `EnforcementRunner.installedThirdPartyPackages()` filters to packages without `FLAG_SYSTEM`. YouTube ships at `/product/app/YouTube` **with** `FLAG_SYSTEM`, so the Device Owner sweep would skip it — even after the factory reset. The apps most worth blocking are preinstalled, which is exactly the set that sweep excludes. Worth fixing there separately; it does not block anything today. ## Current state Removed for user 0, all reboot-verified: - `com.google.android.youtube` - `com.google.android.apps.youtube.music` - `com.android.chrome` Driven by `phone_focus_mode/distraction_purge.sh` (`--list`, `--status`, `--restore`). It re-checks each package with `dumpsys` after acting rather than trusting the `pm` exit code, and exits non-zero if anything is still installed — so a Play Store reinstall surfaces as a failure instead of a silent no-op. ## Layer 2: uBlock Origin in Firefox Independent of the VPN, and that is the point: stopping RethinkDNS does **not** restore YouTube in Firefox. Verified by force-stopping `com.celzero.bravedns` and loading youtube.com, which produced _"uBlock Origin has prevented the following page from loading — `||youtube.com^` — found in: My filters"_. The filters, in uBlock's dashboard → **My filters**: ``` ! YouTube block ||youtube.com^ ||youtu.be^ ||googlevideo.com^ ||ytimg.com^ ||youtube-nocookie.com^ ||ggpht.com^ ||yt3.ggpht.com^ ||m.youtube.com^ ``` Add them by writing that list to a file, pushing it to `/sdcard/Download/`, triggering a media scan (`am broadcast -a android.intent.action.MEDIA_SCANNER_SCAN_FILE -d file:///sdcard/...`, or the picker will not see it), then using uBlock's **import** button. Do NOT type them with `adb shell input text`: it silently strips `|` and `^`, leaving bare domains that do not block. Press the checkmark to apply, and confirm it greys out. These live in the Firefox profile, so they are **not** captured by `phone_backup.sh` and must be re-added by hand after a wipe. The block page has a **Proceed** button — one tap. This layer raises the cost of bypassing; it does not remove the bypass. ## What is NOT blocked **Firefox (`org.mozilla.fenix`) is still installed and still reaches youtube.com.** It is the only remaining browser after Chrome's removal. Unlike the three packages above, Firefox is user-installed (`/data/app/...`, no `FLAG_SYSTEM`), so `pm uninstall --user 0` would **permanently delete it and its data** — no `install-existing` recovery, a full reinstall from the Play Store. That asymmetry is why it was left alone rather than swept up with the rest. Decide deliberately. `com.google.android.webview` was checked and left in place: it is the system WebView provider, so removing it would break in-app browsers everywhere. Chrome and WebView are separate packages on this device, which is why removing Chrome is safe. ## The web path, and why DNS is parked Removing the app kills the recommendation feed, notifications and the account-linked session — most of the pull. It does not stop typing `youtube.com` into a browser. Previously rejected approaches, from `focus_owner/docs/`: - **Home-hosted DoT resolver.** Android's Private DNS fails _closed_, so PC off = phone has no internet at all. Rejected: the phone must work with the PC off. - **Hosted DNS (NextDNS, AdGuard, ControlD).** No provider ingests the 185k domain blocklist; free tiers fail _open_ past ~300k queries/month. The remaining candidate is a **local-VPN content blocker** — an on-device `VpnService` that filters without any network dependency, so it works with the PC off and does not fail closed on network loss. Not yet scoped; the VPN slot was going to be checked when the device disconnected. Note Android allows only one active VPN at a time, so this would conflict with any real VPN. ## How strong this actually is Measured, not assumed: | Layer | Undo cost | | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | App removal | **One tap.** Google Play shows a live **Install** button for YouTube (checked on device 2026-08-09; not installed). | | RethinkDNS rules | A few taps — the VPN toggle in Settings or the quick-settings tile. | | uBlock filters | **Proceed** on the block page, or disabling the extension. | Nothing here is tamper-resistant, and nothing here can be: on an unrooted device without Device Owner, no app can prevent the user disabling a VPN or reinstalling from Play. The layers are independent — undoing one does not undo the others — so the cost is "three separate places" rather than one. That is the honest ceiling. `DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN` plus `setAlwaysOnVpnPackage(..., lockdown)` under Device Owner is the only tier that removes the off switch, and it needs the factory reset in `docs/device-owner-wipe-checklist.md`. See also the FLAG_SYSTEM note above: `focus_owner` would need fixing before Device Owner could touch YouTube at all. Also note nothing re-asserts the purge automatically. `phone-auto-sync.timer` is inactive and its `ExecStart` points at a path that does not exist, so `distraction_purge.sh` is manual today. ## infakt, before any factory reset Checked 2026-08-09 in the web panel and on the device, because infakt was the one app whose loss would have blocked the Device Owner wipe. - **2FA is SMS-only.** "Aplikacja weryfikacyjna" reads _Skonfiguruj_, i.e. not configured, so **no TOTP seed exists** and a wipe cannot destroy one. The registered number survives on the SIM. - **"Logowanie" is unchecked** under _Akcje objęte weryfikacją_ — only _Wrażliwe_ actions prompt. Plain login needs the password alone. - The app uses Firebase push (`FirebaseInstanceIdReceiver`) for the browser-login approval tap. Push tokens are per-install, so a reinstall re-registers and prompts arrive at the new install. So login is safe: reinstall, sign in with the password. What does **not** survive: the banking pairing (_Usuń powiązanie z telefonem_) and the local app PIN. Re-pair via SMS after the wipe. Do not save anything on that settings page casually — it warns that changing it logs out all current mobile sessions. ## Redoing this after a factory reset The purge is per-user state and does not survive a wipe. Re-run `./distraction_purge.sh` after re-enrolling the device.