The Device Owner sweep skipped every FLAG_SYSTEM package, which meant it
could not touch the apps it exists to block: YouTube ships at
/product/app/YouTube as a system app, and so does Chrome.
Deleting the filter is not the fix. Measured on the Pixel 6a, that would
expose 320 system packages of which 243 match no allowlist entry and no
never_disable_prefix -- including com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver
(emergency alerts), com.android.credentialmanager and
com.android.devicelockcontroller. So system apps stay default-deny and
blockable_system_packages is the opt-in.
com.android.vending is on the list deliberately: leaving Play reachable
makes every other removal a one-tap undo.
The list lives in the Python exporter rather than config.sh because it is
a safety boundary, and a shell typo should not be able to widen it. The
exporter subtracts anything already allowed, so an asset can never state
that a package is both allowed and blockable. Kotlin reads the field with
a new optionalStringSet: an asset predating the field parses to the empty
set instead of throwing, because a throw makes decide() skip the pass and
silently disable enforcement.
Verified on-device under a profile owner: hid 1 for YouTube, restored 1
when temporarily allowed, and cellbroadcastreceiver, credentialmanager,
devicelockcontroller and settings all left hidden=false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014DqEd1uUhyT52KjaNeLanC
setApplicationHidden drops a package from the default PackageManager
enumeration even though it stays installed=true, so a sweep querying
with flags 0 could never see anything it had already hidden. That made
packagesToShow permanently empty: measured on device, a pass following
one that hid three apps reported "hid 0, restored 0" and left them
hidden with no way back. Query with MATCH_UNINSTALLED_PACKAGES instead.
Hiding the enforcer itself is the other unrecoverable case, since it
takes the escape hatch and the trigger with it. The exporter now injects
com.kuhy.focus_owner into both the day and night allowlists so the
decision layer cannot propose it, and the runner keeps its point-of-use
skip to cover a policy asset rendered before this fix or hand-edited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YQLwdquDCNmWtvgi3Lk72J
