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2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5f64a8959b |
Sign in with Google, and stop trusting a revoked session
Two changes to the shared sync credential path, both driven by devices that reported "Connected" while every sync failed. Google sign-in (signInWithGoogle, both languages) replaces typing the sync account's password on a fresh install. The account is linked once from the PC with tool/link_google.py, which asserts the pinned uid -- without that assertion an unlinked identity is *signed up* rather than refused, and the new uid is then denied every read and write by the security rules. The second change is the one with teeth. hasSession() is a presence check, so a refresh token the server had revoked still read as a live session: the desktop todo build showed "Connected" and then failed every sync with `HTTP 400 (TOKEN_EXPIRED)`. A refresh that fails for a terminal reason now clears the stored session, so hasSession() answers honestly. Deliberately narrow: only TOKEN_EXPIRED, USER_DISABLED, USER_NOT_FOUND, INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN, INVALID_GRANT_TYPE and MISSING_REFRESH_TOKEN clear it. A network error or a 5xx must not -- a device that signs itself out whenever the wifi drops needs a manual sign-in on every device to recover, which is worse than the stale banner this fixes. Verified against the live endpoint, not just mocks: has_session flips True -> False on a real rejection. crdt_sync_dart 0.9.0 -> 0.10.0; the five apps pin the matching tag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0192EkoAyFBEWTvAN5vVgmSy |
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| 02e2e13790 |
crdt_sync: add a Firebase Realtime Database transport behind a RemoteStore seam
Extracts the three-method remote surface GitHub was reached through into a `RemoteStore` interface, then implements it against Firebase Realtime Database over REST, so apps can move backend with a constructor change. Why REST and not the SDKs: official FlutterFire has no Linux desktop support, and `wake_alarm`'s PC side is a dependency-free systemd job. The RTDB REST endpoints are plain HTTPS and behave identically on Linux, Android and headless. Firebase is a transport, never the datastore -- each app keeps its local log as the source of truth, so offline-first survives. Why RTDB and not Firestore: on the Spark plan RTDB bills only storage and bandwidth with no per-operation quota, so a runaway loop cannot exhaust a daily budget and silently stop syncing mid-day. Two savings make the no-cost tier a guarantee rather than a hope. Measured against the GitHub-backed history this replaces: 4894 of 5542 commits (88.3%) were byte-identical no-ops, and every tick re-downloaded every peer's whole log. Both are now driven by one sha256 revision -- an unchanged log is not re-pushed, and an unchanged peer is not re-fetched. That turns egress from "ticks x log size" (~700 MB/month, and growing with the log) into "edits" (~40 MB/month against a 10 GiB cap). Revisions are one node per device, written only by its owner, rather than one shared map -- a whole-map write would erase every peer's entry, after which those peers would look permanently unchanged and never be fetched again. Per-device keys make that impossible rather than merely avoided. `.` is illegal in an RTDB key and the REST `.json` is a format suffix, so paths get a reversible `~XX` escape (`log.json` -> `log~2Ejson`). Lossy extension-stripping would break `todo`, whose listings return filenames. `MirrorStore` / `MirrorSyncClient` dual-writes during the cutover. Reads consult *both* backends: with primary-only reads a migrated device would never see an un-migrated peer's writes while still mirroring its own back -- silent one-directional convergence with no error raised. Writes are asymmetric on purpose: a primary failure fails the tick, a mirror failure is logged and survived. Auth is Firebase email/password over identitytoolkit REST, with mandatory refresh-token rotation. No service-account key anywhere: it would bypass the security rules and is trivially extractable from an APK. Verified live against a real database, not only mocks: sign-in and refresh, key escaping round-tripping byte-for-byte, an unchanged tick writing nothing, two devices converging, a revoked session throwing rather than returning null, and a log written by the Python client being read by the Dart one. No app is migrated by this commit; every app still runs on GitHub. Dart: 194 tests. Python: 203 tests at 100% branch coverage. No lint suppressions added. |