MirrorSyncClient promised that reads consult both backends "so the
cutover order is irrelevant", but every read called self.primary
unguarded. A Firebase outage therefore produced no data at all and the
GitHub mirror was never consulted -- the union read silently degraded to
nothing, precisely when the fallback existed to help.
This is not hypothetical: screen-locker's workout sync hit it on
2026-08-10, where a DNS failure reading the primary took down the whole
locker rather than falling back.
Reads (list_directory, get_file_text, get_string_map) now degrade to the
mirror when the primary raises, and only fail when NEITHER backend can
answer -- returning an empty result would be indistinguishable from "no
data", which callers act on. Writes keep the old asymmetry on purpose: a
write the primary did not accept has not happened, so it must still fail
the tick.
A mirror that cannot bulk-read (GitHub) contributes nothing but is not a
failure, so it cannot by itself make a revision-map read raise. Both
language ports agree on that.
Same fix in the Dart port, which had all three read paths wrong too and
runs on the phone. Two older tests asserted the buggy read-fail-closed
behaviour and are renamed to describe what they actually exercise: the
both-sides-failed case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JS5V44jkHZiH1wC7BH5h5n
verify_installed() treated "already running" as a pass, so on any run where an
app was already open the strongest gate in the script silently became the
weakest: it proved only that the binary printed something. It now stops a
leftover instance first, so the check always tests a real cold start.
Killing that instance is fiddlier than it looks, and both naive forms are
broken here:
* `pkill -x <name>` matches the kernel's 15-character comm field, and two of
the three wrappers are longer (habit_stack_desktop is 19). It would have
silently never fired -- confirmed by watching an instance survive it.
* `pkill -f <path>` matches this script's own command line and the shell
wrapping it, so it kills the run instead of the app. Observed as an exit
144 with no output, twice.
So the pids come from ps, filtered on the installed /opt path, with our own
process and parent skipped.
Also threads the wrapper process name through the package table rather than
deriving it: diet-guard-app runs diet_guard_desktop, so name mangling produces
the wrong process.
Verified: with an instance deliberately running, the guard reports stopping it
and the launch check then passes on a genuine cold start; all three packages
still pass the full dry run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Aoa1nKWRrAbowz7Hfd3tgL
AUR registration is currently returning a bare nginx 503 server-side, so the
three packages (todo-flutter, habit-stack, diet-guard-app) are built and
verified but cannot be published yet. This runs the whole thing unattended
whenever signup reopens.
anubis_gate.py exists because the AUR sits behind Anubis: every HTML request
gets a proof-of-work challenge page carrying HTTP *200*, so a plain curl
reports 200 for a page that is actually unreachable. That is how the 503 got
misdiagnosed twice as a local/browser/IPv6 problem. The module solves the
challenge and reports the status of the real page behind it.
Fail-closed by construction: each package is built, namcap'd, installed and
LAUNCHED before it is pushed, and check_aur_rules() blocks the push on the
mechanically checkable submission rules (maintainer line, x86_64, no
replaces=, not already in an official repo, .SRCINFO matching the PKGBUILD).
Verified by injecting a replaces= violation: the push was blocked and
reported. A failing package is skipped; the others still publish.
Signup itself stays manual — it needs an email confirmation, and creating
accounts is not something this should do on the user's behalf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Aoa1nKWRrAbowz7Hfd3tgL
Desktop builds of todo/diet-guard/home_inventory are Flutter *web* in a
Chrome --app window, so FlutterSecureStorage resolves to the web backend:
AES-encrypted localStorage keyed inside the browser profile. That makes the
account unsettable from outside the page -- `secret-tool` writes the wrong
store (libsecret, which only the Linux build would read), and a Dart CLI
cannot even import flutter_secure_storage, since it is a Flutter plugin and
fails to resolve on the VM. Verified both, rather than assumed.
The one process that can read the filesystem *and* reach the page is the
wrapper already serving it -- the same seam diet-guard uses to keep the
GitHub token out of the browser. So this adds the shared half of a wrapper
route: the path constant, the opt-in env var, an opt-out marker key, and
accountFromWrapper(), which fetches and hands the body to the existing
FirebaseAccount.tryParse.
Additive only, so consumers adopt it per-app on their own schedule; nothing
forces a phone rebuild. Route handlers stay per-app because each wrapper owns
its own server.
Deliberately opt-in (CRDT_SYNC_SERVE_ACCOUNT): the route hands a credential
with database write access to anything that can reach the wrapper's port, so
it is set once to provision an install rather than left on. kSyncAccountOptOutKey
exists so "Disconnect" cannot be silently undone by the next launch
re-adopting the account.
Every failure path returns null rather than throwing -- an absent route is
the *normal* case -- so the caller degrades to "not configured", which the
settings screens already handle by asking.
254 tests, analyzer clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0177xwzcpfpWG2qca8Mr39q9
`dt.UTC` is a 3.11+ alias, but crdt-sync declares requires-python = ">=3.10"
and the CI matrix tests 3.10 — so `crdt-sync tests` has been failing on the
3.10 leg since before this branch (commit 493db693 failed the same way).
It collected as `AttributeError: module 'datetime' has no attribute 'UTC'`.
This is not only a test problem: `_firebase_auth._utcnow()` is library code,
so on 3.10 every token-expiry check would have raised at runtime. The three
consumers (diet-guard, screen-locker, wake-alarm) all declare >=3.10 too, so
honouring the floor is the right direction rather than raising it.
`dt.UTC is dt.timezone.utc` evaluates to True — the same singleton under two
spellings — so this is a pure rename with no behaviour change.
Verified on a real pyenv 3.10.16 venv, not just the 3.14 dev interpreter:
239 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GZH89WEqAjuJT8WZdqc7AP
Groundwork for moving diet-guard, screen-locker and wake-alarm off fixed
role ids ('pc'/'phone'/'desktop') onto per-install uuids, the scheme todo
and home_inventory already use. A role constant collides the moment a
second machine takes the same role, and a reinstall silently inherits the
previous install's CRDT identity.
The migration cannot rewrite history: the device id is baked into every HLC
stamp already written, is the record path segment and the revision key. So
a device that has just switched ids must still recognise its former id as
its own -- otherwise skip-own-writes stops matching the old path, and the
device pulls back and re-merges its own pre-migration log as though a peer
had written it. Idempotent under LWW, but pure wasted transfer on every
tick.
Both halves therefore take an optional legacy id and test set membership
(own_ids / ownIds) rather than equality against a single id:
- crdt-sync (Python) 0.5.1 -> 0.6.0: new crdt_sync._device with
DeviceIdentity + load_device_identity (generate-or-load, persisted); the
mkdir is deliberately unguarded, since handing back an unpersisted id
would mint a fresh uuid every restart and strand a device dir each time.
sync_log gains legacy_device_id.
- crdt_sync_dart 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0: DeviceIdentity value type; syncLog gains
legacyDeviceId. Persistence stays app-side, where the existing uuid apps
already keep it in SharedPreferences under 'crdt.nodeId'.
Both changes are backward compatible: the parameter defaults to null, which
reproduces the previous single-id behaviour exactly.
Each half has a positive test and a negative control proving the old path
*is* pulled when no legacy id is declared -- so the skip is verified to be
the parameter's doing, not an artifact of the fixture.
Python: 239 tests, 100% branch coverage. Dart: 248 tests, analyzer clean,
device.dart 11/11 and sync.dart 57/57 lines covered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GZH89WEqAjuJT8WZdqc7AP
`tool/` carries an __init__.py so its scripts import cleanly, which makes it a
second top-level package. setuptools' flat-layout auto-discovery refuses to
build at all in that case:
error: Multiple top-level packages discovered in a flat-layout:
['tool', 'crdt_sync']
so `pip install crdt-sync @ git+...` failed outright. Naming the package
explicitly fixes the build and keeps one-shot migration scripts out of every
consumer's site-packages.
Verified by installing from a clean target directory and importing
mirror_client_for from the built wheel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SJ9sxEw3ymzXNjL7SHNpJc
Every repo in this fleet is public, so where each value lives is a disclosure
decision rather than a style choice.
FirebaseProject holds apiKey + databaseUrl: these identify the *project*, and
the Web API key is a public identifier by design -- it ships inside every
Android APK, and the security rules, not the key, are what protect the data.
Safe to bake into app source, which keeps a reinstall zero-setup.
FirebaseAccount holds the email and password: these identify *a person*, so
they are entered once per device and kept in the platform keystore, never in
SharedPreferences and never in a repo.
The uid is deliberately absent from both. Nothing client-side needs it -- the
rules compare auth.uid server-side, so a wrong account is refused by the
database. A local copy would add a way to be wrong without adding protection.
Keyed at `firebase.account`, distinct from `sync.token` (the GitHub PAT) and
`firebase.credentials` (the refresh token), so all three coexist during the
mirrored cutover.
13 tests, 100% line coverage; 241 in the suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SJ9sxEw3ymzXNjL7SHNpJc
Every Flutter consumer already keeps its GitHub token in
flutter_secure_storage, which is where a Firebase refresh token belongs too:
it is the long-lived secret, while ID tokens expire in about an hour.
Takes read/write/delete closures rather than depending on
flutter_secure_storage directly -- this package is pure Dart, and a Flutter
plugin dependency would make it unusable from the command-line tools and from
plain `dart test`. The adapter is two lines at each call site.
Keyed at `firebase.credentials`, namespaced away from each app's `sync.token`
so both secrets coexist for the whole mirrored cutover.
Every load failure degrades to "not signed in" rather than throwing: an app
that threw here would be permanently unable to sync, with no way back short of
a reinstall.
10 tests, 100% line coverage; 228 in the suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SJ9sxEw3ymzXNjL7SHNpJc
Everything an app needs to move from GitHub to Firebase without each one
reinventing the wiring.
Python:
- _config.py: FirebaseConfig.load() + firebase_client_for(app) +
mirror_client_for(app, github). One config file, read in one place.
Credential caches stay per-app (~/.config/<app>/firebase_auth.json) --
one file written by several processes is a corruption waiting to happen.
- tool/preflight_firebase.py: validates the config before any data moves.
Catches a wrong-region databaseUrl (which answers 404 with a correctUrl
body rather than an error, so it would otherwise pass every check and
break mid-migration) and confirms the uid in the ID token matches the uid
the rules pin -- sign_in() returns None and discards localId, so the uid
is decoded from the JWT.
- tool/interop_seed.py: the missing Python half of the cross-language
check. interop_check.dart asserts it can see a record written by Python,
but nothing ever wrote one, so it could only ever fail.
Dart:
- firebase_config.dart: the same config shape, kept free of dart:io so it
works on web and Android, where the file does not exist at all and
credentials belong in flutter_secure_storage.
- PersistedSyncStateStore: the revision cache, persisted. Without it a
phone forgets every peer revision on each cold start and re-downloads
everything -- the exact traffic the revision scheme exists to avoid, and
what the free-tier headroom depends on.
Verified live against the real database: preflight passes all five checks,
the Dart smoke test passes end to end, and Python <-> Dart interop is OK.
Python 226 tests at 100% branch coverage; Dart 218 tests, both new files
at 100% line coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SJ9sxEw3ymzXNjL7SHNpJc
The display fix in 161eccd could never prove itself: both workflows trigger
on `paths: ['gatelock/**']`, and the workflow files live under .github/, so
editing one changes nothing GitHub will act on. The tests job stayed red at
the last gatelock commit with the fix already pushed -- which is the worst
kind of green-looking red, because nothing was running to say otherwise.
A workflow is part of what it tests, so each now lists its own path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BsXnTHyuuCUZsqetTaajcF
Reads through the GitHub API, not a local clone: the checkout on this
machine was five days stale while devices kept syncing, so seeding from it
would have silently rolled back everything written in between. Blobs are
fetched by sha rather than by path, so a concurrent push cannot swap the
content out from under the tree listing.
Writes through the real FirebaseSyncClient so the migration exercises the
same key escaping the apps will, then reads every blob back and compares
bytes before reporting success -- a migration that claimed success without
checking would be indistinguishable from one that dropped a file.
Retries connection resets and 5xx: GitHub drops keep-alive connections
routinely, and a half-completed migration is worse than one that never
started.
Three things are deliberately left behind, and stay in the GitHub repo
(archived, not deleted):
- todo-sync/changesets/ pre-migration sqlite_crdt format, unread since
2026-07-17
- diet-guard-sync/devices/desktop/ a replica that stopped syncing on
2026-07-22; verified to hold 0 records, 0 tombstones and 0 fields newer
than both `pc` and `phone`. Carrying it over would cost a full
re-download every tick forever, since a device that publishes no
revision can never be skipped
- READMEs and .gitkeep, which are not sync data
Run against the live database: 16 files, 956,272 bytes, all verified
byte-for-byte, and independently re-checked by listing the namespaces and
parsing records back out.
Headless, the viewport, fit-check and keyboard tests skip -- 25 of them --
and take their coverage with them, which is why this job went red the moment
they landed: 100% is the bar and _fitcheck drops to 47%, _keyboard to 18%.
Skipping is the worse half. These tests exist because Tk's own focus
delivery and canvas scrolling cannot be mocked -- mocking them is exactly how
a viewport that scrolled itself passed every check for a week -- so a green
run that skipped them would be reporting nothing about the thing they guard.
xvfb-run gives the runner a display, which is what every local run already
used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BsXnTHyuuCUZsqetTaajcF
Extracts the three-method remote surface GitHub was reached through into a
`RemoteStore` interface, then implements it against Firebase Realtime
Database over REST, so apps can move backend with a constructor change.
Why REST and not the SDKs: official FlutterFire has no Linux desktop
support, and `wake_alarm`'s PC side is a dependency-free systemd job. The
RTDB REST endpoints are plain HTTPS and behave identically on Linux,
Android and headless. Firebase is a transport, never the datastore -- each
app keeps its local log as the source of truth, so offline-first survives.
Why RTDB and not Firestore: on the Spark plan RTDB bills only storage and
bandwidth with no per-operation quota, so a runaway loop cannot exhaust a
daily budget and silently stop syncing mid-day.
Two savings make the no-cost tier a guarantee rather than a hope. Measured
against the GitHub-backed history this replaces: 4894 of 5542 commits
(88.3%) were byte-identical no-ops, and every tick re-downloaded every
peer's whole log. Both are now driven by one sha256 revision -- an
unchanged log is not re-pushed, and an unchanged peer is not re-fetched.
That turns egress from "ticks x log size" (~700 MB/month, and growing with
the log) into "edits" (~40 MB/month against a 10 GiB cap).
Revisions are one node per device, written only by its owner, rather than
one shared map -- a whole-map write would erase every peer's entry, after
which those peers would look permanently unchanged and never be fetched
again. Per-device keys make that impossible rather than merely avoided.
`.` is illegal in an RTDB key and the REST `.json` is a format suffix, so
paths get a reversible `~XX` escape (`log.json` -> `log~2Ejson`). Lossy
extension-stripping would break `todo`, whose listings return filenames.
`MirrorStore` / `MirrorSyncClient` dual-writes during the cutover. Reads
consult *both* backends: with primary-only reads a migrated device would
never see an un-migrated peer's writes while still mirroring its own back
-- silent one-directional convergence with no error raised. Writes are
asymmetric on purpose: a primary failure fails the tick, a mirror failure
is logged and survived.
Auth is Firebase email/password over identitytoolkit REST, with mandatory
refresh-token rotation. No service-account key anywhere: it would bypass
the security rules and is trivially extractable from an APK.
Verified live against a real database, not only mocks: sign-in and refresh,
key escaping round-tripping byte-for-byte, an unchanged tick writing
nothing, two devices converging, a revoked session throwing rather than
returning null, and a log written by the Python client being read by the
Dart one.
No app is migrated by this commit; every app still runs on GitHub.
Dart: 194 tests. Python: 203 tests at 100% branch coverage. No lint
suppressions added.
gatelock has never met its own 100% bar; _scrollable.py in particular shipped
with no tests at all, which is how a viewport that scrolled itself passed
every check for a week. The remaining gaps were the ones a reader would most
want proven:
* finalize() is documented idempotent -- a repaint calls it again, and an
earlier version stacked a <FocusIn> handler per call.
* scroll_into_view holds still for a widget already fully on screen. Its
margin logic has three outcomes and "hold" is the one a jittering viewport
gets wrong.
* the type scale reads an existing Tk root rather than opening a second one
next to a live lock window.
* bind_cancel rejects a non-callable at bind time, not on the keypress that
finally needed Escape to work.
328 tests, coverage 99.44% -> 100.00%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BsXnTHyuuCUZsqetTaajcF
On 2026-08-03 the screen locker's lock screen scrolled to mid-content and
back with nobody touching the keyboard, on a 1366x768 panel. Measured under
Xvfb with the real app: one programmatic focus_set() produced three scrolls,
frac 0.000 -> 0.436 -> 0.145.
Two causes, both here:
* ScrollableSurface followed every <FocusIn>. The apps focus a widget on
every repaint (and gatelock re-asserts focus from its recovery tick), and
Tk delivers <FocusIn> to the focused widget's whole ancestor chain when the
toplevel takes X focus -- so each repaint aimed a scroll at containers
taller than the screen. Now a focus move scrolls only when it followed a
real keypress, or a click on the widget that took focus, and only for a
leaf. Tab onto a clipped field still reveals it; nothing else moves.
* finalize()'s reset-to-top cancelled the centring, because centring moved
the canvas item down and the region's top edge with it. The region is now
pinned to the viewport whenever the content fits, so the view cannot move
at all, the scrollbar is taken down, and centring survives the repaint.
Content that does not fit is a layout defect, not a mode to live in, so
finalize() reports it at warning and gatelock.measure_fit() lets each app
gate on it before shipping (scripts/verify_screen_fits.py in all four).
Also: LockConfig's type/space scales now compact below 768px (_density),
which is where a screen has no room to be at design-system size and no
scrollbar to make up for it. 768 and up is verified to fit at full size, so
it is never compacted.
Tests: _scrollable had none; the regression is now stated as code
(programmatic focus must not move yview; Tab must). 323 pass, coverage
95.38% -> 99.44%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BsXnTHyuuCUZsqetTaajcF
gatelock v0.3.0. Every change here works around a Tk *default*, not an
application mistake -- which is why they belong in the shared backend rather
than being fixed four times.
On a lock surface these are not accessibility niceties. The lockers hold a
global input grab with VT switching disabled, so a control the keyboard cannot
reach, or a button clipped off the bottom of the screen, is a bricked machine.
LockConfig gains a type scale, a spacing scale and a focus-ring token:
- font() applies Tk's sign convention. Tk encodes the unit in the SIGN of the
font size -- positive is points, negative is pixels -- so passing the
design system's px values straight through rendered every string ~30%
oversized (measured: body at 16pt has a 26px linespace where 16px gives 20).
That alone pushed diet_guard's meal gate to 866px of content inside a 739px
pane on a 1366x768 screen.
- focus_kwargs() sets highlightcolor, the *focused* ring. Tk's default is a 1px
BLACK ring, invisible against the palette's #211D1B background. Note
highlightbackground is the UNfocused ring: setting only that one inverts the
affordance, which is what diet_guard was doing.
_keyboard.py collects three Tk defaults that each make a form unusable:
- tk.Text traps Tab (inserts a literal tab and refocuses itself) and no-ops
Shift-Tab; the only exits are the undocumented Ctrl+Tab / Ctrl+Shift+Tab.
- tk.Button binds <space> on X11 but never <Return>, so the key a user reaches
for to submit does nothing.
- Escape needs binding at the toplevel to work wherever focus happens to sit.
_scrollable.py adds ScrollableSurface, a viewport that content can actually be
reached in:
- A place()-centred frame takes its *requested* size and is clipped
SYMMETRICALLY, so overflow removes the heading and the submit button at the
same time, with no scrollbar and no hint anything is missing.
- A bare tk.Canvas has no class key bindings, so ::tk::FocusOK rejects it as a
focus stop and the only way to scroll is dragging the thumb with a pointer.
- Canvas clipping does not unmap children, so scrolled-out fields stay in the
tab ring while Tk never scrolls to follow focus -- Tab lands on fields the
user can neither see nor reveal.
- A Canvas holds content in a canvas *item*, so it never propagates the
content's requested size; a toplevel told to size itself has nothing to grow
to. _request_content_size() fixes that, clamped to the display.
center_when_fits keeps short screens looking exactly as they did, so the
viewport can replace a centred frame without a visual change.
A scrollable dialog Toplevel is deliberately NOT the mechanism: on an
override-redirect lock surface a second toplevel steals the Tk grab, which the
recovery tick then kills -- the 2026-07-26 failure where a frozen sport
selector logged a walk as table tennis.
unified-design-system gains the two rule families this implements (pointer-free
operability, 1366x768 usable / 1024x600 graceful), a focus-ring token, and the
px/pt sign convention written down so it cannot recur.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Releases the two fixes from the previous commit so the four consumers
(screen-locker, diet-guard, wake-alarm, testsAndMisc) can pin them: holds_grab
no longer steals the grab back off our own posted menus, and a raising tick
no longer permanently stops the recovery loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`_holds_grab` asked `grab_current() is self._root`, but our own transient
children take the grab for themselves: a posted Tk menu grabs the menu
window, so the test read "the grab was lost" and `grab_set_global()` took it
back a second later, off our own widget mid-interaction. That is what made
screen-locker's sport selector unusable while locked on 2026-07-26. The
predicate is now `grab_current() is not None` -- any window we own means the
lock still has pointer and keyboard -- and it is public, `holds_grab`, so an
embedder can ask the same question instead of re-deriving it. Anything that
does not resolve against our widget map (a Tcl-created `ttk.Combobox`
popdown, a stale name) raises `KeyError` and counts as lost: fail closed,
because losing a popdown beats believing we hold a grab we do not. The
blind spot for a second `tk.Tk()` reporting its root as "." is unchanged from
the old test, and now written down.
`_verify` and `_drain` scheduled the next tick *after* running it, so any
exception ended all re-assertion of coverage, grab and VT for the rest of the
lock -- the exact fail-open this module exists to prevent, in a file whose
docstring is a monotonicity proof. The reschedule moves into `finally`, and
the warnings only fire when the reason changes: these states can last the
whole lock, and a 1Hz journal stream is not the alternative to silence.
The pre-commit side: both subproject configs were written as if cwd were the
subproject, but pre-commit runs hooks from the git root -- which is ~/utils,
not gatelock. Every pushed run since at least 2026-07-11 has been red, and
for compounding reasons: pylint and bandit could not find their config,
bandit's tests exclusion never matched, the pytest hook ran with no config at
all, and with no `files:` filter each config linted the *whole* monorepo, so
gatelock's mypy was type-checking crdt-sync. All paths are now root-relative,
each config is scoped to its own subproject, and the pytest hook goes through
a shared `scripts/run_subproject_tests.sh` that supplies the missing `cd` and
fails loudly if the subproject is gone.
Scoping via `files:` has one sharp edge -- rename the directory and the regex
matches nothing, so every hook passes on zero files, green and useless. An
`always_run` scope-guard hook turns that silent pass into a failure.
bandit 1.7.10 threw inside its AST visitor on Python 3.14 and *skipped* every
file while still reporting zero issues; 1.9.4 actually scans. Codespell was
also flagging a real typo the noise had buried.
Housekeeping the above turned up: `gatelock/.github/` and `crdt-sync/.github/`
were dead -- GitHub only reads the root `.github/workflows`, which already has
all four jobs -- and the two subproject `.gitignore`s were byte-identical to
each other and subsumed by the new root one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every locker here already had a bounded way out -- screen-locker's sick
mode, diet-guard's log-a-meal -- except the wake alarm, which had only the
challenge itself. Rather than copy sick mode a third time, the mechanism
moves into gatelock so all three consumers share one implementation and one
set of budget rules.
`_escape.py` owns the parts that are policy-free: rolling 7/30/90-day
budgets, the justification draft and its validation, the escalating lockout
that doubles with each recent use, HMAC-signed history entries, and the
"last ten, played back to you" summary. App-specific policy (screen-locker's
commitment penalty and workout debt) stays in the consumer.
Entries that fail HMAC verification are KEPT rather than dropped. Dropping
them looks safer but is not: `verify_entry_hmac` also returns False when the
key is merely unreadable, so "discard what you cannot verify" would turn a
chmod on the key file into an unlimited escape hatch. They stay in the
budget count and are reported through a `tampered` counter instead.
278 tests, 100% branch coverage, no lint suppressions.
On 2026-07-25 the PC appeared frozen and needed an SSH rescue. Three defects
stacked:
1. DP-0 came up `connected` with a valid EDID and no mode/CRTC -- physically
dark, while X still reserved its 3840px slice of the root window.
2. diet-guard-gate and workout-locker each mapped an override-redirect window
spanning the WHOLE root (6400x1440+0+0), centring their controls on the
primary output -- the dark one. The escape UI was invisible.
3. They deadlocked on the X grab, and the loser logged "another app -- e.g. a
fullscreen game -- holds it". No game was running; the holder was the other
locker. That guess sent the diagnosis the wrong way for the whole outage.
The library had no concept of an individual output: setup() sized the window
from winfo_screenwidth(), the union bounding box of every output.
What changes:
* _outputs.py An output is LIVE only if connected AND has a mode/CRTC.
RandR (crtc==0 or mode==0) and an xrandr --query parser derive
that predicate independently; verified to agree exactly on the
real DP-0/HDMI-0 layout. Fails closed three distinct ways.
* _surfaces.py One window per live output at its own geometry, and the only
module allowed to create/move/destroy windows. Explicit
geometry replaces attributes(fullscreen=True), which an
override-redirect window is invisible to anyway.
* _detect.py RandR events + Tk <Configure> + xrandr polling, coalesced. The
RandR thread runs on a private X connection and may only call
queue.put -- Tk is not thread-safe.
* _recovery.py Re-asserts coverage, placement, grab and VT on a timer. Proven
monotonic: it may only ADD coverage or RE-ACQUIRE the grab. An
ast test asserts the file contains none of grab_release /
restore_vt_switching / close / destroy / quit / withdraw, while
disable_vt_switching and grab_set_global ARE present. Yanking
every cable therefore does not unlock anything.
* _arbiter.py N-app priority: wake_alarm > screen_locker > diet_guard.
Liveness is proved by flock-on-death -- no heartbeat, no PID
scan, no clock. A two-axis strength check stops rank ever
weakening the lock: an app stands down only for an incumbent
at least as strong on BOTH grab kind and VT disabling.
* _guards.py wait_for_x_server replaces wait_for_display and gates ONLY on
an X server existing. Output count must never gate arming:
zero live outputs means lock without showing, not decline to
lock. That inversion is what left the machine unlocked.
* _window.py Arms first, renders second. Names the real grab holder instead
of blaming a fullscreen game. Releases the arbiter on close so
the alarm -> workout handoff cannot strand the next app.
Two bugs found by running it, not reading it:
* acquire_holder() opened the holder file "w", which truncates at open() --
before the lock attempt. A losing contender erased the incumbent's claim, so
the app that most needed to know who held the screen found an empty file.
* tk.Toplevel over a MagicMock sends real tkinter into infinite mock recursion;
the suite hung instead of failing, and an unpatched setup() would have run
setxkbmap against the developer's own machine. conftest now has an autouse
hermetic fixture; the suite went from >120s to 0.7s.
235 tests, 100% branch coverage, ruff (select=ALL) and mypy --strict clean.
No suppressions added: Protocols replace Any for python-xlib, public attribute
access replaces ._data, and type-only Protocols live under TYPE_CHECKING.
Consumers still pin gatelock-v0.1.1 and are unmigrated; nothing ships until a
tag and a reinstall into system python.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves the design-system rules, frozen token table, and annotated
component references out of ~/.claude/skills/ and the two Claude
Artifacts into a proper subdir here, matching the existing
gatelock/crdt-sync/guard-lib pattern of one-subdir-per-shared-library.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirrors the palette rework already applied to diet-guard/dufs-cloud/
screen-locker. Adds `on_fill` (dark) for text drawn on a filled accent/
success/warning/danger surface -- near-white text under-contrasts on all
four (measured 2.2-3.6:1, below the 4.5:1 floor); dark text passes 5.8-9.7:1
on every one of them.
Bumps to 0.1.1 since this is a real release: the 3 consumer repos pin
gatelock to a git tag, not editable.
Make the shared client a superset of what todo's and diet_guard-app's local
GitHubClient copies provide, so every app can drop its copy and sync through
one client. canAccessRepo() is a lightweight connection test (bare repo GET,
never throws); deleteFile() resolves the file's own sha and no-ops when
absent. Mirrored on the Dart and Python sides. 90 Dart + 78 Python tests, 100%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019KwUCPESvE5CjCtmUFz8xQ
Both CRDT libs are now consumed (crdt_sync_dart: diet_guard app, workout_app,
phone_app, todo; crdt-sync: diet-guard, screen-locker). Reconcile the
sub-package READMEs' old standalone git URLs to the monorepo-subdirectory
form, and bump the crdt_sync examples to v0.2.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019KwUCPESvE5CjCtmUFz8xQ
crdt_sync_dart: new domain-agnostic LogStore -- an in-memory Log with a
reactive changes stream and upsert/delete(sticky tombstone)/replaceAll,
behind an injectable LogPersistence port -- plus logToJson/logFromJson.
FileLogPersistence (atomic temp-file-then-rename, generalizing diet_guard's
LogStorageService) lives behind a separate crdt_sync_io.dart entrypoint so
the core barrel stays pure Dart / web-safe.
crdt-sync (Python): mirror dump_log/load_log/read_log/write_log sharing the
same on-disk JSON format so a log written on one side parses on the other.
Load/save only -- the reactive store is a Dart/Flutter convenience with no
Python equivalent by design (Python consumers are headless sync ticks).
Querying stays app-side: a Record's fields are opaque to the library, so
filtering/sorting/search is the caller's job over LogStore.values.
Both packages bumped to 0.2.0. 83 Dart tests + 71 Python tests (100% branch
coverage) green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019KwUCPESvE5CjCtmUFz8xQ
Record.toJson() was writing the delete-clock field as deletedHlc while
the Python package's Record.to_dict() writes deleted_hlc -- an
undetected cross-language wire divergence: a tombstoned record synced
Python<->Dart would silently lose its delete clock on the receiving
side. Also widen syncLog's decode error handling from FormatException
alone to also catch TypeError, matching the Python side's
(ValueError, KeyError, TypeError) so a valid-JSON-but-wrong-shape push
from an incompatible writer is skipped per-device instead of aborting
the whole sync. Adds a fixture test shared verbatim with the Python
package's test suite so this class of divergence fails loudly going
forward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017McuA1nAi6jBT1EaS5BrVf
The Python and Dart test suites each only verified round-tripping through
their own encoder/decoder, so a Record.to_dict()/toJson() key mismatch
between the two (deleted_hlc vs deletedHlc) would have gone undetected
despite being the exact thing this shared library exists to prevent. Pin
one canonical fixture in both suites so a future divergence fails loudly
on at least one side. Also add a test for a valid-JSON-but-wrong-shape
remote push, exercising the full (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError) skip
path, not just JSON syntax errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017McuA1nAi6jBT1EaS5BrVf
Pure-Dart mirror of the Python crdt-sync package, module-for-module and
test-for-test, so the merge algorithm canonically agrees on both sides of
a sync between a Dart client and a Python one. No Flutter SDK dependency
(package:http only) per Workstream D's scoping decision (2026-07-04).
59 tests, clean dart analyze.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017McuA1nAi6jBT1EaS5BrVf
Extracted and generalized from diet_guard's existing tombstone-merge scheme
and GitHub Contents API client, extended with per-field HLC LWW so the same
library can also cover todo's mutable notes and wake_alarm's single-value
sync (Workstream D scoping decision, 2026-07-04). 100% branch coverage,
clean ruff/mypy/pylint/bandit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017McuA1nAi6jBT1EaS5BrVf
Extracts the chattr+bind-mount+systemd-watcher file-locking pattern (and a
new pacman PreTransaction package-block primitive) out of screen-locker and
steam-backlog-enforcer into a standalone, config-driven library so both
projects (and steam-backlog-enforcer's new block-gaming feature) can share
one implementation instead of maintaining parallel copies.
- guardctl: CLI entry point (file-guard, package-block subcommands)
- lib/file_guard.sh: chattr +i / bind-mount / systemd-path-watcher / pacman
hook enforcement for a single target file, keyed by /etc/guard-lib/targets
config; includes `sync` (adopt current content as canonical - for a
caller's own legitimate edit) distinct from `pacman-relock` (revert drift)
- lib/package_block.sh: time-locked pacman PreTransaction hook that refuses
to (re)install a given package while a lock file's `until` timestamp is in
the future; supports --bind-mount to compose with file-guard on the same
lock file
- pacman-hooks/: the installed hook scripts + .hook definitions
- systemd/: guard-file@.path/.service watcher units, guard-bind-mount@.service
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AFNiYQQgSLAkiBXswyimPq
Extracted from wake_alarm, screen-locker, and diet_guard, which each
independently implemented fullscreen-lock, input-grab, VT-disable, and
HMAC-signed-state mechanics at different levels of maturity (the HMAC
module was already a hand-copied duplicate between two of them).
LockConfig exposes overrideredirect/grab/disable_vt as independent
axes so one LockWindow can reproduce all three projects' exact prior
behavior, plus screen-locker's confirmed upgrade to retry-forever grab.
