todo-app/lib/desktop/wrapper_server.dart

import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:io';

import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:path/path.dart' as p;

part 'wrapper_sync_routes.dart';

/// Route serving `todo`'s own seeded Firebase session (a `FirebaseCredentials`
/// JSON blob), alongside [kSyncAccountPath]'s email/password pair.
///
/// `todo`-local rather than added to `crdt_sync_dart`: no other app in the
/// fleet runs a desktop wrapper of its own, so a shared route would add
/// surface area five other apps never use. Gated by the same
/// [kSyncAccountEnvVar] as [kSyncAccountPath].
const kSyncCredentialsPath = '/sync-credentials';

/// The canonical backlog file for [home], i.e. `~/src/todo/BACKLOG.md`.
///
/// Lives here rather than in `bin/todo_desktop.dart` so it is covered: the
/// entry point is `coverage:ignore-file` thin wiring, and this path silently
/// broke once already. The 2026-09-11 `~` reorganisation moved every repo
/// under `~/src`, but the migration's rewriter only matched *literal*
/// `/home/kuhy/todo` strings — a path assembled from segments was invisible
/// to it, so the wrapper went on exporting to the dead `~/todo` while the
/// `todo` MCP read `~/src/todo`. Every backlog read between 2026-09-11 and
/// 2026-09-12 got a stale file.
String defaultBacklogPath(String home) =>
    p.join(home, 'src', 'todo', 'BACKLOG.md');

/// Local HTTP server backing the desktop app.
///
/// The desktop app is a Flutter **web** build (Flutter's Linux embedder manages
/// only ~20fps at 4K — see `docs/desktop-performance-findings.md`), so it runs
/// in a browser and cannot touch the filesystem. This process is the other half
/// of the desktop app: it serves the build and owns the two files a browser
/// cannot write.
///
/// * `~/src/todo/BACKLOG.md` — the canonical backlog path the user's tooling and
///   the `todo` MCP server read.
/// * a copy of the note log — so a wiped Chrome profile is not a total-loss
///   event for notes that have not yet synced to GitHub.
///
/// Binds to loopback only. The endpoints read and overwrite files in the user's
/// home directory with no authentication, so exposing them on a routable
/// address would let anything on the network rewrite the backlog.
class WrapperServer {
  /// Creates a server serving [webRoot] and persisting under [backlogPath] and
  /// [logPath].
  WrapperServer({
    required this.webRoot,
    required this.backlogPath,
    required this.logPath,
    bool? serveSyncAccount,
    String? syncConfigDir,
    String? todoCredentialsPath,
  }) : serveSyncAccount =
           serveSyncAccount ??
           (Platform.environment[kSyncAccountEnvVar] ?? '').isNotEmpty,
       syncConfigDir =
           syncConfigDir ??
           p.join(Platform.environment['HOME'] ?? '', '.config', 'crdt-sync'),
       todoCredentialsPath =
           todoCredentialsPath ??
           p.join(
             Platform.environment['HOME'] ?? '',
             '.config',
             'todo',
             'firebase_auth.json',
           );

  /// Whether the sync-account route answers; off unless explicitly enabled.
  final bool serveSyncAccount;

  /// Directory holding `firebase.json` and `password`.
  final String syncConfigDir;

  /// Whether [kSyncCredentialsPath] has served a valid credential yet.
  ///
  /// Flips to true after the first 200 and 404s every request after that,
  /// so a normal launch can self-provision with no env var to remember (see
  /// [_syncCredentials]) while the exposure window for a database-write
  /// credential stays "until the app finishes booting" rather than "for as
  /// long as the wrapper process runs". Independent of [serveSyncAccount]:
  /// that gate protects the legacy shared `/sync-account` route other apps'
  /// wrappers also serve, which stays opt-in.
  bool _todoCredentialsServed = false;

  /// `todo`'s own seeded Firebase session, written by
  /// `crdt-sync/tool/seed_session.py --app todo` in the same
  /// `{id_token, refresh_token, expires_at}` shape every other app's
  /// credential cache uses. The account's password grant is retired
  /// fleet-wide (see `link_google.py`/`seed_session.py`), so unlike
  /// [syncConfigDir]'s `password` file this is the only thing that actually
  /// authenticates.
  final String todoCredentialsPath;

  /// Directory holding the built Flutter web assets.
  final String webRoot;

  /// Absolute path of the Markdown backlog export.
  final String backlogPath;

  /// Absolute path of the on-disk note-log copy.
  final String logPath;

  HttpServer? _server;

  /// Port the server is listening on, once [start] has completed.
  int get port => _server!.port;

  /// Binds to loopback on [requestedPort] and begins serving.
  ///
  /// Pass 0 to let the OS choose a port (tests do this); the desktop launcher
  /// passes the fixed port, because the browser keys `localStorage` (the GitHub
  /// token) and IndexedDB (the notes) by origin — a changing port would
  /// silently hide both.
  Future<void> start(int requestedPort) async {
    _server = await HttpServer.bind(
      InternetAddress.loopbackIPv4,
      requestedPort,
    );
    unawaited(_serve(_server!));
  }

  /// Stops serving and releases the port.
  Future<void> stop() async => await _server?.close(force: true);

  Future<void> _serve(HttpServer server) async {
    await for (final request in server) {
      try {
        await _handle(request);
      } on Exception {
        request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.internalServerError;
      }
      await request.response.close();
    }
  }

  Future<void> _handle(HttpRequest request) async {
    final path = request.uri.path;
    if (path == '/backup/backlog') {
      return await _file(request, backlogPath);
    }
    if (path == '/backup/log') {
      return await _file(request, logPath);
    }
    if (path == kSyncAccountPath) {
      return await _syncAccount(request);
    }
    if (path == kSyncCredentialsPath) {
      return await _syncCredentials(request);
    }
    return await _static(request, path);
  }

  /// GET returns the file's contents (404 when absent); POST overwrites it.
  Future<void> _file(HttpRequest request, String filePath) async {
    final file = File(filePath);
    if (request.method == 'POST') {
      await file.parent.create(recursive: true);
      await file.writeAsString(await utf8.decodeStream(request));
      request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.noContent;
      return;
    }
    if (request.method != 'GET') {
      request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.methodNotAllowed;
      return;
    }
    if (!file.existsSync()) {
      request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.notFound;
      return;
    }
    request.response.headers.contentType = ContentType.text;
    request.response.write(await file.readAsString());
  }

  Future<void> _static(HttpRequest request, String path) async {
    final relative = path == '/' ? 'index.html' : path.substring(1);
    // Reject traversal before touching the filesystem: the served root sits
    // next to the user's files, so `../` must not escape it.
    final resolved = p.normalize(p.join(webRoot, relative));
    // coverage:ignore-start
    // Defence in depth, and currently unreachable: Dart's HttpServer decodes
    // and normalises the path before a handler runs, so even `%2e%2e` arrives
    // already collapsed (verified in wrapper_server_test). Kept so the
    // guarantee does not depend on that implementation detail holding.
    if (!p.isWithin(webRoot, resolved) && resolved != p.normalize(webRoot)) {
      request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.forbidden;
      return;
    }
    // coverage:ignore-end
    final file = File(resolved);
    if (!file.existsSync()) {
      request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.notFound;
      return;
    }
    request.response.headers.contentType = contentTypeFor(resolved);
    await request.response.addStream(file.openRead());
  }

  /// Content type for [filePath].
  ///
  /// Flutter web is strict here: CanvasKit refuses to instantiate a `.wasm`
  /// served as anything but `application/wasm`, and the app silently fails to
  /// render if the bootstrap `.js` is mislabelled.
  static ContentType contentTypeFor(String filePath) {
    switch (p.extension(filePath).toLowerCase()) {
      case '.html':
        return ContentType.html;
      case '.js' || '.mjs':
        return ContentType('text', 'javascript', charset: 'utf-8');
      case '.json':
        return ContentType.json;
      case '.wasm':
        return ContentType('application', 'wasm');
      case '.css':
        return ContentType('text', 'css', charset: 'utf-8');
      case '.png':
        return ContentType('image', 'png');
      case '.svg':
        return ContentType('image', 'svg+xml');
      case '.ttf':
        return ContentType('font', 'ttf');
      case '.otf':
        return ContentType('font', 'otf');
      case '.woff2':
        return ContentType('font', 'woff2');
      case '.bin' || '.symbols':
        return ContentType.binary;
      default:
        return ContentType.binary;
    }
  }
}