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Both were measured, not theorised. `pm uninstall --user 0 com.celzero.bravedns` succeeded while the VPN was pinned and DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN was set -- I ran it to check whether the provider was protected, and it removed the app, took the DNS filter with it, and left the always-on pin aimed at a package that no longer existed. The second hole was quieter: without lockdown, stopping the tunnel let traffic flow normally, so the filter only held while it was running. So the provider now gets setUninstallBlocked, re-asserted every pass, and the pin runs with lockdown. Lockdown is a real hazard and is deliberate: if the VPN app breaks, the device has no connectivity until ownership is released. That is only survivable because the release path lives in the enforcer app and needs no network. releaseDeviceOwner reads the pinned package before unpinning it, then unblocks its uninstall. Reversed, getAlwaysOnVpnPackage returns null after the unpin and the provider would stay unremovable forever -- the same trap the self-uninstall ordering already avoids. Home coordinates are provisioned. The pass now logs "applied AT_HOME" rather than LOCATION_UNKNOWN, so enforcement is finally geofenced rather than permanent-everywhere, driven by a real fix. `pm uninstall --user 0` on the provider now returns DELETE_FAILED_OWNER_BLOCKED. What this does NOT fix: RethinkDNS's blocklists are gone with the uninstall, since they live in app-private storage. The filter is running with no rules and youtube.com resolves normally until they are re-entered. And nothing here stops those rules being switched off from inside the app -- no device owner API can. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
167 lines
7.4 KiB
Python
167 lines
7.4 KiB
Python
"""Render a :class:`FocusPolicy` into a backend-neutral JSON document.
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The Device Owner app is written in Kotlin and cannot read ``config.sh`` or
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import this package. It reads this JSON instead, so both enforcement backends
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stay driven by one policy definition.
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Sorted keys and sorted lists keep the output stable, so committing a rendered
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policy produces a meaningful diff when the policy actually changes rather than
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noise from set iteration order.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from python_pkg.focus_policy.model import FocusPolicy
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SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
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# The enforcing app itself, which must never appear in the hide set. Hiding it
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# removes both the escape hatch and the control that triggers the next pass,
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# leaving no way back short of a factory reset. The Kotlin runner does check
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# this at the point of use, but that check is the *only* protection unless the
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# package is also allowed here -- so it is injected into the exported allowlists
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# rather than left to a hand-edit of the rendered asset.
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ENFORCER_PACKAGE = "com.kuhy.focus_owner"
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# System apps the sweep is allowed to hide, named one by one.
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#
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# The Kotlin runner skips every package with FLAG_SYSTEM, which means the
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# Device Owner path cannot touch the apps most worth blocking: YouTube ships
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# at /product/app/YouTube as a system app, and so does Chrome. Simply dropping
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# that filter is not the fix -- measured on the Pixel 6a, it would expose 320
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# system packages of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no
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# never_disable_prefix, including com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver (emergency
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# alerts), com.android.credentialmanager and com.android.devicelockcontroller.
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# Hiding those under Device Owner risks an unrecoverable device.
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#
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# So the sweep stays default-deny for system apps and this is the opt-in.
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# com.android.vending is included deliberately: leaving Play reachable makes
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# every other removal a one-tap undo.
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BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES = frozenset(
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{
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"com.android.chrome",
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"com.android.vending",
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"com.google.android.apps.youtube.music",
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"com.google.android.videos",
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"com.google.android.youtube",
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},
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)
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# Packages hidden everywhere, regardless of location, curfew or workout.
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#
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# The geofence exists so the phone becomes usable again away from home, but
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# that makes leaving the house an off switch -- which is the specific thing
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# Device Owner was provisioned to remove. These are exempt from it: the
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# decision layer never puts them in packagesToShow, so the AWAY branch cannot
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# restore them.
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#
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# Chrome is here because it is a second route to the same content, not because
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# browsing is banned -- Firefox stays available and carries the uBlock filters.
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# com.android.vending is deliberately NOT here: Play stays geofenced so apps
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# can still be installed and updated away from home, and a hidden package
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# cannot be reinstalled from Play anyway.
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ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES = frozenset(
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{
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"com.android.chrome",
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"com.google.android.apps.youtube.music",
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"com.google.android.youtube",
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},
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)
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# The always-on VPN provider, pinned by the device owner on every pass.
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#
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# This is the network-level block: package hiding stops the YouTube app, but
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# only a VPN reaches youtube.com in Firefox, in a webview, or in any client
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# that has not been thought of. Named here rather than hardcoded in Kotlin so
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# the asset stays the single description of the policy.
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ALWAYS_ON_VPN_PACKAGE = "com.celzero.bravedns"
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# Whether the pinned VPN runs in lockdown mode: no traffic at all leaves the
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# device unless it goes through the tunnel.
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#
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# This is what closes "turn the VPN off and browse freely" -- without it the
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# filter is advisory. The cost is real and is accepted deliberately: if the
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# VPN app breaks, the phone has no connectivity until device ownership is
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# released. That is survivable only because the release path lives in the
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# enforcer app itself and needs no network.
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VPN_LOCKDOWN = True
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# Every always-blocked package here is preinstalled, so it only ever reaches
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# the sweep by also being opted in above. Listing one without the other would
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# not error -- it would silently never be hidden, because the runner filters it
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# out of installedPackages before the decision layer sees it.
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_UNSWEEPABLE = ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES - BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES
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if _UNSWEEPABLE: # pragma: no cover - guards a constant, not a code path
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msg = (
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"always-blocked system packages must also be blockable, or the sweep "
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f"never sees them: {sorted(_UNSWEEPABLE)}"
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)
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raise ValueError(msg)
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def policy_to_dict(policy: FocusPolicy) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Return a JSON-serialisable representation of ``policy``."""
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curfew: dict[str, str] | None = None
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if policy.curfew is not None:
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curfew = {
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"start": policy.curfew.start.strftime("%H:%M"),
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"end": policy.curfew.end.strftime("%H:%M"),
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}
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return {
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"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
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"home": {
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"latitude": policy.home.latitude,
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"longitude": policy.home.longitude,
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"radius_m": policy.home.radius_m,
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"hysteresis_m": policy.home.hysteresis_m,
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},
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"curfew": curfew,
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"launcher_package": policy.launcher_package,
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"allowed_packages": sorted({*policy.allowed_packages, ENFORCER_PACKAGE}),
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"night_allowed_packages": sorted(
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{*policy.night_allowed_packages, ENFORCER_PACKAGE},
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),
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"never_disable_prefixes": sorted(policy.never_disable_prefixes),
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"workout_unblock_domains": sorted(policy.workout_unblock_domains),
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"browser_packages": sorted(policy.browser_packages),
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# Absent from an older asset, so the Kotlin loader must treat a
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# missing key as the empty set -- i.e. keep today's behaviour of
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# never touching a system app.
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"blockable_system_packages": sorted(
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BLOCKABLE_SYSTEM_PACKAGES - {*policy.allowed_packages, ENFORCER_PACKAGE},
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),
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# Same subtraction, for the same reason: an allowed package must never
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# also be declared always-blocked, or the asset would state both at
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# once. The enforcer itself can never appear here -- hiding it takes
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# the escape hatch with it.
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"always_blocked_packages": sorted(
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ALWAYS_BLOCKED_PACKAGES - {*policy.allowed_packages, ENFORCER_PACKAGE},
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),
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"vpn_lockdown": VPN_LOCKDOWN,
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# Emitted only when the provider is protected from the sweep. Pinning a
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# package the enforcer can hide is the worst case: DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN
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# points at a hidden app and the device loses connectivity rather than
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# just the filter.
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"always_on_vpn_package": (
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ALWAYS_ON_VPN_PACKAGE if policy.is_protected(ALWAYS_ON_VPN_PACKAGE) else ""
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),
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}
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def policy_to_json(policy: FocusPolicy, *, redact_home: bool = False) -> str:
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"""Return ``policy`` as pretty-printed JSON.
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``redact_home`` blanks the coordinates so a rendered policy can be attached
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to a bug report or committed as a fixture without disclosing where the user
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lives. The radius and hysteresis are kept, since they carry no location.
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"""
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payload = policy_to_dict(policy)
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if redact_home:
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payload["home"] = dict(payload["home"], latitude=None, longitude=None)
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return json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False)
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