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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
name: data_transfer_flutter tests
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['data_transfer_flutter/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['data_transfer_flutter/**']
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: data_transfer_flutter
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Flutter
uses: subosito/flutter-action@v2
with:
channel: stable
- name: Install dependencies
run: flutter pub get
- name: Analyze
run: flutter analyze
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: flutter test --coverage
- name: Enforce 100% line coverage
run: scripts/check_coverage.sh coverage/lcov.info 100

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@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
name: focus-project pre-commit
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as focus_project: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-precommit.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-precommit.yml']
jobs:
pre-commit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
# Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
# env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
# own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
# python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
# packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
# three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
# The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
# it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
- name: Install pre-commit
run: |
pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' focus_project/requirements.txt)"
# Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
# hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
# package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
# from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
# invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
# missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
key: >-
pre-commit-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('focus_project/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
# Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
# event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
# exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
# again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
# repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
# than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
# exact key after a prefix-only hit.
restore-keys: pre-commit-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
# mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
# without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
# warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
# the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
# interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
# what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
# github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
# 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
# the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: .mypy_cache
key: >-
mypy-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('focus_project/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
restore-keys: mypy-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
- name: Run the hooks
run: >-
pre-commit run --config focus_project/.pre-commit-config.yaml
--all-files --show-diff-on-failure

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: focus-project tests
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as focus_project: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-tests.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-tests.yml']
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: focus_project
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
cache: pip
cache-dependency-path: focus_project/requirements.txt
- name: Install dependencies
run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: python -m pytest -v

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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
name: google_account_token tests
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['google_account_token/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['google_account_token/**']
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: google_account_token
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Flutter
uses: subosito/flutter-action@v2
with:
channel: stable
- name: Install dependencies
run: flutter pub get
- name: Analyze
run: flutter analyze
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: flutter test --coverage
- name: Enforce 100% line coverage
run: scripts/check_coverage.sh coverage/lcov.info 100

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@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
name: holds pre-commit
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as holds: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-precommit.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-precommit.yml']
jobs:
pre-commit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
# Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
# env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
# own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
# python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
# packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
# three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
# The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
# it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
- name: Install pre-commit
run: |
pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' holds/requirements.txt)"
# Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
# hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
# package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
# from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
# invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
# missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
key: >-
pre-commit-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('holds/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
# Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
# event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
# exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
# again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
# repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
# than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
# exact key after a prefix-only hit.
restore-keys: pre-commit-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
# mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
# without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
# warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
# the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
# interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
# what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
# github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
# 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
# the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: .mypy_cache
key: >-
mypy-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('holds/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
restore-keys: mypy-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
- name: Run the hooks
run: >-
pre-commit run --config holds/.pre-commit-config.yaml
--all-files --show-diff-on-failure

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: holds tests
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as holds: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-tests.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-tests.yml']
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: holds
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
cache: pip
cache-dependency-path: holds/requirements.txt
- name: Install dependencies
run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: python -m pytest -v

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@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
name: leetcode-coach pre-commit
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as leetcode_coach: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-precommit.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-precommit.yml']
jobs:
pre-commit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
# Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
# env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
# own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
# python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
# packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
# three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
# The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
# it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
- name: Install pre-commit
run: |
pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' leetcode_coach/requirements.txt)"
# Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
# hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
# package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
# from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
# invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
# missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
key: >-
pre-commit-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('leetcode_coach/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
# Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
# event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
# exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
# again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
# repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
# than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
# exact key after a prefix-only hit.
restore-keys: pre-commit-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
# mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
# without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
# warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
# the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
# interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
# what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
# github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
# 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
# the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: .mypy_cache
key: >-
mypy-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('leetcode_coach/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
restore-keys: mypy-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
- name: Run the hooks
run: >-
pre-commit run --config leetcode_coach/.pre-commit-config.yaml
--all-files --show-diff-on-failure

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: leetcode-coach tests
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as leetcode_coach: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-tests.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-tests.yml']
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: leetcode_coach
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
cache: pip
cache-dependency-path: leetcode_coach/requirements.txt
- name: Install dependencies
run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: python -m pytest -v

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: md-naming
# The markdown namespaces (README / CLAUDE* / DOCS*, no TODO*), enforced on push as well as at commit time.
# The four markdown namespaces, enforced on push as well as at commit time.
# The local pre-commit hook can be skipped (a fresh clone that never ran
# `pre-commit install` has no hooks at all), so the convention needs a second
# gate that no one can forget to install.
@ -31,3 +31,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Enforce the naming convention
run: bash .utils/scripts/check_md_naming.sh --all
# Warns only: no machine can prove a task is finished, so an old TODO
# gets a nudge, never a failure.
- name: Warn about stale TODOs
run: PYTHONPATH=.utils python3 .utils/md_naming/stale.py

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@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ jobs:
run: pip install -r requirements.txt
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: python -m pytest -v --cov=music_theory
run: python -m pytest -v

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@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
name: omniroute_offload pre-commit
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as omniroute_offload: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['omniroute_offload/**', '.github/workflows/omniroute_offload-precommit.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['omniroute_offload/**', '.github/workflows/omniroute_offload-precommit.yml']
jobs:
pre-commit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
# Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
# env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
# own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
# python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
# packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
# three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
# The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
# it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
- name: Install pre-commit
run: |
pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' omniroute_offload/requirements.txt)"
# Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
# hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
# package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
# from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
# invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
# missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
key: >-
pre-commit-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('omniroute_offload/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
# Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
# event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
# exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
# again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
# repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
# than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
# exact key after a prefix-only hit.
restore-keys: pre-commit-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
# mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
# without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
# warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
# the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
# interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
# what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
# github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
# 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
# the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: .mypy_cache
key: >-
mypy-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('omniroute_offload/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
restore-keys: mypy-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
- name: Run the hooks
run: >-
pre-commit run --config omniroute_offload/.pre-commit-config.yaml
--all-files --show-diff-on-failure

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@ -31,8 +31,3 @@ jobs:
- name: Categorical ramp still passes its constraints
run: python3 unified-design-system/scripts/ramp_check.py
# Spacing, radius, type, shadow and motion: palette_check.py parses
# hex only, so these scales were unguarded until structural_check.py.
- name: Structural scales agree across all token sources
run: python3 unified-design-system/scripts/structural_check.py

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@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
name: sql-drills pre-commit
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as sql_drills: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-precommit.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-precommit.yml']
jobs:
pre-commit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
# Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
# env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
# own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
# python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
# packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
# three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
# The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
# it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
- name: Install pre-commit
run: |
pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' sql_drills/requirements.txt)"
# Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
# hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
# package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
# from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
# invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
# missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
key: >-
pre-commit-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('sql_drills/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
# Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
# event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
# exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
# again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
# repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
# than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
# exact key after a prefix-only hit.
restore-keys: pre-commit-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
# mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
# without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
# warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
# the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
# interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
# what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
# github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
# 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
# the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: .mypy_cache
key: >-
mypy-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
hashFiles('sql_drills/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
restore-keys: mypy-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
- name: Run the hooks
run: >-
pre-commit run --config sql_drills/.pre-commit-config.yaml
--all-files --show-diff-on-failure

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: sql-drills tests
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# The workflow's own file counts as sql_drills: editing only this file would
# otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
# itself.
paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-tests.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-tests.yml']
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: sql_drills
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.x"
cache: pip
cache-dependency-path: sql_drills/requirements.txt
- name: Install dependencies
run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: python -m pytest -v

View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
# linters, and carry this same hook so committing with one of those configs is
# gated too. This root config is what `pre-commit install` wires up, and it is
# the only one that covers the subprojects without a config of their own
# (guard-lib/, crdt_sync_dart/, file_length/, ...).
# (aur-publish/, guard-lib/, crdt_sync_dart/, file_length/, ...).
#
# The path is repo-relative on purpose. pre-commit always runs hooks from the
# git root, so this resolves the same locally and on a CI runner -- an absolute
@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ repos:
language: system
pass_filenames: true
# Three markdown namespaces (README / CLAUDE* / DOCS*); TODO*.md is banned
# (tasks live in the todo app).
# Four markdown namespaces (README / CLAUDE* / DOCS* / TODO*), plus the
# rule that a TODO carries "REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH" and nothing else may.
# Shared gate in ~/src/utils owns the namespaces and the exemption list, so
# one repo's idea of a valid name cannot drift from every other repo's.
# Since the 2026-09-11 reorganisation ~ holds eleven visible entries and
@ -66,14 +66,9 @@ repos:
# answer and passes with a loud banner; `--no-verify` is banned here, so
# a hook that hard-failed on a flaky connection would leave no way to
# commit at all. CI, always online, is the strict authority.
#
# Scoped to manifests this branch changed (vs merge-base with main), so
# `--all-files` asks "did THIS change leave a stale pin?" and not "is
# every project in the monorepo current?". CI `--all --strict` keeps
# the repo-wide answer. See scripts/dep_freshness_changed.sh.
- id: dependency-freshness
name: dependencies on newest stable
entry: bash scripts/dep_freshness_changed.sh
entry: bash scripts/check_dependency_freshness.sh
language: system
pass_filenames: true
files: >-

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@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# Hooks other repos consume with `repo: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils`.
# All three are post-* stages, so each clone must install them (see
# todo_hooks/README.md). They never fail a git operation: the work has
# already happened, so server/gh trouble prints one warning and exits 0.
- id: todo-closer
name: close Todo trailer tasks
entry: scripts/todo_hooks.sh closer
language: script
stages: [post-commit]
always_run: true
pass_filenames: false
- id: todo-import-pr-merge
name: import PR Todo sections (pull)
entry: scripts/todo_hooks.sh import-pr post-merge
language: script
stages: [post-merge]
always_run: true
pass_filenames: false
- id: todo-import-pr-rewrite
name: import PR Todo sections (pull --rebase)
entry: scripts/todo_hooks.sh import-pr post-rewrite
language: script
stages: [post-rewrite]
always_run: true
pass_filenames: false

View File

@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ overwrite it with `repo_contract/templates/check_repo_contract.shim.sh`.
## Commands
- run: n/a: collection of gates and libraries, no single entry point
- test: `PYTHONPATH=. python -m pytest -q agent_ready/tests coverage_gaps/tests dep_freshness/tests file_length/tests flutter_web_drive/tests home_paths/tests md_naming/tests repo_contract/tests scripts/tests unified-design-system/tests`
- test: `PYTHONPATH=. python -m pytest -q agent_ready/tests coverage_gaps/tests dep_freshness/tests file_length/tests flutter_web_drive/tests home_paths/tests md_naming/tests repo_contract/tests scripts/tests`
- test-changed: `scripts/test_changed.sh`
- lint: `ruff check agent_ready coverage_gaps flutter_web_drive repo_contract`
- coverage: `PYTHONPATH=. python -m pytest -q agent_ready/tests flutter_web_drive/tests repo_contract/tests unified-design-system/tests --cov=agent_ready --cov=flutter_web_drive --cov=repo_contract --cov=conformance --cov=conformance_diff --cov-branch --cov-report=xml --cov-fail-under=100`
- coverage: `PYTHONPATH=. python -m pytest -q agent_ready/tests flutter_web_drive/tests repo_contract/tests --cov=agent_ready --cov=flutter_web_drive --cov=repo_contract --cov-branch --cov-report=xml --cov-fail-under=100`
- coverage-gaps: `coverage-gaps coverage.xml`
- deploy: `git -C ~/src/utils pull --ff-only && ~/src/utils/scripts/deploy.sh` (installs the sickdays CLI + launcher from the live checkout, then exits 1 unless every released library's version tag is on origin and matches HEAD and the live `sickdays` runs the text-free checkout; `--verify-only` for the health check alone)

View File

@ -42,21 +42,6 @@ dependencies:
path: sync_settings_ui
```
## google_account_token/
Flutter plugin (Android only; other platforms return null): one-tap Google ID
token via `AccountManager`, replacing `google_sign_in` in the sync apps.
Consume via:
```yaml
dependencies:
google_account_token:
git:
url: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils
ref: google_account_token-v0.1.0
path: google_account_token
```
## crdt-sync/
Python CRDT sync library (package: `crdt_sync`, not published to PyPI). Same

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@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
# TODO — pylint `--fail-under=10` everywhere, and clear what that surfaces
REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH
## what
Ten pylint hooks across six repos still pass at `--fail-under=8.0`, which
permanently tolerates two points of lint debt and lets a score *regress* from
9.9 to 8.1 without failing anything. Move every one to `10`, and fix what
that surfaces. Five other sites already run at `10`, so this is adopting an
existing standard, not inventing one.
## the ten sites, exact
Measured 2026-09-12. "Score now" is that package's current rating under its
own config, tests included.
| Repo / package | Site | Score now |
|---|---|---|
| `control-panel` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:159` | 8.53 |
| `leetcode-guard` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:112` | 8.71 |
| `screen-locker` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:121` | 9.85 |
| `screen-locker` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:140` | (2nd pylint hook) |
| `steam-backlog-enforcer` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:124` | 8.76 |
| `testsAndMisc/meta` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:194` | 8.77 |
| `utils/crdt-sync` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:111` | 9.59 |
| `utils/freedays` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:109` | 8.55 |
| `utils/gatelock` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:109` | 9.18 |
| `utils/music_theory` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:113` | 8.54 |
`screen-locker` has **two** pylint hooks; both need the bump or the second one
silently keeps the old bar.
Already at `10` — do not touch, these are the reference:
`build-your-x`, `diet-guard`, `testsAndMisc` (root config),
`wake-alarm`, `WUT_Computer_Science/.../translator/.pylintrc`.
## why the scores look bad, and why that is misleading
Every one of these configs runs `enable = "all"` with `disable = []` — the
strictest pylint setting there is, including checks that are off by default.
The raw findings are dominated by **test-file idioms**, not source defects.
Measured on the four `utils` packages:
```
crdt-sync 54 protected-access, 50 redefined-outer-name, 18 duplicate-code
freedays 100 missing-function-docstring, 14 implicit-booleaness
gatelock 147 redefined-outer-name, 142 protected-access
music_theory 112 missing-function-docstring, 14 missing-module-docstring
```
`redefined-outer-name` at that volume is pytest fixtures. `protected-access`
is tests reaching into internals on purpose. Neither is a defect.
**The repos already at 10 solved this and wrote down why.** From
`wake-alarm/pyproject.toml`, verbatim:
> `ignore = [".venv", "__pycache__", "tests"]` — "tests" is a basename match:
> test suites intentionally use patterns (protected-access, magic-value
> comparisons) that don't apply to source code, matching testsAndMisc's
> pylint scope (tests are linted by ruff, not pylint there either).
So the fleet standard is: **pylint grades source, ruff grades tests.** The ten
sites above are the outliers that never adopted it. Their `ruff` config
already carries the equivalent test exemptions
(`"**/tests/**/*.py" = ["ARG", "D", "PLC0415", "PLR2004", "S101", "SLF001"]`),
so tests stay linted — by the tool that has the right rules for them.
## what is actually left after adopting the fleet config
Measured: `pylint --ignore=.venv,__pycache__,tests` plus wake-alarm's
three-item `disable` list, run over source files only.
| Package | Score | Remaining findings |
|---|---|---|
| `crdt-sync` | 9.93 | 5 wrong-import-position, 3 duplicate-code, 1 too-many-locals, 1 invalid-name |
| `freedays` | 9.63 | 3 import-error, 1 broad-exception-caught |
| `gatelock` | 9.88 | 6 missing-function-docstring, 4 wrong-import-position, 3 too-many-instance-attributes, 3 import-outside-toplevel, 2 broad-exception-caught, 1 each too-many-arguments / invalid-name / duplicate-code / disallowed-name / chained-comparison |
| `music_theory` | 9.42 | 10 import-error |
That is ~47 real findings across four packages, not the ~600 the raw run
suggests. **`import-error` is almost certainly config, not code**: every repo
already at 10 carries an `init-hook` the 8.0 repos lack —
```toml
init-hook = "import sys; sys.path.insert(0, '.')"
```
Try that first on `music_theory` and `freedays` before editing any import.
## must
- Every site at `--fail-under=10`. No `9.5`, no per-repo exception.
- Adopt the reference config from `wake-alarm` / `diet-guard`: the `tests`
basename ignore, the `init-hook`, and only then the residue fixes.
- Fix findings in source. Prefer the fix to the disable, every time.
- must not: add a `# pylint: disable=` comment, or extend `disable = [...]`
beyond wake-alarm's three implicit-booleaness entries, **without asking
kuhy first — every time, per `memories/code-quality.md`.** All seven
"unavoidable" disables in a past konbini-67 session were reverted.
- must not: exclude a source file from pylint to raise the score, or drop
`enable = "all"`.
- must not: touch the five sites already at `10`.
- optional: `duplicate-code` findings may be genuine shared-code candidates
for `utils`. Note them, do not force a refactor to hit the number.
## done
Both commands, from `~`:
```bash
# 1. no site left below 10 (cov-fail-under is coverage, not pylint)
! grep -rn --include=.pre-commit-config.yaml --include=.pylintrc \
-E 'fail-under=(8|9)' ~/src ~/praca_magisterska 2>/dev/null \
| grep -v cov-fail-under
# 2. every one of the nine packages passes its own pylint hook
for d in ~/src/control-panel ~/src/leetcode-guard ~/src/screen-locker \
~/src/steam-backlog-enforcer ~/src/testsAndMisc/meta \
~/src/utils/crdt-sync ~/src/utils/freedays \
~/src/utils/gatelock ~/src/utils/music_theory; do
(cd "$d" && pre-commit run pylint --all-files) || echo "FAIL $d"
done
```
Command 1 prints nothing and exits 0; command 2 prints no `FAIL` line.
## verify
Desktop. Per repo, `pre-commit run --all-files` must be green — not just the
pylint hook, since a fix that satisfies pylint can break `ruff`, `mypy` or the
250-line cap. Then the test suite: these are behaviour-affecting edits
(`broad-exception-caught` and `import-outside-toplevel` fixes especially), and
every one of these packages holds a 100% coverage bar.
`utils` and `testsAndMisc` each have CI; push and confirm green rather than
trusting the local run. `gatelock`'s Tk suite is flaky on a live X session —
run it under `xvfb-run -a` and compare against a baseline worktree before
blaming a change for a failure.
## read first
- `~/src/wake-alarm/pyproject.toml` — `[tool.pylint]`, the reference config.
`diet-guard` is byte-similar; `build-your-x` also ignores `conftest.py`.
- `~/.claude/memories/code-quality.md` — the suppression rule that governs
every `disable` decision in this task.
- `~/src/utils/rules/` is not involved; this is not a dependency change.
Each repo is its own git repo: commit per repo, work on `main`, stage
narrowly. `utils` additionally runs the shared `md-naming` and file-length
gates, so delete this file in that repo's final commit.
REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH

45
aur-publish/README.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
# aur-publish
Hands-off publishing of kuhy's Flutter apps to the AUR.
```bash
~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh # wait for registration, then publish
~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh --dry-run # everything except the push
~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh --skip-wait # account already works
~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh --only habit-stack
```
## What it does
1. Polls `/register` until AUR signup reopens, opens it in a browser and
prints the SSH key to paste. **Signup is the only manual step** — it
requires email confirmation.
2. Waits for `ssh aur@aur.archlinux.org` to authenticate.
3. Then, unattended, per package: resolve the newest `vX.Y.Z` tag → set
`pkgver` → `updpkgsums` → `makepkg -C` → `namcap` → AUR rule check →
`pacman -U` → launch check → `.SRCINFO` → commit → push.
Every package is built, installed and **launched** before it is pushed, so a
broken package cannot reach the AUR. A package failing any gate is skipped and
reported; the others still publish. Safe to re-run.
## anubis_gate.py
The AUR sits behind [Anubis](https://anubis.techaro.lol/), which answers HTML
requests with a proof-of-work challenge page carrying **HTTP 200**. A plain
`curl` therefore reports 200 for a page that is actually unreachable — which is
exactly how "is registration back?" gets answered wrong. This module solves the
challenge and reports the status of the *real* page behind it.
```bash
python3 anubis_gate.py /register # prints the true status code
```
## AUR rules enforced before pushing
The AUR does not review uploads, but per the submission guidelines "packages
that violate the rules may be deleted without warning". `check_aur_rules()`
blocks a push on the mechanically checkable ones: `# Maintainer:` line,
`x86_64` in `arch`, no `replaces=` (reserved for renames — use `conflicts`),
not already in an official repo, `pkgdesc`/`url`/`license` present, and
`.SRCINFO` matching the PKGBUILD.

138
aur-publish/anubis_gate.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
"""Fetch an AUR URL from behind the Anubis anti-bot gate.
The AUR sits behind Anubis (https://anubis.techaro.lol/), which answers every
HTML request with a proof-of-work challenge page carrying HTTP **200**. A bare
`curl` therefore reports 200 for a page that is actually unreachable, which is
exactly how "is /register back up?" gets answered wrong.
This module solves the challenge and reports the status of the *real* page
behind it, so the caller can distinguish:
* 200 -> genuinely available
* 503 -> reached the site; that endpoint is disabled server-side
* other-> whatever the app actually said
Exit codes mirror the HTTP status so shell callers can branch on them:
0 for 200, 1 for anything else, 2 for a local/transport failure.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import hashlib
import http.cookiejar
import json
import re
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
BASE = "https://aur.archlinux.org"
UA = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"
CHALLENGE_RE = re.compile(
r'<script id="anubis_challenge" type="application/json">(.*?)</script>',
re.S,
)
PASS_PATH = "/.within.website/x/cmd/anubis/api/pass-challenge"
# A solve at difficulty 4 takes ~0.01s; this ceiling only guards a server-side
# difficulty spike, so the poller degrades instead of spinning forever.
MAX_NONCE = 50_000_000
class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
"""Keep redirects visible instead of silently following them."""
def redirect_request(self, *_args, **_kwargs): # noqa: D102 - see class doc
return None
def _opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
jar = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(jar), _NoRedirect
)
opener.addheaders = [
("User-Agent", UA),
("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8"),
]
return opener
def _solve(random_data: str, difficulty: int) -> tuple[int, str, float]:
"""Find a nonce whose sha256 digest starts with `difficulty` zero hex chars."""
prefix = "0" * difficulty
started = time.time()
for nonce in range(MAX_NONCE):
digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{random_data}{nonce}".encode()).hexdigest()
if digest.startswith(prefix):
return nonce, digest, time.time() - started
raise RuntimeError(f"no nonce found below {MAX_NONCE} at difficulty {difficulty}")
def fetch(path: str, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""Return (status, body) for `path`, clearing Anubis first if challenged."""
opener = _opener()
url = f"{BASE}{path}"
try:
with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
status = resp.status
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
return exc.code, exc.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
match = CHALLENGE_RE.search(body)
if not match:
return status, body
challenge = json.loads(match.group(1))["challenge"]
nonce, digest, elapsed = _solve(
challenge["randomData"], int(challenge["difficulty"])
)
query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
{
"id": challenge["id"],
"response": digest,
"nonce": str(nonce),
"redir": path,
"elapsedTime": str(int(elapsed * 1000)),
}
)
try:
opener.open(f"{BASE}{PASS_PATH}?{query}", timeout=timeout)
except urllib.error.HTTPError:
# A redirect or non-2xx here is fine; what matters is the cookie the
# opener's jar just captured.
pass
try:
with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
return exc.code, exc.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("path", help="AUR path, e.g. /register")
parser.add_argument(
"--print-body", action="store_true", help="write the page body to stdout"
)
args = parser.parse_args()
try:
status, body = fetch(args.path)
except (urllib.error.URLError, RuntimeError, TimeoutError) as exc:
print(f"transport error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
print(status)
if args.print_body:
sys.stdout.write(body)
return 0 if status == 200 else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

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@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
#!/bin/bash
# ============================================================================
# Building, verifying and pushing one package to the AUR.
#
# Sourced by publish.sh, never executed: these functions read the readonly
# config (AUR_HOST, AUR_ROOT, DRY_RUN, PUBLISHED, FAILED) that the entry script declares, and
# a `readonly` re-run inside a twice-sourced lib would abort under `set -e`.
# ============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
publish_one() {
local pkg="$1" repo="$2" wrapper="$3" binary="$4" expected="$5"
local dir="$AUR_ROOT/$pkg"
local version
log "$pkg"
[[ -d "$repo" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no repo at $repo"; return 1; }
[[ -f "$dir/PKGBUILD" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no PKGBUILD at $dir"; return 1; }
version="$(newest_tag "$repo")"
[[ -n "$version" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no vX.Y.Z tag on the remote"; return 1; }
info "newest release tag: v$version"
cd "$dir"
sed -i -E "s/^pkgver=.*/pkgver=$version/" PKGBUILD
# The tarball for a tag contains the PKGBUILD, so the checksum can only be
# computed after the tag exists — never committed ahead of time.
updpkgsums >/dev/null 2>&1 || { warn "$pkg: updpkgsums failed (tag missing?)"; return 1; }
info "building"
if ! env PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/bin makepkg -Cf --noconfirm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
warn "$pkg: makepkg failed"
return 1
fi
local built
built="$(find . -maxdepth 1 -name "$pkg-$version-*.pkg.tar.zst" | head -1)"
[[ -n "$built" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no package produced"; return 1; }
# namcap's "ELF files outside of a valid path ('opt/')" is a false positive
# for /opt-installed apps, so only genuinely new errors are worth failing on.
local findings
findings="$(namcap "$built" 2>&1 | grep -E ' E: ' | grep -v "outside of a valid path" || true)"
if [[ -n "$findings" ]]; then
warn "$pkg: namcap errors:"
printf ' %s\n' "$findings"
return 1
fi
info "installing and launching"
sudo pacman -U --noconfirm "$built" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| { warn "$pkg: pacman -U failed"; return 1; }
verify_installed "$binary" "$expected" "$wrapper" || { warn "$pkg: launch check failed"; return 1; }
# Generated before the rule check, which verifies it matches the PKGBUILD.
makepkg --printsrcinfo > .SRCINFO
check_aur_rules "$pkg" || return 1
# The AUR repo is a separate remote living alongside the build dir; adding
# it here (rather than cloning into a fresh path) keeps the verified
# PKGBUILD and the thing being pushed byte-identical.
if [[ ! -d .git ]]; then
git init -q -b master .
git remote add origin "ssh://aur@$AUR_HOST/$pkg.git"
fi
git remote get-url origin >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| git remote add origin "ssh://aur@$AUR_HOST/$pkg.git"
# Fetch first: an existing AUR package must be built on, not overwritten.
if git fetch -q origin master 2>/dev/null; then
git reset -q --soft FETCH_HEAD 2>/dev/null || true
fi
cat > .gitignore <<'EOF'
# Build products; the AUR tracks only the recipe.
*.pkg.tar.zst
*.tar.gz
src/
pkg/
EOF
git add PKGBUILD .SRCINFO .gitignore
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
info "already up to date on the AUR; nothing to push"
PUBLISHED+=("$pkg v$version (unchanged)")
return 0
fi
git -c user.name='Krzysztof Rudnicki' \
-c user.email='krzysztofrudnicki0@gmail.com' \
commit -q -m "$pkg $version-1"
if ((DRY_RUN)); then
info "DRY RUN — not pushing"
PUBLISHED+=("$pkg v$version (dry run)")
return 0
fi
info "pushing to the AUR"
git push -q origin master 2>&1 | tail -3 || { warn "$pkg: push failed"; return 1; }
PUBLISHED+=("$pkg v$version")
return 0
}

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@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
#!/bin/bash
# ============================================================================
# Waiting for AUR registration and SSH access to come up.
#
# Sourced by publish.sh, never executed: these functions read the readonly
# config (AUR_HOST, SSH_KEY, GATE, POLL_SECONDS) that the entry script declares, and
# a `readonly` re-run inside a twice-sourced lib would abort under `set -e`.
# ============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
register_status() {
python3 "$GATE" /register 2>/dev/null | head -1
}
open_browser() {
local url="$1"
local browser
for browser in xdg-open thorium-browser chromium google-chrome-stable firefox librewolf; do
if command -v "$browser" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
"$browser" "$url" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
info "Opened $url in $browser"
return 0
fi
done
warn "No browser found; open this yourself: $url"
}
ensure_key() {
if [[ ! -f "$SSH_KEY" ]]; then
log "Generating an AUR SSH key (none at $SSH_KEY)"
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f "$SSH_KEY" -N '' -C 'kuhy@aur'
fi
if ! grep -q "Host $AUR_HOST" "$HOME/.ssh/config" 2>/dev/null; then
log "Adding $AUR_HOST to ~/.ssh/config"
mkdir -p "$HOME/.ssh"
cat >> "$HOME/.ssh/config" <<EOF
# AUR uses a dedicated key so it stays separate from the GitHub identity.
Host $AUR_HOST
User aur
IdentityFile $SSH_KEY
IdentitiesOnly yes
EOF
chmod 600 "$HOME/.ssh/config"
fi
}
ssh_works() {
# The AUR refuses interactive shells; "Interactive shell is disabled" on a
# successful key auth is the success signal, not an error.
ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
-o ConnectTimeout=15 "aur@$AUR_HOST" help 2>&1 |
grep -qiE 'interactive shell is disabled|Welcome to AUR'
}
wait_for_registration() {
local status
status="$(register_status)"
if [[ "$status" == "200" ]]; then
log "AUR registration is OPEN"
else
log "AUR registration is closed (HTTP $status). Polling every ${POLL_SECONDS}s."
info "Ctrl-C to stop; re-run any time, nothing is lost."
while :; do
sleep "$POLL_SECONDS"
status="$(register_status)"
if [[ "$status" == "200" ]]; then
log "Registration is BACK (HTTP 200)"
break
fi
printf ' %s still HTTP %s\n' "$(date +%H:%M)" "$status"
done
fi
open_browser "https://$AUR_HOST/register"
cat <<EOF
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sign up, and paste this into the "SSH Public Key" field:
$(sed 's/^/ /' "$SSH_KEY.pub")
You will need to confirm the address from your email before the
account works. This script waits for that automatically.
------------------------------------------------------------------
EOF
}
wait_for_ssh() {
log "Waiting for the SSH key to authenticate against the AUR"
local waited=0
until ssh_works; do
sleep 30
waited=$((waited + 30))
if ((waited % 300 == 0)); then
info "still waiting ($((waited / 60)) min) — key not accepted yet"
fi
done
log "SSH authentication OK"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 2: build, verify and publish one package
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
#!/bin/bash
# ============================================================================
# Gates a package must pass before it is allowed near the AUR.
#
# Sourced by publish.sh, never executed: these functions read the readonly
# config (AUR_ROOT, DRY_RUN) that the entry script declares, and
# a `readonly` re-run inside a twice-sourced lib would abort under `set -e`.
# ============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
newest_tag() {
# Newest clean vX.Y.Z on the remote. Build tags (vX.Y.Z-build.N) and the
# grafted upstream Flutter SDK tags in diet-guard are excluded on purpose.
git -C "$1" ls-remote --tags origin 2>/dev/null |
awk '{print $2}' |
sed 's|refs/tags/||' |
grep -E '^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' |
sed 's/^v//' |
sort -V |
tail -1
}
verify_installed() {
local binary="$1" expected="$2" wrapper="$3" output
# An instance left over from a previous run would make the wrapper print
# "already running" and hand off, which passes trivially and turns the
# strongest gate in this script into the weakest. Clear it first so the
# check always exercises a real cold start.
#
# Resolved through /proc/<pid>/exe rather than any form of name or
# command-line matching. Every argv-based approach selects the wrong
# processes here:
# * `pkill -x` compares against the kernel's 15-character comm field, and
# two of these wrappers are longer (habit_stack_desktop is 19), so a
# name match would silently never fire.
# * `pkill -f`, and equally `ps -eo args` piped through a pattern, match
# any process whose command line merely *mentions* the path — this
# script, the shell running it, and the matching tool itself all
# qualify, so the run kills its own shell instead of the app. A
# $$/$PPID guard does not cover it, because the offending shell is
# often a more distant ancestor.
# /proc/<pid>/exe is a kernel-maintained symlink to the binary actually
# being executed, so it cannot collide with an incidental mention.
# The wrapper name is unique per app, so the /opt/<pkg>/ segment is left as
# a glob instead of threading the package name through another parameter.
#
# The link is read without `-f`: it is already fully resolved, and by the
# time this runs `pacman -U` has replaced the binary, so a leftover process
# points at an unlinked inode that the kernel reports with a " (deleted)"
# suffix. That suffix has to be stripped or the match silently misses the
# one process this exists to kill.
local pid exe killed=()
for pid in /proc/[0-9]*; do
pid="${pid#/proc/}"
exe="$(readlink "/proc/$pid/exe" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
exe="${exe% (deleted)}"
[[ "$exe" == /opt/*/bin/"$wrapper" ]] || continue
kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null && killed+=("$pid")
done
if ((${#killed[@]})); then
info "stopped a running instance so the launch check is meaningful"
# `kill` only reports that the signal was sent. Waiting for the process
# to actually go keeps a slow exit from failing the cold start below on
# a port that is still bound.
local waited=0
while ((waited < 100)) && kill -0 "${killed[@]}" 2>/dev/null; do
sleep 0.1
((waited++))
done
fi
output="$(timeout 15 "/usr/bin/$binary" 2>&1 | head -3 || true)"
if grep -qF "$expected" <<<"$output"; then
return 0
fi
warn "unexpected startup output: $output"
return 1
}
# The AUR does not review uploads, but "packages that violate the rules may be
# deleted without warning" (AUR submission guidelines). These are the rules that
# are mechanically checkable, enforced here so a violation blocks the push
# rather than surfacing later as a deletion request.
check_aur_rules() {
local pkg="$1" problems=()
grep -q '^# Maintainer:' PKGBUILD \
|| problems+=("missing '# Maintainer:' comment on line 1")
grep -qE "^arch=\(.*x86_64" PKGBUILD \
|| problems+=("x86_64 not in arch=() — packages without it are not allowed")
# `replaces` makes pacman rip out the named package on the next -Sy, which
# is only correct for a genuine rename. `conflicts` is the right tool.
grep -q '^replaces=' PKGBUILD \
&& problems+=("uses replaces=; AUR rules reserve it for renames — use conflicts=")
# A package already in an official repo must never be duplicated.
if pacman -Si "$pkg" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
problems+=("$pkg exists in an official repo — must not be submitted")
fi
grep -qE '^(pkgdesc|url|license)=' PKGBUILD \
|| problems+=("missing pkgdesc/url/license")
# A stale .SRCINFO is the single most common upload rejection.
if ! diff -q <(makepkg --printsrcinfo) .SRCINFO >/dev/null 2>&1; then
problems+=(".SRCINFO does not match PKGBUILD")
fi
if ((${#problems[@]})); then
warn "$pkg: AUR rule violations:"
printf ' - %s\n' "${problems[@]}"
return 1
fi
info "AUR rule checks passed"
return 0
}

148
aur-publish/publish.sh Executable file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
#!/bin/bash
# ============================================================================
# Publish kuhy's three Flutter apps to the AUR, hands-off.
#
# Run this once AUR registration is back. It:
# 1. Waits for https://aur.archlinux.org/register to stop returning 503,
# then opens it in a browser and prints the SSH key to paste.
# (Signup is the ONLY manual step: it needs an email confirmation, and
# creating accounts is not something this script will do for you.)
# 2. Waits for `ssh aur@aur.archlinux.org` to authenticate.
# 3. From there, fully unattended, for each package:
# newest release tag -> pkgver -> updpkgsums -> makepkg -C -> namcap
# -> pacman -U -> launch check -> .SRCINFO -> clone AUR repo
# -> commit -> push.
#
# Every package is BUILT, INSTALLED and LAUNCHED before it is pushed, so a
# broken package cannot reach the AUR. A package that fails any gate is
# skipped and reported; the others still publish.
#
# Idempotent and resumable: re-running skips work that is already done, and
# an already-published package is updated rather than duplicated.
# ============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
readonly SCRIPT_DIR
readonly GATE="$SCRIPT_DIR/anubis_gate.py"
readonly AUR_HOST="aur.archlinux.org"
readonly SSH_KEY="$HOME/.ssh/aur"
readonly AUR_ROOT="$HOME/sdk/aur"
# package:repo:wrapper-process:cli-name:expected-startup-string
# The wrapper process name is NOT derivable from the package name
# (diet-guard-app runs diet_guard_desktop), so it is listed explicitly.
readonly PACKAGES=(
"todo-flutter:$HOME/src/todo:todo_desktop:todo:serving on http://localhost:8730"
"habit-stack:$HOME/src/habit_stack:habit_stack_desktop:habit-stack:serving on http://localhost:8731"
"diet-guard-app:$HOME/src/diet-guard:diet_guard_desktop:diet-guard-app:serving on http://localhost:8732"
)
POLL_SECONDS=300
SKIP_WAIT=0
DRY_RUN=0
ONLY=""
FAILED=()
PUBLISHED=()
usage() {
cat <<EOF
Usage: $(basename "$0") [OPTIONS]
Options:
--skip-wait Assume the account + SSH key already work; go straight
to building and publishing.
--dry-run Do everything except the final 'git push' to the AUR.
--only NAME Publish just one package (todo-flutter, habit-stack,
diet-guard-app).
--poll SECONDS How often to re-check /register (default: $POLL_SECONDS).
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
exit 0
}
log() { printf '\n\033[1;34m==>\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; }
info() { printf ' %s\n' "$*"; }
warn() { printf '\033[1;33m ! %s\033[0m\n' "$*" >&2; }
die() { printf '\033[1;31m==> ERROR: %s\033[0m\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
require_tools() {
local missing=()
local tool
for tool in git makepkg updpkgsums namcap ssh python3 curl; do
command -v "$tool" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing+=("$tool")
done
if ((${#missing[@]})); then
info "Installing missing tools: ${missing[*]}"
# namcap/updpkgsums come from namcap + pacman-contrib; the rest are base.
sudo pacman -S --needed --noconfirm namcap pacman-contrib git openssh python \
|| die "could not install: ${missing[*]}"
fi
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 1: wait for registration, then for the key to work
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The rest lives in lib/, sourced (not executed) so every function sees the
# readonly config above and the mutable FAILED/PUBLISHED arrays main() reads.
# shellcheck source=lib/aur_registration.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/aur_registration.sh"
# shellcheck source=lib/aur_verify.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/aur_verify.sh"
# shellcheck source=lib/aur_publish_one.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/aur_publish_one.sh"
main() {
require_tools
[[ -f "$GATE" ]] || die "missing $GATE"
mkdir -p "$AUR_ROOT"
ensure_key
if ((SKIP_WAIT)); then
ssh_works || die "SSH key is not accepted yet; drop --skip-wait to wait for it"
else
wait_for_registration
wait_for_ssh
fi
local entry pkg repo wrapper binary expected
for entry in "${PACKAGES[@]}"; do
IFS=: read -r pkg repo wrapper binary expected <<<"$entry"
[[ -z "$ONLY" || "$ONLY" == "$pkg" ]] || continue
if ! publish_one "$pkg" "$repo" "$wrapper" "$binary" "$expected"; then
FAILED+=("$pkg")
fi
done
log "Summary"
if ((${#PUBLISHED[@]})); then
printf ' published: %s\n' "${PUBLISHED[@]}"
fi
if ((${#FAILED[@]})); then
printf '\033[1;31m FAILED: %s\033[0m\n' "${FAILED[@]}"
info "Nothing broken was pushed; fix and re-run (safe to repeat)."
return 1
fi
if ((${#PUBLISHED[@]} == 0)); then
warn "nothing to do"
return 1
fi
printf '\n Check: https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/todo-flutter\n'
return 0
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
--skip-wait) SKIP_WAIT=1; shift ;;
--dry-run) DRY_RUN=1; shift ;;
--only) ONLY="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--poll) POLL_SECONDS="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-h|--help) usage ;;
*) die "Unknown option: $1" ;;
esac
done
main "$@"

View File

@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ repos:
types: [python]
- repo: https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff-pre-commit
rev: v0.17.4
rev: v0.17.2
hooks:
- id: ruff
args: [--fix, --unsafe-fixes, --exit-non-zero-on-fix, --show-fixes]

View File

@ -14,30 +14,6 @@ from crdt_sync._config import (
mirror_client_for,
)
from crdt_sync._device import DeviceIdentity, load_device_identity
from crdt_sync._e2e_cipher import (
E2eCipher,
E2eDecryptError,
is_e2e_envelope,
open_log_text,
seal_log_text,
)
from crdt_sync._e2e_cleanup import clear_plaintext_prefix, unverified_blobs
from crdt_sync._e2e_key import (
Argon2Params,
E2eHeaderError,
E2eKey,
E2eWrongPassphraseError,
default_e2e_path,
unlock_e2e,
)
from crdt_sync._e2e_store import (
E2eLayout,
E2eLockedError,
EncryptingStore,
copy_to_encrypted,
open_encrypted_client,
reset_e2e_copy_memo,
)
from crdt_sync._firebase import (
DatabaseNotFoundError,
FirebaseSyncClient,
@ -75,19 +51,10 @@ __all__ = [
"CONFIG_DIR",
"CONFIG_FILE",
"PASSWORD_FILE",
"Argon2Params",
"ConfigError",
"CredentialStore",
"DatabaseNotFoundError",
"DeviceIdentity",
"E2eCipher",
"E2eDecryptError",
"E2eHeaderError",
"E2eKey",
"E2eLayout",
"E2eLockedError",
"E2eWrongPassphraseError",
"EncryptingStore",
"Field",
"FileCredentialStore",
"FileSyncStateStore",
@ -114,28 +81,18 @@ __all__ = [
"SyncState",
"SyncStateStore",
"SyncTarget",
"clear_plaintext_prefix",
"copy_to_encrypted",
"credential_store_for",
"default_e2e_path",
"default_revs_path",
"dump_log",
"firebase_client_for",
"is_e2e_envelope",
"load_device_identity",
"load_log",
"merge_field",
"merge_logs",
"merge_record",
"mirror_client_for",
"open_encrypted_client",
"open_log_text",
"read_log",
"reset_e2e_copy_memo",
"revision_of",
"seal_log_text",
"sync_log",
"unlock_e2e",
"unverified_blobs",
"write_log",
]

View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""On-disk E2E state for short-lived daemons (one process per tick).
The derived key is cached ``0600`` beside the app's other state, so Argon2id
runs once per machine rather than once a minute; it is no more sensitive
than ``~/.config/crdt-sync/password``, which it is derived from. The copy
memo records the old prefix's revisions last copied, so an unchanged old
prefix is not re-scanned every tick.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from pathlib import Path
_MASTER = 32
def _slug(old_prefix: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(old_prefix.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
def read_cached_key(state_dir: Path, old_prefix: str) -> bytes | None:
"""Return the cached 32-byte master key, or None."""
path = state_dir / f"e2e-{_slug(old_prefix)}.key"
if not path.exists():
return None
try:
master = bytes.fromhex(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip())
except ValueError:
return None
return master if len(master) == _MASTER else None
def write_cached_key(state_dir: Path, old_prefix: str, master: bytes) -> None:
"""Store the master key owner-only."""
state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path = state_dir / f"e2e-{_slug(old_prefix)}.key"
path.touch(mode=0o600, exist_ok=True)
path.chmod(0o600)
path.write_text(master.hex(), encoding="utf-8")
def read_copy_memo(state_dir: Path, old_prefix: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the old-prefix fingerprint last copied, or None."""
path = state_dir / f"e2e-{_slug(old_prefix)}.copied"
return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if path.exists() else None
def write_copy_memo(state_dir: Path, old_prefix: str, fingerprint: str) -> None:
"""Record that the old prefix was copied at ``fingerprint``."""
state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path = state_dir / f"e2e-{_slug(old_prefix)}.copied"
path.write_text(fingerprint, encoding="utf-8")

View File

@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""XChaCha20-Poly1305 blob cipher and per-record envelope.
Byte-compatible with ``crdt_sync_dart``'s ``E2eCipher`` and
``sealLogText``/``openLogText``: a blob is base64 ``[version][nonce][ct][tag]``
with ``[version] + utf8(path)`` as AAD; an envelope keeps record ids, the
tombstone and the newest HLC clear and seals each record's fields.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import binascii
import json
import secrets
from typing import cast
from nacl.bindings import (
crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
)
from nacl.exceptions import CryptoError
from crdt_sync._hlc import Hlc
E2E_FORMAT_VERSION = 1
_NONCE = 24
_TAG = 16
_KEY = 32
class E2eDecryptError(ValueError):
"""A blob that is tampered, under another key, or in an unknown format.
A ``ValueError`` so the pull loop skips the peer instead of aborting.
"""
def is_plaintext(stored: str) -> bool:
"""Return whether ``stored`` is legacy JSON rather than a sealed blob."""
return stored.lstrip().startswith(("{", "["))
def _aad(version: int, path: str) -> bytes:
return bytes([version]) + path.encode()
class E2eCipher:
"""Seals and opens blobs bound to their remote path."""
def __init__(self, key: bytes, *, accept_plaintext: bool = True) -> None:
"""Wrap a 32-byte ``key``; ``accept_plaintext`` reads old peers."""
if len(key) != _KEY:
msg = "key must be 32 bytes"
raise ValueError(msg)
self._key = bytes(key)
self.accept_plaintext = accept_plaintext
def seal(self, plaintext: str, *, path: str) -> str:
"""Return ``plaintext`` sealed for ``path``."""
nonce = secrets.token_bytes(_NONCE)
box = crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt(
plaintext.encode(), _aad(E2E_FORMAT_VERSION, path), nonce, self._key
)
return base64.b64encode(bytes([E2E_FORMAT_VERSION]) + nonce + box).decode()
def open(self, stored: str, *, path: str) -> str:
"""Return the plaintext of ``stored``; raise :class:`E2eDecryptError`."""
if is_plaintext(stored):
if self.accept_plaintext:
return stored
msg = f"plaintext blob at {path} after migration"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
try:
raw = base64.b64decode(stored, validate=True)
except binascii.Error as exc:
msg = f"blob at {path} is neither JSON nor base64"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg) from exc
if not raw:
msg = f"empty blob at {path}"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
if raw[0] != E2E_FORMAT_VERSION:
msg = f"blob at {path} uses format {raw[0]}; update the app"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
if len(raw) < 1 + _NONCE + _TAG:
msg = f"blob at {path} is truncated"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
try:
clear = crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt(
raw[1 + _NONCE :], _aad(raw[0], path), raw[1 : 1 + _NONCE], self._key
)
except CryptoError as exc:
msg = f"blob at {path} failed authentication"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg) from exc
return clear.decode()
def is_e2e_envelope(text: str) -> bool:
"""Return whether ``text`` is an envelope (integer ``"v"``)."""
try:
data = json.loads(text)
except ValueError:
return False
version = data.get("v") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
return isinstance(version, int) and not isinstance(version, bool)
def _record_aad(
path: str, rid: str, deleted: object, deleted_hlc: object, newest: object
) -> str:
flag = 1 if deleted is True else 0
return f"{path}#{rid}#{flag}#{deleted_hlc or ''}#{newest or ''}"
def _as_log(text: str) -> dict[str, dict[str, object]] | None:
try:
raw = json.loads(text)
except ValueError:
return None
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
return None
for rid, rec in raw.items():
if not isinstance(rec, dict) or rec.get("id") != rid:
return None
if not isinstance(rec.get("fields"), dict):
return None
return cast("dict[str, dict[str, object]]", raw)
def _newest(fields: dict[str, list[object]]) -> str | None:
clocks = [Hlc.from_str(str(pair[1])) for pair in fields.values()]
return max(clocks).to_str() if clocks else None
def seal_log_text(text: str, cipher: E2eCipher, *, path: str) -> str:
"""Seal a log (``dump_log`` shape) as an envelope; anything else whole."""
log = _as_log(text)
if log is None:
return json.dumps(
{"v": E2E_FORMAT_VERSION, "b": cipher.seal(text, path=path)},
separators=(",", ":"),
)
records: dict[str, object] = {}
for rid, rec in log.items():
fields = cast("dict[str, list[object]]", rec["fields"])
deleted = rec.get("deleted") is True
deleted_hlc = rec.get("deleted_hlc")
newest = _newest(fields)
records[rid] = {
"d": deleted,
"dh": deleted_hlc,
"h": newest,
"p": cipher.seal(
json.dumps(fields, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False),
path=_record_aad(path, rid, deleted, deleted_hlc, newest),
),
}
return json.dumps(
{"v": E2E_FORMAT_VERSION, "r": records},
separators=(",", ":"),
ensure_ascii=False,
)
def open_log_text(text: str, cipher: E2eCipher, *, path: str) -> str:
"""Open an envelope back to the ``dump_log`` shape."""
if not is_e2e_envelope(text):
if cipher.accept_plaintext:
return text
msg = f"plaintext blob at {path} after migration"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
data = json.loads(text)
if data["v"] != E2E_FORMAT_VERSION:
msg = f"blob at {path} uses format {data['v']}; update the app"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
whole = data.get("b")
if isinstance(whole, str):
return cipher.open(whole, path=path)
records = data.get("r")
if not isinstance(records, dict):
msg = f"envelope at {path} is mis-shaped"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for rid, rec in records.items():
if (
not isinstance(rec, dict)
or not isinstance(rec.get("p"), str)
or not isinstance(rec.get("d"), bool)
):
msg = f"record {rid} at {path} is mis-shaped"
raise E2eDecryptError(msg)
clear = cipher.open(
rec["p"],
path=_record_aad(path, rid, rec["d"], rec.get("dh"), rec.get("h")),
)
out[rid] = {
"id": rid,
"fields": json.loads(clear),
"deleted": rec["d"],
"deleted_hlc": rec.get("dh"),
}
return json.dumps(out, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)

View File

@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Clear an app's old plaintext prefix once its encrypted copy is proven.
The migration never deletes the old prefix by itself: an old build may still
write there. Run this once every device runs an encrypting build. It never
creates a header (a typo'd passphrase must not lock the app for good) and
deletes nothing unless every old blob is contained in the encrypted copy.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hmac
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from crdt_sync._e2e_key import derive_key, read_header
from crdt_sync._e2e_store import E2eLayout, E2eLockedError, EncryptingStore, _blobs
from crdt_sync._log import merge_logs
from crdt_sync._store import dump_log, load_log
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from crdt_sync._e2e_key import E2eKey
from crdt_sync._remote import RemoteStore
def unverified_blobs(
store: RemoteStore, key: E2eKey, old_prefix: str, layout: E2eLayout
) -> list[str]:
"""Return old blobs (relative paths) not fully contained in the copy."""
dest = EncryptingStore(store, key, layout)
missing: list[str] = []
for rel, text in sorted(_blobs(store, old_prefix).items()):
try:
source = load_log(text)
copied = dest.get_file_text(f"{layout.prefix}/{rel}")
current = load_log(copied) if copied is not None else None
except ValueError, KeyError, TypeError:
missing.append(rel)
continue
if not source:
continue
if current is None or dump_log(merge_logs(current, source)) != dump_log(
current
):
missing.append(rel)
return missing
def _existing_key(store: RemoteStore, layout: E2eLayout, passphrase: str) -> E2eKey:
header = read_header(store, layout.e2e_path)
if header is None:
msg = f"no e2e header at {layout.e2e_path}: nothing was migrated"
raise E2eLockedError(msg)
key = derive_key(passphrase, header.salt, header.params)
if not hmac.compare_digest(key.check_for(header.salt), header.check):
msg = "wrong crdt-sync passphrase"
raise E2eLockedError(msg)
return key
def clear_plaintext_prefix(
store: RemoteStore, old_prefix: str, *, passphrase: str, apply: bool
) -> list[str]:
"""Return the old paths to delete; delete them only when ``apply``.
Raises:
E2eLockedError: No header, a wrong passphrase, or a copy that does
not yet hold every old record.
"""
layout = E2eLayout.of(old_prefix)
key = _existing_key(store, layout, passphrase)
missing = unverified_blobs(store, key, old_prefix, layout)
if missing:
msg = f"copy not verified for {', '.join(missing)}"
raise E2eLockedError(msg)
paths = [f"{old_prefix}/{rel}" for rel in sorted(_blobs(store, old_prefix))]
if apply:
for path in paths:
store.delete_file(path, message="e2e: clear plaintext prefix")
return paths

View File

@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Argon2id key from the shared crdt-sync password, plus HKDF subkeys.
Byte-compatible with ``crdt_sync_dart``'s ``E2eKey``/``unlockE2e``: the clear
header at ``e2e_path`` holds salt, Argon2id cost and a check MAC, never a key.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from dataclasses import dataclass
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import secrets
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from argon2.low_level import Type, hash_secret_raw
from crdt_sync._e2e_cipher import E2eCipher
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from crdt_sync._remote import RemoteStore
_SALT = 16
_MASTER = 32
_HEADER_VERSION = 1
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Argon2Params:
"""Argon2id cost, stored in the header so it can be raised later."""
memory_kib: int = 19456
iterations: int = 2
parallelism: int = 1
class E2eHeaderError(ValueError):
"""The header exists but cannot be parsed; it is never overwritten."""
class E2eWrongPassphraseError(Exception):
"""The passphrase does not match the header's check."""
def default_e2e_path(path_prefix: str) -> str:
"""Return the header path: a sibling of the device dirs, like ``revs``."""
head, sep, _ = path_prefix.rpartition("/")
return f"{head}/e2e" if sep else f"{path_prefix}/e2e"
def _hkdf(master: bytes, label: str) -> bytes:
prk = hmac.new(b"", master, hashlib.sha256).digest()
info = f"crdt_sync e2e {label}".encode()
return hmac.new(prk, info + b"\x01", hashlib.sha256).digest()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class E2eKey:
"""A 32-byte master key and its subkeys. Never written to the remote."""
master: bytes
enc: bytes
rev: bytes
check: bytes
@classmethod
def from_bytes(cls, master: bytes) -> E2eKey:
"""Expand a cached 32-byte master key."""
if len(master) != _MASTER:
msg = "master key must be 32 bytes"
raise ValueError(msg)
return cls(
master, _hkdf(master, "enc"), _hkdf(master, "rev"), _hkdf(master, "check")
)
def cipher(self, *, accept_plaintext: bool = True) -> E2eCipher:
"""Return the blob cipher for this key."""
return E2eCipher(self.enc, accept_plaintext=accept_plaintext)
def revision(self, text: str) -> str:
"""Return the keyed revision (hex HMAC-SHA256) of ``text``."""
return hmac.new(self.rev, text.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def check_for(self, salt: bytes) -> str:
"""Return the header check value for ``salt``."""
mac = hmac.new(self.check, salt, hashlib.sha256).digest()
return base64.b64encode(mac).decode()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _Header:
salt: bytes
params: Argon2Params
check: str
@classmethod
def parse(cls, text: str) -> _Header:
try:
data = json.loads(text)
except ValueError as exc:
msg = "e2e header is not JSON"
raise E2eHeaderError(msg) from exc
if not isinstance(data, dict) or data.get("v") != _HEADER_VERSION:
msg = "e2e header is not a known version"
raise E2eHeaderError(msg)
if data.get("kdf") != "argon2id":
msg = "e2e header is malformed"
raise E2eHeaderError(msg)
try:
return cls(
base64.b64decode(data["salt"]),
Argon2Params(int(data["m"]), int(data["t"]), int(data["p"])),
str(data["check"]),
)
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
msg = "e2e header is malformed"
raise E2eHeaderError(msg) from exc
def encode(self) -> str:
return json.dumps(
{
"v": _HEADER_VERSION,
"kdf": "argon2id",
"salt": base64.b64encode(self.salt).decode(),
"m": self.params.memory_kib,
"t": self.params.iterations,
"p": self.params.parallelism,
"check": self.check,
},
separators=(",", ":"),
)
def derive_key(passphrase: str, salt: bytes, params: Argon2Params) -> E2eKey:
"""Run Argon2id (v1.3) and expand the subkeys."""
master = hash_secret_raw(
secret=passphrase.encode(),
salt=salt,
time_cost=params.iterations,
memory_cost=params.memory_kib,
parallelism=params.parallelism,
hash_len=32,
type=Type.ID,
)
return E2eKey.from_bytes(master)
def read_header(store: RemoteStore, path: str) -> _Header | None:
"""Return the parsed header at ``path``, or None when absent."""
text = store.get_file_text(path)
return None if text is None else _Header.parse(text)
def key_matches(key: E2eKey, store: RemoteStore, path: str) -> bool:
"""Return whether ``key`` matches the header at ``path``."""
header = read_header(store, path)
return header is not None and hmac.compare_digest(
key.check_for(header.salt), header.check
)
def unlock_e2e(
store: RemoteStore,
*,
path_prefix: str,
passphrase: str,
params: Argon2Params | None = None,
e2e_path: str | None = None,
) -> E2eKey:
"""Derive the key from ``passphrase``, creating the header on first use."""
if not passphrase:
msg = "passphrase must not be empty"
raise ValueError(msg)
path = e2e_path or default_e2e_path(path_prefix)
header = read_header(store, path)
if header is None:
salt = secrets.token_bytes(_SALT)
cost = params or Argon2Params()
key = derive_key(passphrase, salt, cost)
encoded = _Header(salt, cost, key.check_for(salt)).encode()
store.put_file_text(path, encoded, message=path)
stored = store.get_file_text(path) or encoded
if stored == encoded:
return key
header = _Header.parse(stored)
key = derive_key(passphrase, header.salt, header.params)
if not hmac.compare_digest(key.check_for(header.salt), header.check):
raise E2eWrongPassphraseError
return key

View File

@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Encrypted remote store, ``-e2e`` layout and the one-time copy.
Mirrors ``crdt_sync_dart``'s ``EncryptingStore``, ``E2eLayout``,
``copyToEncrypted`` and ``openEncryptedStore`` so Python daemons and Flutter
apps share one encrypted prefix per app.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import logging
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from crdt_sync._e2e_cache import (
read_cached_key,
read_copy_memo,
write_cached_key,
write_copy_memo,
)
from crdt_sync._e2e_cipher import E2eDecryptError, open_log_text, seal_log_text
from crdt_sync._e2e_key import (
Argon2Params,
E2eHeaderError,
E2eKey,
E2eWrongPassphraseError,
key_matches,
unlock_e2e,
)
from crdt_sync._log import merge_logs
from crdt_sync._store import dump_log, load_log
from crdt_sync._sync import default_revs_path
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from pathlib import Path
from crdt_sync._remote import RemoteStore
_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class E2eLockedError(Exception):
"""No usable key: the caller must not sync at all (fail closed)."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class E2eLayout:
"""Where an app's encrypted data lives, derived from its old prefix."""
prefix: str
revs_path: str
e2e_path: str
@classmethod
def of(cls, old_prefix: str) -> E2eLayout:
"""Return ``<old>-e2e`` with revs and header kept out of old paths."""
prefix = f"{old_prefix}-e2e"
parent, sep, _ = old_prefix.rpartition("/")
if not sep:
return cls(prefix, f"{prefix}/revs", f"{prefix}/e2e")
return cls(prefix, f"{parent}/revs-e2e", f"{parent}/e2e")
class EncryptingStore:
"""Seals log blobs under the layout's prefix and keys its revisions."""
def __init__(self, inner: RemoteStore, key: E2eKey, layout: E2eLayout) -> None:
"""Wrap ``inner``; other paths pass through unchanged."""
self._inner = inner
self.key = key
self._layout = layout
self._cipher = key.cipher()
def _is_rev(self, path: str) -> bool:
return path.startswith(f"{self._layout.revs_path}/")
def _is_log(self, path: str) -> bool:
return (
not self._is_rev(path)
and path != self._layout.e2e_path
and path.startswith(f"{self._layout.prefix}/")
)
def list_directory(self, path: str) -> list[str]:
"""Delegate."""
return self._inner.list_directory(path)
def get_file_text(self, path: str) -> str | None:
"""Read and open a sealed log; other paths pass through."""
text = self._inner.get_file_text(path)
if text is None or not self._is_log(path):
return text
return open_log_text(text, self._cipher, path=path)
def put_file_text(self, path: str, text: str, *, message: str) -> None:
"""Seal logs and key revisions before writing."""
if self._is_log(path):
text = seal_log_text(text, self._cipher, path=path)
elif self._is_rev(path):
text = self.key.revision(text)
self._inner.put_file_text(path, text, message=message)
def get_string_map(self, path: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Bulk read; sealed entries come back opened, bad ones dropped."""
reader = getattr(self._inner, "get_string_map", None)
if reader is None:
return {}
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for name, value in reader(path).items():
full = f"{path}/{name}"
if not self._is_log(full):
out[name] = value
continue
try:
out[name] = open_log_text(value, self._cipher, path=full)
except E2eDecryptError:
_logger.warning("Undecryptable entry %s dropped", full)
return out
def delete_file(self, path: str, *, message: str = "") -> None:
"""Delegate."""
self._inner.delete_file(path, message=message)
def can_access_remote(self) -> bool:
"""Delegate."""
return self._inner.can_access_remote()
def _blobs(store: RemoteStore, root: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Every text blob under ``root`` (flat leaves and ``<dir>/<file>``)."""
skip = {default_revs_path(root), f"{root}/e2e", f"{root}/revs"}
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for name in store.list_directory(root):
full = f"{root}/{name}"
if full in skip:
continue
children = store.list_directory(full)
if not children:
text = store.get_file_text(full)
if text is not None:
out[name] = text
continue
for child in children:
text = store.get_file_text(f"{full}/{child}")
if text is not None:
out[f"{name}/{child}"] = text
return out
def copy_to_encrypted(
store: RemoteStore, key: E2eKey, old_prefix: str, layout: E2eLayout
) -> int:
"""Merge every readable old log into its encrypted twin; return writes."""
dest = EncryptingStore(store, key, layout)
copied = 0
for rel, text in _blobs(store, old_prefix).items():
try:
source = load_log(text)
except ValueError, KeyError, TypeError:
_logger.warning("Unreadable old log %s/%s not copied", old_prefix, rel)
continue
if not source:
continue
path = f"{layout.prefix}/{rel}"
existing = dest.get_file_text(path)
try:
current = load_log(existing) if existing is not None else {}
except ValueError, KeyError, TypeError:
# Not a sync log (an app's own blob): never overwrite it.
_logger.warning("Non-log blob at %s left as is", path)
continue
merged = merge_logs(current, source)
if existing is not None and dump_log(merged) == dump_log(current):
continue
dest.put_file_text(path, dump_log(merged), message="e2e copy")
copied += 1
return copied
_copied: dict[str, str] = {}
def reset_e2e_copy_memo() -> None:
"""Forget which old prefixes were copied; for tests."""
_copied.clear()
def _fingerprint(store: RemoteStore, old_prefix: str) -> str:
reader = getattr(store, "get_string_map", None)
if reader is None:
return ""
revs = reader(default_revs_path(old_prefix))
return ";".join(f"{k}={revs[k]}" for k in sorted(revs))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _OpenRequest:
old_prefix: str
layout: E2eLayout
passphrase: str
params: Argon2Params | None
state_dir: Path | None
def _unlock(store: RemoteStore, req: _OpenRequest) -> E2eKey:
old_prefix, layout, state_dir = req.old_prefix, req.layout, req.state_dir
if state_dir is not None:
cached = read_cached_key(state_dir, old_prefix)
if cached is not None:
key = E2eKey.from_bytes(cached)
if key_matches(key, store, layout.e2e_path):
return key
if not req.passphrase:
msg = "no crdt-sync passphrase on this device"
raise E2eLockedError(msg)
try:
key = unlock_e2e(
store,
path_prefix=layout.prefix,
passphrase=req.passphrase,
params=req.params,
e2e_path=layout.e2e_path,
)
except (E2eWrongPassphraseError, E2eHeaderError) as exc:
raise E2eLockedError(str(exc) or type(exc).__name__) from exc
if state_dir is not None:
write_cached_key(state_dir, old_prefix, key.master)
return key
def open_encrypted_client(
store: RemoteStore,
old_prefix: str,
*,
passphrase: str,
params: Argon2Params | None = None,
state_dir: Path | None = None,
) -> tuple[EncryptingStore, E2eLayout]:
"""Unlock, copy the old prefix when it changed, and return the store.
Args:
store: The outermost remote (above any mirror).
old_prefix: The app's former plaintext prefix.
passphrase: The shared crdt-sync password.
params: Argon2id cost for a header created now; tests lower it.
state_dir: Where a short-lived daemon keeps its derived key (0600)
and copy memo between runs; None keeps both in memory only.
Raises:
E2eLockedError: No passphrase, a wrong one, or an unreadable header.
"""
layout = E2eLayout.of(old_prefix)
key = _unlock(
store, _OpenRequest(old_prefix, layout, passphrase, params, state_dir)
)
fingerprint = _fingerprint(store, old_prefix)
last = (
read_copy_memo(state_dir, old_prefix)
if state_dir is not None
else _copied.get(old_prefix)
)
if last != fingerprint:
copy_to_encrypted(store, key, old_prefix, layout)
_copied[old_prefix] = fingerprint
if state_dir is not None:
write_copy_memo(state_dir, old_prefix, fingerprint)
return EncryptingStore(store, key, layout), layout

View File

@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
import logging
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from crdt_sync._e2e_cipher import E2eDecryptError
from crdt_sync._revisions import revision_of
if TYPE_CHECKING:
@ -91,16 +90,9 @@ def _pull_remote_logs(
# skipped next tick.
seen_revs[other_device_id] = remote_rev
continue
try:
text = ctx.client.get_file_text(
f"{ctx.path_prefix}/{other_device_id}/{ctx.filename}"
)
except E2eDecryptError:
_logger.warning(
"Undecryptable log from device %r (wrong key or newer app)",
other_device_id,
)
continue
text = ctx.client.get_file_text(
f"{ctx.path_prefix}/{other_device_id}/{ctx.filename}"
)
if text is None:
continue
try:

View File

@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
{
"passphrase": "correct horse ✓",
"header": "{\"v\":1,\"kdf\":\"argon2id\",\"salt\":\"HGW+FZJe6hd71He22BrlUA==\",\"m\":64,\"t\":2,\"p\":1,\"check\":\"okKnATkNoZKvjSGfrgQGOjdRw5NORh2lC32zuBq7V6I=\"}",
"master_hex": "cad5afe8ddc6e21d2f39eb196de454db6b6d1f60629619ce8539f03a4bb0b086",
"revision_of_abc": "e7f845e1b0a7ea2b571fd3e3bdfb60641e650d63171bf73b6356c7909d2748c8",
"path": "vec/notes-e2e/phone/log.json",
"log": "{\"n1\":{\"id\":\"n1\",\"fields\":{\"title\":[\"buy milk\",\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\"]},\"deleted\":false,\"deleted_hlc\":null},\"n2\":{\"id\":\"n2\",\"fields\":{\"title\":[\"zażółć\",\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\"]},\"deleted\":false,\"deleted_hlc\":null}}",
"envelope": "{\"v\":1,\"r\":{\"n1\":{\"d\":false,\"dh\":null,\"h\":\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\",\"p\":\"AR1zODx4TD67X3TGa0N7EV/V4FcZAaqc41jxZVtskFu3Pqb/pNlqm6db66rQUaMyNLtTPa4HMOJzZomBRyaSHjaPb4oNxgVPkMeIF5IbuI/GA30gR0sz/MSvYmfZ5wSnlBo1+fpH\"},\"n2\":{\"d\":false,\"dh\":null,\"h\":\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\",\"p\":\"Aa0omlBGnmlsItzq7A21G0A1tqT8xMOJE0wgxcxJ1c3hVpRmNt4kq2IPNNGuW8v4A7fvs2FrnGX4A+NVtXPpu41ckKSShTqk8Ml6zTuxyrT85g50sgzbM7PKFczeEaS+ITWDj0N04u0=\"}}}",
"whole": "{\"v\":1,\"b\":\"AYdAwPehG84oHBRhRr5dP5VmleBGzQC1ryV5QHTCqBZE9ZsOZMMkJiP40+KzpnfIc2g=\"}"
}

View File

@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""E2eCipher blob errors and the per-record envelope's edge shapes."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import pytest
from crdt_sync import (
E2eCipher,
E2eDecryptError,
is_e2e_envelope,
open_log_text,
seal_log_text,
)
PATH = "app/devices-e2e/pc/log.json"
CLOCK = "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-pc"
def _cipher(*, accept_plaintext: bool = True) -> E2eCipher:
return E2eCipher(bytes(range(32)), accept_plaintext=accept_plaintext)
def _blob(raw: bytes) -> str:
return base64.b64encode(raw).decode()
def _log(**records: object) -> str:
return json.dumps(records)
def _record(rid: str = "a", **extra: object) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"id": rid,
"fields": {"title": ["x", CLOCK]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
**extra,
}
def test_key_must_be_32_bytes() -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="32 bytes"):
E2eCipher(b"short")
def test_blob_round_trips() -> None:
cipher = _cipher()
assert cipher.open(cipher.seal("héllo", path=PATH), path=PATH) == "héllo"
def test_plaintext_is_read_only_while_accepted() -> None:
assert _cipher().open('{"a": 1}', path=PATH) == '{"a": 1}'
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="after migration"):
_cipher(accept_plaintext=False).open("[1]", path=PATH)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("stored", "message"),
[
("!!not base64!!", "neither JSON nor base64"),
("", "empty blob"),
(_blob(b"\x02" + bytes(60)), "uses format 2"),
(_blob(b"\x01" + bytes(10)), "truncated"),
(_blob(b"\x01" + bytes(60)), "failed authentication"),
],
)
def test_bad_blobs_are_refused(stored: str, message: str) -> None:
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match=message):
_cipher().open(stored, path=PATH)
def test_blob_is_bound_to_its_path() -> None:
sealed = _cipher().seal("secret", path=PATH)
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="failed authentication"):
_cipher().open(sealed, path="other")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("text", ["not json", "[1]", '{"v": true}', '{"v": "1"}', "{}"])
def test_non_envelopes_are_detected(text: str) -> None:
assert not is_e2e_envelope(text)
def test_envelope_is_detected() -> None:
assert is_e2e_envelope('{"v": 1}')
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"text",
[
"not json",
"[1]",
_log(a=[1]),
_log(a=_record("b")),
_log(a={"id": "a", "fields": []}),
],
)
def test_non_log_text_is_sealed_whole(text: str) -> None:
sealed = seal_log_text(text, _cipher(), path=PATH)
assert "b" in json.loads(sealed)
assert open_log_text(sealed, _cipher(), path=PATH) == text
def test_record_without_fields_has_no_newest_clock() -> None:
empty = {"id": "a", "fields": {}, "deleted": True, "deleted_hlc": CLOCK}
sealed = seal_log_text(_log(a=empty), _cipher(), path=PATH)
assert json.loads(sealed)["r"]["a"]["h"] is None
opened = json.loads(open_log_text(sealed, _cipher(), path=PATH))
assert opened == {"a": empty}
def test_plaintext_log_passes_or_fails_by_policy() -> None:
text = _log(a=_record())
assert open_log_text(text, _cipher(), path=PATH) == text
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="after migration"):
open_log_text(text, _cipher(accept_plaintext=False), path=PATH)
def test_unknown_envelope_version_is_refused() -> None:
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="uses format 2"):
open_log_text('{"v": 2, "r": {}}', _cipher(), path=PATH)
def test_envelope_without_records_is_misshaped() -> None:
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="mis-shaped"):
open_log_text('{"v": 1, "b": 5, "r": []}', _cipher(), path=PATH)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"record",
[[], {"p": "x", "d": 1}, {"d": False}, {"p": 3, "d": False}],
)
def test_misshaped_record_is_refused(record: object) -> None:
text = json.dumps({"v": 1, "r": {"a": record}})
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="record a"):
open_log_text(text, _cipher(), path=PATH)
def test_tampered_record_metadata_fails_authentication() -> None:
sealed = json.loads(seal_log_text(_log(a=_record()), _cipher(), path=PATH))
sealed["r"]["a"]["d"] = True
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError, match="failed authentication"):
open_log_text(json.dumps(sealed), _cipher(), path=PATH)

View File

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Clearing an old plaintext prefix only after the encrypted copy is proven."""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import json
import pytest
from crdt_sync import (
Argon2Params,
E2eLayout,
E2eLockedError,
clear_plaintext_prefix,
copy_to_encrypted,
unlock_e2e,
unverified_blobs,
)
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore
from tool import e2e_cleanup
CHEAP = Argon2Params(8, 1, 1)
PHRASE = "pw"
WRONG = PHRASE + "x"
OLD = "app/devices"
LAYOUT = E2eLayout.of(OLD)
def _log(title: str, stamp: str = "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z") -> str:
return json.dumps(
{
"n": {
"id": "n",
"fields": {"t": [title, f"{stamp}-0000-a"]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
}
)
def _seeded() -> FakeStore:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": _log("x"), "app/revs/pc": "r"})
key = unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix=LAYOUT.prefix,
passphrase=PHRASE,
params=CHEAP,
e2e_path=LAYOUT.e2e_path,
)
copy_to_encrypted(remote, key, OLD, LAYOUT)
return remote
def test_dry_run_lists_and_deletes_nothing() -> None:
remote = _seeded()
paths = clear_plaintext_prefix(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, apply=False)
assert paths == [f"{OLD}/pc/log.json"]
assert f"{OLD}/pc/log.json" in remote.files
def test_apply_deletes_only_after_verification() -> None:
remote = _seeded()
clear_plaintext_prefix(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, apply=True)
assert f"{OLD}/pc/log.json" not in remote.files
assert f"{LAYOUT.prefix}/pc/log.json" in remote.files
def test_unverified_copy_refuses() -> None:
remote = _seeded()
remote.files[f"{OLD}/pc/log.json"] = _log("newer", "2026-02-01T00:00:00.000Z")
remote.files[f"{OLD}/bad/log.json"] = "{oops"
key = unlock_e2e(
remote, path_prefix=LAYOUT.prefix, passphrase=PHRASE, e2e_path=LAYOUT.e2e_path
)
assert unverified_blobs(remote, key, OLD, LAYOUT) == ["bad/log.json", "pc/log.json"]
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError, match="not verified"):
clear_plaintext_prefix(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, apply=True)
assert f"{OLD}/pc/log.json" in remote.files
def test_empty_logs_need_no_copy() -> None:
remote = _seeded()
remote.files[f"{OLD}/tab/log.json"] = "{}"
paths = clear_plaintext_prefix(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, apply=False)
assert f"{OLD}/tab/log.json" in paths
def test_never_creates_a_header_and_wrong_passphrase_locks() -> None:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": _log("x")})
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError, match="no e2e header"):
clear_plaintext_prefix(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, apply=False)
assert LAYOUT.e2e_path not in remote.files
seeded = _seeded()
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError):
clear_plaintext_prefix(seeded, OLD, passphrase=WRONG, apply=False)
def test_tool_main(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
remote = _seeded()
out = io.StringIO()
monkeypatch.setattr("sys.stdout", out)
assert e2e_cleanup.run(remote, OLD, PHRASE, apply=False) == 0
assert "would delete 1" in out.getvalue()
assert e2e_cleanup.run(remote, OLD, PHRASE, apply=True) == 0
assert "deleted 1" in out.getvalue()
assert e2e_cleanup.run(FakeStore(), OLD, PHRASE, apply=True) == 1

View File

@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Cross-language golden vectors: Python opens what Dart sealed."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from crdt_sync import (
E2eDecryptError,
E2eKey,
E2eWrongPassphraseError,
open_log_text,
seal_log_text,
unlock_e2e,
)
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore as MemoryRemote
WRONG = "nope"
VECTORS = json.loads(
(Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "e2e_dart_vectors.json").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
)
def _key() -> E2eKey:
remote = MemoryRemote({"vec/e2e": VECTORS["header"]})
return unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix="vec/notes-e2e",
passphrase=str(VECTORS["passphrase"]),
e2e_path="vec/e2e",
)
def test_argon2id_and_hkdf_match_dart() -> None:
assert _key().master.hex() == VECTORS["master_hex"]
def test_keyed_revision_matches_dart() -> None:
assert _key().revision("abc") == VECTORS["revision_of_abc"]
def test_opens_a_dart_envelope() -> None:
opened = open_log_text(VECTORS["envelope"], _key().cipher(), path=VECTORS["path"])
assert json.loads(opened) == json.loads(VECTORS["log"])
def test_opens_a_dart_whole_blob() -> None:
opened = open_log_text(VECTORS["whole"], _key().cipher(), path=VECTORS["path"])
assert opened == "not a log"
def test_wrong_passphrase_is_refused() -> None:
remote = MemoryRemote({"vec/e2e": VECTORS["header"]})
with pytest.raises(E2eWrongPassphraseError):
unlock_e2e(remote, path_prefix="x", passphrase=WRONG, e2e_path="vec/e2e")
def test_a_moved_envelope_is_refused() -> None:
with pytest.raises(E2eDecryptError):
open_log_text(VECTORS["envelope"], _key().cipher(), path="vec/other")
def test_python_round_trip() -> None:
cipher = _key().cipher()
sealed = seal_log_text(VECTORS["log"], cipher, path=VECTORS["path"])
assert "buy milk" not in sealed
assert json.loads(open_log_text(sealed, cipher, path=VECTORS["path"])) == (
json.loads(VECTORS["log"])
)

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# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Argon2id key, header parsing and unlock edge cases."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pytest
from crdt_sync import (
Argon2Params,
E2eHeaderError,
E2eKey,
E2eWrongPassphraseError,
default_e2e_path,
unlock_e2e,
)
from crdt_sync._e2e_key import key_matches, read_header
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore
CHEAP = Argon2Params(8, 1, 1)
HEADER = {
"v": 1,
"kdf": "argon2id",
"salt": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==",
"m": 8,
"t": 1,
"p": 1,
"check": "c",
}
def _unlock(remote: FakeStore, phrase: str = "pw") -> E2eKey:
return unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix="app/devices-e2e",
passphrase=phrase,
params=CHEAP,
e2e_path="app/e2e",
)
class RacedStore(FakeStore):
"""Another device's header wins the first write."""
def __init__(self, winner: str) -> None:
super().__init__()
self._winner = winner
def put_file_text(self, path: str, text: str, *, message: str) -> None:
super().put_file_text(path, self._winner, message=message)
def test_default_path_is_a_sibling_or_nested() -> None:
assert default_e2e_path("app/devices-e2e") == "app/e2e"
assert default_e2e_path("flat") == "flat/e2e"
def test_master_key_must_be_32_bytes() -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="32 bytes"):
E2eKey.from_bytes(b"short")
def test_unlock_refuses_an_empty_passphrase() -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="empty"):
_unlock(FakeStore(), "")
def test_unlock_creates_then_reuses_the_header() -> None:
remote = FakeStore()
first = _unlock(remote)
assert _unlock(remote).master == first.master
assert key_matches(first, remote, "app/e2e")
assert not key_matches(_unlock(FakeStore(), "other"), remote, "app/e2e")
def test_missing_header_matches_nothing() -> None:
key = E2eKey.from_bytes(bytes(32))
assert read_header(FakeStore(), "app/e2e") is None
assert not key_matches(key, FakeStore(), "app/e2e")
def test_wrong_passphrase_is_refused() -> None:
remote = FakeStore()
_unlock(remote)
with pytest.raises(E2eWrongPassphraseError):
_unlock(remote, "nope")
def test_losing_the_header_race_adopts_the_winner() -> None:
winner = FakeStore()
key = _unlock(winner)
raced = RacedStore(winner.files["app/e2e"])
assert _unlock(raced).master == key.master
with pytest.raises(E2eWrongPassphraseError):
_unlock(RacedStore(winner.files["app/e2e"]), "nope")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("text", "message"),
[
("not json", "not JSON"),
("[1]", "known version"),
(json.dumps({**HEADER, "v": 2}), "known version"),
(json.dumps({**HEADER, "kdf": "scrypt"}), "malformed"),
(json.dumps({k: v for k, v in HEADER.items() if k != "m"}), "malformed"),
(json.dumps({**HEADER, "m": "x"}), "malformed"),
(json.dumps({**HEADER, "salt": "A"}), "malformed"),
],
)
def test_bad_headers_are_refused(text: str, message: str) -> None:
remote = FakeStore({"app/e2e": text})
with pytest.raises(E2eHeaderError, match=message):
read_header(remote, "app/e2e")
with pytest.raises(E2eHeaderError, match=message):
_unlock(remote)
def test_a_good_header_parses() -> None:
header = read_header(FakeStore({"app/e2e": json.dumps(HEADER)}), "app/e2e")
assert header is not None
assert header.params == CHEAP
assert header.check == "c"

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# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""A per-minute daemon must not pay Argon2id or a full copy every tick."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import pytest
from crdt_sync import Argon2Params, E2eLockedError, open_encrypted_client
from crdt_sync import _e2e_key as key_mod
from crdt_sync import _e2e_store as store_mod
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from pathlib import Path
from crdt_sync import E2eKey, RemoteStore
CHEAP = Argon2Params(8, 1, 1)
PHRASE = "pw"
WRONG = PHRASE + "x"
LOG = json.dumps(
{
"a": {
"id": "a",
"fields": {"t": ["x", "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-a"]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
}
)
def test_state_dir_caches_key_and_copy_across_processes(
tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
) -> None:
remote = FakeStore({"app/devices/pc/log.json": LOG, "app/revs/pc": "r1"})
derives: list[int] = []
real = key_mod.unlock_e2e
def counting(
remote: RemoteStore,
*,
path_prefix: str,
passphrase: str,
params: Argon2Params | None = None,
e2e_path: str | None = None,
) -> E2eKey:
derives.append(1)
return real(
remote,
path_prefix=path_prefix,
passphrase=passphrase,
params=params,
e2e_path=e2e_path,
)
monkeypatch.setattr(store_mod, "unlock_e2e", counting)
for _ in range(3):
store_mod.reset_e2e_copy_memo() # a fresh process each tick
remote.writes.clear()
open_encrypted_client(
remote, "app/devices", passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP, state_dir=tmp_path
)
assert derives == [1]
assert remote.writes == []
key_files = list(tmp_path.glob("e2e-*.key"))
assert len(key_files) == 1
assert key_files[0].stat().st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
def test_stale_cached_key_rederives(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
remote = FakeStore()
open_encrypted_client(
remote, "app/devices", passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP, state_dir=tmp_path
)
for key_file in tmp_path.glob("e2e-*.key"):
key_file.write_text("00" * 32, encoding="utf-8")
store, _ = open_encrypted_client(
remote, "app/devices", passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP, state_dir=tmp_path
)
assert next(tmp_path.glob("e2e-*.key")).read_text(encoding="utf-8") == (
store.key.master.hex()
)
def test_garbage_cached_key_is_ignored_and_wrong_passphrase_locks(
tmp_path: Path,
) -> None:
remote = FakeStore()
open_encrypted_client(
remote, "app/devices", passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP, state_dir=tmp_path
)
for key_file in tmp_path.glob("e2e-*.key"):
key_file.write_text("not hex", encoding="utf-8")
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError):
open_encrypted_client(
remote, "app/devices", passphrase=WRONG, params=CHEAP, state_dir=tmp_path
)

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# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""EncryptingStore, layout, one-time copy and open, mirroring the Dart side."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import pytest
from crdt_sync import (
Argon2Params,
E2eLayout,
E2eLockedError,
EncryptingStore,
LogCodec,
SyncTarget,
copy_to_encrypted,
dump_log,
load_log,
open_encrypted_client,
reset_e2e_copy_memo,
sync_log,
unlock_e2e,
)
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
from crdt_sync import Hlc
PHRASE = "pw"
WRONG = "bad"
CHEAP = Argon2Params(8, 1, 1)
OLD = "app/devices"
def _log_text(make_hlc: Callable[..., Hlc], **titles: str) -> str:
return json.dumps(
{
rid: {
"id": rid,
"fields": {"title": [t, make_hlc(1000).to_str()]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
for rid, t in titles.items()
}
)
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _memo() -> None:
reset_e2e_copy_memo()
def test_layouts() -> None:
assert E2eLayout.of("app/devices") == E2eLayout(
"app/devices-e2e", "app/revs-e2e", "app/e2e"
)
assert E2eLayout.of("settings-sync") == E2eLayout(
"settings-sync-e2e", "settings-sync-e2e/revs", "settings-sync-e2e/e2e"
)
def test_sync_through_store_is_ciphertext_and_merges(
make_hlc: Callable[..., Hlc],
) -> None:
remote = FakeStore()
layout = E2eLayout.of(OLD)
key = unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix=layout.prefix,
passphrase=PHRASE,
params=CHEAP,
e2e_path=layout.e2e_path,
)
store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, layout)
codec = LogCodec(encode=dump_log, decode=load_log, filename="log.json")
phone = load_log(_log_text(make_hlc, n1="buy milk"))
sync_log(SyncTarget(store, "phone", layout.prefix), phone, codec)
blob = remote.files[f"{layout.prefix}/phone/log.json"]
assert "buy milk" not in blob
assert '"title"' not in blob
merged = sync_log(SyncTarget(store, "pc", layout.prefix), {}, codec)
assert set(merged) == {"n1"}
def test_open_copies_old_prefix_once_and_locks_without_password(
make_hlc: Callable[..., Hlc],
) -> None:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": _log_text(make_hlc, a="x")})
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError):
open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase="", params=CHEAP)
store, layout = open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP)
text = store.get_file_text(f"{layout.prefix}/pc/log.json")
assert text is not None
assert set(load_log(text)) == {"a"}
assert "x" in remote.files[f"{OLD}/pc/log.json"]
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError):
open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=WRONG, params=CHEAP)
def test_copy_is_idempotent(make_hlc: Callable[..., Hlc]) -> None:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": _log_text(make_hlc, a="x")})
layout = E2eLayout.of(OLD)
key = unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix=layout.prefix,
passphrase=PHRASE,
params=CHEAP,
e2e_path=layout.e2e_path,
)
assert copy_to_encrypted(remote, key, OLD, layout) == 1
remote.writes.clear()
assert copy_to_encrypted(remote, key, OLD, layout) == 0
assert remote.writes == []

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@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""EncryptingStore passthroughs, bulk reads and copy/open edge cases."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import pytest
from crdt_sync import (
Argon2Params,
E2eLayout,
E2eLockedError,
EncryptingStore,
copy_to_encrypted,
load_log,
open_encrypted_client,
reset_e2e_copy_memo,
unlock_e2e,
)
from crdt_sync._e2e_store import _blobs, _fingerprint
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore, FakeStoreWithoutBulkRead
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
from crdt_sync import E2eKey, Hlc
PHRASE = "pw"
CHEAP = Argon2Params(8, 1, 1)
OLD = "app/devices"
LAYOUT = E2eLayout.of(OLD)
CLOCK = "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-pc"
def _log(title: str = "x", rid: str = "a") -> str:
return json.dumps(
{
rid: {
"id": rid,
"fields": {"title": [title, CLOCK]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
}
)
def _key(remote: FakeStore) -> E2eKey:
return unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix=LAYOUT.prefix,
passphrase=PHRASE,
params=CHEAP,
e2e_path=LAYOUT.e2e_path,
)
class HidingStore(FakeStore):
"""Lists every file but reads ``hidden`` paths as absent."""
def __init__(self, files: dict[str, str], hidden: set[str]) -> None:
super().__init__(files)
self._hidden = hidden
def get_file_text(self, path: str) -> str | None:
if path in self._hidden:
return None
return super().get_file_text(path)
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _memo() -> None:
reset_e2e_copy_memo()
def test_passthroughs_and_keyed_revisions() -> None:
remote = FakeStore({"other/file": "raw"})
store = EncryptingStore(remote, _key(remote), LAYOUT)
assert store.list_directory("other") == ["file"]
assert store.get_file_text("other/file") == "raw"
assert store.get_file_text(f"{LAYOUT.prefix}/pc/log.json") is None
assert store.can_access_remote()
store.put_file_text(f"{LAYOUT.revs_path}/pc", "text", message="m")
assert remote.files[f"{LAYOUT.revs_path}/pc"] == store.key.revision("text")
store.put_file_text("other/file", "plain", message="m")
assert remote.files["other/file"] == "plain"
store.delete_file("other/file")
assert "other/file" not in remote.files
def test_bulk_read_opens_sealed_and_drops_bad(
caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
) -> None:
remote = FakeStore()
store = EncryptingStore(remote, _key(remote), LAYOUT)
store.put_file_text(f"{LAYOUT.prefix}/pc", _log(), message="m")
remote.files[f"{LAYOUT.prefix}/bad"] = '{"v": 2, "r": {}}'
remote.files[f"{LAYOUT.revs_path}/pc"] = "rev"
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
out = store.get_string_map(LAYOUT.prefix)
assert set(out) == {"pc"}
assert set(load_log(out["pc"])) == {"a"}
assert "Undecryptable entry" in caplog.text
assert store.get_string_map(LAYOUT.revs_path) == {"pc": "rev"}
def test_bulk_read_is_empty_without_inner_support() -> None:
remote = FakeStoreWithoutBulkRead()
store = EncryptingStore(remote, _key(FakeStore()), LAYOUT)
assert store.get_string_map(LAYOUT.prefix) == {}
assert _fingerprint(remote, OLD) == ""
def test_blobs_cover_flat_nested_and_skipped_paths() -> None:
remote = HidingStore(
{
f"{OLD}/flat": "f",
f"{OLD}/gone": "g",
f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": "n",
f"{OLD}/pc/hidden.json": "h",
"app/revs/pc": "r",
f"{OLD}/e2e": "h",
f"{OLD}/revs": "r",
},
{f"{OLD}/gone", f"{OLD}/pc/hidden.json"},
)
assert _blobs(remote, OLD) == {"flat": "f", "pc/log.json": "n"}
def test_copy_skips_unreadable_and_flat_logs(
caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
) -> None:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/flat": _log(), f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": "not json"})
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
copied = copy_to_encrypted(remote, _key(remote), OLD, LAYOUT)
assert copied == 1
assert "Unreadable old log" in caplog.text
assert f"{LAYOUT.prefix}/flat" in remote.files
assert f"{LAYOUT.prefix}/pc/log.json" not in remote.files
def test_changed_old_prefix_is_copied_again() -> None:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": _log("one")})
open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP)
remote.files[f"{OLD}/pc/log.json"] = _log("two", rid="b")
remote.files["app/revs/pc"] = "newer"
store, layout = open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP)
text = store.get_file_text(f"{layout.prefix}/pc/log.json")
assert text is not None
assert set(load_log(text)) == {"a", "b"}
def test_unchanged_prefix_is_not_copied_twice() -> None:
remote = FakeStore({f"{OLD}/pc/log.json": _log()})
open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP)
remote.writes.clear()
open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP)
assert remote.writes == []
def test_unreadable_header_locks_the_client() -> None:
remote = FakeStore({LAYOUT.e2e_path: "not json"})
with pytest.raises(E2eLockedError, match="not JSON"):
open_encrypted_client(remote, OLD, passphrase=PHRASE, params=CHEAP)
def test_copy_never_overwrites_non_log_and_skips_empty() -> None:
layout = E2eLayout.of("app/devices")
remote = FakeStore(
{
"app/devices/pc/current.json": "{}",
"app/devices-e2e/pc/current.json": '{"photos":["a"]}',
"app/devices/tab/current.json": "{}",
}
)
key = unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix=layout.prefix,
passphrase="x" * 8,
params=Argon2Params(8, 1, 1),
e2e_path=layout.e2e_path,
)
assert copy_to_encrypted(remote, key, "app/devices", layout) == 0
assert remote.files["app/devices-e2e/pc/current.json"] == '{"photos":["a"]}'
assert "app/devices-e2e/tab/current.json" not in remote.files
def test_copy_leaves_a_non_log_destination_alone(
make_hlc: Callable[..., Hlc],
) -> None:
layout = E2eLayout.of("app/devices")
log = {
"n": {
"id": "n",
"fields": {"t": ["x", make_hlc(1).to_str()]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
}
remote = FakeStore(
{
"app/devices/pc/current.json": json.dumps(log),
"app/devices-e2e/pc/current.json": '{"photos":["a"]}',
}
)
key = unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix=layout.prefix,
passphrase="x" * 8,
params=Argon2Params(8, 1, 1),
e2e_path=layout.e2e_path,
)
assert copy_to_encrypted(remote, key, "app/devices", layout) == 0
assert remote.files["app/devices-e2e/pc/current.json"] == '{"photos":["a"]}'

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@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""A peer whose log cannot be decrypted is skipped, not fatal."""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
from crdt_sync import (
E2eDecryptError,
GitHubSyncClient,
LogCodec,
SyncTarget,
dump_log,
load_log,
sync_log,
)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
import pytest
def test_undecryptable_peer_is_skipped(caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
client = MagicMock(spec=GitHubSyncClient)
client.list_directory.return_value = ["phone"]
client.get_file_text.side_effect = E2eDecryptError("wrong key")
codec = LogCodec(encode=dump_log, decode=load_log, filename="log.json")
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
merged = sync_log(SyncTarget(client, "pc", "devices"), {}, codec)
assert merged == {}
assert "Undecryptable log from device 'phone'" in caplog.text

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@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Tests for ``tool/client_probe``: the click-free "does the client work" check."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import requests
from tool import client_probe as probe
from tool.desktop_client import DesktopClient
_HELD = "stored-client-credential"
_CLIENT = DesktopClient(
client_id="1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com",
client_secret=_HELD,
project_id="kuhy-syncs",
)
def _location(payload: bytes) -> str:
encoded = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(payload).decode().rstrip("=")
return f"https://accounts.google.com/signin/oauth/error?authError={encoded}&x=1"
def test_auth_location_without_error_is_ok() -> None:
result = probe.classify_auth_location("https://accounts.google.com/v3/signin")
assert result.ok
def test_auth_location_none_is_ok() -> None:
assert probe.classify_auth_location(None).ok
def test_auth_error_is_decoded() -> None:
location = _location(b"\n\x0finvalid_request\x12\x02 Custom URI scheme is bad")
result = probe.classify_auth_location(location)
assert not result.ok
assert "invalid_request" in result.detail
assert "Custom URI scheme" in result.detail
def test_undecodable_auth_error_is_still_a_failure() -> None:
result = probe.classify_auth_location(
"https://accounts.google.com/signin/oauth/error?authError=!!!"
)
assert not result.ok
assert "authError=!!!" in result.detail
def test_token_invalid_grant_means_client_and_secret_are_good() -> None:
assert probe.classify_token(400, {"error": "invalid_grant"}).ok
def test_token_client_not_found_means_still_propagating() -> None:
result = probe.classify_token(
401,
{
"error": "invalid_client",
"error_description": "The OAuth client was not found.",
},
)
assert not result.ok
assert "--verify-only" in result.detail
def test_token_invalid_client_means_wrong_secret() -> None:
result = probe.classify_token(
401, {"error": "invalid_client", "error_description": "Unauthorized"}
)
assert not result.ok
assert "secret" in result.detail
def test_token_other_error_is_reported_verbatim() -> None:
result = probe.classify_token(500, {"error": "backend_error"})
assert not result.ok
assert "backend_error" in result.detail
def test_token_non_json_body_is_reported() -> None:
result = probe.classify_token(502, None)
assert not result.ok
assert "502" in result.detail
def _fakes(location: str | None, status: int, body: object) -> tuple:
get = MagicMock(
return_value=MagicMock(headers={"Location": location} if location else {})
)
post_response = MagicMock(status_code=status)
if body is None:
post_response.json.side_effect = ValueError
else:
post_response.json.return_value = body
return get, MagicMock(return_value=post_response)
def test_probe_client_runs_both_checks() -> None:
get, post = _fakes(None, 400, {"error": "invalid_grant"})
results = probe.probe_client(_CLIENT, get=get, post=post)
assert [r.ok for r in results] == [True, True]
assert get.call_args.kwargs["allow_redirects"] is False
assert post.call_args.kwargs["data"]["client_secret"] == _HELD
def test_probe_client_turns_network_errors_into_failures() -> None:
get = MagicMock(side_effect=requests.ConnectionError("down"))
post = MagicMock(side_effect=requests.ConnectionError("down"))
results = probe.probe_client(_CLIENT, get=get, post=post)
assert [r.ok for r in results] == [False, False]
assert "down" in results[0].detail
def test_probe_client_tolerates_a_non_json_token_reply() -> None:
get, post = _fakes(None, 502, None)
results = probe.probe_client(_CLIENT, get=get, post=post)
assert results[1].ok is False
assert "502" in results[1].detail

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@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Tests for ``tool/desktop_client``: picking up and validating the client JSON.
The Android client JSON Google offers for download has the same top-level
``installed`` key and project as a Desktop one, so the negative fixture here is
that exact shape: it must be refused, or the wrong client gets stored.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import stat
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import pytest
from tool import desktop_client as dc
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from pathlib import Path
_CLIENT_ID = "1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com"
_HELD = "the-desktop-client-credential"
def _installed(**overrides: object) -> dict[str, object]:
body: dict[str, object] = {
"client_id": _CLIENT_ID,
"project_id": "kuhy-syncs",
"auth_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
"token_uri": "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
"client_secret": _HELD,
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost"],
}
body.update(overrides)
return body
def _text(**overrides: object) -> str:
return json.dumps({"installed": _installed(**overrides)})
def _android_text() -> str:
body = _installed()
del body["client_secret"]
del body["redirect_uris"]
return json.dumps({"installed": body})
def test_valid_desktop_json_parses() -> None:
client = dc.parse_client_json(_text())
assert client == dc.DesktopClient(_CLIENT_ID, _HELD, "kuhy-syncs")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("text", "needle"),
[
("{not json", "not valid JSON"),
("[]", "JSON object"),
(json.dumps({"web": _installed()}), "'installed'"),
(_text(project_id="other"), "other"),
(_text(client_id="plain"), "client_id"),
(_android_text(), "client_secret"),
(_text(redirect_uris=["https://x.example"]), "http://localhost"),
(json.dumps({"installed": "nope"}), "'installed'"),
],
)
def test_invalid_json_is_refused_with_a_reason(text: str, needle: str) -> None:
with pytest.raises(dc.ClientFileError, match=needle):
dc.parse_client_json(text)
def _touch(directory: Path, name: str, text: str, mtime: float) -> Path:
path = directory / name
path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
os.utime(path, (mtime, mtime))
return path
def _wait(directory: Path, since: float, skipped: list[str]) -> dc.Pickup | None:
return dc.wait_for_client_json(
directory, since, attempts=3, pause=lambda: None, report=skipped.append
)
def test_pickup_ignores_old_files_and_the_android_json(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
_touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_old.json", _text(), 50.0)
_touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_android.json", _android_text(), 150.0)
_touch(tmp_path, "notes.json", _text(), 150.0)
skipped: list[str] = []
assert _wait(tmp_path, 100.0, skipped) is None
assert len(skipped) == 1
assert "client_secret_android.json" in skipped[0]
assert "client_secret" in skipped[0]
def test_pickup_takes_the_newest_valid_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
_touch(
tmp_path,
"client_secret_a.json",
_text(client_id="1-a.apps.googleusercontent.com"),
120.0,
)
newest = _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_b.json", _text(), 130.0)
found = _wait(tmp_path, 100.0, [])
assert found is not None
assert found.path == newest
assert found.client.client_id == _CLIENT_ID
def test_pickup_waits_for_the_file_to_appear(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
def pause() -> None:
_touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_late.json", _text(), 500.0)
found = dc.wait_for_client_json(tmp_path, 100.0, attempts=3, pause=pause)
assert found is not None
def test_pickup_pauses_between_attempts_only(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
pauses: list[int] = []
result = dc.wait_for_client_json(
tmp_path, 0.0, attempts=3, pause=lambda: pauses.append(1)
)
assert result is None
assert len(pauses) == 2
def test_store_client_is_private_and_consumes_the_download(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
source = _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_x.json", _text(), 1.0)
dest = tmp_path / "conf" / "desktop_client.json"
dc.store_client(source, dest)
assert stat.S_IMODE(dest.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
assert dc.load_client(dest).client_id == _CLIENT_ID
assert not source.exists()
def test_store_client_overwrites_and_tightens_an_existing_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
dest = tmp_path / "desktop_client.json"
dest.write_text("old", encoding="utf-8")
dest.chmod(0o644)
dc.store_client(_touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_y.json", _text(), 1.0), dest)
assert stat.S_IMODE(dest.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
assert dest.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == _text()
def test_load_client_points_at_the_register_script_when_missing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
with pytest.raises(dc.ClientFileError, match=r"register_desktop_client\.sh"):
dc.load_client(tmp_path / "absent.json")
def test_main_pickup_stores_the_client(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
_touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_z.json", _text(), 200.0)
dest = tmp_path / "out" / "desktop_client.json"
code = dc.main(
[
"pickup",
"--since",
"100",
"--timeout",
"5",
"--downloads",
str(tmp_path),
"--dest",
str(dest),
]
)
assert code == 0
assert dc.load_client(dest).project_id == "kuhy-syncs"
def test_main_pickup_times_out(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
code = dc.main(
[
"pickup",
"--since",
"100",
"--timeout",
"0",
"--downloads",
str(tmp_path),
"--dest",
str(tmp_path / "d.json"),
]
)
assert code == 1

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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""The RTDB plaintext audit behind the E2E done check."""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import json
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from crdt_sync import E2eCipher, seal_log_text
from tool import e2e_audit
if TYPE_CHECKING:
import pytest
LOG = json.dumps(
{
"n": {
"id": "n",
"fields": {"title": ["x", "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-a"]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
}
)
def _sealed() -> str:
return seal_log_text(LOG, E2eCipher(bytes(32)), path="a/devices-e2e/p/log.json")
def test_sealed_tree_is_clean() -> None:
tree = {
"devices-e2e": {"p": {"log~2Ejson": _sealed()}},
"revs-e2e": {"p": "ab" * 32},
"e2e": '{"v":1,"kdf":"argon2id"}',
}
assert e2e_audit.plaintext_paths(tree) == []
def test_plaintext_leaf_is_reported_with_decoded_key() -> None:
tree = {"devices": {"p": {"log~2Ejson": LOG}}, "settings": {"k": '{"a":1}'}}
assert e2e_audit.plaintext_paths(tree) == [
"devices/p/log.json",
"settings/k",
]
def test_raw_json_scalars_count_as_plaintext() -> None:
assert e2e_audit.plaintext_paths({"a": 5, "b": True, "c": None}) == ["a", "b"]
def test_main_reads_stdin_and_sets_exit_code(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr("sys.stdin", io.StringIO(json.dumps({"x": LOG})))
assert e2e_audit.main(["todo-sync"]) == 1
assert "todo-sync/x" in capsys.readouterr().out
monkeypatch.setattr("sys.stdin", io.StringIO("null"))
assert e2e_audit.main(["todo-sync"]) == 0
monkeypatch.setattr("sys.stdin", io.StringIO(json.dumps({"x": _sealed()})))
assert e2e_audit.main([]) == 0

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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""tool/e2e_vectors writes vectors that Python itself can open."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
import runpy
import pytest
from crdt_sync import open_log_text, unlock_e2e
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore
from tool import e2e_vectors
def test_vectors_open_with_the_stated_passphrase() -> None:
vec = e2e_vectors.vectors()
key = unlock_e2e(
FakeStore({"vec/e2e": str(vec["header"])}),
path_prefix="vec/notes-e2e",
passphrase=str(vec["passphrase"]),
e2e_path="vec/e2e",
)
assert key.master.hex() == vec["master_hex"]
path = str(vec["path"])
opened = open_log_text(str(vec["envelope"]), key.cipher(), path=path)
assert json.loads(opened) == json.loads(str(vec["log"]))
assert open_log_text(str(vec["whole"]), key.cipher(), path=path) == "not a log"
def test_main_prints_json(capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]) -> None:
assert e2e_vectors.main() == 0
assert "master_hex" in json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out)
def test_module_entry_point(capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]) -> None:
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
runpy.run_path(str(Path(e2e_vectors.__file__)), run_name="__main__")
assert exc.value.code == 0
assert "envelope" in capsys.readouterr().out

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@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Tests for ``tool/_pkce``: the verifier/challenge pair, consent URL, browser."""
from __future__ import annotations
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import urllib.parse
from tool import _pkce
# The worked example from RFC 7636 appendix B.
_RFC_VERIFIER = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
_RFC_CHALLENGE = "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"
def test_challenge_matches_the_rfc_vector() -> None:
assert _pkce.challenge_for(_RFC_VERIFIER) == _RFC_CHALLENGE
def test_make_pkce_is_random_and_self_consistent() -> None:
first, second = _pkce.make_pkce(), _pkce.make_pkce()
assert first.verifier != second.verifier
assert 43 <= len(first.verifier) <= 128
assert first.challenge == _pkce.challenge_for(first.verifier)
def test_consent_url_carries_every_pkce_field() -> None:
url = _pkce.build_consent_url(
client_id="cid",
redirect_uri="http://127.0.0.1:5555",
challenge="chal",
state="st",
login_hint="me@example.com",
)
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
query = {k: v[0] for k, v in urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query).items()}
assert parsed.netloc == "accounts.google.com"
assert query == {
"client_id": "cid",
"redirect_uri": "http://127.0.0.1:5555",
"response_type": "code",
"scope": "openid email profile",
"state": "st",
"code_challenge": "chal",
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
"login_hint": "me@example.com",
"prompt": "select_account",
}
def test_open_detached_spawns_a_new_session() -> None:
popen = MagicMock()
which = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda name: f"/usr/bin/{name}")
assert _pkce.open_detached("https://x", popen=popen, which=which) is True
args, kwargs = popen.call_args
assert args[0] == ["/usr/bin/setsid", "/usr/bin/xdg-open", "https://x"]
assert kwargs["start_new_session"] is True
def test_open_detached_reports_missing_tools() -> None:
popen = MagicMock()
which = MagicMock(return_value=None)
assert _pkce.open_detached("https://x", popen=popen, which=which) is False
popen.assert_not_called()

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@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""The todo MCP server's desktop session is seeded by ``seed_session``.
Split from :mod:`test_tool_seed_session_main` for the 250-line cap.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import UTC, datetime
import json
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from crdt_sync._config import credential_store_for
from crdt_sync._credentials import FirebaseCredentials
from tool import seed_session as ss
_APP = "todo-mcp"
def test_todo_mcp_is_a_default_app() -> None:
"""``~/src/todo/mcp`` reads ``~/.config/todo-mcp/firebase_auth.json`` once
at start; ``--app todo-mcp`` is rejected by argparse unless it is listed."""
assert _APP in ss.DEFAULT_APPS
def test_the_seed_lands_where_the_todo_mcp_server_reads_it(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""The Dart server's ``seedCredentials`` path, in the usual shape."""
with patch.object(Path, "home", return_value=tmp_path):
credential_store_for(_APP).save(
FirebaseCredentials("fake-id", "fake-refresh", datetime.now(UTC))
)
written = tmp_path / ".config" / _APP / "firebase_auth.json"
assert set(json.loads(written.read_text())) == {
"id_token",
"refresh_token",
"expires_at",
}

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@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Tests for ``tool/verify_desktop_client``: the PKCE loopback + Firebase check.
No browser, no network, no socket: the consent step, the code exchange and
Firebase's REST endpoint are all faked at the module boundary.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import contextlib
import json
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from crdt_sync._autherrors import FirebaseAuthError
from crdt_sync._config import FirebaseConfig
from tool import verify_desktop_client as vdc
from tool._token_exchange import TokenError, _exchange_code
from tool.desktop_client import DesktopClient
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Iterator
_HELD = "stored-client-credential"
_CLIENT = DesktopClient("1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com", _HELD, "kuhy-syncs")
_CONFIG = FirebaseConfig("api", "https://db", "kuhy-syncs", "uid-1", "me@example.com")
_ID_VALUE = (
"header."
+ base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"aud": _CLIENT.client_id}).encode())
.decode()
.rstrip("=")
+ ".sig"
)
def test_audience_of_reads_the_aud_claim() -> None:
assert vdc.audience_of(_ID_VALUE) == _CLIENT.client_id
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"bad", ["", "a.b", "a.!!!.c", "a." + base64.b64encode(b"[]").decode() + ".c"]
)
def test_audience_of_survives_garbage(bad: str) -> None:
assert vdc.audience_of(bad) == "?"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("message", "needle"),
[
(
"failed: HTTP 400 (INVALID_IDP_RESPONSE : id_token audience mismatch)",
"Safelist",
),
("signed in as the wrong account: Google resolved to uid 'x'", "login_hint"),
("anything else", ""),
],
)
def test_hint_for(message: str, needle: str) -> None:
hint = vdc.hint_for(message)
assert (needle in hint) if needle else hint == ""
@contextlib.contextmanager
def _flow(result: dict[str, str]) -> Iterator[MagicMock]:
"""Fake the socket, the callback and the exchange; yield the exchange."""
with (
patch.object(vdc, "_free_port", return_value=5555),
patch.object(
vdc, "_start_callback_server", return_value=(MagicMock(), MagicMock())
),
patch.object(vdc._CallbackHandler, "result", result),
patch.object(vdc, "_exchange_code", return_value=_ID_VALUE) as exchange,
patch.object(
vdc.secrets,
"token_urlsafe",
side_effect=lambda nbytes: "st" if nbytes == 16 else "v" * 86,
),
):
yield exchange
def test_fetch_id_token_sends_pkce_and_the_secret() -> None:
opener = MagicMock(return_value=True)
with _flow({"code": "abc", "state": "st"}) as exchange:
token = vdc.fetch_id_token(_CLIENT, "me@example.com", opener=opener)
assert token == _ID_VALUE
url = opener.call_args.args[0]
assert "redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A5555" in url
assert "code_challenge_method=S256" in url
code, client_id, held, redirect, verifier = exchange.call_args.args
assert (code, client_id, held) == ("abc", _CLIENT.client_id, _HELD)
assert redirect == "http://127.0.0.1:5555"
assert len(verifier) >= 43
def test_fetch_id_token_without_a_browser_still_waits() -> None:
opener = MagicMock(return_value=False)
with _flow({"code": "abc", "state": "st"}):
token = vdc.fetch_id_token(_CLIENT, "", open_browser=False, opener=opener)
assert token == _ID_VALUE
opener.assert_not_called()
def test_fetch_id_token_reports_a_refused_consent() -> None:
with (
_flow({"error": "access_denied"}),
pytest.raises(TokenError, match="access_denied"),
):
vdc.fetch_id_token(_CLIENT, "", opener=MagicMock())
def _firebase_reply(*, ok: bool, body: dict[str, object]) -> MagicMock:
response = MagicMock(ok=ok, status_code=200 if ok else 400)
response.json.return_value = body
return response
def test_sign_in_returns_the_email_and_writes_no_file() -> None:
reply = _firebase_reply(
ok=True,
body={
"localId": "uid-1",
"email": "me@example.com",
"idToken": "i",
"refreshToken": "r",
"expiresIn": "3600",
},
)
with patch("crdt_sync._firebase_auth.requests.post", return_value=reply) as post:
assert vdc.sign_in(_CONFIG, _ID_VALUE) == "me@example.com"
assert "signInWithIdp" in post.call_args.args[0]
def test_sign_in_surfaces_the_exact_firebase_error() -> None:
reply = _firebase_reply(
ok=False,
body={
"error": {"message": "INVALID_IDP_RESPONSE : id_token audience mismatch"}
},
)
with (
patch("crdt_sync._firebase_auth.requests.post", return_value=reply),
pytest.raises(FirebaseAuthError, match="audience mismatch"),
):
vdc.sign_in(_CONFIG, _ID_VALUE)
def test_exchange_sends_the_pkce_verifier() -> None:
reply = MagicMock(ok=True)
reply.json.return_value = {"id_token": _ID_VALUE}
with patch("tool._token_exchange.requests.post", return_value=reply) as post:
_exchange_code("c", "id", _HELD, "http://127.0.0.1:1", "ver")
assert post.call_args.kwargs["data"]["code_verifier"] == "ver"

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@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Tests for ``verify_desktop_client.main``: every exit path and its message."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import logging
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from crdt_sync._autherrors import FirebaseAuthError
from crdt_sync._config import ConfigError, FirebaseConfig
from tool import verify_desktop_client as vdc
from tool._token_exchange import TokenError
from tool.client_probe import ProbeResult
from tool.desktop_client import ClientFileError, DesktopClient
_HELD = "stored-client-credential"
_CLIENT = DesktopClient("1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com", _HELD, "kuhy-syncs")
_CONFIG = FirebaseConfig("api", "https://db", "kuhy-syncs", "uid-1", "me@example.com")
_ID_VALUE = (
"header."
+ base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"aud": _CLIENT.client_id}).encode())
.decode()
.rstrip("=")
+ ".sig"
)
def _run(
*,
probe_ok: bool = True,
token: object = _ID_VALUE,
sign_in: object = "me@example.com",
argv: list[str] | None = None,
) -> tuple[int, MagicMock]:
fetch = MagicMock(
side_effect=token if isinstance(token, Exception) else None, return_value=token
)
signer = MagicMock(
side_effect=sign_in if isinstance(sign_in, Exception) else None,
return_value=sign_in,
)
with (
patch.object(vdc.FirebaseConfig, "load", return_value=_CONFIG),
patch.object(vdc, "load_client", return_value=_CLIENT),
patch.object(
vdc, "probe_client", return_value=[ProbeResult(probe_ok, "probed")]
),
patch.object(vdc, "fetch_id_token", fetch),
patch.object(vdc, "sign_in", signer),
):
return vdc.main(argv or []), fetch
def test_main_passes_and_names_the_uid(caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
code, _ = _run()
assert code == 0
assert "PASS" in caplog.text
assert "uid-1" in caplog.text
assert "me@example.com" in caplog.text
def test_main_stops_before_consent_when_the_probe_fails(
caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
) -> None:
caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
code, fetch = _run(probe_ok=False)
assert code == 1
assert "FAIL" in caplog.text
fetch.assert_not_called()
def test_main_probe_only_never_opens_consent() -> None:
code, fetch = _run(argv=["--probe-only"])
assert code == 0
fetch.assert_not_called()
def test_main_skip_probe_goes_straight_to_consent() -> None:
code, fetch = _run(probe_ok=False, argv=["--skip-probe", "--no-browser"])
assert code == 0
assert fetch.call_args.kwargs["open_browser"] is False
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("kwargs", "needle"),
[
(
{"token": TokenError("token exchange failed: HTTP 400 invalid_grant")},
"invalid_grant",
),
(
{
"sign_in": FirebaseAuthError(
"INVALID_IDP_RESPONSE : id_token audience mismatch"
)
},
"Safelist",
),
],
)
def test_main_prints_the_exact_error_and_exits_1(
kwargs: dict[str, object], needle: str, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
) -> None:
caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
code, _ = _run(**kwargs)
assert code == 1
assert "FAIL" in caplog.text
assert needle in caplog.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"error", [ConfigError("no config"), ClientFileError("no client")]
)
def test_main_reports_setup_errors(
error: Exception, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
) -> None:
caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
with patch.object(vdc.FirebaseConfig, "load", side_effect=error):
assert vdc.main([]) == 1
assert "FAIL" in caplog.text

View File

@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
[project]
name = "crdt-sync"
version = "0.11.1"
version = "0.9.2"
description = "Shared CRDT merge scheme + GitHub-Contents-API sync transport for cross-device apps"
requires-python = ">=3.14"
dependencies = [
"argon2-cffi==25.1.0",
"pynacl==1.6.2",
"requests==2.34.2",
]
dependencies = ["requests==2.34.2"]
# Ship only the library. `tool/` is a package too (it has an __init__.py so
# its scripts import cleanly), and setuptools' flat-layout auto-discovery

View File

@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
# Exact pins, enforced by the shared dependency-freshness gate: a `>=`
# floor is satisfied by anything newer, so it tells a checker nothing
# about whether this repo is actually current.
argon2-cffi==25.1.0
bandit[toml]==1.9.4
mypy==2.4.1
mypy==2.4.0
pre-commit==4.7.0
pylint==4.1.3
pynacl==1.6.2
pytest==9.2.0
pytest==9.1.1
pytest-cov==7.1.0
requests==2.34.2
ruff==0.17.4
types-requests==2.33.0.20261030
ruff==0.17.2
types-requests==2.33.0.20261006

View File

@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""PKCE pair, consent URL and detached browser launch for the loopback flow."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from dataclasses import dataclass
import hashlib
import secrets
import shutil
import subprocess
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import urllib.parse
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
AUTH_ENDPOINT = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth"
SCOPES = "openid email profile"
_VERIFIER_BYTES = 64
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Pkce:
"""A code verifier and the S256 challenge derived from it."""
verifier: str
challenge: str
def challenge_for(verifier: str) -> str:
"""Return the unpadded base64url SHA-256 of ``verifier`` (RFC 7636 S256)."""
digest = hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
def make_pkce() -> Pkce:
"""Return a fresh 86-char verifier and its challenge."""
verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(_VERIFIER_BYTES)
return Pkce(verifier=verifier, challenge=challenge_for(verifier))
def build_consent_url(
*,
client_id: str,
redirect_uri: str,
challenge: str,
state: str,
login_hint: str,
) -> str:
"""Return the consent URL, with the sync account preselected."""
query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
{
"client_id": client_id,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"response_type": "code",
"scope": SCOPES,
"state": state,
"code_challenge": challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
"login_hint": login_hint,
"prompt": "select_account",
}
)
return f"{AUTH_ENDPOINT}?{query}"
def open_detached(
url: str,
*,
popen: Callable[..., object] = subprocess.Popen,
which: Callable[[str], str | None] = shutil.which,
) -> bool:
"""Open ``url`` via ``setsid xdg-open``; False if either tool is missing."""
setsid, opener = which("setsid"), which("xdg-open")
if not setsid or not opener:
return False
popen(
[setsid, opener, url],
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
start_new_session=True,
)
return True

View File

@ -67,8 +67,4 @@ DEFAULT_APPS: Final = (
# /kartka/source_health via credential_store_for("kartka-source-eval")
# and falls back to the retired password only with no session here.
"kartka-source-eval",
# ~/src/todo/mcp: the Dart todo MCP server (systemd --user, :8735) is one
# more sync node with its own session, read once from
# ~/.config/todo-mcp/firebase_auth.json at start.
"todo-mcp",
)

View File

@ -44,17 +44,9 @@ def _authorization_code(params: dict[str, str], redirect_uri: str, state: str) -
def _exchange_code(
code: str,
client_id: str,
client_secret: str,
redirect_uri: str,
code_verifier: str = "",
code: str, client_id: str, client_secret: str, redirect_uri: str
) -> str:
"""Trade the authorization code for an ID token at Google's endpoint.
``code_verifier`` is sent only when given, for PKCE flows.
"""
pkce = {"code_verifier": code_verifier} if code_verifier else {}
"""Trade the authorization code for an ID token at Google's endpoint."""
try:
response = requests.post(
_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_URL,
@ -64,7 +56,6 @@ def _exchange_code(
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
**pkce,
},
timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)

View File

@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Click-free checks that a freshly stored Desktop OAuth client actually works.
Both requests need no signed-in user: Google's endpoints answer them before any
account is involved, so they say whether the client exists, accepts a loopback
redirect and whether the stored secret is right -- without opening a browser.
That separates "the console step went wrong" from "Firebase rejects the
audience" before the one human consent click is spent.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from dataclasses import dataclass
import re
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import urllib.parse
import requests
from tool._pkce import AUTH_ENDPOINT, challenge_for
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
from tool.desktop_client import DesktopClient
# Assembled from host and path: a literal ending in "/token" trips ruff's
# hardcoded-password check, and suppressions are banned in this repo.
_OAUTH_HOST = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com"
_TOKEN_URL = f"{_OAUTH_HOST}/token"
_PROBE_REDIRECT = "http://127.0.0.1:41234"
_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20
_ASCII_RUN = re.compile(rb"[ -~]{6,}")
_PROBE_VERIFIER = "probe-verifier-" + "x" * 30
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProbeResult:
"""One check's verdict and the words that explain it."""
ok: bool
detail: str
def classify_auth_location(location: str | None) -> ProbeResult:
"""Judge the auth endpoint's redirect target.
A valid request while signed out still redirects (to the sign-in page), so
the status code means nothing: only an ``authError`` parameter in the
target says Google refused the client or its redirect URI.
"""
if not location or "authError=" not in location:
return ProbeResult(
ok=True, detail="auth endpoint accepts the loopback redirect"
)
raw = location.split("authError=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(
raw + "=" * (-len(raw) % 4), altchars=b"-_", validate=True
)
except ValueError:
return ProbeResult(
ok=False, detail=f"auth endpoint refused the request (authError={raw})"
)
text = " | ".join(run.decode("ascii") for run in _ASCII_RUN.findall(decoded))
return ProbeResult(
ok=False, detail=f"auth endpoint refused the request: {text[:300]}"
)
def classify_token(status: int, body: dict[str, str] | None) -> ProbeResult:
"""Judge the token endpoint's answer to a deliberately bogus code.
``invalid_grant`` is the success signal: Google checked the client and
secret first, accepted them, and only then rejected the fake code.
"""
if body is None:
return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"token endpoint: HTTP {status}, no JSON")
error = body.get("error", "")
description = body.get("error_description", "")
if error == "invalid_grant":
return ProbeResult(
ok=True, detail="token endpoint accepts the client and secret"
)
if error == "invalid_client" and "not found" in description:
return ProbeResult(
ok=False,
detail=(
"client not found yet: new clients take a few minutes to "
"propagate; rerun with --verify-only shortly"
),
)
if error == "invalid_client":
return ProbeResult(
ok=False, detail=f"the stored secret is wrong ({description})"
)
return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"token endpoint: HTTP {status} {body}")
def _probe_auth(
client: DesktopClient, get: Callable[..., requests.Response]
) -> ProbeResult:
query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
{
"client_id": client.client_id,
"redirect_uri": _PROBE_REDIRECT,
"response_type": "code",
"scope": "openid email",
"code_challenge": challenge_for(_PROBE_VERIFIER),
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
"hl": "en",
}
)
try:
reply = get(
f"{AUTH_ENDPOINT}?{query}",
allow_redirects=False,
timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
except requests.RequestException as exc:
return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"auth endpoint unreachable: {exc}")
return classify_auth_location(reply.headers.get("Location"))
def _probe_token(
client: DesktopClient, post: Callable[..., requests.Response]
) -> ProbeResult:
try:
answer = post(
_TOKEN_URL,
data={
"code": "probe-not-a-real-code",
"client_id": client.client_id,
"client_secret": client.client_secret,
"redirect_uri": _PROBE_REDIRECT,
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code_verifier": _PROBE_VERIFIER,
},
timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
except requests.RequestException as exc:
return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"token endpoint unreachable: {exc}")
try:
body = answer.json()
except ValueError:
body = None
return classify_token(answer.status_code, body)
def probe_client(
client: DesktopClient,
*,
get: Callable[..., requests.Response] = requests.get,
post: Callable[..., requests.Response] = requests.post,
) -> list[ProbeResult]:
"""Run the auth-endpoint and token-endpoint checks for ``client``."""
return [_probe_auth(client, get), _probe_token(client, post)]

View File

@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Pick up, validate and store the Desktop OAuth client JSON from the console.
Android and iOS clients download as the same top-level ``installed`` object, so
the type alone proves nothing: only a ``client_secret`` plus the
``http://localhost`` redirect marks a Desktop client.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
from dataclasses import dataclass
from functools import partial
import json
import logging
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import time
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
PROJECT_ID = "kuhy-syncs"
DEFAULT_DEST = Path.home() / ".config" / "crdt-sync" / "desktop_client.json"
DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS = Path.home() / "Downloads"
_POLL_SECONDS = 2.0
_pause_between_polls = partial(time.sleep, _POLL_SECONDS)
_CLIENT_ID_SUFFIX = ".apps.googleusercontent.com"
_LOOPBACK_REDIRECT = "http://localhost"
_logger = logging.getLogger("desktop_client")
class ClientFileError(Exception):
"""The client JSON is missing, malformed or not a Desktop client."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DesktopClient:
"""The installed-app client as downloaded from the console."""
client_id: str
client_secret: str
project_id: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Pickup:
"""A valid client JSON found in the downloads folder."""
path: Path
client: DesktopClient
def parse_client_json(text: str, project_id: str = PROJECT_ID) -> DesktopClient:
"""Return the Desktop client in ``text``, or raise saying what is wrong."""
try:
document = json.loads(text)
except ValueError as exc:
msg = f"not valid JSON: {exc}"
raise ClientFileError(msg) from exc
if not isinstance(document, dict):
msg = "must contain a JSON object"
raise ClientFileError(msg)
installed = document.get("installed")
if not isinstance(installed, dict):
msg = f"no 'installed' object (found {sorted(document)}); pick 'Desktop app'"
raise ClientFileError(msg)
if installed.get("project_id") != project_id:
msg = f"belongs to project {installed.get('project_id')!r}, not {project_id!r}"
raise ClientFileError(msg)
client_id = str(installed.get("client_id", ""))
if not client_id.endswith(_CLIENT_ID_SUFFIX):
msg = f"client_id {client_id!r} is not a Google OAuth client id"
raise ClientFileError(msg)
held = str(installed.get("client_secret", ""))
if not held:
msg = "no client_secret: this is an Android/iOS client, not a Desktop app"
raise ClientFileError(msg)
if _LOOPBACK_REDIRECT not in installed.get("redirect_uris", []):
msg = f"redirect_uris lacks {_LOOPBACK_REDIRECT}: not a Desktop app client"
raise ClientFileError(msg)
return DesktopClient(client_id=client_id, client_secret=held, project_id=project_id)
def _scan(
downloads: Path, since: float, rejected: set[str], report: Callable[[str], None]
) -> Pickup | None:
candidates = [
path
for path in downloads.glob("client_secret_*.json")
if path.stat().st_mtime >= since
]
for path in sorted(candidates, key=lambda p: p.stat().st_mtime, reverse=True):
try:
client = parse_client_json(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except ClientFileError as exc:
if path.name not in rejected:
rejected.add(path.name)
report(f"ignoring {path.name}: {exc}")
continue
return Pickup(path=path, client=client)
return None
def wait_for_client_json(
downloads: Path,
since: float,
*,
attempts: int,
pause: Callable[[], None] = _pause_between_polls,
report: Callable[[str], None] = print,
) -> Pickup | None:
"""Scan ``downloads`` up to ``attempts`` times for a JSON newer than ``since``."""
rejected: set[str] = set()
for attempt in range(attempts):
found = _scan(downloads, since, rejected, report)
if found:
return found
if attempt < attempts - 1:
pause()
return None
def store_client(source: Path, dest: Path) -> None:
"""Move ``source`` to ``dest`` with mode 0600, so no copy lingers in Downloads."""
dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
descriptor = os.open(dest, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
handle.write(source.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
dest.chmod(0o600)
source.unlink()
def load_client(dest: Path = DEFAULT_DEST) -> DesktopClient:
"""Load the stored client, pointing at the register script when absent."""
try:
return parse_client_json(dest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except OSError as exc:
msg = f"{dest} unreadable ({exc}); run tool/register_desktop_client.sh"
raise ClientFileError(msg) from exc
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
"""Wait for the downloaded JSON and store it. Returns an exit code."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
parser.add_argument("action", choices=["pickup"])
parser.add_argument("--since", type=float, required=True, help="epoch seconds")
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=600.0)
parser.add_argument("--downloads", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS)
parser.add_argument("--dest", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_DEST)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
logging.basicConfig(stream=sys.stdout, level=logging.INFO, format="%(message)s")
found = wait_for_client_json(
args.downloads,
args.since,
attempts=int(args.timeout / _POLL_SECONDS) + 1,
report=_logger.info,
)
if found is None:
_logger.error(" FAIL no Desktop client JSON appeared in %s", args.downloads)
return 1
store_client(found.path, args.dest)
_logger.info(
" PASS stored %s at %s (mode 600)", found.client.client_id, args.dest
)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Read-only E2E done check: list plaintext leaves in an RTDB JSON dump.
Feed it ``firebase database:get /<root>`` on stdin::
firebase database:get /todo-sync | python3 -m tool.e2e_audit todo-sync
Exit 0 when every leaf is sealed (or is the clear Argon2id header or a keyed
revision), 1 when any leaf is plaintext. A plain ``grep '"title"'`` misses
plaintext because RTDB serves each blob as an escaped JSON string; this
decodes the tree instead.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
import sys
from crdt_sync import is_e2e_envelope
_HEX64 = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}")
def _decode_key(key: str) -> str:
return re.sub(r"~([0-9A-F]{2})", lambda m: chr(int(m.group(1), 16)), key)
def _is_clear_leaf(value: str) -> bool:
# Envelopes and the Argon2id header both carry an integer "v"; keyed
# revisions are 64 hex chars; a bare E2eCipher blob is base64, not JSON.
if is_e2e_envelope(value) or _HEX64.fullmatch(value):
return True
return not value.lstrip().startswith(("{", "["))
def plaintext_paths(tree: object, prefix: str = "") -> list[str]:
"""Return the decoded paths of every plaintext leaf under ``tree``."""
found: list[str] = []
if isinstance(tree, dict):
for key, value in tree.items():
path = f"{prefix}/{_decode_key(key)}" if prefix else _decode_key(key)
found.extend(plaintext_paths(value, path))
elif isinstance(tree, str):
if not _is_clear_leaf(tree):
found.append(prefix)
elif tree is not None:
found.append(prefix)
return found
def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
"""Audit the dump on stdin; ``argv[0]`` names the root for the report."""
root = argv[0] if argv else ""
paths = plaintext_paths(json.load(sys.stdin), root)
sys.stdout.write(f"plaintext leaves under /{root}: {len(paths)}\n")
for path in paths:
sys.stdout.write(f" {path}\n")
return 1 if paths else 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

View File

@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Clear an app's old plaintext RTDB prefix after the E2E copy is verified.
Dry run by default; ``--apply`` deletes. Run only once every device runs an
encrypting build::
python3 -m tool.e2e_cleanup todo-sync/notes --app todo
python3 -m tool.e2e_cleanup todo-sync/notes --app todo --apply
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import sys
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from crdt_sync import (
PASSWORD_FILE,
E2eLockedError,
FirebaseConfig,
clear_plaintext_prefix,
firebase_client_for,
)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from crdt_sync import RemoteStore
def run(store: RemoteStore, old_prefix: str, passphrase: str, *, apply: bool) -> int:
"""Clear (or list) ``old_prefix``; return a process exit code."""
try:
paths = clear_plaintext_prefix(
store, old_prefix, passphrase=passphrase, apply=apply
)
except E2eLockedError as exc:
sys.stdout.write(f"refused: {exc}\n")
return 1
verb = "deleted" if apply else "would delete"
sys.stdout.write(f"{verb} {len(paths)} plaintext blob(s) under /{old_prefix}\n")
for path in paths:
sys.stdout.write(f" {path}\n")
return 0
def main(argv: list[str]) -> int: # pragma: no cover - live database entry
"""Parse args and run against the live database."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("old_prefix")
parser.add_argument("--app", required=True, help="seeded session name")
parser.add_argument("--apply", action="store_true")
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
client = firebase_client_for(args.app, config=FirebaseConfig.load())
passphrase = PASSWORD_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
return run(client, args.old_prefix, passphrase, apply=args.apply)
if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

View File

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Write golden vectors sealed by Python for the Dart side to open.
Run from ``crdt-sync``::
python -m tool.e2e_vectors > e2e_py_vectors.json
then move the file to ``crdt_sync_dart/test/fixtures/``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import sys
from crdt_sync import Argon2Params, seal_log_text, unlock_e2e
from crdt_sync.tests.conftest import FakeStore
# A public test-vector passphrase, not a secret.
PHRASE = "correct horse \u2713"
def vectors() -> dict[str, object]:
"""Return a fresh vector set (random salt and nonces)."""
remote = FakeStore()
key = unlock_e2e(
remote,
path_prefix="vec/notes-e2e",
passphrase=PHRASE,
params=Argon2Params(64, 2, 1),
e2e_path="vec/e2e",
)
path = "vec/notes-e2e/pc/log.json"
log = json.dumps(
{
"n9": {
"id": "n9",
"fields": {"title": ["zażółć", "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-pc"]},
"deleted": False,
"deleted_hlc": None,
}
},
ensure_ascii=False,
)
cipher = key.cipher()
return {
"passphrase": PHRASE,
"header": remote.files["vec/e2e"],
"master_hex": key.master.hex(),
"path": path,
"log": log,
"envelope": seal_log_text(log, cipher, path=path),
"whole": seal_log_text("not a log", cipher, path=path),
}
def main() -> int:
"""Print the vectors as JSON."""
sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(vectors(), indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())

View File

@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Registers the Desktop OAuth client (no API exists, so one console step stays
# manual), stores its JSON privately, then proves Firebase accepts its tokens.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_DIR="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
readonly SCRIPT_DIR REPO_DIR
readonly PROJECT="kuhy-syncs"
readonly ACCOUNT="321krzychu@gmail.com"
readonly CONSOLE_URL="https://console.cloud.google.com/auth/clients?project=${PROJECT}&authuser=${ACCOUNT}"
readonly APP_TYPE="Desktop app"
readonly CLIENT_NAME="crdt-sync desktop/android PKCE"
readonly PAUSE_SECONDS="${PAUSE_SECONDS:-12}"
readonly WAIT_SECONDS="${WAIT_SECONDS:-900}"
readonly PROBE_TRIES="${PROBE_TRIES:-12}"
readonly PROBE_GAP_SECONDS="${PROBE_GAP_SECONDS:-30}"
log() { printf '\n\033[1m==> %s\033[0m\n' "$1"; }
step() { printf ' %s\n' "$1"; }
usage() {
cat <<EOF
Usage: $(basename "$0") [--verify-only | --dry-run | --help]
(no flag) open the console, clipboard-feed the form, pick up the
downloaded JSON, store it, then verify
--verify-only skip registration; probe, consent flow, signInWithIdp
--dry-run print the plan; open, copy and write nothing
Your part: Application type = Desktop app, paste the name, CREATE, DOWNLOAD
JSON in the dialog; later tap Allow on the consent page.
Stored at ~/.config/crdt-sync/desktop_client.json (mode 600).
EOF
}
# Prints the value always, so this works over ssh with no X display too.
clip() {
if command -v xclip >/dev/null 2>&1 && [[ -n "${DISPLAY:-}" ]]; then
printf '%s' "$1" | xclip -selection clipboard 2>/dev/null || true
printf ' \033[32m[copied]\033[0m %s\n' "$1"
else
printf ' %s\n' "$1"
fi
}
# Without a terminal (e.g. run via `!`) read would hit EOF at once.
pause() {
if [[ -t 0 ]]; then
read -rp " ...press Enter once pasted " _ || true
else
sleep "$PAUSE_SECONDS"
fi
}
open_console() {
if command -v xdg-open >/dev/null 2>&1; then
setsid xdg-open "$CONSOLE_URL" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
else
step "open: $CONSOLE_URL"
fi
}
run_tool() { (cd "$REPO_DIR" && python3 -m "tool.$1" "${@:2}"); }
wait_for_propagation() {
local try
for ((try = 1; try <= PROBE_TRIES; try++)); do
if run_tool verify_desktop_client --probe-only; then
return 0
fi
step "probe $try/$PROBE_TRIES failed; new clients need a few minutes"
sleep "$PROBE_GAP_SECONDS"
done
echo "error: client still not accepted; rerun with --verify-only later" >&2
return 1
}
verify() {
log "Verifying: probe, consent flow, Firebase signInWithIdp"
step "Tap Allow on the sync account's consent page when it opens."
run_tool verify_desktop_client
}
register() {
local started
started="$(date +%s)"
log "Create ONE Desktop OAuth client in project $PROJECT"
open_console
sleep 2
step "Click '+ CREATE CLIENT'. Application type (paste or pick):"
clip "$APP_TYPE"
pause
step "Field 'Name':"
clip "$CLIENT_NAME"
pause
step "Click CREATE, then DOWNLOAD JSON in the dialog (the secret shows once)."
step "Leave the existing Web and Android clients alone."
log "Waiting up to ${WAIT_SECONDS}s for the downloaded client_secret_*.json"
run_tool desktop_client pickup --since "$started" --timeout "$WAIT_SECONDS"
wait_for_propagation
verify
}
dry_run() {
log "Dry run: nothing is opened, copied or written"
step "page: $CONSOLE_URL"
step "type: $APP_TYPE"
step "name: $CLIENT_NAME"
step "stores at: ~/.config/crdt-sync/desktop_client.json (mode 600)"
step "verify: python3 -m tool.verify_desktop_client (in $REPO_DIR)"
}
main() {
case "${1:-}" in
--verify-only) verify ;;
--dry-run) dry_run ;;
-h | --help) usage ;;
"") register ;;
*)
usage >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
}
main "$@"

View File

@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
"""Prove Firebase accepts an id_token issued to the stored Desktop OAuth client.
Runs the PKCE loopback flow with the installed-app client (secret included in
the exchange), then calls Firebase Auth REST ``signInWithIdp`` with the result.
The consent click in the browser is the only human step. No app credential
file is written: the session lives in memory and is dropped.
Run from the crdt-sync directory::
python3 -m tool.verify_desktop_client
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import base64
import json
import logging
import secrets
import sys
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from crdt_sync._autherrors import FirebaseAuthError
from crdt_sync._config import ConfigError, FirebaseConfig
from crdt_sync._credentials import MemoryCredentialStore
from crdt_sync._firebase_auth import FirebaseTokenProvider
from tool._oauth_callback import (
_CONSENT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
_CallbackHandler,
_free_port,
_start_callback_server,
)
from tool._pkce import build_consent_url, make_pkce, open_detached
from tool._token_exchange import TokenError, _authorization_code, _exchange_code
from tool.client_probe import probe_client
from tool.desktop_client import ClientFileError, DesktopClient, load_client
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
_logger = logging.getLogger("verify_desktop_client")
def audience_of(id_token: str) -> str:
"""Return the ``aud`` claim of an unverified JWT, or ``?`` if unreadable."""
try:
segment = id_token.split(".")[1]
claims = json.loads(
base64.urlsafe_b64decode(segment + "=" * (-len(segment) % 4))
)
return str(claims["aud"])
except IndexError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError:
return "?"
def hint_for(message: str) -> str:
"""Return what to do about a known failure message, or an empty string."""
if "audience mismatch" in message:
return (
"Firebase does not trust this client yet: Firebase console > "
"Authentication > Sign-in method > Google > Safelist client IDs "
"from external projects, add the Desktop client id, then rerun."
)
if "wrong account" in message:
return (
"Pick the sync account in the consent picker (login_hint only "
"preselects it). Firebase may have created a stray user for the "
"other account: check Authentication > Users."
)
return ""
def fetch_id_token(
client: DesktopClient,
login_hint: str,
*,
open_browser: bool = True,
opener: Callable[[str], bool] = open_detached,
) -> str:
"""Run the PKCE loopback flow with ``client`` and return its id_token."""
port = _free_port()
redirect_uri = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
state = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
pkce = make_pkce()
server, thread = _start_callback_server(port, state)
url = build_consent_url(
client_id=client.client_id,
redirect_uri=redirect_uri,
challenge=pkce.challenge,
state=state,
login_hint=login_hint,
)
_logger.info(" .. consent page (opened in your browser, tap Allow):")
_logger.info(" %s", url)
if open_browser:
opener(url)
thread.join(timeout=_CONSENT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
server.server_close()
code = _authorization_code(_CallbackHandler.result, redirect_uri, state)
return _exchange_code(
code, client.client_id, client.client_secret, redirect_uri, pkce.verifier
)
def sign_in(config: FirebaseConfig, id_token: str) -> str:
"""Call ``signInWithIdp`` in memory; return the account email.
Raises:
FirebaseAuthError: With Firebase's exact message, or on a uid other
than the pinned one.
"""
provider = FirebaseTokenProvider(config.api_key, MemoryCredentialStore())
return provider.sign_in_with_google(id_token, expected_uid=config.uid)
def _fail(message: str) -> int:
_logger.error(" FAIL %s", message)
hint = hint_for(message)
if hint:
_logger.error(" .. %s", hint)
return 1
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
"""Probe the stored client, run the consent flow, sign in to Firebase."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
parser.add_argument("--no-browser", action="store_true", help="only print the URL")
parser.add_argument(
"--skip-probe", action="store_true", help="skip click-free checks"
)
parser.add_argument(
"--probe-only", action="store_true", help="stop after the click-free checks"
)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
logging.basicConfig(stream=sys.stdout, level=logging.INFO, format="%(message)s")
try:
config = FirebaseConfig.load()
client = load_client()
if not args.skip_probe:
results = probe_client(client)
for result in results:
_logger.info(" %s %s", "ok" if result.ok else "!!", result.detail)
failed = [r.detail for r in results if not r.ok]
if failed:
return _fail("; ".join(failed))
if args.probe_only:
return 0
id_token = fetch_id_token(
client, config.email, open_browser=not args.no_browser
)
_logger.info(" .. id_token audience: %s", audience_of(id_token))
email = sign_in(config, id_token)
except (ConfigError, ClientFileError, TokenError, FirebaseAuthError) as exc:
return _fail(str(exc))
_logger.info(
" PASS Firebase accepted the Desktop client: uid %s, %s", config.uid, email
)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

View File

@ -118,16 +118,6 @@ The public/private split is not cosmetic: every repo in this fleet is public.
APK — the security rules, not secrecy, protect the data. The account email and
password identify *a person* and are entered once per device.
### Sandbox namespace for test builds
`--dart-define=SYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/slot3` moves every RTDB read and write
under `/sandbox/slot3/...`, so a test build never touches real data. Sign-in
is unchanged (the real account). Empty, the default, keeps the exact current
paths. Only `^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$` is accepted; anything else throws
`ConfigException` at startup (`firebaseClientFor` / `FirebaseRestClient`), never
falling back to production paths. The shipped rules (root-level uid pin) already
allow these paths.
### `password: ''` is legal
The Google one-tap path and the seeded-session path both store an empty

View File

@ -2,13 +2,6 @@
library;
export 'src/device.dart';
export 'src/e2e_audit.dart';
export 'src/e2e_cipher.dart';
export 'src/e2e_envelope.dart';
export 'src/e2e_key.dart';
export 'src/e2e_migration.dart';
export 'src/e2e_open.dart';
export 'src/encrypting_store.dart';
export 'src/firebase_account_provisioning.dart';
export 'src/firebase_auth_error.dart';
export 'src/firebase_auth_rest.dart';
@ -27,5 +20,4 @@ export 'src/remote_store.dart';
export 'src/secure_credential_store.dart';
export 'src/store.dart';
export 'src/sync.dart';
export 'src/sync_namespace.dart';
export 'src/sync_state.dart';

View File

@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
import 'e2e_envelope.dart';
import 'firebase_keys.dart';
/// Plaintext leaves in a decoded RTDB dump; empty once an app is migrated.
/// Decodes because RTDB serves blobs as escaped strings that defeat grep.
List<String> plaintextBlobPaths(Object? tree) {
final found = <String>[];
void walk(Object? node, String path) {
if (node is String) {
if (E2eCipher.isPlaintext(node) && !isE2eEnvelope(node)) found.add(path);
} else if (node is Map) {
for (final MapEntry(:key, :value) in node.entries) {
if (key == 'e2e' && value is String) continue;
final segment = decodeKey(key as String);
walk(value, path.isEmpty ? segment : '$path/$segment');
}
}
}
walk(tree, '');
return found;
}

View File

@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
const int e2eFormatVersion = 1;
const _nonceLength = 24;
const _tagLength = 16;
/// A FormatException so `syncLog` skips the peer instead of aborting the tick.
class E2eDecryptError extends FormatException {
E2eDecryptError(super.message);
@override
String toString() => 'E2eDecryptError: $message';
}
/// XChaCha20-Poly1305 per blob: base64 `[version][nonce][ct][tag]`, with the
/// version byte and remote path as AAD so blobs cannot be swapped.
///
/// [acceptPlaintext] reads un-migrated peers; turn it off after migration.
class E2eCipher {
E2eCipher(List<int> key, {this.acceptPlaintext = true})
: _key = SecretKey(List<int>.unmodifiable(key)) {
if (key.length != 32) {
throw ArgumentError.value(key.length, 'key', 'must be 32 bytes');
}
}
final SecretKey _key;
final bool acceptPlaintext;
static final _aead = Xchacha20.poly1305Aead();
static bool isPlaintext(String stored) {
final trimmed = stored.trimLeft();
return trimmed.startsWith('{') || trimmed.startsWith('[');
}
Future<String> seal(String plaintext, {required String path}) async {
final box = await _aead.encrypt(
utf8.encode(plaintext),
secretKey: _key,
nonce: _aead.newNonce(),
aad: _aad(e2eFormatVersion, path),
);
return base64.encode([
e2eFormatVersion,
...box.nonce,
...box.cipherText,
...box.mac.bytes,
]);
}
Future<String> open(String stored, {required String path}) async {
if (isPlaintext(stored)) {
if (acceptPlaintext) return stored;
throw E2eDecryptError('plaintext blob at $path after migration');
}
final List<int> bytes;
try {
bytes = base64.decode(stored);
} on FormatException {
throw E2eDecryptError('blob at $path is neither JSON nor base64');
}
if (bytes.isEmpty) throw E2eDecryptError('empty blob at $path');
final version = bytes.first;
if (version != e2eFormatVersion) {
throw E2eDecryptError(
'blob at $path uses format $version; update the app to read it',
);
}
if (bytes.length < 1 + _nonceLength + _tagLength) {
throw E2eDecryptError('blob at $path is truncated');
}
final box = SecretBox(
bytes.sublist(1 + _nonceLength, bytes.length - _tagLength),
nonce: bytes.sublist(1, 1 + _nonceLength),
mac: Mac(bytes.sublist(bytes.length - _tagLength)),
);
try {
final clear = await _aead.decrypt(
box,
secretKey: _key,
aad: _aad(version, path),
);
return utf8.decode(clear);
} on SecretBoxAuthenticationError {
throw E2eDecryptError('blob at $path failed authentication');
}
}
static List<int> _aad(int version, String path) => [
version,
...utf8.encode(path),
];
}

View File

@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
/// The per-record wire envelope: record ids, the tombstone and the newest HLC
/// stay in clear so the relay can order and inspect; every field name and
/// value is sealed. Merge still runs on the decrypted [Log].
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
import 'hlc.dart';
const int _envelopeVersion = 1;
/// Whether [text] is an envelope (explicit `"v"` integer), not legacy plaintext.
///
/// A legacy log maps record ids to objects, so an id named `v` still maps to
/// a map, never an int.
bool isE2eEnvelope(String text) {
try {
final json = jsonDecode(text);
return json is Map && json['v'] is int;
} on FormatException {
return false;
}
}
String _aad(
String path,
String id,
bool deleted,
String? deletedHlc,
String? h,
) => '$path#$id#${deleted ? 1 : 0}#${deletedHlc ?? ''}#${h ?? ''}';
/// Seals a log (the `logToJson` shape) into an envelope. Text that is not
/// log-shaped is sealed whole, so nothing is ever pushed in clear.
Future<String> sealLogText(
String text,
E2eCipher cipher, {
required String path,
}) async {
final Map<String, dynamic> raw;
try {
raw = (jsonDecode(text) as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
for (final entry in raw.entries) {
final rec = entry.value as Map;
if (rec['id'] != entry.key || rec['fields'] is! Map) {
throw const FormatException('not a log');
}
}
} on Object {
return jsonEncode({
'v': _envelopeVersion,
'b': await cipher.seal(text, path: path),
});
}
final records = <String, Object?>{};
for (final entry in raw.entries) {
final rec = (entry.value as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
final fields = (rec['fields'] as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
Hlc? newest;
for (final field in fields.values) {
final hlc = Hlc.fromStr((field as List)[1] as String);
if (newest == null || hlc > newest) newest = hlc;
}
final deleted = rec['deleted'] as bool? ?? false;
final deletedHlc = rec['deleted_hlc'] as String?;
final h = newest?.toStr();
records[entry.key] = {
'd': deleted,
'dh': deletedHlc,
'h': h,
'p': await cipher.seal(
jsonEncode(fields),
path: _aad(path, entry.key, deleted, deletedHlc, h),
),
};
}
return jsonEncode({'v': _envelopeVersion, 'r': records});
}
/// Opens an envelope back to the `logToJson` shape. Legacy plaintext is
/// returned as-is while the cipher accepts it.
Future<String> openLogText(
String text,
E2eCipher cipher, {
required String path,
}) async {
if (!isE2eEnvelope(text)) {
if (cipher.acceptPlaintext) return text;
throw E2eDecryptError('plaintext blob at $path after migration');
}
final json = (jsonDecode(text) as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
if (json['v'] != _envelopeVersion) {
throw E2eDecryptError(
'blob at $path uses format ${json['v']}; update the app to read it',
);
}
final whole = json['b'];
if (whole is String) return cipher.open(whole, path: path);
final records = json['r'];
if (records is! Map) throw E2eDecryptError('envelope at $path is mis-shaped');
final out = <String, Object?>{};
for (final entry in records.entries) {
final id = entry.key as String;
final rec = entry.value;
if (rec is! Map || rec['p'] is! String || rec['d'] is! bool) {
throw E2eDecryptError('record $id at $path is mis-shaped');
}
final deletedHlc = rec['dh'] as String?;
final h = rec['h'] as String?;
final clear = await cipher.open(
rec['p'] as String,
path: _aad(path, id, rec['d'] as bool, deletedHlc, h),
);
out[id] = {
'id': id,
'fields': jsonDecode(clear),
'deleted': rec['d'],
'deleted_hlc': deletedHlc,
};
}
return jsonEncode(out);
}

View File

@ -1,254 +0,0 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math';
import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
import 'encrypting_store.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
const _saltLength = 16;
const _headerVersion = 1;
/// Argon2id cost, stored in the header so it can be raised later.
class Argon2Params {
const Argon2Params({
required this.memoryKiB,
required this.iterations,
required this.parallelism,
});
/// OWASP's floor (19 MiB, t=2); higher stalls the Flutter-web desktop build.
static const recommended = Argon2Params(
memoryKiB: 19456,
iterations: 2,
parallelism: 1,
);
final int memoryKiB;
final int iterations;
final int parallelism;
}
class E2eHeaderError extends FormatException {
E2eHeaderError(super.message);
@override
String toString() => 'E2eHeaderError: $message';
}
class E2eWrongPassphraseError implements Exception {
@override
String toString() => 'E2eWrongPassphraseError: wrong sync passphrase';
}
/// The clear header's path: a sibling of the device dirs, like `revs`.
String defaultE2ePath(String pathPrefix) {
final cut = pathPrefix.lastIndexOf('/');
return cut < 0 ? '$pathPrefix/e2e' : '${pathPrefix.substring(0, cut)}/e2e';
}
class _Header {
_Header(this.salt, this.params, this.check);
factory _Header.parse(String text) {
final Object? json;
try {
json = jsonDecode(text);
} on FormatException {
throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header is not JSON');
}
if (json is! Map<String, dynamic>) {
throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header is not an object');
}
if (json['v'] != _headerVersion) {
throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header v${json['v']}; update the app');
}
try {
if (json['kdf'] != 'argon2id') throw const FormatException();
return _Header(
base64.decode(json['salt'] as String),
Argon2Params(
memoryKiB: json['m'] as int,
iterations: json['t'] as int,
parallelism: json['p'] as int,
),
json['check'] as String,
);
} on Object {
throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header is malformed');
}
}
final List<int> salt;
final Argon2Params params;
final String check;
String encode() => jsonEncode({
'v': _headerVersion,
'kdf': 'argon2id',
'salt': base64.encode(salt),
'm': params.memoryKiB,
't': params.iterations,
'p': params.parallelism,
'check': check,
});
}
/// A 32-byte master key plus its HKDF subkeys for sealing, revisions and the
/// passphrase check. Cache [bytes] in the OS keystore, never in RTDB.
class E2eKey {
E2eKey._(this.bytes, this._enc, this._rev, this._check);
static Future<E2eKey> fromBytes(List<int> bytes) {
if (bytes.length != 32) {
throw ArgumentError.value(bytes.length, 'bytes', 'must be 32 bytes');
}
return _expand(List<int>.unmodifiable(bytes));
}
static Future<E2eKey> _expand(List<int> master) async {
Future<List<int>> sub(String label) async {
final key = await Hkdf(hmac: Hmac.sha256(), outputLength: 32).deriveKey(
secretKey: SecretKey(master),
info: utf8.encode('crdt_sync e2e $label'),
);
return key.bytes;
}
return E2eKey._(
master,
await sub('enc'),
SecretKey(await sub('rev')),
SecretKey(await sub('check')),
);
}
final List<int> bytes;
final List<int> _enc;
final SecretKey _rev;
final SecretKey _check;
E2eCipher cipher({bool acceptPlaintext = true}) =>
E2eCipher(_enc, acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext);
/// Keyed `revisionOf`: a published revision cannot confirm a guessed log.
Future<String> revision(String text) async {
final mac = await Hmac.sha256().calculateMac(
utf8.encode(text),
secretKey: _rev,
);
return mac.bytes.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0')).join();
}
Future<String> _checkFor(List<int> salt) async {
final mac = await Hmac.sha256().calculateMac(salt, secretKey: _check);
return base64.encode(mac.bytes);
}
}
Future<E2eKey> _derive(
String passphrase,
List<int> salt,
Argon2Params params,
) async {
final key = await Argon2id(
parallelism: params.parallelism,
memory: params.memoryKiB,
iterations: params.iterations,
hashLength: 32,
).deriveKeyFromPassword(password: passphrase, nonce: salt);
return E2eKey._expand(await key.extractBytes());
}
Future<_Header?> _readHeader(RemoteStore store, String path) async {
final text = await store.getFileText(path);
return text == null ? null : _Header.parse(text);
}
/// Derives this app's key from [passphrase], creating the header on first use.
///
/// Throws [E2eWrongPassphraseError] on a failed check and [E2eHeaderError]
/// for an unreadable header, which is never overwritten.
Future<E2eKey> unlockE2e({
required RemoteStore store,
required String pathPrefix,
required String passphrase,
Argon2Params params = Argon2Params.recommended,
Random? random,
String? e2ePath,
}) async {
if (passphrase.isEmpty) {
throw ArgumentError.value('', 'passphrase', 'must not be empty');
}
final path = e2ePath ?? defaultE2ePath(pathPrefix);
var header = await _readHeader(store, path);
if (header == null) {
final rng = random ?? Random.secure();
final salt = List<int>.generate(_saltLength, (_) => rng.nextInt(256));
final key = await _derive(passphrase, salt, params);
final encoded = _Header(salt, params, await key._checkFor(salt)).encode();
await store.putFileText(path, encoded, message: path);
// Two devices setting up at once: the last write wins, so re-read.
final stored = await store.getFileText(path) ?? encoded;
if (stored == encoded) return key;
header = _Header.parse(stored);
}
final key = await _derive(passphrase, header.salt, header.params);
if (await key._checkFor(header.salt) != header.check) {
throw E2eWrongPassphraseError();
}
return key;
}
sealed class E2eState {}
/// No header and no key: this app has never been encrypted.
final class E2eOff extends E2eState {}
enum E2eLockReason { needsPassphrase, wrongKey, badHeader }
/// Encryption is on, but this device must not sync until it has the key.
final class E2eLocked extends E2eState {
E2eLocked(this.reason);
final E2eLockReason reason;
}
final class E2eReady extends E2eState {
E2eReady(this.store);
final EncryptingStore store;
}
Future<E2eState> openE2e({
required RemoteStore store,
required String pathPrefix,
E2eKey? key,
String? e2ePath,
String? revsPath,
bool acceptPlaintext = true,
}) async {
final _Header? header;
try {
header = await _readHeader(store, e2ePath ?? defaultE2ePath(pathPrefix));
} on E2eHeaderError {
return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.badHeader);
}
if (key == null) {
return header == null ? E2eOff() : E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
}
if (header == null || await key._checkFor(header.salt) != header.check) {
return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
}
return E2eReady(
EncryptingStore(
store,
key,
pathPrefix: pathPrefix,
revsPath: revsPath,
e2ePath: e2ePath,
acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext,
),
);
}

View File

@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
/// The one-time copy from a plaintext prefix to `<prefix>-e2e`.
///
/// Re-encrypting in place is rejected: an old build still writing the old
/// prefix would be broken mid-migration. Instead the old prefix stays
/// untouched until [deletePlaintextPrefix] verifies the copy.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'e2e_key.dart';
import 'encrypting_store.dart';
import 'log.dart';
import 'record.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
import 'store.dart';
import 'sync.dart';
/// Where an app's encrypted data lives, derived from its old plaintext prefix.
class E2eLayout {
const E2eLayout._(this.prefix, this.revsPath, this.e2ePath);
/// `<oldPrefix>-e2e`, with revisions and header apart from the old ones so
/// old builds neither see nor clobber them.
///
/// A slashless prefix (`settings-sync`) keeps revisions and header inside
/// its own node, as `defaultRevsPath` does, never at the database root.
factory E2eLayout.of(String oldPrefix) {
final prefix = '$oldPrefix-e2e';
final cut = oldPrefix.lastIndexOf('/');
if (cut < 0) {
return E2eLayout._(prefix, '$prefix/revs', '$prefix/e2e');
}
final parent = oldPrefix.substring(0, cut);
return E2eLayout._(prefix, '$parent/revs-e2e', defaultE2ePath(prefix));
}
final String prefix;
final String revsPath;
final String e2ePath;
}
class MigrationReport {
const MigrationReport(this.copied, this.skipped);
/// Blobs written (new or changed) this run.
final int copied;
/// Source blobs unreadable as a log, relative path.
final List<String> skipped;
}
/// Every text blob under [root], keyed by path relative to it: flat
/// `<node>.json` leaves and nested `<device>/<file>` blobs. Real RTDB bulk
/// reads return direct string children only, so dirs are walked.
Future<Map<String, String>> _listBlobs(RemoteStore store, String root) async {
final out = <String, String>{};
if (store is BulkMapReader) {
out.addAll(await (store as BulkMapReader).getStringMap(root));
}
final revs = defaultRevsPath(root);
final header = defaultE2ePath(root);
for (final name in await store.listDirectory(root)) {
if (out.containsKey(name)) continue;
final full = '$root/$name';
if (full == header || full == revs) continue;
final children = await _safeList(store, full);
if (children.isEmpty) {
final text = await _safeRead(store, full);
if (text != null) out[name] = text;
continue;
}
for (final child in children) {
final text = await _safeRead(store, '$full/$child');
if (text != null) out['$name/$child'] = text;
}
}
out.removeWhere(
(rel, _) => '$root/$rel' == header || '$root/$rel'.startsWith('$revs/'),
);
return out;
}
Future<List<String>> _safeList(RemoteStore store, String path) async {
try {
return await store.listDirectory(path);
} on Object {
return const [];
}
}
Future<String?> _safeRead(RemoteStore store, String path) async {
try {
return await store.getFileText(path);
} on Object {
return null;
}
}
EncryptingStore _dest(RemoteStore store, E2eKey key, E2eLayout layout) =>
EncryptingStore(
store,
key,
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
revsPath: layout.revsPath,
e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
);
/// Order-independent signature of a log, to tell "same records" cheaply.
String _signature(Log log) {
final ids = log.keys.toList()..sort();
return jsonEncode([
for (final id in ids)
[
id,
log[id]!.deleted,
log[id]!.deletedHlc?.toStr(),
[
for (final name in (log[id]!.fields.keys.toList()..sort()))
[
name,
jsonEncode(log[id]!.fields[name]!.$1),
log[id]!.fields[name]!.$2.toStr(),
],
],
],
]);
}
Log? _parse(String text) {
try {
return logFromJson(text);
} on FormatException {
return null;
} on TypeError {
return null;
}
}
/// Copies every readable plaintext log under [fromPrefix] into the encrypted
/// prefix, merging into what is already there. Idempotent: an unchanged
/// destination is not rewritten. Never touches [fromPrefix].
Future<MigrationReport> copyToEncrypted({
required RemoteStore store,
required E2eKey key,
required String fromPrefix,
required E2eLayout layout,
}) async {
final dest = _dest(store, key, layout);
var copied = 0;
final skipped = <String>[];
final blobs = await _listBlobs(store, fromPrefix);
for (final MapEntry(key: rel, value: text) in blobs.entries) {
final source = _parse(text);
if (source == null) {
skipped.add(rel);
continue;
}
if (source.isEmpty) continue;
final path = '${layout.prefix}/$rel';
final existing = await dest.getFileText(path);
final current = existing == null ? null : _parse(existing);
// Not a sync log (an app's own blob): never overwrite it.
if (existing != null && current == null) continue;
final merged = mergeLogs(current ?? <String, Record>{}, source);
if (current != null && _signature(merged) == _signature(current)) continue;
await dest.putFileText(path, logToJson(merged), message: 'e2e copy');
copied++;
}
return MigrationReport(copied, skipped);
}
/// True when every readable plaintext blob is contained in the encrypted copy
/// and none is unreadable.
Future<bool> verifyCopy({
required RemoteStore store,
required E2eKey key,
required String fromPrefix,
required E2eLayout layout,
}) async {
final dest = _dest(store, key, layout);
for (final MapEntry(key: rel, value: text) in (await _listBlobs(
store,
fromPrefix,
)).entries) {
final source = _parse(text);
if (source == null) return false;
final existing = await dest.getFileText('${layout.prefix}/$rel');
final current = existing == null ? null : _parse(existing);
if (current == null) return false;
if (_signature(mergeLogs(current, source)) != _signature(current)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/// Deletes the plaintext prefix, only after [verifyCopy] passes. Returns
/// whether it deleted.
Future<bool> deletePlaintextPrefix({
required RemoteStore store,
required E2eKey key,
required String fromPrefix,
required E2eLayout layout,
}) async {
if (!await verifyCopy(
store: store,
key: key,
fromPrefix: fromPrefix,
layout: layout,
)) {
return false;
}
for (final rel in (await _listBlobs(store, fromPrefix)).keys) {
await store.deleteFile('$fromPrefix/$rel', message: 'e2e cleanup');
}
return true;
}

View File

@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
/// Opens the encrypted store for an app whose old plaintext prefix is
/// [oldPrefix]; data lives on `E2eLayout.of(oldPrefix)`.
///
/// [readPassphrase] supplies the shared crdt-sync passphrase from the OS
/// keystore, so the open is prompt-free. Fail closed: a missing or wrong
/// passphrase, or an unreadable header, returns [E2eLocked] and the caller
/// must not sync. On success the old plaintext prefix is copied over
/// (idempotent; picks up writes from builds not yet migrated) and is never
/// deleted here.
library;
import 'dart:developer';
import 'e2e_key.dart';
import 'e2e_migration.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
import 'sync.dart';
/// Keystore entry name apps store the shared passphrase under.
const String kE2ePassphraseStorageKey = 'crdt_sync_e2e_passphrase';
/// Where a device keeps its derived 32-byte key, so Argon2id runs once per
/// device rather than once per sync tick. Back it with the OS keystore.
class E2eKeyCache {
/// Creates a cache from [read] and [write] closures.
const E2eKeyCache({required this.read, required this.write});
/// Returns the cached key bytes, or null.
final Future<List<int>?> Function() read;
/// Stores freshly derived key bytes.
final Future<void> Function(List<int> bytes) write;
}
/// Old-prefix revision fingerprints already copied, per old prefix.
final Map<String, String> _copied = {};
/// Forgets which old prefixes were copied; for tests.
void resetE2eCopyMemo() => _copied.clear();
Future<String> _oldFingerprint(RemoteStore store, String oldPrefix) async {
if (store is! BulkMapReader) return '';
try {
final revs = await (store as BulkMapReader).getStringMap(
defaultRevsPath(oldPrefix),
);
final keys = revs.keys.toList()..sort();
return [for (final k in keys) '$k=${revs[k]}'].join(';');
} on Object {
return '';
}
}
Future<E2eReady?> _tryCached(
RemoteStore store,
E2eLayout layout,
E2eKeyCache? cache,
) async {
final bytes = await cache?.read();
if (bytes == null || bytes.length != 32) return null;
final state = await openE2e(
store: store,
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
key: await E2eKey.fromBytes(bytes),
e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
revsPath: layout.revsPath,
);
return state is E2eReady ? state : null;
}
/// Opens the encrypted store; see the library doc.
///
/// [keyCache] skips Argon2id when it holds the key for the current header.
/// The one-time copy reruns only when the old prefix's published revisions
/// change (or once per process where the backend cannot bulk-read them).
/// [onDerive] is called each time Argon2id actually runs; for tests.
Future<E2eState> openEncryptedStore({
required RemoteStore store,
required String oldPrefix,
required Future<String?> Function() readPassphrase,
Argon2Params params = Argon2Params.recommended,
E2eKeyCache? keyCache,
void Function()? onDerive,
}) async {
final layout = E2eLayout.of(oldPrefix);
final E2eReady ready;
final E2eReady? cached;
try {
cached = await _tryCached(store, layout, keyCache);
} on E2eHeaderError {
return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.badHeader);
}
if (cached != null) {
ready = cached;
} else {
final passphrase = await readPassphrase();
if (passphrase == null || passphrase.isEmpty) {
return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
}
final E2eKey key;
try {
onDerive?.call();
key = await unlockE2e(
store: store,
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
passphrase: passphrase,
params: params,
e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
);
} on E2eWrongPassphraseError {
return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
} on E2eHeaderError {
return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.badHeader);
}
await keyCache?.write(key.bytes);
final state = await openE2e(
store: store,
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
key: key,
e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
revsPath: layout.revsPath,
);
if (state is! E2eReady) return state;
ready = state;
}
try {
final print = await _oldFingerprint(store, oldPrefix);
if (_copied[oldPrefix] != print) {
await copyToEncrypted(
store: store,
key: ready.store.key,
fromPrefix: oldPrefix,
layout: layout,
);
_copied[oldPrefix] = print;
}
} on Object catch (error, stackTrace) {
// The copy is retried next open; sync itself must not stop for it.
log('e2e copy failed', level: 900, error: error, stackTrace: stackTrace);
}
return ready;
}

View File

@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
import 'e2e_envelope.dart';
import 'e2e_key.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
import 'sync.dart';
/// A [RemoteStore] that seals every blob under `pathPrefix` (nested
/// `<device>/<file>` or flat `<node>.json`) except the header, as a
/// per-record envelope (ids and HLCs clear, names and values opaque), and
/// keys every revision under `revsPath`, so the remote is a blind relay.
///
/// Wrap the outermost store (above a `MirrorStore`) so every backend gets
/// ciphertext. Other paths pass through unchanged.
class EncryptingStore implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
EncryptingStore(
this._inner,
this._key, {
required String pathPrefix,
String? revsPath,
String? e2ePath,
bool acceptPlaintext = true,
}) : _cipher = _key.cipher(acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext),
_prefix = pathPrefix,
_revs = revsPath ?? defaultRevsPath(pathPrefix),
_header = e2ePath ?? defaultE2ePath(pathPrefix);
final RemoteStore _inner;
final E2eKey _key;
/// The key this store seals with.
E2eKey get key => _key;
final E2eCipher _cipher;
final String _prefix;
final String _revs;
final String _header;
bool _isRev(String path) => path.startsWith('$_revs/');
bool _isLog(String path) =>
!_isRev(path) && path != _header && path.startsWith('$_prefix/');
@override
Future<String?> getFileText(String path) async {
final text = await _inner.getFileText(path);
if (text == null || !_isLog(path)) return text;
return openLogText(text, _cipher, path: path);
}
@override
Future<void> putFileText(
String path,
String text, {
required String message,
}) async {
final stored = _isLog(path)
? await sealLogText(text, _cipher, path: path)
: _isRev(path)
? await _key.revision(text)
: text;
await _inner.putFileText(path, stored, message: message);
}
@override
Future<Map<String, String>> getStringMap(String path) async {
if (_inner case final BulkMapReader reader) {
final map = await reader.getStringMap(path);
if (!_isLog('$path/x')) return map;
final out = <String, String>{};
for (final MapEntry(:key, :value) in map.entries) {
final full = '$path/$key';
if (!_isLog(full)) {
out[key] = value;
continue;
}
try {
out[key] = await openLogText(value, _cipher, path: full);
} on E2eDecryptError {
// Unreadable entries are dropped, as a corrupt value would be.
}
}
return out;
}
return const {};
}
@override
Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) => _inner.listDirectory(path);
@override
Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) =>
_inner.deleteFile(path, message: message);
@override
Future<bool> canAccessRemote() => _inner.canAccessRemote();
@override
void close() => _inner.close();
}

View File

@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import 'firebase_auth_rest.dart';
import 'firebase_errors.dart';
import 'firebase_keys.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
import 'sync_namespace.dart';
const _httpUnauthorized = 401;
const _httpForbidden = 403;
@ -34,22 +33,13 @@ class FirebaseRestClient implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
required String databaseUrl,
required this.auth,
http.Client? httpClient,
String namespace = syncNamespace,
}) : _databaseUrl = databaseUrl.endsWith('/')
? databaseUrl.substring(0, databaseUrl.length - 1)
: databaseUrl,
_prefix = _prefixFor(checkSyncNamespace(namespace)),
_http = httpClient ?? http.Client();
final String _databaseUrl;
/// `<namespace>/` or empty: put in front of every RTDB path. Every request
/// goes through [_uri], so this is the single choke point.
final String _prefix;
static String _prefixFor(String namespace) =>
namespace.isEmpty ? '' : '$namespace/';
/// Mints the ID token every request carries. Public so a settings screen
/// can drive `signIn` / `signOut` through the same instance the client uses.
final FirebaseTokenProvider auth;
@ -57,12 +47,8 @@ class FirebaseRestClient implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
Future<Uri> _uri(String path, {Map<String, String> query = const {}}) async {
final encoded = encodePath(path);
// A bare namespace (the root probe) must not leave a trailing slash.
final full = encoded.isEmpty && _prefix.isNotEmpty
? _prefix.substring(0, _prefix.length - 1)
: '$_prefix$encoded';
return Uri.parse(
'$_databaseUrl/$full.json',
'$_databaseUrl/$encoded.json',
).replace(queryParameters: {'auth': await auth.idToken(), ...query});
}

View File

@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import 'firebase_credentials.dart';
import 'firebase_client.dart';
import 'mirror_store.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
import 'sync_namespace.dart';
/// The shared config is missing a field, or still holds a scaffold placeholder.
class ConfigException implements Exception {
@ -122,8 +121,6 @@ Future<FirebaseRestClient> firebaseClientFor({
String? expectedUid,
http.Client? httpClient,
}) async {
// Before any sign-in: a bad SYNC_NAMESPACE must stop the app at startup.
checkSyncNamespace(syncNamespace);
final auth = FirebaseTokenProvider(
apiKey: config.apiKey,
store: store,

View File

@ -7,11 +7,8 @@ import 'store.dart';
/// Writes atomically -- to a per-process temp file, then `rename`d over the
/// real path -- so a concurrent reader (e.g. a background sync isolate writing
/// while the foreground app also writes) never observes a half-written file.
/// The pid in the temp name keeps two processes from colliding; within one
/// instance, writes are serialized in issue order (last issued wins), so
/// overlapping calls (e.g. per-keystroke saves) never share the temp file
/// mid-flight. This generalizes diet_guard's hand-rolled `LogStorageService`
/// write scheme.
/// The pid in the temp name keeps two writers from colliding. This generalizes
/// diet_guard's hand-rolled `LogStorageService` write scheme.
///
/// Lives behind the `package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync_io.dart` entrypoint, not the
/// main barrel, because it imports `dart:io` and so is unavailable on web --
@ -23,10 +20,6 @@ class FileLogPersistence implements LogPersistence {
final File _file;
/// Completes when the most recently issued write has settled. Never
/// rejects, so one failed write cannot block the ones queued after it.
Future<void> _tail = Future<void>.value();
@override
Future<String?> read() async {
if (!_file.existsSync()) return null;
@ -38,14 +31,7 @@ class FileLogPersistence implements LogPersistence {
}
@override
Future<void> write(String text) {
final result = _tail.then((_) => _writeNow(text));
// The caller still sees its own error via [result]; the chain ignores it.
_tail = result.then((_) {}, onError: (Object _) {});
return result;
}
Future<void> _writeNow(String text) async {
Future<void> write(String text) async {
await _file.parent.create(recursive: true);
final tmp = File('${_file.path}.$pid.tmp');
await tmp.writeAsString(text);

View File

@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
import 'log.dart';
import 'record.dart';
import 'remote_store.dart';
@ -45,9 +44,6 @@ String revisionOf(String encodedLog) =>
/// treated as this device's own rather than as a peer's, so its
/// pre-migration log is not pulled back and re-merged every tick. Pass null
/// once that path has been reclaimed.
///
/// [onPeerSkipped] reports each peer skipped as unreadable, e.g. an
/// [E2eDecryptError] from a wrong key or an app that needs updating.
Future<Log> syncLog({
required RemoteStore client,
required String deviceId,
@ -60,7 +56,6 @@ Future<Log> syncLog({
SyncStateStore? stateStore,
String? revsPath,
String? legacyDeviceId,
void Function(String deviceId, Object error)? onPeerSkipped,
}) async {
final revs = revsPath ?? defaultRevsPath(pathPrefix);
final state = await stateStore?.load() ?? const SyncState();
@ -85,21 +80,15 @@ Future<Log> syncLog({
seenRevs[otherDeviceId] = remoteRev;
continue;
}
final String? text;
try {
text = await client.getFileText('$pathPrefix/$otherDeviceId/$filename');
} on E2eDecryptError catch (error) {
onPeerSkipped?.call(otherDeviceId, error);
continue;
}
final text = await client.getFileText(
'$pathPrefix/$otherDeviceId/$filename',
);
if (text == null) continue;
try {
mergedLog = mergeLogs(mergedLog, decode(text));
} on FormatException catch (error) {
onPeerSkipped?.call(otherDeviceId, error);
} on FormatException {
continue;
} on TypeError catch (error) {
onPeerSkipped?.call(otherDeviceId, error);
} on TypeError {
continue;
}
// Only remembered once the merge succeeded: a corrupt push must be

View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
/// Compile-time sandbox namespace for the Realtime Database.
///
/// Build a test app with `--dart-define=SYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/slot3` and every
/// RTDB path the library reads or writes moves under `/sandbox/slot3/`, so a
/// test build can never touch real data. Sign-in is unchanged (real account).
/// Empty, the default, leaves every path exactly as it was.
library;
import 'firebase_config.dart';
/// The `SYNC_NAMESPACE` dart-define; empty means production paths.
const String syncNamespace = String.fromEnvironment('SYNC_NAMESPACE');
final RegExp _allowed = RegExp(r'^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$');
/// Returns [namespace] when it is empty or `sandbox/<slot>`, else throws.
///
/// Fails closed: a typo must stop the app at startup, never quietly fall back
/// to production paths. A trailing newline is rejected too.
String checkSyncNamespace(String namespace) {
if (namespace.isEmpty || _allowed.hasMatch(namespace)) return namespace;
throw ConfigException(
'SYNC_NAMESPACE "$namespace" is invalid: it must be empty or match '
r'^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$ (e.g. sandbox/slot3)',
);
}

View File

@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ packages:
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "2.1.2"
characters:
dependency: transitive
description:
name: characters
sha256: faf38497bda5ead2a8c7615f4f7939df04333478bf32e4173fcb06d428b5716b
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "1.4.1"
cli_config:
dependency: transitive
description:
@ -89,22 +81,6 @@ packages:
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "3.0.8"
cryptography:
dependency: "direct main"
description:
name: cryptography
sha256: "3eda3029d34ec9095a27a198ac9785630fe525c0eb6a49f3d575272f8e792ef0"
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "2.9.0"
ffi:
dependency: transitive
description:
name: ffi
sha256: "6d7fd89431262d8f3125e81b50d3847a091d846eafcd4fdb88dd06f36d705a45"
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "2.2.0"
file:
dependency: transitive
description:
@ -121,14 +97,6 @@ packages:
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "4.0.0"
glados:
dependency: "direct dev"
description:
name: glados
sha256: c39446c0c4fe83a6ee6ee4fdee5a1afa27050619c7df390bf4c3b77b6f1acb33
url: "https://pub.dev"
source: hosted
version: "1.1.7"
glob:
dependency: transitive
description:

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: crdt_sync
description: >-
Shared CRDT merge scheme + GitHub-Contents-API sync transport for
cross-device apps. Pure Dart, no Flutter dependency.
version: 0.14.1
version: 0.11.3
publish_to: 'none'
environment:
@ -10,10 +10,8 @@ environment:
dependencies:
crypto: 3.0.8
cryptography: 2.9.0
http: 1.6.0
dev_dependencies:
glados: 1.1.7
lints: 6.1.0
test: 1.33.0

View File

@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ void main() {
// Nothing listens on this port, so the GET throws and the `on Exception`
// path returns null -- while the `finally` still closes the client the
// function created for itself.
final account = await accountFromWrapper(Uri.parse('http://127.0.0.1:1'));
final account = await accountFromWrapper(
Uri.parse('http://127.0.0.1:1'),
);
expect(account, isNull);
});
@ -48,10 +50,8 @@ void main() {
final mock = http_testing.MockClient(
(_) async => http.Response(jsonEncode({}), 404),
);
expect(
await accountFromWrapper(Uri.parse('http://x'), client: mock),
isNull,
);
expect(await accountFromWrapper(Uri.parse('http://x'), client: mock),
isNull);
// Still usable: the function must not close a client it did not create.
expect((await mock.get(Uri.parse('http://x'))).statusCode, 404);
});
@ -106,65 +106,27 @@ void main() {
expect(await store.read(), isNull);
});
test(
'read returns null when the file cannot be read',
() async {
// A mode-000 file still passes existsSync, so the guard does not fire
// and readAsString throws PathAccessException (a FileSystemException).
// A directory would NOT work here: File.existsSync() is false for one,
// so read() would return early down the guard path instead.
final file = File('${dir.path}/unreadable.json')
..writeAsStringSync('{}');
final chmod = Process.runSync('chmod', ['000', file.path]);
expect(chmod.exitCode, 0);
addTearDown(() => Process.runSync('chmod', ['644', file.path]));
test('read returns null when the file cannot be read', () async {
// A mode-000 file still passes existsSync, so the guard does not fire
// and readAsString throws PathAccessException (a FileSystemException).
// A directory would NOT work here: File.existsSync() is false for one,
// so read() would return early down the guard path instead.
final file = File('${dir.path}/unreadable.json')..writeAsStringSync('{}');
final chmod = Process.runSync('chmod', ['000', file.path]);
expect(chmod.exitCode, 0);
addTearDown(() => Process.runSync('chmod', ['644', file.path]));
expect(await FileLogPersistence(file).read(), isNull);
},
// root ignores the permission bits, so the exception never fires.
skip: Platform.environment['USER'] == 'root'
? 'permission bits do not apply to root'
: null,
);
expect(await FileLogPersistence(file).read(), isNull);
},
// root ignores the permission bits, so the exception never fires.
skip: Platform.environment['USER'] == 'root'
? 'permission bits do not apply to root'
: null);
test('round-trips what it wrote', () async {
final store = FileLogPersistence(File('${dir.path}/log.json'));
await store.write('{"hello":"world"}');
expect(await store.read(), '{"hello":"world"}');
});
test(
'50 overlapping writes all succeed and the last issued wins',
() async {
// Regression: every call shared one `<file>.<pid>.tmp`, so the first
// rename moved it away and a later rename threw PathNotFoundException.
final store = FileLogPersistence(File('${dir.path}/log.json'));
await Future.wait([
for (var i = 0; i < 50; i++) store.write('{"n":$i}'),
]);
expect(await store.read(), '{"n":49}');
expect(dir.listSync().map((e) => e.uri.pathSegments.last), [
'log.json',
]);
},
);
test(
'a failed write rejects its caller but does not block later writes',
() async {
final target = File('${dir.path}/log.json');
// A directory at the target path makes the rename fail.
Directory(target.path).createSync();
final store = FileLogPersistence(target);
await expectLater(
store.write('{"n":0}'),
throwsA(isA<FileSystemException>()),
);
Directory(target.path).deleteSync();
await store.write('{"n":1}');
expect(await store.read(), '{"n":1}');
},
);
});
}

View File

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
/// The done check: find plaintext blobs in a raw RTDB dump.
///
/// RTDB returns each blob as a JSON string, so its quotes arrive escaped and
/// `grep -c '"title"'` prints 0 even on plaintext. The audit decodes instead.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
// Shape copied from a live `GET /<root>.json` (scratch data).
const _livePlaintextDump =
r'{"notes":{"pc":{"log~2Ejson":"{\"n2\":{\"id\":\"n2\",\"fields\":'
r'{\"title\":[\"call mum\",\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.001Z-0000-pc\"]},'
r'\"deleted\":false,\"deleted_hlc\":null}}"}},"revs":{"pc":"ab12"}}';
void main() {
test('the grep done check misses live plaintext; the audit does not', () {
expect('"title"'.allMatches(_livePlaintextDump), isEmpty);
expect(plaintextBlobPaths(jsonDecode(_livePlaintextDump)), [
'notes/pc/log.json',
]);
});
test('sealed blobs, revs and the clear e2e header pass', () async {
final sealed = await E2eCipher(
List<int>.filled(32, 1),
).seal('{"title":"x"}', path: 'notes/pc/log.json');
final dump = {
'e2e': '{"v":1,"kdf":"argon2id"}',
'notes': {
'pc': {'log~2Ejson': sealed},
},
'revs': {'pc': 'ab12'},
};
expect(plaintextBlobPaths(dump), isEmpty);
});
test('every plaintext leaf is reported, with keys unescaped', () {
final dump = {
'a': {
'x~2Ey': '[1]',
'b': {'c': ' {"k":1}'},
},
'n': 3,
'nil': null,
};
expect(plaintextBlobPaths(dump), unorderedEquals(['a/x.y', 'a/b/c']));
});
test('a root that is itself plaintext, or empty, is handled', () {
expect(plaintextBlobPaths('{"a":1}'), ['']);
expect(plaintextBlobPaths(null), isEmpty);
});
}

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/// The record-blob AEAD: what makes the remote a blind relay.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:glados/glados.dart' hide expect, group, test, setUp;
import 'package:test/test.dart';
const _path = 'todo-sync/notes/phone/log.json';
E2eCipher _cipher([int fill = 7, bool acceptPlaintext = true]) =>
E2eCipher(List<int>.filled(32, fill), acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext);
void main() {
Glados(any.letterOrDigits, ExploreConfig(numRuns: 60)).test(
'open(seal(x)) == x for any text',
(text) async {
final cipher = _cipher();
final sealed = await cipher.seal('{"t":"$text"}', path: _path);
expect(await cipher.open(sealed, path: _path), '{"t":"$text"}');
},
);
test('sealed text contains no plaintext and is not JSON', () async {
final sealed = await _cipher().seal('{"title":"secret"}', path: _path);
expect(sealed, isNot(contains('title')));
expect(sealed, isNot(contains('secret')));
expect(() => jsonDecode(sealed), throwsFormatException);
expect(E2eCipher.isPlaintext(sealed), isFalse);
});
test('two seals of the same text differ (random nonce)', () async {
final cipher = _cipher();
expect(
await cipher.seal('{}', path: _path),
isNot(await cipher.seal('{}', path: _path)),
);
});
test('wire format starts with the version byte', () async {
final bytes = base64.decode(await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path));
expect(bytes.first, e2eFormatVersion);
expect(bytes.length, 1 + 24 + 2 + 16);
});
test('plaintext JSON passes through during migration', () async {
expect(await _cipher().open(' {"a":1}', path: _path), ' {"a":1}');
expect(await _cipher().open('[1]', path: _path), '[1]');
expect(E2eCipher.isPlaintext('\n{'), isTrue);
});
test('plaintext is refused once migration is over', () async {
expect(
() => _cipher(7, false).open('{"a":1}', path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
group('rejects, as a FormatException so syncLog skips the peer', () {
test('a wrong key', () async {
final sealed = await _cipher(1).seal('{}', path: _path);
expect(
() => _cipher(2).open(sealed, path: _path),
throwsA(isA<FormatException>()),
);
});
test('a blob moved to another path', () async {
final sealed = await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path);
expect(
() => _cipher().open(sealed, path: 'todo-sync/notes/pc/log.json'),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('a flipped ciphertext byte', () async {
final bytes = base64.decode(await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path));
bytes[30] ^= 1;
expect(
() => _cipher().open(base64.encode(bytes), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('an unknown version byte', () async {
final bytes = base64.decode(await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path));
bytes[0] = 9;
expect(
() => _cipher().open(base64.encode(bytes), path: _path),
throwsA(
isA<E2eDecryptError>().having(
(e) => e.message,
'message',
contains('update the app'),
),
),
);
});
test('text that is not base64', () {
expect(
() => _cipher().open('not base64 !!', path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('a blob too short to hold nonce and tag', () {
expect(
() => _cipher().open(base64.encode([1, 2, 3]), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('an empty blob', () {
expect(
() => _cipher().open('', path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
});
test('a key that is not 32 bytes is a programming error', () {
expect(() => E2eCipher(const [1, 2]), throwsArgumentError);
});
test('E2eDecryptError reads as itself', () {
expect(E2eDecryptError('x').toString(), 'E2eDecryptError: x');
});
}

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@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
/// Per-record envelope: ids and HLCs stay clear, field names and values are
/// opaque, and merge results are identical with and without encryption.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:glados/glados.dart' hide expect, group, test, setUp;
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
const _path = 'app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json';
E2eCipher _cipher([int fill = 7, bool acceptPlaintext = true]) =>
E2eCipher(List<int>.filled(32, fill), acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext);
Hlc _hlc(int ms, int counter, String node) =>
Hlc(wallTimeMs: ms, counter: counter, nodeId: node);
Log _logFrom(List<(int, int, String)> rows) {
final log = <String, Record>{};
for (final (id, field, value) in rows) {
final key = 'r$id';
final old = log[key];
log[key] = Record(
id: key,
fields: {
...?old?.fields,
'f$field': (value, _hlc(1000 + id * 7 + field, field, 'n$id')),
},
deleted: id % 4 == 0,
deletedHlc: id % 4 == 0 ? _hlc(5000, 0, 'n$id') : null,
);
}
return log;
}
final _rows = any.list(
any.combine3(
any.intInRange(0, 6),
any.intInRange(0, 4),
any.letterOrDigits,
(a, b, c) => (a, b, c),
),
);
void main() {
Glados(_rows, ExploreConfig(numRuns: 40)).test(
'decode(open(seal(encode(log)))) == log',
(rows) async {
final log = _logFrom(rows);
final cipher = _cipher();
final sealed = await sealLogText(encodeLog(log), cipher, path: _path);
final opened = await openLogText(sealed, cipher, path: _path);
expect(encodeLog(decodeLog(opened)), encodeLog(log));
},
);
Glados2(_rows, _rows, ExploreConfig(numRuns: 40)).test(
'merge through the envelope == merge without it',
(a, b) async {
final cipher = _cipher();
Future<Log> viaCipher(Log log) async => decodeLog(
await openLogText(
await sealLogText(encodeLog(log), cipher, path: _path),
cipher,
path: _path,
),
);
final la = _logFrom(a);
final lb = _logFrom(b);
final plain = mergeLogs(la, lb);
final sealed = mergeLogs(await viaCipher(la), await viaCipher(lb));
expect(encodeLog(sealed), encodeLog(plain));
},
);
test('ids and HLCs are clear, names and values are not', () async {
final log = logOf({'n1': 'buy milk'});
final sealed = await sealLogText(encodeLog(log), _cipher(), path: _path);
final json = jsonDecode(sealed) as Map<String, dynamic>;
expect(json['v'], 1);
final rec = (json['r'] as Map<String, dynamic>)['n1'] as Map;
expect(rec['h'], log['n1']!.fields['title']!.$2.toStr());
expect(rec['d'], false);
expect(sealed, isNot(contains('title')));
expect(sealed, isNot(contains('buy milk')));
expect(isE2eEnvelope(sealed), isTrue);
expect(isE2eEnvelope(encodeLog(log)), isFalse);
});
test('legacy plaintext passes only while acceptPlaintext', () async {
final text = encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'x'}));
expect(await openLogText(text, _cipher(), path: _path), text);
expect(
() => openLogText(text, _cipher(7, false), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('a record id named v is still legacy plaintext', () async {
final text = encodeLog(logOf({'v': 'x'}));
expect(isE2eEnvelope(text), isFalse);
});
group('tamper and wrong key are E2eDecryptError', () {
Future<String> sealed() async =>
sealLogText(encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'x'})), _cipher(), path: _path);
test('wrong key', () async {
final text = await sealed();
expect(
() => openLogText(text, _cipher(8), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('moved path', () async {
final text = await sealed();
expect(
() => openLogText(text, _cipher(), path: '$_path-x'),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('flipped clear deleted flag', () async {
final json = jsonDecode(await sealed()) as Map<String, dynamic>;
((json['r'] as Map)['n1'] as Map)['d'] = true;
expect(
() => openLogText(jsonEncode(json), _cipher(), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('record swapped to another id', () async {
final json = jsonDecode(await sealed()) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final r = json['r'] as Map;
r['n2'] = r.remove('n1');
expect(
() => openLogText(jsonEncode(json), _cipher(), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
test('mis-shaped envelope', () async {
expect(
() => openLogText('{"v":1,"r":5}', _cipher(), path: _path),
throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
);
});
});
test('text that is not a log is sealed whole and opens back', () async {
final cipher = _cipher();
final sealed = await sealLogText('{"n":{"id":1}}', cipher, path: _path);
expect(sealed, isNot(contains('"id"')));
expect(await openLogText(sealed, cipher, path: _path), '{"n":{"id":1}}');
});
}

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@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
const cheapArgon = Argon2Params(memoryKiB: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1);
Log logOf(Map<String, String> titles, {String nodeId = 'node-a'}) => {
for (final entry in titles.entries)
entry.key: Record(
id: entry.key,
fields: {
'title': (
entry.value,
Hlc(wallTimeMs: 1000, counter: 0, nodeId: nodeId),
),
},
),
};
String encodeLog(Log log) =>
jsonEncode(log.map((id, record) => MapEntry(id, record.toJson())));
Log decodeLog(String text) => (jsonDecode(text) as Map<String, dynamic>).map(
(id, data) => MapEntry(id, Record.fromJson(data as Map<String, dynamic>)),
);
/// In-memory remote; [bulk] toggles the [BulkMapReader] capability.
class MemoryRemote implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
MemoryRemote([Map<String, String>? files]) : files = files ?? {};
final Map<String, String> files;
final List<String> writes = [];
final List<String> reads = [];
bool closed = false;
/// Overrides the next reads of a path, oldest first, to fake a race.
final Map<String, List<String?>> scriptedReads = {};
@override
Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) async => files.keys
.where((key) => key.startsWith('$path/'))
.map((key) => key.substring(path.length + 1).split('/').first)
.toSet()
.toList();
@override
Future<String?> getFileText(String path) async {
reads.add(path);
final script = scriptedReads[path];
if (script != null && script.isNotEmpty) return script.removeAt(0);
return files[path];
}
@override
Future<void> putFileText(
String path,
String text, {
required String message,
}) async {
writes.add(path);
files[path] = text;
}
@override
Future<Map<String, String>> getStringMap(String path) async => {
for (final entry in files.entries)
if (entry.key.startsWith('$path/') &&
!entry.key.substring(path.length + 1).contains('/'))
entry.key.substring(path.length + 1): entry.value,
};
@override
Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) async =>
files.remove(path);
@override
Future<bool> canAccessRemote() async => true;
@override
void close() => closed = true;
}
/// Same storage without the bulk capability, like `GitHubClient`.
class PlainRemote implements RemoteStore {
PlainRemote(this.inner);
final MemoryRemote inner;
@override
Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) => inner.listDirectory(path);
@override
Future<String?> getFileText(String path) => inner.getFileText(path);
@override
Future<void> putFileText(
String path,
String text, {
required String message,
}) => inner.putFileText(path, text, message: message);
@override
Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) =>
inner.deleteFile(path);
@override
Future<bool> canAccessRemote() => inner.canAccessRemote();
@override
void close() => inner.close();
}

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@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
/// Cross-language golden vectors: Dart opens what the Python port sealed.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:io';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
void main() {
final vec =
jsonDecode(File('test/fixtures/e2e_py_vectors.json').readAsStringSync())
as Map<String, dynamic>;
Future<E2eKey> key() => unlockE2e(
store: MemoryRemote({'vec/e2e': vec['header'] as String}),
pathPrefix: 'vec/notes-e2e',
passphrase: vec['passphrase'] as String,
e2ePath: 'vec/e2e',
);
test('Argon2id and HKDF match Python', () async {
final hex = (await key()).bytes
.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0'))
.join();
expect(hex, vec['master_hex']);
});
test('opens a Python envelope and whole blob', () async {
final cipher = (await key()).cipher();
final path = vec['path'] as String;
final opened = await openLogText(
vec['envelope'] as String,
cipher,
path: path,
);
expect(jsonDecode(opened), jsonDecode(vec['log'] as String));
expect(
await openLogText(vec['whole'] as String, cipher, path: path),
'not a log',
);
});
}

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@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
/// Passphrase -> key, the clear header beside the data, and the open gate.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
const _prefix = 'todo-sync/notes';
const _headerPath = 'todo-sync/e2e';
Future<E2eKey> _unlock(MemoryRemote remote, String passphrase) => unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: _prefix,
passphrase: passphrase,
params: cheapArgon,
random: Random(1),
);
void main() {
test('the header sits beside the device dirs, not among them', () {
expect(defaultE2ePath(_prefix), _headerPath);
expect(defaultE2ePath('wake-alarm'), 'wake-alarm/e2e');
});
test(
'first unlock writes a clear header with salt, params and check',
() async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
await _unlock(remote, 'correct horse');
final header = jsonDecode(remote.files[_headerPath]!) as Map;
expect(header['v'], 1);
expect(header['kdf'], 'argon2id');
expect(base64.decode(header['salt'] as String), hasLength(16));
expect(header['m'], 8);
expect(header['t'], 1);
expect(header['p'], 1);
expect(header['check'], isA<String>());
expect(remote.files[_headerPath], isNot(contains('correct horse')));
},
);
test('the same passphrase on another device yields the same key', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final a = await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
final b = await unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: _prefix,
passphrase: 'pw',
random: Random(99),
);
expect(b.bytes, a.bytes);
expect(remote.writes, [_headerPath]);
});
test('a wrong passphrase is refused before anything is written', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
remote.writes.clear();
await expectLater(
_unlock(remote, 'not pw'),
throwsA(isA<E2eWrongPassphraseError>()),
);
expect(remote.writes, isEmpty);
});
test('a setup race derives from the header that won', () async {
final winner = MemoryRemote();
await unlockE2e(
store: winner,
pathPrefix: _prefix,
passphrase: 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
random: Random(5),
);
final remote = MemoryRemote()
..scriptedReads[_headerPath] = [null, winner.files[_headerPath]];
final key = await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
final expected = await _unlock(winner, 'pw');
expect(key.bytes, expected.bytes);
});
test('an empty passphrase is refused', () {
expect(() => _unlock(MemoryRemote(), ''), throwsArgumentError);
});
test('a corrupt or newer header is refused, never overwritten', () async {
for (final bad in ['nope', '[]', '{"v":2}', '{"v":1,"kdf":"scrypt"}']) {
final remote = MemoryRemote({_headerPath: bad});
await expectLater(
_unlock(remote, 'pw'),
throwsA(isA<E2eHeaderError>()),
reason: bad,
);
expect(remote.files[_headerPath], bad);
}
});
test('E2eKey.fromBytes round-trips a cached key', () async {
final key = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'pw');
final cached = await E2eKey.fromBytes(
base64.decode(base64.encode(key.bytes)),
);
expect(cached.bytes, key.bytes);
expect(await cached.revision('x'), await key.revision('x'));
expect(() => E2eKey.fromBytes(const [1]), throwsArgumentError);
});
test('revision is keyed: not sha256, and differs across keys', () async {
final a = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'a');
final b = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'b');
expect(await a.revision('{}'), isNot(revisionOf('{}')));
expect(await a.revision('{}'), isNot(await b.revision('{}')));
expect(await a.revision('{}'), await a.revision('{}'));
});
test('errors read as themselves', () {
expect(E2eWrongPassphraseError().toString(), contains('passphrase'));
expect(E2eHeaderError('x').toString(), 'E2eHeaderError: x');
});
group('openE2e', () {
test('no header and no key: off, plaintext sync allowed', () async {
final state = await openE2e(store: MemoryRemote(), pathPrefix: _prefix);
expect(state, isA<E2eOff>());
});
test('header but no key: locked, needs the passphrase', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
final state = await openE2e(store: remote, pathPrefix: _prefix);
expect(state, isA<E2eLocked>());
expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
});
test('a cached key the header rejects: locked, wrong key', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
final stale = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'old');
final state = await openE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: _prefix,
key: stale,
);
expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
});
test('a cached key with the header gone: locked, wrong key', () async {
final key = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'pw');
final state = await openE2e(
store: MemoryRemote(),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
key: key,
);
expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
});
test('a corrupt header: locked, unreadable header', () async {
final state = await openE2e(
store: MemoryRemote({_headerPath: 'garbage'}),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.badHeader);
});
test('a matching key: ready with an encrypting store', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final key = await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
final state = await openE2e(store: remote, pathPrefix: _prefix, key: key);
expect((state as E2eReady).store, isA<EncryptingStore>());
});
});
test('recommended params meet the OWASP Argon2id floor', () {
expect(Argon2Params.recommended.memoryKiB, greaterThanOrEqualTo(19456));
expect(Argon2Params.recommended.iterations, greaterThanOrEqualTo(2));
});
}

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@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
/// One-time copy from the plaintext prefix to `<prefix>-e2e`.
library;
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
const _old = 'app/notes';
Future<E2eKey> _key(MemoryRemote remote, E2eLayout layout) => unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
passphrase: 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
);
MemoryRemote _plainRemote() => MemoryRemote({
'$_old/phone/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'milk', 'b': 'eggs'})),
'$_old/pc/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'c': 'tea'}, nodeId: 'node-b')),
});
void main() {
final layout = E2eLayout.of(_old);
test('layout puts ciphertext on a new prefix, revs apart from old', () {
expect(layout.prefix, 'app/notes-e2e');
expect(layout.revsPath, isNot(defaultRevsPath(_old)));
expect(layout.e2ePath, startsWith('app/'));
});
test('copy seals every device log under the new prefix', () async {
final remote = _plainRemote();
final key = await _key(remote, layout);
final report = await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
expect(report.copied, 2);
final blob = remote.files['app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json']!;
expect(blob, isNot(contains('milk')));
expect(blob, isNot(contains('"title"')));
expect(remote.files['$_old/phone/log.json'], contains('milk'));
final enc = EncryptingStore(
remote,
key,
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
revsPath: layout.revsPath,
e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
);
final merged = await syncLog(
client: enc,
deviceId: 'tablet',
pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
localLog: {},
encode: encodeLog,
decode: decodeLog,
);
expect(merged.keys, unorderedEquals(['a', 'b', 'c']));
});
test('copying twice adds no duplicate and loses nothing', () async {
final remote = _plainRemote();
final key = await _key(remote, layout);
Future<MigrationReport> run() => copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
await run();
final first = Map.of(remote.files);
remote.writes.clear();
final second = await run();
expect(second.copied, 0);
expect(remote.writes, isEmpty);
expect(remote.files, first);
});
test('a later plaintext write by an old build is copied again', () async {
final remote = _plainRemote();
final key = await _key(remote, layout);
await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
remote.files['$_old/pc/log.json'] = encodeLog(
logOf({'c': 'tea', 'd': 'jam'}, nodeId: 'node-b'),
);
final report = await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
expect(report.copied, 1);
expect(
await verifyCopy(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
),
isTrue,
);
});
test('cleanup refuses before the copy is verified, then deletes', () async {
final remote = _plainRemote();
final key = await _key(remote, layout);
expect(
await deletePlaintextPrefix(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
),
isFalse,
);
expect(remote.files['$_old/phone/log.json'], isNotNull);
await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
expect(
await deletePlaintextPrefix(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
),
isTrue,
);
expect(remote.files.keys.where((k) => k.startsWith('$_old/')), isEmpty);
expect(remote.files['app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json'], isNotNull);
});
test('a corrupt source blob is skipped and blocks cleanup', () async {
final remote = _plainRemote();
remote.files['$_old/bad/log.json'] = '{oops';
final key = await _key(remote, layout);
final report = await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
expect(report.copied, 2);
expect(report.skipped, ['bad/log.json']);
expect(
await deletePlaintextPrefix(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
),
isFalse,
);
});
group('slashless prefix (settings-sync)', () {
final flat = E2eLayout.of('settings-sync');
test('revs and header stay inside the app node', () {
expect(flat.prefix, 'settings-sync-e2e');
expect(flat.revsPath, 'settings-sync-e2e/revs');
expect(flat.e2ePath, 'settings-sync-e2e/e2e');
});
test('old revs and header are not copied as logs', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({
'settings-sync/phone/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'x'})),
'settings-sync/revs/phone': 'abc',
'settings-sync/e2e': '{"v":1}',
});
final key = await _key(remote, flat);
final report = await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: 'settings-sync',
layout: flat,
);
expect(report.copied, 1);
expect(report.skipped, isEmpty);
expect(
await verifyCopy(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: 'settings-sync',
layout: flat,
),
isTrue,
);
});
});
test('never overwrites a non-log blob and skips empty sources', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({
'app/notes/pc/current.json': '{}',
'app/notes-e2e/pc/current.json': '{"photos":["a"]}',
'app/notes/tab/current.json': '{}',
});
final key = await _key(remote, layout);
final report = await copyToEncrypted(
store: remote,
key: key,
fromPrefix: _old,
layout: layout,
);
expect(report.copied, 0);
expect(remote.files['app/notes-e2e/pc/current.json'], '{"photos":["a"]}');
expect(remote.files.containsKey('app/notes-e2e/tab/current.json'), isFalse);
});
}

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@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
/// openEncryptedStore must not pay Argon2id or a full copy on every tick.
library;
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
const _old = 'app/notes';
void main() {
setUp(resetE2eCopyMemo);
test('a cached key skips Argon2 and still unlocks', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
List<int>? cached;
var derived = 0;
Future<E2eState> open() => openEncryptedStore(
store: remote,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
keyCache: E2eKeyCache(
read: () async => cached,
write: (bytes) async => cached = bytes,
),
onDerive: () => derived++,
);
expect(await open(), isA<E2eReady>());
expect(cached, hasLength(32));
expect(await open(), isA<E2eReady>());
expect(derived, 1);
});
test('a stale cached key falls back to the passphrase', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
List<int>? cached = List<int>.filled(32, 9);
final state = await openEncryptedStore(
store: remote,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
keyCache: E2eKeyCache(
read: () async => cached,
write: (bytes) async => cached = bytes,
),
);
expect(state, isA<E2eReady>());
expect(cached, isNot(List<int>.filled(32, 9)));
});
test('the copy reruns only when old revisions change', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({
'$_old/pc/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'x'})),
'app/revs/pc': 'r1',
});
Future<void> open() => openEncryptedStore(
store: remote,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
);
await open();
remote.reads.clear();
await open();
expect(remote.reads.where((p) => p.startsWith('app/notes-e2e/')), isEmpty);
remote.files['$_old/pc/log.json'] = encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'x', 'b': 'y'}));
remote.files['app/revs/pc'] = 'r2';
await open();
final state =
await openEncryptedStore(
store: remote,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
)
as E2eReady;
final text = await state.store.getFileText('app/notes-e2e/pc/log.json');
expect(decodeLog(text!).keys, unorderedEquals(['a', 'b']));
});
test('bulk reads of a data dir come back decrypted', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final state =
await openEncryptedStore(
store: remote,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
)
as E2eReady;
final log = encodeLog(logOf({'k': 'secret'}));
await state.store.putFileText('app/notes-e2e/k1', log, message: 'm');
expect(remote.files['app/notes-e2e/k1'], isNot(contains('secret')));
final map = await state.store.getStringMap('app/notes-e2e');
expect(map['k1'], log);
});
}

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@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
const _old = 'app/notes';
Future<E2eState> _open(MemoryRemote r, String? pass) => openEncryptedStore(
store: r,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => pass,
params: cheapArgon,
);
void main() {
test('no passphrase is locked', () async {
for (final p in [null, '']) {
final s = await _open(MemoryRemote(), p);
expect((s as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
}
});
test('right passphrase copies and is ready; wrong one is locked', () async {
final r = MemoryRemote({
'$_old/phone/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'milk'})),
});
expect(await _open(r, 'pw'), isA<E2eReady>());
expect(r.files['app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json'], isNot(contains('milk')));
expect(await _open(r, 'pw'), isA<E2eReady>());
expect(
((await _open(r, 'bad')) as E2eLocked).reason,
E2eLockReason.wrongKey,
);
});
test('a corrupt header locks as badHeader', () async {
final r = MemoryRemote({'app/e2e': 'garbage'});
expect(
((await _open(r, 'pw')) as E2eLocked).reason,
E2eLockReason.badHeader,
);
});
test('a failing copy does not stop the open', () async {
final r = MemoryRemote();
r.files['$_old/phone/log.json'] = encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'x'}));
final failing = _FailingList(r);
final s = await openEncryptedStore(
store: failing,
oldPrefix: _old,
readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
);
expect(s, isA<E2eReady>());
});
}
class _FailingList extends PlainRemote {
_FailingList(super.inner);
@override
Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) =>
throw StateError('list down');
}

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@ -1,290 +0,0 @@
/// syncLog over an EncryptingStore: the relay sees ciphertext, merge is
/// unchanged.
library;
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:glados/glados.dart' hide expect, group, test, setUp;
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
const _prefix = 'todo-sync/notes';
const _revs = 'todo-sync/revs';
Future<E2eKey> _key(MemoryRemote remote, [String passphrase = 'pw']) =>
unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: _prefix,
passphrase: passphrase,
params: cheapArgon,
random: Random(1),
);
Future<Log> _tick(
RemoteStore client,
String deviceId,
Log local, {
SyncStateStore? state,
List<String>? skipped,
}) => syncLog(
client: client,
deviceId: deviceId,
pathPrefix: _prefix,
localLog: local,
encode: encodeLog,
decode: decodeLog,
stateStore: state,
onPeerSkipped: (id, _) => skipped?.add(id),
);
void main() {
test('pushed blob is ciphertext and a peer merges it', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final key = await _key(remote);
final store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, pathPrefix: _prefix);
await _tick(store, 'phone', logOf({'n1': 'buy milk'}));
final blob = remote.files['$_prefix/phone/log.json']!;
expect(blob, isNot(contains('title')));
expect(blob, isNot(contains('buy milk')));
final merged = await _tick(store, 'pc', logOf({'n2': 'call mum'}));
expect(merged.keys, unorderedEquals(['n1', 'n2']));
expect(remote.files.values.where((v) => v.contains('"title"')), isEmpty);
});
test('published revisions are keyed, not sha256 of the plaintext', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
final local = logOf({'n1': 'x'});
await _tick(store, 'phone', local, state: InMemorySyncStateStore());
final rev = remote.files['$_revs/phone']!;
expect(rev, isNot(revisionOf(encodeLog(local))));
expect(rev, hasLength(64));
});
test('a peer that has not upgraded is still read', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
await _tick(remote, 'pc', logOf({'old': 'plain'}));
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
final merged = await _tick(store, 'phone', logOf({'n1': 'x'}));
expect(merged.keys, unorderedEquals(['old', 'n1']));
});
test('a tampered peer is skipped and the others still merge', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
await _tick(store, 'b', logOf({'b1': 'y'}));
await _tick(store, 'a', logOf({'a1': 'x'}));
final blob = remote.files['$_prefix/a/log.json']!;
remote.files['$_prefix/a/log.json'] = blob.replaceRange(
40,
41,
blob[40] == 'A' ? 'B' : 'A',
);
final skipped = <String>[];
final merged = await _tick(store, 'c', {}, skipped: skipped);
expect(merged.keys, ['b1']);
expect(skipped, ['a']);
});
test('unparsable and mis-shaped peers are reported as skipped', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({
'$_prefix/bad/log.json': '{oops',
'$_prefix/shape/log.json': '{"n":{"id":1}}',
});
final skipped = <String>[];
await _tick(remote, 'me', {}, skipped: skipped);
expect(skipped, unorderedEquals(['bad', 'shape']));
});
test('a peer under another passphrase is skipped, not fatal', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final other = MemoryRemote();
final mine = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
final theirs = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(other, 'other'),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
await _tick(theirs, 'x', logOf({'x1': 'x'}));
expect(await _tick(mine, 'me', {}), isEmpty);
});
test('a prefix without a slash keeps revs out of the sealed set', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final key = await unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm',
passphrase: 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
);
final store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm');
await syncLog(
client: store,
deviceId: 'phone',
pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm',
localLog: logOf({'n': 'x'}),
encode: encodeLog,
decode: decodeLog,
stateStore: InMemorySyncStateStore(),
);
expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/revs/phone'], hasLength(64));
expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/phone/log.json'], isNot(contains('"x"')));
expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/e2e'], contains('argon2id'));
});
test('paths outside the prefix pass through untouched', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
await store.putFileText('other/x', '{"a":1}', message: 'm');
expect(remote.files['other/x'], '{"a":1}');
expect(await store.getFileText('other/x'), '{"a":1}');
expect(await store.getFileText('$_prefix/none/log.json'), isNull);
});
test('a flat <prefix>/<node>.json layout (todo) is sealed too', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
final log = encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'buy milk'}));
await store.putFileText('$_prefix/node-a.json', log, message: 'm');
expect(remote.files['$_prefix/node-a.json'], isNot(contains('milk')));
expect(isE2eEnvelope(remote.files['$_prefix/node-a.json']!), isTrue);
expect(await store.getFileText('$_prefix/node-a.json'), log);
});
test('a slashless prefix keeps the header and revs out of sealing', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final key = await unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm',
passphrase: 'pw',
params: cheapArgon,
);
final store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm');
final header = remote.files['wake-alarm/e2e']!;
expect(await store.getFileText('wake-alarm/e2e'), header);
await store.putFileText('wake-alarm/e2e', header, message: 'm');
expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/e2e'], header);
});
test('plaintext is refused when acceptPlaintext is off', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({
'$_prefix/pc/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'b'})),
});
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
acceptPlaintext: false,
);
expect(await _tick(store, 'phone', {}), isEmpty);
});
group('delegation', () {
test('bulk reads forward when the inner store has them', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({'$_revs/a': 'r'});
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
expect(await store.getStringMap(_revs), {'a': 'r'});
});
test('bulk reads degrade to "fetch everything" without them', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({'$_revs/a': 'r'});
final store = EncryptingStore(
PlainRemote(remote),
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
expect(await store.getStringMap(_revs), isEmpty);
});
test('list, delete, access and close reach the inner store', () async {
final remote = MemoryRemote({'$_prefix/a/log.json': '{}'});
final store = EncryptingStore(
remote,
await _key(remote),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
expect(await store.listDirectory(_prefix), ['a']);
await store.deleteFile('$_prefix/a/log.json', message: 'm');
expect(remote.files.containsKey('$_prefix/a/log.json'), isFalse);
expect(await store.canAccessRemote(), isTrue);
store.close();
expect(remote.closed, isTrue);
});
});
// Differential: the same sync rounds over a plain and an encrypting relay
// must converge to the same logs.
Glados(
any.list(
any.combine3(
any.intInRange(0, 3),
any.intInRange(0, 6),
any.letterOrDigits,
(int d, int n, String t) => (d, n, t),
),
),
ExploreConfig(numRuns: 25),
).test('merge is identical with and without encryption', (edits) async {
const devices = ['a', 'b', 'c'];
Log localFor(int d) => {
for (final (i, (dev, note, title)) in edits.indexed)
if (dev == d)
'n$note': Record(
id: 'n$note',
fields: {
'title': (
title,
Hlc(wallTimeMs: 1000 + i, counter: 0, nodeId: devices[d]),
),
},
),
};
final plain = MemoryRemote();
final sealedRemote = MemoryRemote();
final sealed = EncryptingStore(
sealedRemote,
await E2eKey.fromBytes(List<int>.filled(32, 3)),
pathPrefix: _prefix,
);
final plainLogs = [for (var d = 0; d < 3; d++) localFor(d)];
final sealedLogs = [for (var d = 0; d < 3; d++) localFor(d)];
for (var round = 0; round < 2; round++) {
for (var d = 0; d < 3; d++) {
plainLogs[d] = await _tick(plain, devices[d], plainLogs[d]);
sealedLogs[d] = await _tick(sealed, devices[d], sealedLogs[d]);
}
}
expect(sealedLogs, plainLogs);
expect(sealedLogs[0], sealedLogs[2]);
});
}

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@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
{
"passphrase": "correct horse ✓",
"header": "{\"v\":1,\"kdf\":\"argon2id\",\"salt\":\"HGW+FZJe6hd71He22BrlUA==\",\"m\":64,\"t\":2,\"p\":1,\"check\":\"okKnATkNoZKvjSGfrgQGOjdRw5NORh2lC32zuBq7V6I=\"}",
"master_hex": "cad5afe8ddc6e21d2f39eb196de454db6b6d1f60629619ce8539f03a4bb0b086",
"revision_of_abc": "e7f845e1b0a7ea2b571fd3e3bdfb60641e650d63171bf73b6356c7909d2748c8",
"path": "vec/notes-e2e/phone/log.json",
"log": "{\"n1\":{\"id\":\"n1\",\"fields\":{\"title\":[\"buy milk\",\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\"]},\"deleted\":false,\"deleted_hlc\":null},\"n2\":{\"id\":\"n2\",\"fields\":{\"title\":[\"zażółć\",\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\"]},\"deleted\":false,\"deleted_hlc\":null}}",
"envelope": "{\"v\":1,\"r\":{\"n1\":{\"d\":false,\"dh\":null,\"h\":\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\",\"p\":\"AR1zODx4TD67X3TGa0N7EV/V4FcZAaqc41jxZVtskFu3Pqb/pNlqm6db66rQUaMyNLtTPa4HMOJzZomBRyaSHjaPb4oNxgVPkMeIF5IbuI/GA30gR0sz/MSvYmfZ5wSnlBo1+fpH\"},\"n2\":{\"d\":false,\"dh\":null,\"h\":\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z-0000-node-a\",\"p\":\"Aa0omlBGnmlsItzq7A21G0A1tqT8xMOJE0wgxcxJ1c3hVpRmNt4kq2IPNNGuW8v4A7fvs2FrnGX4A+NVtXPpu41ckKSShTqk8Ml6zTuxyrT85g50sgzbM7PKFczeEaS+ITWDj0N04u0=\"}}}",
"whole": "{\"v\":1,\"b\":\"AYdAwPehG84oHBRhRr5dP5VmleBGzQC1ryV5QHTCqBZE9ZsOZMMkJiP40+KzpnfIc2g=\"}"
}

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@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"passphrase": "correct horse ✓",
"header": "{\"v\":1,\"kdf\":\"argon2id\",\"salt\":\"fGy9SnWSTwxKbS/sAluVjA==\",\"m\":64,\"t\":2,\"p\":1,\"check\":\"ekpcuZxZl+Ei6Y5yQp+cwdi4yR6ItJiYR7S3cd214ds=\"}",
"master_hex": "834f54fef4eb086e4201b918c938be179f91cf72e157e28d56dfe72bc46cbefd",
"path": "vec/notes-e2e/pc/log.json",
"log": "{\"n9\": {\"id\": \"n9\", \"fields\": {\"title\": [\"zażółć\", \"2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-pc\"]}, \"deleted\": false, \"deleted_hlc\": null}}",
"envelope": "{\"v\":1,\"r\":{\"n9\":{\"d\":false,\"dh\":null,\"h\":\"2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-pc\",\"p\":\"ATAIR4jQmlBjDF+/4+AYp3ATcGgjZQ60tQ05uvF1howYly4W4h3lLI04BssCRASargNV/+hDhqTl7n2cz4hh7Z5lmZYgElso/4k85hwO1SRuDPOYMKsLCpYgTy8zYzEiiRlv+g==\"}}}",
"whole": "{\"v\":1,\"b\":\"ARvUAj5nIfmJdsxdaiAl5uYkgry9VG5VQLQBi6+BNbyJ0t//UGjc1Ji2hmbBJl3v9kw=\"}"
}

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import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:io';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import 'package:http/testing.dart' as http_testing;
import 'package:test/test.dart';
const _databaseUrl = 'https://example-default-rtdb.firebasedatabase.app';
FirebaseTokenProvider _auth() => FirebaseTokenProvider(
apiKey: 'fake-api-key',
store: InMemoryCredentialStore(
FirebaseCredentials(
idToken: 'id-token',
refreshToken: 'refresh-token',
expiresAt: DateTime.utc(2099),
),
),
httpClient: http_testing.MockClient(
(_) async => throw StateError('auth must not be contacted'),
),
);
/// Client over an in-memory transport that records every request path.
(FirebaseRestClient, List<http.Request>) _client(String? namespace) {
final requests = <http.Request>[];
final mock = http_testing.MockClient((request) async {
requests.add(request);
return http.Response(jsonEncode(request.method == 'GET' ? null : 'x'), 200);
});
final client = namespace == null
? FirebaseRestClient(
databaseUrl: _databaseUrl,
auth: _auth(),
httpClient: mock,
)
: FirebaseRestClient(
databaseUrl: _databaseUrl,
auth: _auth(),
httpClient: mock,
namespace: namespace,
);
return (client, requests);
}
void main() {
group('compile-time default', () {
test('is empty when SYNC_NAMESPACE is not defined', () {
expect(syncNamespace, isEmpty);
});
test('empty namespace leaves paths byte-for-byte unchanged', () async {
final (client, requests) = _client(null);
await client.getFileText('devices/pc/log.json');
expect(requests.single.url.path, '/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json');
});
});
group('prefixing', () {
test('every operation lands under the namespace', () async {
final (client, requests) = _client('sandbox/slot3');
await client.getFileText('devices/pc/log.json');
await client.putFileText('devices/pc/log.json', 't', message: 'm');
await client.listDirectory('devices');
await client.getStringMap('revs');
await client.patchValues('revs', {'a': 'b'});
await client.deleteFile('devices/pc/log.json');
await client.canAccessRemote();
expect(requests.map((r) => r.url.path), [
'/sandbox/slot3/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json',
'/sandbox/slot3/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json',
'/sandbox/slot3/devices.json',
'/sandbox/slot3/revs.json',
'/sandbox/slot3/revs.json',
'/sandbox/slot3/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json',
'/sandbox/slot3.json',
]);
});
test('an explicitly empty namespace is the unprefixed path', () async {
final (client, requests) = _client('');
await client.getStringMap('revs');
expect(requests.single.url.path, '/revs.json');
});
});
group('validation (fail closed)', () {
const bad = [
'sandbox',
'sandbox/',
'sandbox/Slot3',
'sandbox/slot 3',
'sandbox/slot3/',
'sandbox/a/b',
'/sandbox/slot3',
'prod/slot3',
'sandbox/slot3\n',
'Sandbox/slot3',
'sandbox/slot.3',
'sandbox/..',
];
for (final value in bad) {
test('rejects ${jsonEncode(value)}', () {
expect(
() => checkSyncNamespace(value),
throwsA(isA<ConfigException>()),
);
expect(
() => FirebaseRestClient(
databaseUrl: _databaseUrl,
auth: _auth(),
namespace: value,
),
throwsA(isA<ConfigException>()),
);
});
}
test('the message names the define and the required shape', () {
expect(
() => checkSyncNamespace('typo'),
throwsA(
isA<ConfigException>().having(
(e) => e.message,
'message',
allOf(
contains('SYNC_NAMESPACE'),
contains(r'^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$'),
),
),
),
);
});
test('accepts the allowed alphabet', () {
expect(() => checkSyncNamespace('sandbox/slot3'), returnsNormally);
expect(() => checkSyncNamespace('sandbox/a_b-c9'), returnsNormally);
expect(() => checkSyncNamespace(''), returnsNormally);
});
test(
'a bad compile-time define stops firebaseClientFor at startup',
() async {
// The define is compile-time, so only a fresh process can set it.
final result = await Process.run(Platform.resolvedExecutable, [
'-DSYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/Typo',
'run',
'tool/namespace_probe.dart',
]);
expect(result.exitCode, isNot(0));
expect(
result.stderr,
contains('SYNC_NAMESPACE "sandbox/Typo" is invalid'),
);
},
);
test('a good compile-time define reaches the request path', () async {
final result = await Process.run(Platform.resolvedExecutable, [
'-DSYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/slot3',
'run',
'tool/namespace_probe.dart',
]);
expect(result.stderr, isEmpty);
expect(result.stdout, '/sandbox/slot3/devices.json\n');
});
});
}

View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
/// Read-only done check: lists plaintext blobs under an RTDB root.
///
/// Usage: `dart run tool/e2e_audit.dart <root> <firebase_auth.json>`
/// Exit 0 when every blob is sealed, 1 when any is plaintext, 2 on misuse.
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:io';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
if (args.length != 2) {
stderr.writeln('usage: e2e_audit.dart <root> <firebase_auth.json>');
exit(2);
}
final [root, sessionFile] = args;
final home = Platform.environment['HOME'];
final cfg =
jsonDecode(
File('$home/.config/crdt-sync/firebase.json').readAsStringSync(),
)
as Map<String, dynamic>;
final session = FirebaseCredentials.fromJson(
jsonDecode(File(sessionFile).readAsStringSync()) as Map<String, dynamic>,
);
final auth = FirebaseTokenProvider(
apiKey: cfg['apiKey'] as String,
store: InMemoryCredentialStore(session),
);
final url = Uri.parse(
'${cfg['databaseUrl']}/${encodePath(root)}.json'
'?auth=${await auth.idToken()}',
);
final response = await http.get(url);
if (response.statusCode != 200) {
stderr.writeln('GET $root: HTTP ${response.statusCode}');
exit(2);
}
final plaintext = plaintextBlobPaths(jsonDecode(response.body));
stdout.writeln('plaintext blobs under $root: ${plaintext.length}');
for (final path in plaintext) {
stdout.writeln(' $root/$path');
}
exit(plaintext.isEmpty ? 0 : 1);
}

View File

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
/// Writes cross-language golden vectors for the Python port to open.
///
/// Run: `dart run tool/e2e_vectors.dart > test/fixtures/e2e_dart_vectors.json`
library;
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math';
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import '../test/e2e_fakes.dart';
Future<void> main() async {
const params = Argon2Params(memoryKiB: 64, iterations: 2, parallelism: 1);
final remote = MemoryRemote();
final key = await unlockE2e(
store: remote,
pathPrefix: 'vec/notes-e2e',
passphrase: 'correct horse ✓',
params: params,
random: Random(7),
e2ePath: 'vec/e2e',
);
final cipher = key.cipher();
const path = 'vec/notes-e2e/phone/log.json';
final log = encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'buy milk', 'n2': 'zażółć'}));
print(
const JsonEncoder.withIndent(' ').convert({
'passphrase': 'correct horse ✓',
'header': remote.files['vec/e2e'],
'master_hex': key.bytes
.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0'))
.join(),
'revision_of_abc': await key.revision('abc'),
'path': path,
'log': log,
'envelope': await sealLogText(log, cipher, path: path),
'whole': await sealLogText('not a log', cipher, path: path),
}),
);
}

View File

@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
/// mode 0600 -- never in source, because this repository is public.
final _configDir = '${Platform.environment['HOME']}/.config/crdt-sync';
Log _decode(String t) => (jsonDecode(t) as Map<String, dynamic>).map(
(k, v) => MapEntry(k, Record.fromJson(v as Map<String, dynamic>)),
);
String _encode(Log l) => jsonEncode(l.map((k, v) => MapEntry(k, v.toJson())));
Log _decode(String t) => (jsonDecode(t) as Map<String, dynamic>)
.map((k, v) => MapEntry(k, Record.fromJson(v as Map<String, dynamic>)));
String _encode(Log l) =>
jsonEncode(l.map((k, v) => MapEntry(k, v.toJson())));
Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
final cfg =
jsonDecode(File('$_configDir/firebase.json').readAsStringSync())
as Map<String, dynamic>;
final cfg = jsonDecode(
File('$_configDir/firebase.json').readAsStringSync(),
) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final auth = FirebaseTokenProvider(
apiKey: cfg['apiKey'] as String,
store: InMemoryCredentialStore(),

View File

@ -23,9 +23,7 @@ const _prefix = '_smoketest/devices';
var _failures = 0;
void _check(String what, bool ok, [String detail = '']) {
stdout.writeln(
'${ok ? " ok " : " FAIL"} $what${detail.isEmpty ? '' : ' ($detail)'}',
);
stdout.writeln('${ok ? " ok " : " FAIL"} $what${detail.isEmpty ? '' : ' ($detail)'}');
if (!ok) _failures++;
}
@ -70,24 +68,16 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
_check('canAccessRemote is false before sign-in', !await auth.hasSession());
await auth.signIn(email: email, password: password);
_check('signIn stored a session', await auth.hasSession());
_check(
'canAccessRemote is true after sign-in',
await client.canAccessRemote(),
);
_check('canAccessRemote is true after sign-in', await client.canAccessRemote());
stdout.writeln('\n== round-trip and key escaping ==');
const path = '$_prefix/pc/log.json';
await client.putFileText(path, '{"hello":"world"}', message: 'smoke');
final read = await client.getFileText(path);
_check(
'a .json filename round-trips byte-for-byte',
read == '{"hello":"world"}',
read ?? 'null',
);
_check(
'missing path reads as null',
await client.getFileText('$_prefix/nope/log.json') == null,
);
_check('a .json filename round-trips byte-for-byte',
read == '{"hello":"world"}', read ?? 'null');
_check('missing path reads as null',
await client.getFileText('$_prefix/nope/log.json') == null);
final listed = await client.listDirectory(_prefix);
_check('listDirectory sees the device', listed.contains('pc'), '$listed');
@ -106,11 +96,8 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
final pushed = await client.getFileText(path);
_check('the log landed in the database', pushed != null);
final revs = await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs');
_check(
'a revision was published for this device',
revs['pc'] == revisionOf(_encode(pcLog)),
'${revs.keys}',
);
_check('a revision was published for this device',
revs['pc'] == revisionOf(_encode(pcLog)), '${revs.keys}');
stdout.writeln('\n== sync: an unchanged tick writes nothing ==');
final before = await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs');
@ -123,10 +110,8 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
decode: _decode,
stateStore: storePc,
);
_check(
'revision unchanged, so nothing was re-uploaded',
(await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs'))['pc'] == before['pc'],
);
_check('revision unchanged, so nothing was re-uploaded',
(await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs'))['pc'] == before['pc']);
stdout.writeln('\n== sync: two devices converge ==');
final storePhone = InMemorySyncStateStore();
@ -150,10 +135,8 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
stateStore: storePc,
);
_check('pc merged the phone record', pcAfter.containsKey('b'));
_check(
'each device wrote only its own revision key',
(await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs')).length == 2,
);
_check('each device wrote only its own revision key',
(await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs')).length == 2);
stdout.writeln('\n== fail-closed ==');
await auth.signOut();
@ -177,9 +160,7 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
client.close();
auth.close();
stdout.writeln(
_failures == 0
? '\nALL LIVE CHECKS PASSED'
: '\n$_failures LIVE CHECK(S) FAILED',
_failures == 0 ? '\nALL LIVE CHECKS PASSED' : '\n$_failures LIVE CHECK(S) FAILED',
);
exit(_failures == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}

View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
// Helper for test/sync_namespace_test.dart: the SYNC_NAMESPACE define is
// compile-time, so the test runs this in a fresh process with -D set. It signs
// in from an in-memory session (no network) and prints the first request path.
import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import 'package:http/testing.dart' as http_testing;
Future<void> main() async {
final mock = http_testing.MockClient((request) async {
print(request.url.path);
return http.Response('null', 200);
});
final client = await firebaseClientFor(
config: const FirebaseConfig(
apiKey: 'k',
databaseUrl: 'https://example.firebasedatabase.app',
projectId: 'p',
uid: 'u',
email: 'e@x.y',
),
store: InMemoryCredentialStore(
FirebaseCredentials(
idToken: 'i',
refreshToken: 'r',
expiresAt: DateTime.utc(2099),
),
),
httpClient: mock,
);
await client.listDirectory('devices');
}

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ bootstrap, so a new app reaches "syncing" without writing any of it.
`crdt_sync` is pure Dart on purpose — it runs from command-line tools and from
`wake_alarm`'s headless systemd job, so it cannot depend on
`flutter_secure_storage` or the Android Google plugin. It takes closures instead.
`flutter_secure_storage` or `google_sign_in`. It takes closures instead.
Every Flutter app then wrote the same ~390 lines to supply those closures
(`firebase_backend.dart` + `google_sign_in_backend.dart` + `google_platform*`),
@ -110,11 +110,6 @@ const kServerClientId = '845446124781-...apps.googleusercontent.com';
/// to loopback.
const kDesktopClientId = '845446124781-...apps.googleusercontent.com';
/// That Desktop client's secret. Google rejects the token exchange without
/// it, but treats it as non-confidential for installed apps: inject it at
/// build time (`--dart-define`), never commit it. '' sends none.
const kDesktopClientSecret = String.fromEnvironment('DESKTOP_CLIENT_SECRET');
SyncSettingsScreen(
accountLoader: () => loadAccount(),
accountSaver: saveAccount,
@ -126,7 +121,6 @@ SyncSettingsScreen(
tokenFetcher: () => googleAnyIdToken(
serverClientId: kServerClientId,
desktopClientId: kDesktopClientId,
desktopClientSecret: kDesktopClientSecret,
),
),
googleAvailable: googleAnySignInSupported(
@ -138,13 +132,13 @@ SyncSettingsScreen(
### One tap on every platform
[`google_account_token`](../google_account_token) wraps Android's AccountManager
(no Google client library in the APK), so a real GTK desktop build cannot use
it. This package covers both halves and picks between them:
`google_sign_in` ships **android, ios and web** implementations only — there
is no `google_sign_in_linux` — so a real GTK desktop build cannot use the
plugin at all. This package covers both halves and picks between them:
| Platform | Flow | Entry point |
|---|---|---|
| Android | `google_account_token` plugin, OS account chooser | `googleIdToken` |
| Android / iOS | `google_sign_in` plugin, OS account picker | `googleIdToken` |
| Linux / Windows / macOS | OAuth **loopback** + PKCE, system browser | `googleDesktopIdToken` |
| Web | none (GIS renders its own button) | falls back to password |

View File

@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ library;
export 'src/account_store.dart';
export 'src/bootstrap.dart';
export 'src/device_id.dart';
export 'src/e2e_bootstrap.dart';
export 'src/e2e_passphrase_button.dart';
export 'src/google_any_sign_in.dart';
export 'src/google_desktop_sign_in.dart';
export 'src/google_pkce.dart';

View File

@ -108,7 +108,9 @@ Future<FirebaseAccount?> _adoptSeededSession(
}) async {
final httpClient = client ?? http.Client();
try {
final response = await httpClient.get(base.resolve(routes.credentialsPath));
final response = await httpClient.get(
base.resolve(routes.credentialsPath),
);
if (response.statusCode != 200) return null;
final body = jsonDecode(utf8.decode(response.bodyBytes));
if (body is! Map<String, dynamic>) return null;

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