!dodaj is unwired: register_add_command is no longer called, its aliases
are gone from aliases.json, and the word is an unknown one like any
other -- answered with "Nie znam !dodaj", storing nothing. The ingest
path itself (pack_add, pack_ingest, pack_store, the stripper) stays,
tested at 100%, because the approval queue that replaces the direct
write will reuse every piece of it: !dodaj lands in pending/, and the
tagger view gets approve / reject.
The eight e2e scenarios that proved the direct write, the media
generation step and prove_the_add_photo_invariants leave with it;
64852ae has them for the queue to bring back in their new shape. One
scenario takes their place and pins the disabled state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7.4 KiB
Adding a photo from the chat: !add_photo
Unwired since 2026-09-04.
!dodajis not a command until photos land in an approval queue instead of straight in the album. Everything below describes the ingest path as it was wired, and as the queue will reuse it.
How a member of an album's group puts a photo into it by sending one, and
what keeps that path from leaking anything. The album itself — where it
lives, what its manifests look like, how several albums coexist — is
DOCS-photo-pack.md.
Send a photo captioned !add_photo alfa wakacje2019 in one of the album's
groups. alfa resolves to that person's key; wakacje2019 matches nobody and
is minted as a custom tag. The photo is retrievable through !alfa and
!random wakacje2019 immediately, with no restart.
What holds:
- No typed label travels. Labels become keys in the registry's
arg_resolver, at the dispatcher, before the line that logs the command name. The reply is counts and pseudonyms —dodano · p1: 4 · t1: 1. - No cap. No cooldown, no size limit, no daily limit.
!randomtakes the ordinary pack cooldown;!add_phototakes no decorator at all. - At most six labels, the same ceiling
!alfa beta …has. - The attachment must be on the same message, never a quoted one: a reply
carries the quoted message's media in
quote.attachments, and taking it would let anyone re-file somebody else's photo. - A duplicate changes nothing. The stored name is a content hash, so a photo already in the album is reported and skipped; a mixed batch stores the new files and says how many were already there.
- Nothing is written until it works. Media,
tags.json,custom.jsonandadds.jsonare written, the album is reloaded, and only a load that succeeds is published. A load that fails rolls all four back and keeps serving the album that was already working. - The second copy goes. signal-cli keeps its own copy of every inbound
attachment outside the album's
0700.!add_photodeletes it once the file is stored, and also when the upload was refused.
Stripping: exiftool, with a positive check
ffmpeg -map_metadata -1 -c copy was tried first and fails silently on
photos: given a JPEG with a real APP1 Exif segment it returned a
byte-identical file, GPS marker intact, and exited 0. -c copy passes the
compressed frame through as an opaque packet and a JPEG's Exif lives inside
it. Do not reintroduce ffmpeg for this.
So the gate is a positive check on the output, never an exit code:
exiftool -all= -time:all= -o <dst> <src> # never --overwrite_original
exiftool -G0 -s -all <dst> # then read it back
-time:all= is not redundant with -all=. media_tags.ZEROED_DATE_TAGS
allows the QuickTime date tags "by value" on the grounds that -all= zeroes
rather than deletes them. Measured 2026-08-31: it does not. -all= alone left
QuickTime:CreateDate at its real value, and the consequence was that every
mp4 was refused — the code documented behaviour it did not get. -time:all=
is what actually zeroes them.
and every surviving tag must be structural. Measured against exiftool
13.55, the plan's original "the surviving set must be empty" would have
rejected every format except JPEG — a valid PNG always reports its IHDR under
PNG, a GIF its screen descriptor under GIF, an MP4 some fifty QuickTime
tags that are the container. So the allowlist is per tag name
(signal_bot/media_tags.py), which keeps the property that matters: an atom
nobody anticipated arrives as a name that is not on the list, and the upload
is refused.
Allowlist, not blocklist, for the reason a naive gate misses: an MP4 geotag is
a QuickTime udta/©xyz atom reported under QuickTime, not GPS.
Tracks: ffmpeg, for what no tag allowlist can see
A tag allowlist is structurally blind to one class, and it is the worst one.
IMG_6924.mp4 in the live album carries two mebx timed-metadata tracks, and
after a complete -all= -time:all= pass its bytes still contain:
com.apple.quicktime.detected-face
com.apple.quicktime.detected-face.bounds
com.apple.quicktime.detected-face.face-id
com.apple.quicktime.detected-face.roll-angle / .yaw-angle
Per-frame face bounding boxes and a face identity number. exiftool is not
broken for missing them: mebx samples live in mdat as opaque payload, not
as tags, so there is no tag to refuse. The only answer is to drop the
track, which signal_bot/media_tracks.py does before exiftool runs:
ffmpeg -v error -i <src> -map 0:v -map "0:a?" -c copy \
-map_metadata -1 -map_chapters -1 -y <dst>
ffprobe -v error -show_entries stream=codec_type -of csv=p=0 <dst>
and every surviving stream must be video or audio.
This is not the ffmpeg mistake above. That one was ffmpeg replacing
exiftool for tag removal, where it silently failed on JPEG. Here ffmpeg
removes tracks, exiftool still does every tag removal afterwards, and the
gate is a positive read-back of which streams survived rather than an exit
code. -c copy is safe for this job precisely because nothing is being
claimed about the frames — the claim is about which tracks exist, and ffprobe
answers that directly. Do not collapse the two jobs back together.
QuickTime:MetaFormat is deliberately absent from the allowlist: a file
still reporting one has a metadata track the re-mux should have removed, and
refusing it is the correct outcome.
Both entry points obey this. ./web.sh --import used to be a
verbatim shutil.copy2; since 2026-08-31 it runs the same stripper, so the
guarantee on this page covers the whole album and not just the chat path.
The list includes the codec's own configuration — CompressorName,
VendorID, and the HEVC parameter set (HEVCConfigurationVersion,
GeneralProfileIDC, BitDepthLuma, …). That was forced by measurement, not
chosen for convenience: with them off the list exiftool 13.55 could produce no
acceptable video and no acceptable HEIC, because CompressorName lives in
the avc1 sample description and exiftool reports it as not writable at all
(Sorry, QuickTime:CompressorName doesn't exist or isn't writable), and a real
HEIC reports sixteen HEVC config tags. Since HEIC is the iPhone default, the
choice was codec parameters or no phone photos. They describe how the picture
is encoded, never where it was taken or who took it; every location and
identity tag is still refused, and scripts/e2e.sh proves a QuickTime GPS atom
does not survive on a file the album actually stored.
Formats are decided by magic bytes, never by the filename: jpg, png, gif,
webp, mp4, mov, m4v, heic, heif, avif, webm and svg. Every one of them must
also be in pack.MEDIA_TYPES, or a file that uploaded cleanly is refused by
the next load and takes startup down.
⚠️ .webm and .svg are stored unstripped
exiftool 13.55 can write neither (exiftool -listwf lists no WEBM and no
SVG; a strip attempt returns Can't write SVG files). Its SVG reader does
not surface <metadata> content either, so there is no detection to fall back
on.
kuhy's decision of 2026-08-31 is to keep both on the allowlist and store them
as they arrive, metadata included. The consequence, stated plainly: an
.svg carrying <metadata> or an embedded
<image xlink:href="data:image/jpeg;base64,…"> keeps whatever is in it, and
every later !alfa re-sends that file verbatim. Every other format on the
list is stripped and verified.