mirror of
https://github.com/kuhyx/testsAndMisc.git
synced 2026-11-10 19:07:04 +01:00
Krzysztof kuhy Rudnicki
4f2b0ccdf7
Two levels of pure taxonomy carrying no information, and a 2-directory
cap leaves no room for them. Categories now sit directly under
linux_configuration/: features, fixes, utils, misc, fresh-install,
installers, diagnostics, gaming, boot_recovery, periodic_background, lib,
meta, tests. A script's own lib/ and tests/ are exempt from the cap, so
those stay put.
Depth violations 248 -> 139; roughly 40 of the remainder are inside
digital_wellbeing and hosts, deferred until the guard-lib repoint.
The moves are the easy half. What breaks is every path that counted
levels, and three classes of it had to be found by resolving paths rather
than reading diffs:
- 52 relative `source` lines for lib/common.sh and lib/android.sh. The
correct prefix differs per file: 40 were ../../ and 12 were ../../../,
so a blanket replace would have fixed one set and broken the other.
- REPO_ROOT in 7 fixes/lib/tests harnesses and setup_syncyomi_guard.sh,
each walking up four levels from a directory now two levels shallower.
This caused a real regression -- the fixes suite went red with
"log_warn: command not found" -- caught by running it and comparing
against the pre-move baseline worktree.
- conftest.py's sys.path entries, which took the pytest gate down with
14 collection errors, and the `# shellcheck source=` directives, which
took shellcheck down with SC1091.
16 symlinks in $HOME broke, including the entire i3blocks bar. All
repointed, and cpu_monitor/memory/disk/time/volume were run to confirm
they emit real output rather than merely resolving.
Verified: 1798 tests pass at 100% coverage, 8 of 9 lib/tests suites pass
(the ninth needs the coverage jail, identically at baseline), pre-commit
is clean, and the two untracked secret configs are still ignored after
their gitignore paths changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJrqKERAo5QUeEHWS5Asgp
59 lines
2.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
59 lines
2.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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# The SearXNG limiter.toml, without which botdetection 429s everything.
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#
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# Sourced by setup_searxng.sh; split out to keep searxng_stack.sh under
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# the 250-line cap. Sourced rather than run, so it inherits the caller's
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# strict mode and the variables defined above the source line.
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write_searx_limiter() {
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# Without this file SearXNG logs "missing config file:
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# /etc/searxng/limiter.toml" and runs with no trusted_proxies, so the
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# forwarded client IP is never trusted and botdetection 429s *everything*.
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cat >"$SEARX_LIMITER" <<'EOF'
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# Managed by setup_searxng.sh — do not edit by hand.
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[botdetection]
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ipv4_prefix = 32
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ipv6_prefix = 48
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# The edge (gitea-caddy) shares the host network namespace, so its requests
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# arrive from loopback. Without 127.0.0.0/8 here the X-Forwarded-For that Caddy
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# sends is ignored, every request looks like it came from the proxy itself, and
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# rate limiting collapses onto a single bucket.
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trusted_proxies = [
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'127.0.0.0/8',
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'::1',
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]
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[botdetection.ip_limit]
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filter_link_local = false
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# Off (the shipped default). link_token sends a probe the client must fetch to
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# prove it renders HTML, which no scripted JSON client can satisfy. IP-based
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# rate limiting below is unaffected and still applies.
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link_token = false
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[botdetection.ip_lists]
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block_ip = []
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# pass_ip bypasses ALL botdetection (including the Sec-Fetch/User-Agent probe
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# headers) for these addresses.
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#
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# This is what makes search.formats = [html, json] usable. A scripted JSON
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# client — an MCP server, a script — cannot send Sec-Fetch-Mode/Site/Dest, and
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# botdetection 429s anything that lacks them, so WITHOUT this entry the JSON API
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# is unreachable for every non-browser client. Verified: with browser headers a
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# search returns 200 + results; the identical request without Sec-Fetch-* gets
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# 429.
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#
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# Deliberately LOOPBACK ONLY. Requests arriving through the public edge carry
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# the real client IP in X-Forwarded-For (trusted_proxies above), so they are
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# still fully rate-limited — this exempts only tools running on this host.
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pass_ip = [
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'127.0.0.0/8',
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'::1',
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]
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EOF
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chmod 640 "$SEARX_LIMITER"
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log_ok "Wrote ${SEARX_LIMITER}."
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}
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