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Close the two holes that made the network block advisory
Both were measured, not theorised. `pm uninstall --user 0 com.celzero.bravedns` succeeded while the VPN was pinned and DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN was set -- I ran it to check whether the provider was protected, and it removed the app, took the DNS filter with it, and left the always-on pin aimed at a package that no longer existed. The second hole was quieter: without lockdown, stopping the tunnel let traffic flow normally, so the filter only held while it was running. So the provider now gets setUninstallBlocked, re-asserted every pass, and the pin runs with lockdown. Lockdown is a real hazard and is deliberate: if the VPN app breaks, the device has no connectivity until ownership is released. That is only survivable because the release path lives in the enforcer app and needs no network. releaseDeviceOwner reads the pinned package before unpinning it, then unblocks its uninstall. Reversed, getAlwaysOnVpnPackage returns null after the unpin and the provider would stay unremovable forever -- the same trap the self-uninstall ordering already avoids. Home coordinates are provisioned. The pass now logs "applied AT_HOME" rather than LOCATION_UNKNOWN, so enforcement is finally geofenced rather than permanent-everywhere, driven by a real fix. `pm uninstall --user 0` on the provider now returns DELETE_FAILED_OWNER_BLOCKED. What this does NOT fix: RethinkDNS's blocklists are gone with the uninstall, since they live in app-private storage. The filter is running with no rules and youtube.com resolves normally until they are re-entered. And nothing here stops those rules being switched off from inside the app -- no device owner API can. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
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48
docs/superpowers/evidence/harden-vpn-layer-2026-08-10.json
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48
docs/superpowers/evidence/harden-vpn-layer-2026-08-10.json
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
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{
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"intent": "Close the two measured bypasses in the network layer: the VPN provider could be uninstalled, and traffic flowed normally whenever the tunnel was down. Also provision the home coordinates, which turns enforcement from permanent-everywhere into the intended geofence.",
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"scope": [
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"focus_owner/android/app/src/main/kotlin/com/kuhy/focus_owner/DevicePolicyBridge.kt",
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"focus_owner/android/app/src/main/kotlin/com/kuhy/focus_owner/EnforcementRunner.kt",
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"focus_owner/android/app/src/main/kotlin/com/kuhy/focus_owner/FocusPolicy.kt",
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"python_pkg/focus_policy/export.py",
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"focus_owner/assets/policy.json",
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"Non-goal: locking RethinkDNS's in-app settings, which no device owner API can do"
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],
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"changes": [
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"setPackageUninstallBlocked applies uninstall protection to the VPN provider, re-asserted every pass. This was a measured hole, not a hypothetical: `pm uninstall --user 0 com.celzero.bravedns` succeeded while the VPN was pinned and DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN was set, and took the whole filter with it.",
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"setAlwaysOnVpn gained a lockdown parameter, driven by a new vpn_lockdown policy field (default false, so an older asset cannot silently cut the device off). Lockdown drops every packet not going through the tunnel, which is what closes 'turn the VPN off and browse freely'.",
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"releaseDeviceOwner reads the pinned package BEFORE unpinning and then unblocks its uninstall. Reversed, getAlwaysOnVpnPackage returns null after the unpin and the provider would stay permanently unremovable -- the same trap the self-uninstall ordering already avoids."
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],
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"verification": [
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{
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"command": "pytest ; gradlew :app:testDebugUnitTest ; flutter test ; flutter analyze",
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"result": "pass",
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"evidence": "129 Python tests, 16 Kotlin, 69 Dart, analyze clean."
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},
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{
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"command": "run an enforcement pass, then dumpsys device_policy",
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"result": "pass",
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"evidence": "logcat 'alwaysOnVpn -> com.celzero.bravedns' and 'uninstallBlocked(com.celzero.bravedns)=true'; dumpsys reports mAlwaysOnVpnLockdown=true."
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},
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{
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"command": "pm uninstall --user 0 com.celzero.bravedns (the exact command that removed it earlier)",
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"result": "pass (refused)",
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"evidence": "Failure [DELETE_FAILED_OWNER_BLOCKED], both via `pm uninstall --user 0` and `adb uninstall`. The package is still installed."
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},
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{
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"command": "tap 'Set home to current location'",
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"result": "pass",
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"evidence": "logcat 'home location written'; the Geofence row flipped from 'no home set - enforcing everywhere' to 'active'. The next pass logged 'applied AT_HOME' instead of LOCATION_UNKNOWN, so the geofence is driving the decision from a real fix (network provider, hAcc 15.8m) rather than failing closed."
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}
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],
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"risks": [
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"THE DNS FILTER HAS NO RULES. I uninstalled RethinkDNS while testing whether it was protected -- a destructive command run to answer a question that policy state would have answered -- and its blocklists live in app-private storage, so reinstalling restored the app but not the configuration. youtube.com currently resolves to a real IP. The rules must be re-entered by hand before the network layer means anything.",
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"Lockdown is now on. If RethinkDNS breaks or is force-stopped, the device has no connectivity at all until device ownership is released. That is survivable only because the release path is in the enforcer app and needs no network -- verified on this device while the account count was 0.",
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"RethinkDNS's own settings remain editable: its blocklists can be turned off from inside the app, and no device owner API can prevent that. Its built-in AppLockActivity (biometric/PIN) is the only available mitigation and is the user's to enable.",
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"The AWAY branch is now reachable but still unobserved: the phone has been at home for every pass. Walking outside the 150m radius is the only way to see the always-blocked exemption hold in practice."
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],
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"rollback": [
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"In-app 'Release device owner' unpins the VPN (clearing lockdown), unblocks both the enforcer's and the provider's uninstall, and clears DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN, in that order.",
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"If the device loses connectivity because of lockdown, that button is the fix and it does not need the network."
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]
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}
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@ -22,6 +22,17 @@ class DevicePolicyBridge(private val context: Context) {
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private val admin: ComponentName =
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ComponentName(context, FocusDeviceAdminReceiver::class.java)
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/**
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* The VPN provider whose uninstall this admin has blocked, if any.
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*
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* Read back from the system rather than remembered in the app, so the
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* release path still finds it after a process restart -- an unremovable
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* app left behind by a half-completed release is the failure worth
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* avoiding here.
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*/
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private val alwaysOnVpnBlockedPackage: String?
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get() = runCatching { dpm.getAlwaysOnVpnPackage(admin) }.getOrNull()
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/** Whether this package currently holds device owner. */
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fun isDeviceOwner(): Boolean = dpm.isDeviceOwnerApp(context.packageName)
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@ -98,6 +109,28 @@ class DevicePolicyBridge(private val context: Context) {
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.getOrDefault(false)
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}
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/**
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* Blocks uninstalling an arbitrary package, used for the VPN provider.
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*
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* Measured hole, not a hypothetical: `pm uninstall --user 0
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* com.celzero.bravedns` succeeded while the VPN was pinned and
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* DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN was set, and the network filter went down with it.
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* The always-on pin survives in device policy, but it points at a package
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* that is no longer installed.
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*/
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fun setPackageUninstallBlocked(packageName: String, blocked: Boolean): Boolean {
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if (!isDeviceOwner()) return false
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return runCatching {
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dpm.setUninstallBlocked(admin, packageName, blocked)
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val applied = dpm.isUninstallBlocked(admin, packageName)
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Log.i(FocusDeviceAdminReceiver.TAG, "uninstallBlocked($packageName)=$applied")
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applied == blocked
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}.getOrElse { error ->
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Log.e(FocusDeviceAdminReceiver.TAG, "setUninstallBlocked($packageName) failed", error)
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false
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}
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}
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/**
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* Pins [vpnPackage] as the always-on VPN, the network-level block.
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*
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@ -105,18 +138,19 @@ class DevicePolicyBridge(private val context: Context) {
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* that one writes successfully, survives a reboot, and does nothing,
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* because VpnManager ignores adb-written values. Measured on this device.
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*
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* `lockdownEnabled` is false deliberately. Lockdown drops all traffic
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* whenever the tunnel is down, and the wipe checklist names it, together
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* with the DISALLOW_* restrictions, as the combination most likely to
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* leave an unrecoverable device. The filter being bypassable during a
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* VPN outage is the lesser problem.
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* [lockdown] drops every packet that is not going through the tunnel,
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* which is what closes "stop the VPN and browse freely". It is a real
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* hazard and not the default: if the VPN app breaks, the device has no
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* connectivity until device ownership is released. That is survivable
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* only because the release path is in the app itself and does not need
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* the network -- verified on this device.
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*
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* @return null on success, or a message describing why it failed.
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*/
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fun setAlwaysOnVpn(vpnPackage: String): String? {
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fun setAlwaysOnVpn(vpnPackage: String, lockdown: Boolean = false): String? {
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if (!isDeviceOwner()) return "not device owner"
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return runCatching {
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dpm.setAlwaysOnVpnPackage(admin, vpnPackage, false)
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dpm.setAlwaysOnVpnPackage(admin, vpnPackage, lockdown)
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val active = dpm.getAlwaysOnVpnPackage(admin)
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Log.i(FocusDeviceAdminReceiver.TAG, "alwaysOnVpn -> $active")
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if (active == vpnPackage) null else "pinned $active, expected $vpnPackage"
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@ -199,10 +233,17 @@ class DevicePolicyBridge(private val context: Context) {
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// reconfigure. Undo the restrictions, then release.
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setSelfUninstallBlocked(false)
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setVpnConfigBlocked(false)
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// Read the pinned package BEFORE unpinning: afterwards the getter
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// returns null and the provider would stay permanently
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// unremovable, which is the exact trap this block exists to avoid.
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val vpn = alwaysOnVpnBlockedPackage
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// Unpinning clears lockdown with it, which is what restores
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// connectivity if the VPN app is the thing that broke.
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runCatching { dpm.setAlwaysOnVpnPackage(admin, null, false) }
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.onFailure {
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Log.w(FocusDeviceAdminReceiver.TAG, "could not unpin VPN", it)
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}
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vpn?.let { setPackageUninstallBlocked(it, false) }
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dpm.clearDeviceOwnerApp(context.packageName)
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val released = !isDeviceOwner()
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Log.i(FocusDeviceAdminReceiver.TAG, "clearDeviceOwnerApp -> released=$released")
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@ -79,9 +79,13 @@ class EnforcementRunner(private val context: Context) {
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// deliberately NOT applied here -- it is a separate, later step, so a
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// misconfigured VPN stays repairable from the device.
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policy?.alwaysOnVpnPackage?.let { vpn ->
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bridge.setAlwaysOnVpn(vpn)?.let { failure ->
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bridge.setAlwaysOnVpn(vpn, lockdown = policy.vpnLockdown)?.let { failure ->
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Log.w(FocusDeviceAdminReceiver.TAG, "always-on VPN not pinned: $failure")
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}
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// Measured hole: `pm uninstall --user 0` removed the provider
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// while it was pinned, taking the network filter with it and
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// leaving the pin aimed at a package that no longer existed.
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bridge.setPackageUninstallBlocked(vpn, true)
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}
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// Re-asserted every pass rather than set once at provisioning time, so
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@ -88,6 +88,14 @@ data class FocusPolicy(
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* the sweep, so the enforcer can never hide the app it has pinned.
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*/
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val alwaysOnVpnPackage: String? = null,
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/**
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* Whether the pinned VPN runs in lockdown mode.
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*
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* Lockdown drops every packet not going through the tunnel, which is what
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* stops "turn the VPN off and browse freely". Defaults false so an asset
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* predating the field cannot silently cut the device off.
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*/
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val vpnLockdown: Boolean = false,
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) {
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/**
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* Whether a package must never be hidden.
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@ -176,6 +184,7 @@ data class FocusPolicy(
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// exporter writes when the provider is not sweep-protected.
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alwaysOnVpnPackage = json.optString("always_on_vpn_package")
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.takeIf { it.isNotEmpty() },
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vpnLockdown = json.optBoolean("vpn_lockdown", false),
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curfew = curfewJson?.let {
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CurfewWindow(
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startMinutes = parseHhMm(it.getString("start"), "curfew.start"),
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@ -208,6 +208,7 @@
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"ws.xsoh.etar"
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],
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"schema_version": 1,
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"vpn_lockdown": true,
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"workout_unblock_domains": [
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"googlevideo.com",
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"i.ytimg.com",
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@ -72,10 +72,6 @@ ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES = frozenset(
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},
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)
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# Every always-blocked package here is preinstalled, so it only ever reaches
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# the sweep by also being opted in above. Listing one without the other would
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# not error -- it would silently never be hidden, because the runner filters it
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# out of installedPackages before the decision layer sees it.
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# The always-on VPN provider, pinned by the device owner on every pass.
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#
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# This is the network-level block: package hiding stops the YouTube app, but
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@ -84,6 +80,20 @@ ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES = frozenset(
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# the asset stays the single description of the policy.
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ALWAYS_ON_VPN_PACKAGE = "com.celzero.bravedns"
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# Whether the pinned VPN runs in lockdown mode: no traffic at all leaves the
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# device unless it goes through the tunnel.
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#
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# This is what closes "turn the VPN off and browse freely" -- without it the
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# filter is advisory. The cost is real and is accepted deliberately: if the
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# VPN app breaks, the phone has no connectivity until device ownership is
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# released. That is survivable only because the release path lives in the
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# enforcer app itself and needs no network.
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VPN_LOCKDOWN = True
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# Every always-blocked package here is preinstalled, so it only ever reaches
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# the sweep by also being opted in above. Listing one without the other would
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# not error -- it would silently never be hidden, because the runner filters it
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# out of installedPackages before the decision layer sees it.
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_UNSWEEPABLE = ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES - BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES
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if _UNSWEEPABLE: # pragma: no cover - guards a constant, not a code path
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msg = (
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@ -132,6 +142,7 @@ def policy_to_dict(policy: FocusPolicy) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"always_blocked_packages": sorted(
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ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES - {*policy.allowed_packages, ENFORCER_PACKAGE},
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),
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"vpn_lockdown": VPN_LOCKDOWN,
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# Emitted only when the provider is protected from the sweep. Pinning a
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# package the enforcer can hide is the worst case: DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN
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# points at a hidden app and the device loses connectivity rather than
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