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https://github.com/kuhyx/testsAndMisc.git
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071d706d8a
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7e967de79b |
Split seven more linux_configuration scripts
10-recon.sh, install_exercism.sh, fix_arch_performance.sh, format_sd_card.sh, setup_dot_resolver.sh, fix_unity.sh and 20-dump-stock.sh, all now under the cap. Splitting a file twice is the risky move: the second cut on 20-dump-stock.sh dropped the first cut's source line, leaving verify_dump called but never defined, and the repair then landed the line inside the lib instead of the entry script. Both fixed - the entry sources both libs and no lib sources another. Grep the source lines after any double split. fix_unity.sh's desktop_dir is read across the seam; renamed to DESKTOP_DIR to match the file's own convention for globals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011w2Pj4Ek3ZNMQVYcFHgXDY |
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| 2d4d2a2eb2 |
Block by hiding apps, which the phone cannot undo
The network layer was the wrong place for this. Tested remotely today: opening RethinkDNS and switching off its device blocklists un-blocked YouTube in a few taps, and no device owner API can stop that -- an on-device filter app always owns its own rules. App hiding is different. 'pm unhide' from adb shell throws a SecurityException and the package stays hidden; only the device owner can reverse it, and reaching that costs a factory reset. So the block moves there, scoped to an explicit allowlist and the home geofence. Both whitelists are rewritten from the apps that actually exist on this phone. The old ones described the rooted Blackview. Every browser is excluded now, so at home a link does not open at all -- confirmed as intended. LAUNCHER_PACKAGE was still the Blackview's launcher, which is not installed here. The exporter refused to render the policy twice over it -- precisely what that check is for. The network layer stays a soft deterrent by choice: pinned and uninstall-blocked, but without lockdown, and its blocklists remain switchable. Private DNS is implemented but ships disabled. stunnel logged zero connections from the handset across two pin attempts, so the router does not forward 853. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC |
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| 143d260c1c |
Park phone DNS filtering: Private DNS fails closed, so the PC cannot host it
Measured on the Pixel 6a, twice: with private_dns_mode=hostname and the resolver unreachable, `ping example.com` returns "unknown host". Android's Private DNS does not fall back to the carrier's resolver -- hostname mode is RFC 8310's strict profile, and failing to establish TLS on 853 is a hard error. So a resolver living on this PC means "PC off" equals "phone has no internet", not merely "no filtering". That is disqualifying for a daily driver, and it disqualifies the whole home-hosted delivery path regardless of how well it works while the machine is up -- which it does; it was verified end to end. DNS_TRUSTED_DOT_HOST/IPS go back to empty, which restores the previous enforcer behaviour byte for byte. No code revert is needed, which is exactly why the flag was built to default empty. Two things found while testing are worth keeping. The nftables input chain is policy drop and admitted only ssh over wg0, so binding stunnel to the tunnel address was not sufficient on its own: ICMP passed while TCP 853 was dropped, which presents confusingly as "ping works but the port does not". That rule is now added explicitly and scoped to wg0. And setup_phone_wireguard.sh automates the client setup the tunnel needed, verifying handshake, reachability and DNS rather than assuming success, and deleting the pushed private key afterwards. The deeper reason the home endpoint could not work even with the tunnel up: dns.kuhy.duckdns.org resolves to the public IP while stunnel listens only on 10.8.0.1, and with AllowedIPs=10.8.0.0/24 that routes outside the tunnel to a closed port. Android never opened a connection at all. Split-horizon DNS does not fix it either, since on mobile data the phone uses the carrier's resolver. Research also ruled out the hosted-hybrid option that looked most attractive: no provider can ingest a 185k-domain list (NextDNS none, AdGuard 1-5K, ControlD 10K), and the free tiers fail OPEN -- they stop filtering past 300k queries a month while still resolving, which for a self-control tool is the worst failure mode available. Details and the remaining options are in the parked doc. The stunnel endpoint is left running deliberately: WireGuard-only, verified unreachable from LAN and WAN, and it makes the next attempt testable immediately. Removal commands are documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL |
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| e3d5e1dd18 |
Serve the blocklist over DoT and hand the policy to the app as an asset
Two gaps stopped the unrooted path working end to end. The phone had no way to read the focus policy, and the blocklist was only reachable as a hosts file or over plain UDP/53 on the LAN -- while the rooted enforcer actively rejected every DoT connection, so a self-hosted resolver could not have worked even if one existed. focus_owner now loads a generated policy.json instead of hardcoding anything, so config.sh stays the single source of truth across Python, shell and Kotlin. The committed asset is rendered with --redact-home and a test fails if home coordinates ever appear in it. An unknown schema_version is rejected outright: silently accepting a newer schema means enforcing a policy the app has misread, and a misread allowlist is one that blocks the dialer. dns_enforcer.sh rejected ALL port 853 traffic and pinned Private DNS off, every 20 seconds. That is right when DoT is a bypass channel and exactly wrong when DoT is the enforcement channel, which is what an unrooted phone needs -- it has no hosts file to fall back to. With DNS_TRUSTED_DOT_HOST set it now ACCEPTs the trusted resolver before the blanket REJECT, and pins Private DNS to that hostname so the user cannot pick an unfiltered one. Rule order is load-bearing: iptables takes the first match, so an ACCEPT appended after the REJECT would never be reached. expected_rule_count() counts the new rules, because a mismatch there makes chain_intact() rebuild the chain every 20s -- a silent fork storm that also drops the connection each time. With the variable empty the behaviour is byte-identical, so the rooted phone is untouched until this is deployed. setup_dot_resolver.sh terminates DoT with stunnel rather than Caddy: DoT is a raw TLS stream and stock caddy:2.8 has no layer4 module, so using Caddy would have meant an xcaddy rebuild of a container serving five live sites. It reuses the certificate Caddy already renews, so nothing competes for port 80. It binds to the WireGuard address, not 0.0.0.0 -- a public DoT endpoint is an open resolver, and over the existing tunnel it needs no port-forward, no firewall rule and no rate limiting. Verified: example.com resolves, pornhub.com returns 0.0.0.0, TLS 1.3 against the LE cert, and both the LAN and public addresses refuse. The Device Owner checklist is planning only. Checking the device rather than the config settled the one open risk: Google Wallet is not installed and no NFC payment default is set, so the unconfirmable tap-to-pay question does not apply here. The same check found that Aegis, MS Authenticator, Oracle IDM and PKO IKO are absent -- they are in config.sh's whitelist, which describes the rooted phone, not this one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL |
