Hiding the YouTube package stops the app. It does nothing about
youtube.com in Firefox, in a webview, or in any client nobody has
enumerated. This is that layer.
setAlwaysOnVpnPackage from the device owner is not the mechanism that
failed on 2026-08-09 -- that was `settings put secure always_on_vpn_app`,
which writes successfully, survives a reboot, and is ignored by
VpnManager. The DPM call takes effect: dumpsys now reports
mAlwaysOnVpnPackage=com.celzero.bravedns.
Lockdown stays off. It drops all traffic whenever the tunnel is down,
and the wipe checklist names it together with the DISALLOW_*
restrictions as the combination most likely to leave an unrecoverable
device. DISALLOW_CONFIG_VPN is deferred for the same reason: locking VPN
configuration before the filter is confirmed working would pin a broken
setup in place.
The exporter emits always_on_vpn_package only when the provider is also
in never_disable_prefixes, and RethinkDNS was added there. Pinning a
package the sweep can hide is the worst case -- the restriction would
point at a hidden app and cost general connectivity, not just the
filter. The pin is re-asserted every pass and, unlike the uninstall
block, does not track the decision: the network filter must not lift
when the geofence says AWAY.
releaseDeviceOwner now unpins the VPN and clears the restriction before
clearing ownership, for the same reason it already unblocked uninstall.
Not yet active, and the commit does not pretend otherwise: the tunnel
needs a one-time in-app VPN consent tap that adb cannot grant, and
RethinkDNS is at first-run state because its wildcard rules live in
app-private storage that the backup never reached. They have to be
re-entered by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
Leaving the house was an off switch. The AWAY branch returned early with
packagesToShow = every installed package, so walking 150m from home
restored YouTube -- which is the exact affordance device owner was
provisioned to remove.
always_blocked_packages is exempt from all four branches: AWAY hides
them, the allowlist loop cannot show them, and the workout release skips
them, because otherwise "go for a run" is the off switch instead. Chrome
is included as a second route to the same content; Firefox stays, and
carries the uBlock filters. Play is deliberately left geofenced so apps
can still be installed away from home -- and a hidden package cannot be
reinstalled from Play anyway.
infakt moves from the allowlist to SYSTEM_NEVER_DISABLE. Allowlisting
only held while it stayed in BOTH the day and night lists, and dropping
it from either would silently make it hideable; isAllowed() consults the
never-disable list before the curfew split, so it now holds under every
condition. It is device-paired to a bank over SMS, so losing it strands
the same re-authentication chain a hidden Messages app would.
The exporter now refuses an always-blocked package that is not also
blockable: the runner filters unopted system packages out of
installedPackages, so such an entry would never be hidden and nothing
would say so.
Verified: 128 Python tests at 100% branch coverage, 16 Kotlin tests, the
new ones canary-checked by breaking an assertion and confirming the
suite actually fails. On device, youtube/music/chrome/vending are
hidden=true, infakt hidden=false, uninstall still refused.
The AWAY path itself is unit-tested but NOT verified on hardware: with
no home_location.json every pass decides LOCATION_UNKNOWN, so the branch
is unreachable on this phone until coordinates can be provisioned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
The Device Owner sweep skipped every FLAG_SYSTEM package, which meant it
could not touch the apps it exists to block: YouTube ships at
/product/app/YouTube as a system app, and so does Chrome.
Deleting the filter is not the fix. Measured on the Pixel 6a, that would
expose 320 system packages of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no
never_disable_prefix -- including com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver
(emergency alerts), com.android.credentialmanager and
com.android.devicelockcontroller. So system apps stay default-deny and
blockable_system_packages is the opt-in.
com.android.vending is on the list deliberately: leaving Play reachable
makes every other removal a one-tap undo.
The list lives in the Python exporter rather than config.sh because it is
a safety boundary, and a shell typo should not be able to widen it. The
exporter subtracts anything already allowed, so an asset can never state
that a package is both allowed and blockable. Kotlin reads the field with
a new optionalStringSet: an asset predating the field parses to the empty
set instead of throwing, because a throw makes decide() skip the pass and
silently disable enforcement.
Verified on-device under a profile owner: hid 1 for YouTube, restored 1
when temporarily allowed, and cellbroadcastreceiver, credentialmanager,
devicelockcontroller and settings all left hidden=false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
setApplicationHidden drops a package from the default PackageManager
enumeration even though it stays installed=true, so a sweep querying
with flags 0 could never see anything it had already hidden. That made
packagesToShow permanently empty: measured on device, a pass following
one that hid three apps reported "hid 0, restored 0" and left them
hidden with no way back. Query with MATCH_UNINSTALLED_PACKAGES instead.
Hiding the enforcer itself is the other unrecoverable case, since it
takes the escape hatch and the trigger with it. The exporter now injects
com.kuhy.focus_owner into both the day and night allowlists so the
decision layer cannot propose it, and the runner keeps its point-of-use
skip to cover a policy asset rendered before this fix or hand-edited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YQLwdquDCNmWtvgi3Lk72J
phone_focus_mode is built for a rooted phone: the hosts layer is a read-only
bind mount over /system/etc/hosts, chosen so that even root-in-a-terminal
cannot overwrite it. None of that ports to a stock locked device. This splits
out the parts that are device-independent so one policy can drive both.
python_pkg/focus_policy parses config.sh rather than copying it, so the shell
config stays the source of truth and the two cannot drift. It rejects the
shipped REDACTED_* coordinate placeholder instead of defaulting to (0,0),
which would move "home" to the Atlantic and quietly disable the location gate.
blocklist.py converts the hosts file to domains for a DoT resolver or a local
VpnService. Three properties of the real 194k-line file make the obvious parser
wrong, and all three are handled: generate_hosts_file.sh *comments out*
deliberate unblocks rather than deleting them, so stripping '#' re-blocks
facebook/messenger/linkedin/4chan; the StevenBlack header carries loopback and
IPv6 housekeeping that would blackhole localhost; and ~1060 upstream annotation
tokens ('#[adware.zeno]', '"spam') render as address=/"spam/, which makes
dnsmasq refuse to start -- taking DNS down rather than blocking anything.
Verified with dnsmasq --test over all 185681 generated domains.
strip_workout_hosts.py had the same class of bug on the live rooted phone:
exact set membership meant the allowlisted googlevideo.com never matched the
dynamic r*---sn-*.googlevideo.com hosts YouTube actually streams from, so the
workout unblock was only partly working. Now suffix-matched (17 lines stripped,
was 14). The three new tests were checked against the original code in a
throwaway worktree; two of them fail there, so they pin the fix rather than
passing vacuously.
focus_owner is a device-owner app that deliberately does nothing yet. It ships
clearDeviceOwnerApp() implemented and tested first, because dpm
remove-active-admin does not work on a device owner: an app that locks the
device down before proving it can let go leaves a soft-brick recoverable only
through fastboot on a locked bootloader. Built, installed and launched on the
Pixel 6a; dumpsys afterwards confirms Device Owner Type -1 and no user
restrictions, i.e. the phone is unchanged.
Measured while scoping this, and not yet reflected in any enforcement code:
on Android 16 both pm suspend and pm disable-user are cleared by a reboot, so
shell-level app blocking is per-session only. setApplicationHidden is assumed
to persist under Device Owner but is untested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AwepyL5Lxs5QKbKkMpxxxL
