testsAndMisc/docs/superpowers/evidence/infakt-2fa-wipe-safety-2026-08-09.json
Krzysztof kuhy Rudnicki 553c395cff
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inFakt is SMS-only 2FA, so the wipe cannot strand the account
This was the last blocker on the Device Owner decision. Checked in the
web panel: "Aplikacja weryfikacyjna" is unconfigured, so no TOTP seed
exists for a wipe to destroy, and only "Wrazliwe" actions are gated --
"Logowanie" is unchecked, so plain login needs the password alone. The
registered SMS number lives on the SIM, which survives.

The browser-login approval tap is a Firebase push prompt
(FirebaseInstanceIdReceiver on the device). Push tokens are per-install,
so a reinstall re-registers; and if that ever misbehaved, SMS is still
the fallback.

Corrects the wipe checklist, which assumed TOTP secrets were "likely"
inside the KeePassDX database and treated the .kdbx as a seed backup.
Neither holds: the canonical .kdbx is on the PC, and there are no seeds.
Earlier advice in this session to fetch inFakt backup codes was likewise
for the OTP-app variant this account does not use.

What still does not survive is unchanged and unrelated to 2FA: the
banking pairing ("Usun powiazanie z telefonem") and the local app PIN,
re-paired via SMS like mBank.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JxNrcMDcizNB3XrrYpZF23
2026-08-10 20:04:06 +02:00

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JSON

{
"intent": "Settle whether a Device Owner factory reset would lock the user out of inFakt, which was the last blocker on that decision.",
"scope": [
"phone_focus_mode/docs/youtube-block-unrooted.md",
"docs/device-owner-wipe-checklist.md",
"Documentation only -- no code, no device state changed"
],
"changes": [
"Recorded that inFakt 2FA is SMS-only and that no TOTP seed exists, so a wipe cannot destroy one.",
"Corrected the wipe checklist, which assumed TOTP secrets were 'likely' inside the KeePassDX database and treated the .kdbx as a seed backup. Neither holds: the user keeps the canonical .kdbx on the PC, and inFakt has no authenticator configured.",
"Added pl.infakt.infakt to the set of apps whose banking pairing does not survive the wipe."
],
"verification": [
{
"command": "inFakt web panel, Weryfikacja dwuetapowa (screenshot supplied by the user)",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": "2FA = Wlaczona with SMS to the registered number. 'Aplikacja weryfikacyjna' shows a 'Skonfiguruj' link, i.e. NOT configured -- no TOTP seed. Under 'Akcje objete weryfikacja dwuetapowa' only 'Wrazliwe' is checked; 'Logowanie' and 'Wystawianie faktur' are unchecked, so plain login needs the password alone."
},
{
"command": "adb shell dumpsys package pl.infakt.infakt | grep -i c2dm/firebase",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": "FirebaseInstanceIdReceiver registered for com.google.android.c2dm.intent.RECEIVE, so the browser-login approval tap is a push prompt. Push tokens are per-install, so a reinstall re-registers rather than stranding the account."
},
{
"command": "adb shell dumpsys account | grep -i infakt",
"result": "pass",
"evidence": "No device account entry -- nothing stored locally that a wipe would destroy beyond the pairing and app PIN."
}
],
"risks": [
"The push-reinstall behaviour is inferred from the Firebase receiver plus vendor docs, not from a stated 'reinstalling does not lock you out'. It is safe to act on because the second factor is SMS and the SIM survives -- if push re-registration misbehaved, SMS still works.",
"Earlier in this session the user was advised to download inFakt backup codes. That advice applies to the extended OTP-app variant, which this account does not use; with SMS-only 2FA the recovery path is the SIM. Corrected rather than left standing.",
"The 2FA settings page warns that saving changes logs out all current mobile sessions, so it should not be edited casually.",
"Still unresolved and unchanged: inFakt's banking side is device-paired and holds a live session with funds and an active card. Re-pairing after a wipe goes through SMS."
],
"rollback": [
"git revert -- documentation only, nothing on the device depends on it."
]
}