Krzysztof kuhy Rudnicki
e3d5e1dd18
Two gaps stopped the unrooted path working end to end. The phone had no way to read the focus policy, and the blocklist was only reachable as a hosts file or over plain UDP/53 on the LAN -- while the rooted enforcer actively rejected every DoT connection, so a self-hosted resolver could not have worked even if one existed. focus_owner now loads a generated policy.json instead of hardcoding anything, so config.sh stays the single source of truth across Python, shell and Kotlin. The committed asset is rendered with --redact-home and a test fails if home coordinates ever appear in it. An unknown schema_version is rejected outright: silently accepting a newer schema means enforcing a policy the app has misread, and a misread allowlist is one that blocks the dialer. dns_enforcer.sh rejected ALL port 853 traffic and pinned Private DNS off, every 20 seconds. That is right when DoT is a bypass channel and exactly wrong when DoT is the enforcement channel, which is what an unrooted phone needs -- it has no hosts file to fall back to. With DNS_TRUSTED_DOT_HOST set it now ACCEPTs the trusted resolver before the blanket REJECT, and pins Private DNS to that hostname so the user cannot pick an unfiltered one. Rule order is load-bearing: iptables takes the first match, so an ACCEPT appended after the REJECT would never be reached. expected_rule_count() counts the new rules, because a mismatch there makes chain_intact() rebuild the chain every 20s -- a silent fork storm that also drops the connection each time. With the variable empty the behaviour is byte-identical, so the rooted phone is untouched until this is deployed. setup_dot_resolver.sh terminates DoT with stunnel rather than Caddy: DoT is a raw TLS stream and stock caddy:2.8 has no layer4 module, so using Caddy would have meant an xcaddy rebuild of a container serving five live sites. It reuses the certificate Caddy already renews, so nothing competes for port 80. It binds to the WireGuard address, not 0.0.0.0 -- a public DoT endpoint is an open resolver, and over the existing tunnel it needs no port-forward, no firewall rule and no rate limiting. Verified: example.com resolves, pornhub.com returns 0.0.0.0, TLS 1.3 against the LE cert, and both the LAN and public addresses refuse. The Device Owner checklist is planning only. Checking the device rather than the config settled the one open risk: Google Wallet is not installed and no NFC payment default is set, so the unconfirmable tap-to-pay question does not apply here. The same check found that Aegis, MS Authenticator, Oracle IDM and PKO IKO are absent -- they are in config.sh's whitelist, which describes the rooted phone, not this one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL |
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| .. | ||
| android | ||
| assets | ||
| lib | ||
| test | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .metadata | ||
| analysis_options.yaml | ||
| pubspec.lock | ||
| pubspec.yaml | ||
| README.md | ||
focus_owner
Device Owner companion app for unrooted focus mode. Currently inert: it can be provisioned as device owner, but it applies no restrictions.
Why the escape hatch ships first
dpm remove-active-admin does not work on a device owner. The only exit that
avoids a factory reset is DevicePolicyManager.clearDeviceOwnerApp(), callable
solely by this package on itself. An app that locks the device down before
proving it can let go leaves a soft-brick recoverable only through fastboot —
painful on a locked bootloader, and impossible to reach if
DISALLOW_FACTORY_RESET is ever set.
So: DevicePolicyBridge.releaseDeviceOwner() is implemented, unit-tested, and
reachable from the app's main screen with no PC attached. Enforcement is added
only after that path has been exercised on a provisioned device.
Provisioning (NOT done yet — requires a factory reset)
dpm set-device-owner refuses to run while any account exists on the device.
The Pixel 6a has 6, so provisioning means a wipe. See
~/.claude/projects/-home-kuhy-testsAndMisc/memory/device-owner-not-root-banking-works.md
for what does and does not survive that, and for the Google Wallet open risk.
Once wiped, before adding any account:
adb install -r build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-debug.apk
adb shell dpm set-device-owner com.kuhy.focus_owner/.FocusDeviceAdminReceiver
Then immediately verify tap-to-pay and banking apps, while the release button is still reachable.
Build and verify
cd ~/testsAndMisc/focus_owner
flutter analyze && flutter test
flutter build apk --debug
adb -s 23181JEGR08034 install -r build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-debug.apk
adb -s 23181JEGR08034 shell am start -n com.kuhy.focus_owner/.MainActivity
The status screen reads live state over the platform channel; "Android SDK 36" confirms the Kotlin bridge is working.
Still to do
- Consume the policy JSON from
python_pkg/focus_policy(export.py). - Add enforcement (
setApplicationHidden,addUserRestriction,setAlwaysOnVpnPackage) — only after the release path is verified on-device. - Verify
setApplicationHiddensurvives a reboot.pm suspendandpm disable-userboth do NOT; do not assume the DPM equivalent behaves the same until measured.