sync_settings_ui 0.7.1: crdt_sync 0.13.1

Todo: fda71ed1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/workflows/focus-project-precommit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: focus-project pre-commit
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as focus_project: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-precommit.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-precommit.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  pre-commit:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+      # Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
+      # env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
+      # own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
+      # python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
+      # packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
+      # three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
+      # The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
+      # it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
+      - name: Install pre-commit
+        run: |
+          pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' focus_project/requirements.txt)"
+
+      # Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
+      # hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
+      # package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
+      # from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
+      # invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
+      # missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
+          key: >-
+            pre-commit-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('focus_project/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          # Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
+          # event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
+          # exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
+          # again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
+          # repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
+          # than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
+          # exact key after a prefix-only hit.
+          restore-keys: pre-commit-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      # mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
+      # without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
+      # warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
+      # the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
+      # interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
+      # what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
+      # github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
+      # 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
+      # the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: .mypy_cache
+          key: >-
+            mypy-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('focus_project/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          restore-keys: mypy-focus-project-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      - name: Run the hooks
+        run: >-
+          pre-commit run --config focus_project/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+          --all-files --show-diff-on-failure

.github/workflows/focus-project-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: focus-project tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as focus_project: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-tests.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['focus_project/**', '.github/workflows/focus-project-tests.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: focus_project
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+          cache: pip
+          cache-dependency-path: focus_project/requirements.txt
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
+
+      - name: Run tests with coverage
+        run: python -m pytest -v

.github/workflows/google-account-token-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+name: google_account_token tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['google_account_token/**']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['google_account_token/**']
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: google_account_token
+
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Flutter
+        uses: subosito/flutter-action@v2
+        with:
+          channel: stable
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: flutter pub get
+
+      - name: Analyze
+        run: flutter analyze
+
+      - name: Run tests with coverage
+        run: flutter test --coverage
+
+      - name: Enforce 100% line coverage
+        run: scripts/check_coverage.sh coverage/lcov.info 100

.github/workflows/holds-precommit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: holds pre-commit
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as holds: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-precommit.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-precommit.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  pre-commit:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+      # Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
+      # env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
+      # own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
+      # python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
+      # packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
+      # three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
+      # The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
+      # it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
+      - name: Install pre-commit
+        run: |
+          pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' holds/requirements.txt)"
+
+      # Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
+      # hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
+      # package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
+      # from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
+      # invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
+      # missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
+          key: >-
+            pre-commit-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('holds/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          # Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
+          # event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
+          # exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
+          # again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
+          # repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
+          # than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
+          # exact key after a prefix-only hit.
+          restore-keys: pre-commit-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      # mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
+      # without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
+      # warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
+      # the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
+      # interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
+      # what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
+      # github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
+      # 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
+      # the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: .mypy_cache
+          key: >-
+            mypy-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('holds/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          restore-keys: mypy-holds-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      - name: Run the hooks
+        run: >-
+          pre-commit run --config holds/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+          --all-files --show-diff-on-failure

.github/workflows/holds-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: holds tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as holds: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-tests.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['holds/**', '.github/workflows/holds-tests.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: holds
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+          cache: pip
+          cache-dependency-path: holds/requirements.txt
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
+
+      - name: Run tests with coverage
+        run: python -m pytest -v

.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-precommit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: leetcode-coach pre-commit
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as leetcode_coach: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-precommit.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-precommit.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  pre-commit:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+      # Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
+      # env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
+      # own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
+      # python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
+      # packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
+      # three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
+      # The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
+      # it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
+      - name: Install pre-commit
+        run: |
+          pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' leetcode_coach/requirements.txt)"
+
+      # Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
+      # hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
+      # package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
+      # from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
+      # invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
+      # missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
+          key: >-
+            pre-commit-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('leetcode_coach/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          # Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
+          # event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
+          # exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
+          # again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
+          # repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
+          # than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
+          # exact key after a prefix-only hit.
+          restore-keys: pre-commit-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      # mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
+      # without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
+      # warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
+      # the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
+      # interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
+      # what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
+      # github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
+      # 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
+      # the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: .mypy_cache
+          key: >-
+            mypy-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('leetcode_coach/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          restore-keys: mypy-leetcode-coach-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      - name: Run the hooks
+        run: >-
+          pre-commit run --config leetcode_coach/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+          --all-files --show-diff-on-failure

.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: leetcode-coach tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as leetcode_coach: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-tests.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['leetcode_coach/**', '.github/workflows/leetcode-coach-tests.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: leetcode_coach
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+          cache: pip
+          cache-dependency-path: leetcode_coach/requirements.txt
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
+
+      - name: Run tests with coverage
+        run: python -m pytest -v

.github/workflows/md-naming.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: md-naming
 
-# The four markdown namespaces, enforced on push as well as at commit time.
+# The markdown namespaces (README / CLAUDE* / DOCS*, no TODO*), enforced on push as well as at commit time.
 # The local pre-commit hook can be skipped (a fresh clone that never ran
 # `pre-commit install` has no hooks at all), so the convention needs a second
 # gate that no one can forget to install.
@@ -31,8 +31,3 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Enforce the naming convention
         run: bash .utils/scripts/check_md_naming.sh --all
-
-      # Warns only: no machine can prove a task is finished, so an old TODO
-      # gets a nudge, never a failure.
-      - name: Warn about stale TODOs
-        run: PYTHONPATH=.utils python3 .utils/md_naming/stale.py

.github/workflows/music-theory-tests.yml

@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ jobs:
         run: pip install -r requirements.txt
 
       - name: Run tests with coverage
-        run: python -m pytest -v
+        run: python -m pytest -v --cov=music_theory

.github/workflows/omniroute_offload-precommit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: omniroute_offload pre-commit
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as omniroute_offload: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['omniroute_offload/**', '.github/workflows/omniroute_offload-precommit.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['omniroute_offload/**', '.github/workflows/omniroute_offload-precommit.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  pre-commit:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+      # Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
+      # env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
+      # own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
+      # python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
+      # packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
+      # three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
+      # The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
+      # it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
+      - name: Install pre-commit
+        run: |
+          pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' omniroute_offload/requirements.txt)"
+
+      # Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
+      # hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
+      # package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
+      # from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
+      # invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
+      # missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
+          key: >-
+            pre-commit-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('omniroute_offload/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          # Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
+          # event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
+          # exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
+          # again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
+          # repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
+          # than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
+          # exact key after a prefix-only hit.
+          restore-keys: pre-commit-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      # mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
+      # without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
+      # warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
+      # the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
+      # interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
+      # what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
+      # github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
+      # 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
+      # the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: .mypy_cache
+          key: >-
+            mypy-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('omniroute_offload/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          restore-keys: mypy-omniroute_offload-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      - name: Run the hooks
+        run: >-
+          pre-commit run --config omniroute_offload/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+          --all-files --show-diff-on-failure

.github/workflows/palette-drift.yml

@@ -31,3 +31,8 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Categorical ramp still passes its constraints
         run: python3 unified-design-system/scripts/ramp_check.py
+
+      # Spacing, radius, type, shadow and motion: palette_check.py parses
+      # hex only, so these scales were unguarded until structural_check.py.
+      - name: Structural scales agree across all token sources
+        run: python3 unified-design-system/scripts/structural_check.py

.github/workflows/sql-drills-precommit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: sql-drills pre-commit
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as sql_drills: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-precommit.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-precommit.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  pre-commit:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+      # Only pre-commit itself. Every linting hook runs in its own isolated
+      # env -- ruff, mypy, pylint, bandit and codespell each come from their
+      # own repo+rev, and the local hooks need nothing beyond bash and
+      # python3 -- so installing the full requirements.txt spent 9s a run on
+      # packages no pre-commit-stage hook imports. Verified by running all
+      # three configs green in a venv holding pre-commit and nothing else.
+      # The pin is read out of requirements.txt rather than repeated here, so
+      # it cannot drift from what the dependency-freshness gate governs.
+      - name: Install pre-commit
+        run: |
+          pip install "$(grep '^pre-commit==' sql_drills/requirements.txt)"
+
+      # Keyed on THIS package's config. pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 caches on
+      # hashFiles('.pre-commit-config.yaml') -- the repo ROOT's -- so all three
+      # package jobs shared one key, raced to overwrite it with hook sets built
+      # from four different configs, and editing a per-package config did not
+      # invalidate it. The cache was therefore silently wrong rather than
+      # missing, and the hooks reinstalled from scratch on every run (38-49s).
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: ~/.cache/pre-commit
+          key: >-
+            pre-commit-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('sql_drills/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          # Prefix fallback, or this fix would evaporate on the very
+          # event that motivated it: bumping a hook rev changes the
+          # exact key, and a total miss means reinstalling every hook
+          # again. pre-commit's store is keyed internally by hook
+          # repo+rev, so a superseded entry is ignored disk rather
+          # than a wrong hook, and cache still re-saves under the new
+          # exact key after a prefix-only hit.
+          restore-keys: pre-commit-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      # mypy re-analyses the stdlib and every third-party stub from scratch
+      # without this, which measured 10s of the hook step in CI against 0.25s
+      # warm locally -- a 19MB cache dir does the whole difference. Keyed on
+      # the config, not the sources: mypy's own cache metadata records the
+      # interpreter, the flag set and a hash per source file, so it re-checks
+      # what changed and cannot pass stale code. Deliberately NOT keyed on
+      # github.sha -- that re-saves 19MB x3 every commit and would evict the
+      # 68MB hook caches under the repo's 10GB LRU budget. A fixed key keeps
+      # the expensive part, the dependency analysis, which is what costs 10s.
+      - uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: .mypy_cache
+          key: >-
+            mypy-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-${{
+            hashFiles('sql_drills/.pre-commit-config.yaml') }}
+          restore-keys: mypy-sql-drills-${{ env.pythonLocation }}-
+      - name: Run the hooks
+        run: >-
+          pre-commit run --config sql_drills/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+          --all-files --show-diff-on-failure

.github/workflows/sql-drills-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: sql-drills tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # The workflow's own file counts as sql_drills: editing only this file would
+    # otherwise trigger nothing, so a fix to the job itself could never prove
+    # itself.
+    paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-tests.yml']
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths: ['sql_drills/**', '.github/workflows/sql-drills-tests.yml']
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: sql_drills
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.x"
+          cache: pip
+          cache-dependency-path: sql_drills/requirements.txt
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install --no-deps -e .
+
+      - name: Run tests with coverage
+        run: python -m pytest -v

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 # linters, and carry this same hook so committing with one of those configs is
 # gated too. This root config is what `pre-commit install` wires up, and it is
 # the only one that covers the subprojects without a config of their own
-# (aur-publish/, guard-lib/, crdt_sync_dart/, file_length/, ...).
+# (guard-lib/, crdt_sync_dart/, file_length/, ...).
 #
 # The path is repo-relative on purpose. pre-commit always runs hooks from the
 # git root, so this resolves the same locally and on a CI runner -- an absolute
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ repos:
         language: system
         pass_filenames: true
 
-      # Four markdown namespaces (README / CLAUDE* / DOCS* / TODO*), plus the
-      # rule that a TODO carries "REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH" and nothing else may.
+      # Three markdown namespaces (README / CLAUDE* / DOCS*); TODO*.md is banned
+      # (tasks live in the todo app).
       # Shared gate in ~/src/utils owns the namespaces and the exemption list, so
       # one repo's idea of a valid name cannot drift from every other repo's.
       # Since the 2026-09-11 reorganisation ~ holds eleven visible entries and
@@ -66,9 +66,14 @@ repos:
       # answer and passes with a loud banner; `--no-verify` is banned here, so
       # a hook that hard-failed on a flaky connection would leave no way to
       # commit at all. CI, always online, is the strict authority.
+      #
+      # Scoped to manifests this branch changed (vs merge-base with main), so
+      # `--all-files` asks "did THIS change leave a stale pin?" and not "is
+      # every project in the monorepo current?". CI `--all --strict` keeps
+      # the repo-wide answer. See scripts/dep_freshness_changed.sh.
       - id: dependency-freshness
         name: dependencies on newest stable
-        entry: bash scripts/check_dependency_freshness.sh
+        entry: bash scripts/dep_freshness_changed.sh
         language: system
         pass_filenames: true
         files: >-

.pre-commit-hooks.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Hooks other repos consume with `repo: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils`.
+# All three are post-* stages, so each clone must install them (see
+# todo_hooks/README.md). They never fail a git operation: the work has
+# already happened, so server/gh trouble prints one warning and exits 0.
+- id: todo-closer
+  name: close Todo trailer tasks
+  entry: scripts/todo_hooks.sh closer
+  language: script
+  stages: [post-commit]
+  always_run: true
+  pass_filenames: false
+
+- id: todo-import-pr-merge
+  name: import PR Todo sections (pull)
+  entry: scripts/todo_hooks.sh import-pr post-merge
+  language: script
+  stages: [post-merge]
+  always_run: true
+  pass_filenames: false
+
+- id: todo-import-pr-rewrite
+  name: import PR Todo sections (pull --rebase)
+  entry: scripts/todo_hooks.sh import-pr post-rewrite
+  language: script
+  stages: [post-rewrite]
+  always_run: true
+  pass_filenames: false

CLAUDE.md

@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ overwrite it with `repo_contract/templates/check_repo_contract.shim.sh`.
 - lint: `ruff check agent_ready coverage_gaps flutter_web_drive repo_contract`
 - coverage: `PYTHONPATH=. python -m pytest -q agent_ready/tests flutter_web_drive/tests repo_contract/tests unified-design-system/tests --cov=agent_ready --cov=flutter_web_drive --cov=repo_contract --cov=conformance --cov=conformance_diff --cov-branch --cov-report=xml --cov-fail-under=100`
 - coverage-gaps: `coverage-gaps coverage.xml`
+- deploy: `git -C ~/src/utils pull --ff-only && ~/src/utils/scripts/deploy.sh` (installs the sickdays CLI + launcher from the live checkout, then exits 1 unless every released library's version tag is on origin and matches HEAD and the live `sickdays` runs the text-free checkout; `--verify-only` for the health check alone)

README.md

@@ -42,6 +42,21 @@ dependencies:
       path: sync_settings_ui
 ```
 
+## google_account_token/
+
+Flutter plugin (Android only; other platforms return null): one-tap Google ID
+token via `AccountManager`, replacing `google_sign_in` in the sync apps.
+
+Consume via:
+```yaml
+dependencies:
+  google_account_token:
+    git:
+      url: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils
+      ref: google_account_token-v0.1.0
+      path: google_account_token
+```
+
 ## crdt-sync/
 
 Python CRDT sync library (package: `crdt_sync`, not published to PyPI). Same

TODO-crdt-e2e-encryption.md

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-# Encrypt crdt_sync payloads end to end
-
-## what
-Firebase RTDB stores every crdt_sync record in plaintext, so Google can read
-all app data. Encrypt record payloads on the device before push and decrypt
-after pull, so RTDB stays a blind relay (the "ownership" meaning of
-local-first: hologram.page/blog/local-first-means-three-different-things).
-
-## open decisions (ask kuhy before coding)
-- Key source: derived from the shared crdt-sync password (Argon2id) or a
-  random key stored in the OS keystore and copied to new devices.
-- Migration: re-encrypt existing logs in place, or new prefix + one-time copy.
-- Scope: payload only (keep HLC/ids clear for merge) or whole record.
-- diet_guard's `export_keys` document (random data-export keys, synced as a
-  keyring) sits in plaintext in RTDB, so Firebase can read them: it must move
-  under E2E too, with its key source decided here first.
-- tutor uses its own RTDB client (`~/src/tutor/app/lib/sync/rtdb_client.dart`):
-  in or out of scope.
-
-## steps
-1. Add an encrypt/decrypt seam in `crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/remote_store.dart`
-   (push/pull), AEAD (XChaCha20-Poly1305), version byte per record.
-2. Property test: decrypt(encrypt(r)) == r; merge result identical with and
-   without encryption (see property-and-differential-tests skill).
-3. Read path accepts plaintext and v1 records during migration.
-4. Roll out app by app (todo first), bump pins, verify on the phone.
-
-## done
-`dart test` in `crdt_sync_dart` passes, and
-`firebase database:get /<prefix> | grep -c '"title"'` returns 0 for every
-migrated app.
-
-## verify
-Pixel 6a + desktop todo: edit on one, see it on the other; raw RTDB JSON shows
-only ciphertext.
-
-## read first
-- `crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/sync.dart`, `log.dart`, `remote_store.dart`
-- `crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/bootstrap.dart`
-
-REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH

TODO-pylint-fail-under-10.md

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-# TODO — pylint `--fail-under=10` everywhere, and clear what that surfaces
-
-REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH
-
-## what
-
-Ten pylint hooks across six repos still pass at `--fail-under=8.0`, which
-permanently tolerates two points of lint debt and lets a score *regress* from
-9.9 to 8.1 without failing anything. Move every one to `10`, and fix what
-that surfaces. Five other sites already run at `10`, so this is adopting an
-existing standard, not inventing one.
-
-## the ten sites, exact
-
-Measured 2026-09-12. "Score now" is that package's current rating under its
-own config, tests included.
-
-| Repo / package | Site | Score now |
-|---|---|---|
-| `control-panel` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:159` | 8.53 |
-| `leetcode-guard` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:112` | 8.71 |
-| `screen-locker` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:121` | 9.85 |
-| `screen-locker` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:140` | (2nd pylint hook) |
-| `steam-backlog-enforcer` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:124` | 8.76 |
-| `testsAndMisc/meta` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:194` | 8.77 |
-| `utils/crdt-sync` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:111` | 9.59 |
-| `utils/freedays` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:109` | 8.55 |
-| `utils/gatelock` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:109` | 9.18 |
-| `utils/music_theory` | `.pre-commit-config.yaml:113` | 8.54 |
-
-`screen-locker` has **two** pylint hooks; both need the bump or the second one
-silently keeps the old bar.
-
-Already at `10` — do not touch, these are the reference:
-`build-your-x`, `diet-guard`, `testsAndMisc` (root config),
-`wake-alarm`, `WUT_Computer_Science/.../translator/.pylintrc`.
-
-## why the scores look bad, and why that is misleading
-
-Every one of these configs runs `enable = "all"` with `disable = []` — the
-strictest pylint setting there is, including checks that are off by default.
-The raw findings are dominated by **test-file idioms**, not source defects.
-Measured on the four `utils` packages:
-
-```
-crdt-sync     54 protected-access, 50 redefined-outer-name, 18 duplicate-code
-freedays     100 missing-function-docstring, 14 implicit-booleaness
-gatelock     147 redefined-outer-name, 142 protected-access
-music_theory 112 missing-function-docstring, 14 missing-module-docstring
-```
-
-`redefined-outer-name` at that volume is pytest fixtures. `protected-access`
-is tests reaching into internals on purpose. Neither is a defect.
-
-**The repos already at 10 solved this and wrote down why.** From
-`wake-alarm/pyproject.toml`, verbatim:
-
-> `ignore = [".venv", "__pycache__", "tests"]` — "tests" is a basename match:
-> test suites intentionally use patterns (protected-access, magic-value
-> comparisons) that don't apply to source code, matching testsAndMisc's
-> pylint scope (tests are linted by ruff, not pylint there either).
-
-So the fleet standard is: **pylint grades source, ruff grades tests.** The ten
-sites above are the outliers that never adopted it. Their `ruff` config
-already carries the equivalent test exemptions
-(`"**/tests/**/*.py" = ["ARG", "D", "PLC0415", "PLR2004", "S101", "SLF001"]`),
-so tests stay linted — by the tool that has the right rules for them.
-
-## what is actually left after adopting the fleet config
-
-Measured: `pylint --ignore=.venv,__pycache__,tests` plus wake-alarm's
-three-item `disable` list, run over source files only.
-
-| Package | Score | Remaining findings |
-|---|---|---|
-| `crdt-sync` | 9.93 | 5 wrong-import-position, 3 duplicate-code, 1 too-many-locals, 1 invalid-name |
-| `freedays` | 9.63 | 3 import-error, 1 broad-exception-caught |
-| `gatelock` | 9.88 | 6 missing-function-docstring, 4 wrong-import-position, 3 too-many-instance-attributes, 3 import-outside-toplevel, 2 broad-exception-caught, 1 each too-many-arguments / invalid-name / duplicate-code / disallowed-name / chained-comparison |
-| `music_theory` | 9.42 | 10 import-error |
-
-That is ~47 real findings across four packages, not the ~600 the raw run
-suggests. **`import-error` is almost certainly config, not code**: every repo
-already at 10 carries an `init-hook` the 8.0 repos lack —
-
-```toml
-init-hook = "import sys; sys.path.insert(0, '.')"
-```
-
-Try that first on `music_theory` and `freedays` before editing any import.
-
-## must
-
-- Every site at `--fail-under=10`. No `9.5`, no per-repo exception.
-- Adopt the reference config from `wake-alarm` / `diet-guard`: the `tests`
-  basename ignore, the `init-hook`, and only then the residue fixes.
-- Fix findings in source. Prefer the fix to the disable, every time.
-- must not: add a `# pylint: disable=` comment, or extend `disable = [...]`
-  beyond wake-alarm's three implicit-booleaness entries, **without asking
-  kuhy first — every time, per `memories/code-quality.md`.** All seven
-  "unavoidable" disables in a past konbini-67 session were reverted.
-- must not: exclude a source file from pylint to raise the score, or drop
-  `enable = "all"`.
-- must not: touch the five sites already at `10`.
-- optional: `duplicate-code` findings may be genuine shared-code candidates
-  for `utils`. Note them, do not force a refactor to hit the number.
-
-## done
-
-Both commands, from `~`:
-
-```bash
-# 1. no site left below 10 (cov-fail-under is coverage, not pylint)
-! grep -rn --include=.pre-commit-config.yaml --include=.pylintrc \
-    -E 'fail-under=(8|9)' ~/src ~/praca_magisterska 2>/dev/null \
-  | grep -v cov-fail-under
-
-# 2. every one of the nine packages passes its own pylint hook
-for d in ~/src/control-panel ~/src/leetcode-guard ~/src/screen-locker \
-         ~/src/steam-backlog-enforcer ~/src/testsAndMisc/meta \
-         ~/src/utils/crdt-sync ~/src/utils/freedays \
-         ~/src/utils/gatelock ~/src/utils/music_theory; do
-  (cd "$d" && pre-commit run pylint --all-files) || echo "FAIL $d"
-done
-```
-
-Command 1 prints nothing and exits 0; command 2 prints no `FAIL` line.
-
-## verify
-
-Desktop. Per repo, `pre-commit run --all-files` must be green — not just the
-pylint hook, since a fix that satisfies pylint can break `ruff`, `mypy` or the
-250-line cap. Then the test suite: these are behaviour-affecting edits
-(`broad-exception-caught` and `import-outside-toplevel` fixes especially), and
-every one of these packages holds a 100% coverage bar.
-
-`utils` and `testsAndMisc` each have CI; push and confirm green rather than
-trusting the local run. `gatelock`'s Tk suite is flaky on a live X session —
-run it under `xvfb-run -a` and compare against a baseline worktree before
-blaming a change for a failure.
-
-## read first
-
-- `~/src/wake-alarm/pyproject.toml` — `[tool.pylint]`, the reference config.
-  `diet-guard` is byte-similar; `build-your-x` also ignores `conftest.py`.
-- `~/.claude/memories/code-quality.md` — the suppression rule that governs
-  every `disable` decision in this task.
-- `~/src/utils/rules/` is not involved; this is not a dependency change.
-
-Each repo is its own git repo: commit per repo, work on `main`, stage
-narrowly. `utils` additionally runs the shared `md-naming` and file-length
-gates, so delete this file in that repo's final commit.
-
-REMOVE ME AFTER FINISH

aur-publish/README.md

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-# aur-publish
-
-Hands-off publishing of kuhy's Flutter apps to the AUR.
-
-```bash
-~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh              # wait for registration, then publish
-~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh --dry-run    # everything except the push
-~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh --skip-wait  # account already works
-~/src/utils/aur-publish/publish.sh --only habit-stack
-```
-
-## What it does
-
-1. Polls `/register` until AUR signup reopens, opens it in a browser and
-   prints the SSH key to paste. **Signup is the only manual step** — it
-   requires email confirmation.
-2. Waits for `ssh aur@aur.archlinux.org` to authenticate.
-3. Then, unattended, per package: resolve the newest `vX.Y.Z` tag → set
-   `pkgver` → `updpkgsums` → `makepkg -C` → `namcap` → AUR rule check →
-   `pacman -U` → launch check → `.SRCINFO` → commit → push.
-
-Every package is built, installed and **launched** before it is pushed, so a
-broken package cannot reach the AUR. A package failing any gate is skipped and
-reported; the others still publish. Safe to re-run.
-
-## anubis_gate.py
-
-The AUR sits behind [Anubis](https://anubis.techaro.lol/), which answers HTML
-requests with a proof-of-work challenge page carrying **HTTP 200**. A plain
-`curl` therefore reports 200 for a page that is actually unreachable — which is
-exactly how "is registration back?" gets answered wrong. This module solves the
-challenge and reports the status of the *real* page behind it.
-
-```bash
-python3 anubis_gate.py /register     # prints the true status code
-```
-
-## AUR rules enforced before pushing
-
-The AUR does not review uploads, but per the submission guidelines "packages
-that violate the rules may be deleted without warning". `check_aur_rules()`
-blocks a push on the mechanically checkable ones: `# Maintainer:` line,
-`x86_64` in `arch`, no `replaces=` (reserved for renames — use `conflicts`),
-not already in an official repo, `pkgdesc`/`url`/`license` present, and
-`.SRCINFO` matching the PKGBUILD.

aur-publish/anubis_gate.py

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-"""Fetch an AUR URL from behind the Anubis anti-bot gate.
-
-The AUR sits behind Anubis (https://anubis.techaro.lol/), which answers every
-HTML request with a proof-of-work challenge page carrying HTTP **200**. A bare
-`curl` therefore reports 200 for a page that is actually unreachable, which is
-exactly how "is /register back up?" gets answered wrong.
-
-This module solves the challenge and reports the status of the *real* page
-behind it, so the caller can distinguish:
-
-  * 200  -> genuinely available
-  * 503  -> reached the site; that endpoint is disabled server-side
-  * other-> whatever the app actually said
-
-Exit codes mirror the HTTP status so shell callers can branch on them:
-0 for 200, 1 for anything else, 2 for a local/transport failure.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import hashlib
-import http.cookiejar
-import json
-import re
-import sys
-import time
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-
-BASE = "https://aur.archlinux.org"
-UA = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"
-CHALLENGE_RE = re.compile(
-    r'<script id="anubis_challenge" type="application/json">(.*?)</script>',
-    re.S,
-)
-PASS_PATH = "/.within.website/x/cmd/anubis/api/pass-challenge"
-# A solve at difficulty 4 takes ~0.01s; this ceiling only guards a server-side
-# difficulty spike, so the poller degrades instead of spinning forever.
-MAX_NONCE = 50_000_000
-
-
-class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
-    """Keep redirects visible instead of silently following them."""
-
-    def redirect_request(self, *_args, **_kwargs):  # noqa: D102 - see class doc
-        return None
-
-
-def _opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
-    jar = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
-    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
-        urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(jar), _NoRedirect
-    )
-    opener.addheaders = [
-        ("User-Agent", UA),
-        ("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8"),
-    ]
-    return opener
-
-
-def _solve(random_data: str, difficulty: int) -> tuple[int, str, float]:
-    """Find a nonce whose sha256 digest starts with `difficulty` zero hex chars."""
-    prefix = "0" * difficulty
-    started = time.time()
-    for nonce in range(MAX_NONCE):
-        digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{random_data}{nonce}".encode()).hexdigest()
-        if digest.startswith(prefix):
-            return nonce, digest, time.time() - started
-    raise RuntimeError(f"no nonce found below {MAX_NONCE} at difficulty {difficulty}")
-
-
-def fetch(path: str, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, str]:
-    """Return (status, body) for `path`, clearing Anubis first if challenged."""
-    opener = _opener()
-    url = f"{BASE}{path}"
-
-    try:
-        with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
-            body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
-            status = resp.status
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        return exc.code, exc.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
-
-    match = CHALLENGE_RE.search(body)
-    if not match:
-        return status, body
-
-    challenge = json.loads(match.group(1))["challenge"]
-    nonce, digest, elapsed = _solve(
-        challenge["randomData"], int(challenge["difficulty"])
-    )
-    query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
-        {
-            "id": challenge["id"],
-            "response": digest,
-            "nonce": str(nonce),
-            "redir": path,
-            "elapsedTime": str(int(elapsed * 1000)),
-        }
-    )
-    try:
-        opener.open(f"{BASE}{PASS_PATH}?{query}", timeout=timeout)
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError:
-        # A redirect or non-2xx here is fine; what matters is the cookie the
-        # opener's jar just captured.
-        pass
-
-    try:
-        with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
-            return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        return exc.code, exc.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
-    parser.add_argument("path", help="AUR path, e.g. /register")
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "--print-body", action="store_true", help="write the page body to stdout"
-    )
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-
-    try:
-        status, body = fetch(args.path)
-    except (urllib.error.URLError, RuntimeError, TimeoutError) as exc:
-        print(f"transport error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 2
-
-    print(status)
-    if args.print_body:
-        sys.stdout.write(body)
-    return 0 if status == 200 else 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    sys.exit(main())

aur-publish/lib/aur_publish_one.sh

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-# ============================================================================
-# Building, verifying and pushing one package to the AUR.
-#
-# Sourced by publish.sh, never executed: these functions read the readonly
-# config (AUR_HOST, AUR_ROOT, DRY_RUN, PUBLISHED, FAILED) that the entry script declares, and
-# a `readonly` re-run inside a twice-sourced lib would abort under `set -e`.
-# ============================================================================
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-publish_one() {
-    local pkg="$1" repo="$2" wrapper="$3" binary="$4" expected="$5"
-    local dir="$AUR_ROOT/$pkg"
-    local version
-
-    log "$pkg"
-
-    [[ -d "$repo" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no repo at $repo"; return 1; }
-    [[ -f "$dir/PKGBUILD" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no PKGBUILD at $dir"; return 1; }
-
-    version="$(newest_tag "$repo")"
-    [[ -n "$version" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no vX.Y.Z tag on the remote"; return 1; }
-    info "newest release tag: v$version"
-
-    cd "$dir"
-    sed -i -E "s/^pkgver=.*/pkgver=$version/" PKGBUILD
-    # The tarball for a tag contains the PKGBUILD, so the checksum can only be
-    # computed after the tag exists — never committed ahead of time.
-    updpkgsums >/dev/null 2>&1 || { warn "$pkg: updpkgsums failed (tag missing?)"; return 1; }
-
-    info "building"
-    if ! env PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/bin makepkg -Cf --noconfirm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        warn "$pkg: makepkg failed"
-        return 1
-    fi
-
-    local built
-    built="$(find . -maxdepth 1 -name "$pkg-$version-*.pkg.tar.zst" | head -1)"
-    [[ -n "$built" ]] || { warn "$pkg: no package produced"; return 1; }
-
-    # namcap's "ELF files outside of a valid path ('opt/')" is a false positive
-    # for /opt-installed apps, so only genuinely new errors are worth failing on.
-    local findings
-    findings="$(namcap "$built" 2>&1 | grep -E ' E: ' | grep -v "outside of a valid path" || true)"
-    if [[ -n "$findings" ]]; then
-        warn "$pkg: namcap errors:"
-        printf '      %s\n' "$findings"
-        return 1
-    fi
-
-    info "installing and launching"
-    sudo pacman -U --noconfirm "$built" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-        || { warn "$pkg: pacman -U failed"; return 1; }
-    verify_installed "$binary" "$expected" "$wrapper" || { warn "$pkg: launch check failed"; return 1; }
-
-    # Generated before the rule check, which verifies it matches the PKGBUILD.
-    makepkg --printsrcinfo > .SRCINFO
-    check_aur_rules "$pkg" || return 1
-
-    # The AUR repo is a separate remote living alongside the build dir; adding
-    # it here (rather than cloning into a fresh path) keeps the verified
-    # PKGBUILD and the thing being pushed byte-identical.
-    if [[ ! -d .git ]]; then
-        git init -q -b master .
-        git remote add origin "ssh://aur@$AUR_HOST/$pkg.git"
-    fi
-    git remote get-url origin >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-        || git remote add origin "ssh://aur@$AUR_HOST/$pkg.git"
-
-    # Fetch first: an existing AUR package must be built on, not overwritten.
-    if git fetch -q origin master 2>/dev/null; then
-        git reset -q --soft FETCH_HEAD 2>/dev/null || true
-    fi
-
-    cat > .gitignore <<'EOF'
-# Build products; the AUR tracks only the recipe.
-*.pkg.tar.zst
-*.tar.gz
-src/
-pkg/
-EOF
-
-    git add PKGBUILD .SRCINFO .gitignore
-    if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-        info "already up to date on the AUR; nothing to push"
-        PUBLISHED+=("$pkg v$version (unchanged)")
-        return 0
-    fi
-
-    git -c user.name='Krzysztof Rudnicki' \
-        -c user.email='krzysztofrudnicki0@gmail.com' \
-        commit -q -m "$pkg $version-1"
-
-    if ((DRY_RUN)); then
-        info "DRY RUN — not pushing"
-        PUBLISHED+=("$pkg v$version (dry run)")
-        return 0
-    fi
-
-    info "pushing to the AUR"
-    git push -q origin master 2>&1 | tail -3 || { warn "$pkg: push failed"; return 1; }
-    PUBLISHED+=("$pkg v$version")
-    return 0
-}
-

aur-publish/lib/aur_registration.sh

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-# ============================================================================
-# Waiting for AUR registration and SSH access to come up.
-#
-# Sourced by publish.sh, never executed: these functions read the readonly
-# config (AUR_HOST, SSH_KEY, GATE, POLL_SECONDS) that the entry script declares, and
-# a `readonly` re-run inside a twice-sourced lib would abort under `set -e`.
-# ============================================================================
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-register_status() {
-    python3 "$GATE" /register 2>/dev/null | head -1
-}
-
-open_browser() {
-    local url="$1"
-    local browser
-    for browser in xdg-open thorium-browser chromium google-chrome-stable firefox librewolf; do
-        if command -v "$browser" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            "$browser" "$url" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
-            info "Opened $url in $browser"
-            return 0
-        fi
-    done
-    warn "No browser found; open this yourself: $url"
-}
-
-ensure_key() {
-    if [[ ! -f "$SSH_KEY" ]]; then
-        log "Generating an AUR SSH key (none at $SSH_KEY)"
-        ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f "$SSH_KEY" -N '' -C 'kuhy@aur'
-    fi
-    if ! grep -q "Host $AUR_HOST" "$HOME/.ssh/config" 2>/dev/null; then
-        log "Adding $AUR_HOST to ~/.ssh/config"
-        mkdir -p "$HOME/.ssh"
-        cat >> "$HOME/.ssh/config" <<EOF
-
-# AUR uses a dedicated key so it stays separate from the GitHub identity.
-Host $AUR_HOST
-    User aur
-    IdentityFile $SSH_KEY
-    IdentitiesOnly yes
-EOF
-        chmod 600 "$HOME/.ssh/config"
-    fi
-}
-
-ssh_works() {
-    # The AUR refuses interactive shells; "Interactive shell is disabled" on a
-    # successful key auth is the success signal, not an error.
-    ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
-        -o ConnectTimeout=15 "aur@$AUR_HOST" help 2>&1 |
-        grep -qiE 'interactive shell is disabled|Welcome to AUR'
-}
-
-wait_for_registration() {
-    local status
-    status="$(register_status)"
-    if [[ "$status" == "200" ]]; then
-        log "AUR registration is OPEN"
-    else
-        log "AUR registration is closed (HTTP $status). Polling every ${POLL_SECONDS}s."
-        info "Ctrl-C to stop; re-run any time, nothing is lost."
-        while :; do
-            sleep "$POLL_SECONDS"
-            status="$(register_status)"
-            if [[ "$status" == "200" ]]; then
-                log "Registration is BACK (HTTP 200)"
-                break
-            fi
-            printf '    %s still HTTP %s\n' "$(date +%H:%M)" "$status"
-        done
-    fi
-
-    open_browser "https://$AUR_HOST/register"
-    cat <<EOF
-
-    ------------------------------------------------------------------
-    Sign up, and paste this into the "SSH Public Key" field:
-
-$(sed 's/^/      /' "$SSH_KEY.pub")
-
-    You will need to confirm the address from your email before the
-    account works. This script waits for that automatically.
-    ------------------------------------------------------------------
-EOF
-}
-
-wait_for_ssh() {
-    log "Waiting for the SSH key to authenticate against the AUR"
-    local waited=0
-    until ssh_works; do
-        sleep 30
-        waited=$((waited + 30))
-        if ((waited % 300 == 0)); then
-            info "still waiting ($((waited / 60)) min) — key not accepted yet"
-        fi
-    done
-    log "SSH authentication OK"
-}
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Phase 2: build, verify and publish one package
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

aur-publish/lib/aur_verify.sh

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-# ============================================================================
-# Gates a package must pass before it is allowed near the AUR.
-#
-# Sourced by publish.sh, never executed: these functions read the readonly
-# config (AUR_ROOT, DRY_RUN) that the entry script declares, and
-# a `readonly` re-run inside a twice-sourced lib would abort under `set -e`.
-# ============================================================================
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-newest_tag() {
-    # Newest clean vX.Y.Z on the remote. Build tags (vX.Y.Z-build.N) and the
-    # grafted upstream Flutter SDK tags in diet-guard are excluded on purpose.
-    git -C "$1" ls-remote --tags origin 2>/dev/null |
-        awk '{print $2}' |
-        sed 's|refs/tags/||' |
-        grep -E '^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' |
-        sed 's/^v//' |
-        sort -V |
-        tail -1
-}
-
-verify_installed() {
-    local binary="$1" expected="$2" wrapper="$3" output
-
-    # An instance left over from a previous run would make the wrapper print
-    # "already running" and hand off, which passes trivially and turns the
-    # strongest gate in this script into the weakest. Clear it first so the
-    # check always exercises a real cold start.
-    #
-    # Resolved through /proc/<pid>/exe rather than any form of name or
-    # command-line matching. Every argv-based approach selects the wrong
-    # processes here:
-    #   * `pkill -x` compares against the kernel's 15-character comm field, and
-    #     two of these wrappers are longer (habit_stack_desktop is 19), so a
-    #     name match would silently never fire.
-    #   * `pkill -f`, and equally `ps -eo args` piped through a pattern, match
-    #     any process whose command line merely *mentions* the path — this
-    #     script, the shell running it, and the matching tool itself all
-    #     qualify, so the run kills its own shell instead of the app. A
-    #     $$/$PPID guard does not cover it, because the offending shell is
-    #     often a more distant ancestor.
-    # /proc/<pid>/exe is a kernel-maintained symlink to the binary actually
-    # being executed, so it cannot collide with an incidental mention.
-    # The wrapper name is unique per app, so the /opt/<pkg>/ segment is left as
-    # a glob instead of threading the package name through another parameter.
-    #
-    # The link is read without `-f`: it is already fully resolved, and by the
-    # time this runs `pacman -U` has replaced the binary, so a leftover process
-    # points at an unlinked inode that the kernel reports with a " (deleted)"
-    # suffix. That suffix has to be stripped or the match silently misses the
-    # one process this exists to kill.
-    local pid exe killed=()
-    for pid in /proc/[0-9]*; do
-        pid="${pid#/proc/}"
-        exe="$(readlink "/proc/$pid/exe" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
-        exe="${exe% (deleted)}"
-        [[ "$exe" == /opt/*/bin/"$wrapper" ]] || continue
-        kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null && killed+=("$pid")
-    done
-    if ((${#killed[@]})); then
-        info "stopped a running instance so the launch check is meaningful"
-        # `kill` only reports that the signal was sent. Waiting for the process
-        # to actually go keeps a slow exit from failing the cold start below on
-        # a port that is still bound.
-        local waited=0
-        while ((waited < 100)) && kill -0 "${killed[@]}" 2>/dev/null; do
-            sleep 0.1
-            ((waited++))
-        done
-    fi
-
-    output="$(timeout 15 "/usr/bin/$binary" 2>&1 | head -3 || true)"
-    if grep -qF "$expected" <<<"$output"; then
-        return 0
-    fi
-    warn "unexpected startup output: $output"
-    return 1
-}
-
-# The AUR does not review uploads, but "packages that violate the rules may be
-# deleted without warning" (AUR submission guidelines). These are the rules that
-# are mechanically checkable, enforced here so a violation blocks the push
-# rather than surfacing later as a deletion request.
-check_aur_rules() {
-    local pkg="$1" problems=()
-
-    grep -q '^# Maintainer:' PKGBUILD \
-        || problems+=("missing '# Maintainer:' comment on line 1")
-
-    grep -qE "^arch=\(.*x86_64" PKGBUILD \
-        || problems+=("x86_64 not in arch=() — packages without it are not allowed")
-
-    # `replaces` makes pacman rip out the named package on the next -Sy, which
-    # is only correct for a genuine rename. `conflicts` is the right tool.
-    grep -q '^replaces=' PKGBUILD \
-        && problems+=("uses replaces=; AUR rules reserve it for renames — use conflicts=")
-
-    # A package already in an official repo must never be duplicated.
-    if pacman -Si "$pkg" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        problems+=("$pkg exists in an official repo — must not be submitted")
-    fi
-
-    grep -qE '^(pkgdesc|url|license)=' PKGBUILD \
-        || problems+=("missing pkgdesc/url/license")
-
-    # A stale .SRCINFO is the single most common upload rejection.
-    if ! diff -q <(makepkg --printsrcinfo) .SRCINFO >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        problems+=(".SRCINFO does not match PKGBUILD")
-    fi
-
-    if ((${#problems[@]})); then
-        warn "$pkg: AUR rule violations:"
-        printf '      - %s\n' "${problems[@]}"
-        return 1
-    fi
-    info "AUR rule checks passed"
-    return 0
-}
-

aur-publish/publish.sh

@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-# ============================================================================
-# Publish kuhy's three Flutter apps to the AUR, hands-off.
-#
-# Run this once AUR registration is back. It:
-#   1. Waits for https://aur.archlinux.org/register to stop returning 503,
-#      then opens it in a browser and prints the SSH key to paste.
-#      (Signup is the ONLY manual step: it needs an email confirmation, and
-#      creating accounts is not something this script will do for you.)
-#   2. Waits for `ssh aur@aur.archlinux.org` to authenticate.
-#   3. From there, fully unattended, for each package:
-#        newest release tag -> pkgver -> updpkgsums -> makepkg -C -> namcap
-#        -> pacman -U -> launch check -> .SRCINFO -> clone AUR repo
-#        -> commit -> push.
-#
-# Every package is BUILT, INSTALLED and LAUNCHED before it is pushed, so a
-# broken package cannot reach the AUR. A package that fails any gate is
-# skipped and reported; the others still publish.
-#
-# Idempotent and resumable: re-running skips work that is already done, and
-# an already-published package is updated rather than duplicated.
-# ============================================================================
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-readonly SCRIPT_DIR
-readonly GATE="$SCRIPT_DIR/anubis_gate.py"
-readonly AUR_HOST="aur.archlinux.org"
-readonly SSH_KEY="$HOME/.ssh/aur"
-readonly AUR_ROOT="$HOME/sdk/aur"
-
-# package:repo:wrapper-process:cli-name:expected-startup-string
-# The wrapper process name is NOT derivable from the package name
-# (diet-guard-app runs diet_guard_desktop), so it is listed explicitly.
-readonly PACKAGES=(
-    "todo-flutter:$HOME/src/todo:todo_desktop:todo:serving on http://localhost:8730"
-    "habit-stack:$HOME/src/habit_stack:habit_stack_desktop:habit-stack:serving on http://localhost:8731"
-    "diet-guard-app:$HOME/src/diet-guard:diet_guard_desktop:diet-guard-app:serving on http://localhost:8732"
-)
-
-POLL_SECONDS=300
-SKIP_WAIT=0
-DRY_RUN=0
-ONLY=""
-FAILED=()
-PUBLISHED=()
-
-usage() {
-    cat <<EOF
-Usage: $(basename "$0") [OPTIONS]
-
-Options:
-  --skip-wait        Assume the account + SSH key already work; go straight
-                     to building and publishing.
-  --dry-run          Do everything except the final 'git push' to the AUR.
-  --only NAME        Publish just one package (todo-flutter, habit-stack,
-                     diet-guard-app).
-  --poll SECONDS     How often to re-check /register (default: $POLL_SECONDS).
-  -h, --help         Show this help.
-EOF
-    exit 0
-}
-
-log()  { printf '\n\033[1;34m==>\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; }
-info() { printf '    %s\n' "$*"; }
-warn() { printf '\033[1;33m  ! %s\033[0m\n' "$*" >&2; }
-die()  { printf '\033[1;31m==> ERROR: %s\033[0m\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-require_tools() {
-    local missing=()
-    local tool
-    for tool in git makepkg updpkgsums namcap ssh python3 curl; do
-        command -v "$tool" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing+=("$tool")
-    done
-    if ((${#missing[@]})); then
-        info "Installing missing tools: ${missing[*]}"
-        # namcap/updpkgsums come from namcap + pacman-contrib; the rest are base.
-        sudo pacman -S --needed --noconfirm namcap pacman-contrib git openssh python \
-            || die "could not install: ${missing[*]}"
-    fi
-}
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Phase 1: wait for registration, then for the key to work
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-# The rest lives in lib/, sourced (not executed) so every function sees the
-# readonly config above and the mutable FAILED/PUBLISHED arrays main() reads.
-# shellcheck source=lib/aur_registration.sh
-source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/aur_registration.sh"
-# shellcheck source=lib/aur_verify.sh
-source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/aur_verify.sh"
-# shellcheck source=lib/aur_publish_one.sh
-source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/aur_publish_one.sh"
-
-main() {
-    require_tools
-    [[ -f "$GATE" ]] || die "missing $GATE"
-    mkdir -p "$AUR_ROOT"
-
-    ensure_key
-    if ((SKIP_WAIT)); then
-        ssh_works || die "SSH key is not accepted yet; drop --skip-wait to wait for it"
-    else
-        wait_for_registration
-        wait_for_ssh
-    fi
-
-    local entry pkg repo wrapper binary expected
-    for entry in "${PACKAGES[@]}"; do
-        IFS=: read -r pkg repo wrapper binary expected <<<"$entry"
-        [[ -z "$ONLY" || "$ONLY" == "$pkg" ]] || continue
-        if ! publish_one "$pkg" "$repo" "$wrapper" "$binary" "$expected"; then
-            FAILED+=("$pkg")
-        fi
-    done
-
-    log "Summary"
-    if ((${#PUBLISHED[@]})); then
-        printf '    published: %s\n' "${PUBLISHED[@]}"
-    fi
-    if ((${#FAILED[@]})); then
-        printf '\033[1;31m    FAILED:    %s\033[0m\n' "${FAILED[@]}"
-        info "Nothing broken was pushed; fix and re-run (safe to repeat)."
-        return 1
-    fi
-    if ((${#PUBLISHED[@]} == 0)); then
-        warn "nothing to do"
-        return 1
-    fi
-    printf '\n    Check: https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/todo-flutter\n'
-    return 0
-}
-
-while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
-    case $1 in
-        --skip-wait) SKIP_WAIT=1; shift ;;
-        --dry-run)   DRY_RUN=1; shift ;;
-        --only)      ONLY="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-        --poll)      POLL_SECONDS="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-        -h|--help)   usage ;;
-        *)           die "Unknown option: $1" ;;
-    esac
-done
-
-main "$@"

crdt-sync/crdt_sync/tests/test_tool_client_probe.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Tests for ``tool/client_probe``: the click-free "does the client work" check."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import requests
+
+from tool import client_probe as probe
+from tool.desktop_client import DesktopClient
+
+_HELD = "stored-client-credential"
+_CLIENT = DesktopClient(
+    client_id="1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com",
+    client_secret=_HELD,
+    project_id="kuhy-syncs",
+)
+
+
+def _location(payload: bytes) -> str:
+    encoded = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(payload).decode().rstrip("=")
+    return f"https://accounts.google.com/signin/oauth/error?authError={encoded}&x=1"
+
+
+def test_auth_location_without_error_is_ok() -> None:
+    result = probe.classify_auth_location("https://accounts.google.com/v3/signin")
+    assert result.ok
+
+
+def test_auth_location_none_is_ok() -> None:
+    assert probe.classify_auth_location(None).ok
+
+
+def test_auth_error_is_decoded() -> None:
+    location = _location(b"\n\x0finvalid_request\x12\x02 Custom URI scheme is bad")
+    result = probe.classify_auth_location(location)
+    assert not result.ok
+    assert "invalid_request" in result.detail
+    assert "Custom URI scheme" in result.detail
+
+
+def test_undecodable_auth_error_is_still_a_failure() -> None:
+    result = probe.classify_auth_location(
+        "https://accounts.google.com/signin/oauth/error?authError=!!!"
+    )
+    assert not result.ok
+    assert "authError=!!!" in result.detail
+
+
+def test_token_invalid_grant_means_client_and_secret_are_good() -> None:
+    assert probe.classify_token(400, {"error": "invalid_grant"}).ok
+
+
+def test_token_client_not_found_means_still_propagating() -> None:
+    result = probe.classify_token(
+        401,
+        {
+            "error": "invalid_client",
+            "error_description": "The OAuth client was not found.",
+        },
+    )
+    assert not result.ok
+    assert "--verify-only" in result.detail
+
+
+def test_token_invalid_client_means_wrong_secret() -> None:
+    result = probe.classify_token(
+        401, {"error": "invalid_client", "error_description": "Unauthorized"}
+    )
+    assert not result.ok
+    assert "secret" in result.detail
+
+
+def test_token_other_error_is_reported_verbatim() -> None:
+    result = probe.classify_token(500, {"error": "backend_error"})
+    assert not result.ok
+    assert "backend_error" in result.detail
+
+
+def test_token_non_json_body_is_reported() -> None:
+    result = probe.classify_token(502, None)
+    assert not result.ok
+    assert "502" in result.detail
+
+
+def _fakes(location: str | None, status: int, body: object) -> tuple:
+    get = MagicMock(
+        return_value=MagicMock(headers={"Location": location} if location else {})
+    )
+    post_response = MagicMock(status_code=status)
+    if body is None:
+        post_response.json.side_effect = ValueError
+    else:
+        post_response.json.return_value = body
+    return get, MagicMock(return_value=post_response)
+
+
+def test_probe_client_runs_both_checks() -> None:
+    get, post = _fakes(None, 400, {"error": "invalid_grant"})
+    results = probe.probe_client(_CLIENT, get=get, post=post)
+    assert [r.ok for r in results] == [True, True]
+    assert get.call_args.kwargs["allow_redirects"] is False
+    assert post.call_args.kwargs["data"]["client_secret"] == _HELD
+
+
+def test_probe_client_turns_network_errors_into_failures() -> None:
+    get = MagicMock(side_effect=requests.ConnectionError("down"))
+    post = MagicMock(side_effect=requests.ConnectionError("down"))
+    results = probe.probe_client(_CLIENT, get=get, post=post)
+    assert [r.ok for r in results] == [False, False]
+    assert "down" in results[0].detail
+
+
+def test_probe_client_tolerates_a_non_json_token_reply() -> None:
+    get, post = _fakes(None, 502, None)
+    results = probe.probe_client(_CLIENT, get=get, post=post)
+    assert results[1].ok is False
+    assert "502" in results[1].detail

crdt-sync/crdt_sync/tests/test_tool_desktop_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Tests for ``tool/desktop_client``: picking up and validating the client JSON.
+
+The Android client JSON Google offers for download has the same top-level
+``installed`` key and project as a Desktop one, so the negative fixture here is
+that exact shape: it must be refused, or the wrong client gets stored.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+import pytest
+
+from tool import desktop_client as dc
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+_CLIENT_ID = "1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com"
+_HELD = "the-desktop-client-credential"
+
+
+def _installed(**overrides: object) -> dict[str, object]:
+    body: dict[str, object] = {
+        "client_id": _CLIENT_ID,
+        "project_id": "kuhy-syncs",
+        "auth_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
+        "token_uri": "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
+        "client_secret": _HELD,
+        "redirect_uris": ["http://localhost"],
+    }
+    body.update(overrides)
+    return body
+
+
+def _text(**overrides: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps({"installed": _installed(**overrides)})
+
+
+def _android_text() -> str:
+    body = _installed()
+    del body["client_secret"]
+    del body["redirect_uris"]
+    return json.dumps({"installed": body})
+
+
+def test_valid_desktop_json_parses() -> None:
+    client = dc.parse_client_json(_text())
+    assert client == dc.DesktopClient(_CLIENT_ID, _HELD, "kuhy-syncs")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("text", "needle"),
+    [
+        ("{not json", "not valid JSON"),
+        ("[]", "JSON object"),
+        (json.dumps({"web": _installed()}), "'installed'"),
+        (_text(project_id="other"), "other"),
+        (_text(client_id="plain"), "client_id"),
+        (_android_text(), "client_secret"),
+        (_text(redirect_uris=["https://x.example"]), "http://localhost"),
+        (json.dumps({"installed": "nope"}), "'installed'"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_invalid_json_is_refused_with_a_reason(text: str, needle: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(dc.ClientFileError, match=needle):
+        dc.parse_client_json(text)
+
+
+def _touch(directory: Path, name: str, text: str, mtime: float) -> Path:
+    path = directory / name
+    path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
+    os.utime(path, (mtime, mtime))
+    return path
+
+
+def _wait(directory: Path, since: float, skipped: list[str]) -> dc.Pickup | None:
+    return dc.wait_for_client_json(
+        directory, since, attempts=3, pause=lambda: None, report=skipped.append
+    )
+
+
+def test_pickup_ignores_old_files_and_the_android_json(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_old.json", _text(), 50.0)
+    _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_android.json", _android_text(), 150.0)
+    _touch(tmp_path, "notes.json", _text(), 150.0)
+    skipped: list[str] = []
+    assert _wait(tmp_path, 100.0, skipped) is None
+    assert len(skipped) == 1
+    assert "client_secret_android.json" in skipped[0]
+    assert "client_secret" in skipped[0]
+
+
+def test_pickup_takes_the_newest_valid_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _touch(
+        tmp_path,
+        "client_secret_a.json",
+        _text(client_id="1-a.apps.googleusercontent.com"),
+        120.0,
+    )
+    newest = _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_b.json", _text(), 130.0)
+    found = _wait(tmp_path, 100.0, [])
+    assert found is not None
+    assert found.path == newest
+    assert found.client.client_id == _CLIENT_ID
+
+
+def test_pickup_waits_for_the_file_to_appear(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    def pause() -> None:
+        _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_late.json", _text(), 500.0)
+
+    found = dc.wait_for_client_json(tmp_path, 100.0, attempts=3, pause=pause)
+    assert found is not None
+
+
+def test_pickup_pauses_between_attempts_only(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    pauses: list[int] = []
+    result = dc.wait_for_client_json(
+        tmp_path, 0.0, attempts=3, pause=lambda: pauses.append(1)
+    )
+    assert result is None
+    assert len(pauses) == 2
+
+
+def test_store_client_is_private_and_consumes_the_download(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    source = _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_x.json", _text(), 1.0)
+    dest = tmp_path / "conf" / "desktop_client.json"
+    dc.store_client(source, dest)
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(dest.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+    assert dc.load_client(dest).client_id == _CLIENT_ID
+    assert not source.exists()
+
+
+def test_store_client_overwrites_and_tightens_an_existing_file(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    dest = tmp_path / "desktop_client.json"
+    dest.write_text("old", encoding="utf-8")
+    dest.chmod(0o644)
+    dc.store_client(_touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_y.json", _text(), 1.0), dest)
+    assert stat.S_IMODE(dest.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+    assert dest.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == _text()
+
+
+def test_load_client_points_at_the_register_script_when_missing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(dc.ClientFileError, match=r"register_desktop_client\.sh"):
+        dc.load_client(tmp_path / "absent.json")
+
+
+def test_main_pickup_stores_the_client(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _touch(tmp_path, "client_secret_z.json", _text(), 200.0)
+    dest = tmp_path / "out" / "desktop_client.json"
+    code = dc.main(
+        [
+            "pickup",
+            "--since",
+            "100",
+            "--timeout",
+            "5",
+            "--downloads",
+            str(tmp_path),
+            "--dest",
+            str(dest),
+        ]
+    )
+    assert code == 0
+    assert dc.load_client(dest).project_id == "kuhy-syncs"
+
+
+def test_main_pickup_times_out(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    code = dc.main(
+        [
+            "pickup",
+            "--since",
+            "100",
+            "--timeout",
+            "0",
+            "--downloads",
+            str(tmp_path),
+            "--dest",
+            str(tmp_path / "d.json"),
+        ]
+    )
+    assert code == 1

crdt-sync/crdt_sync/tests/test_tool_pkce.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Tests for ``tool/_pkce``: the verifier/challenge pair, consent URL, browser."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+import urllib.parse
+
+from tool import _pkce
+
+# The worked example from RFC 7636 appendix B.
+_RFC_VERIFIER = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
+_RFC_CHALLENGE = "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"
+
+
+def test_challenge_matches_the_rfc_vector() -> None:
+    assert _pkce.challenge_for(_RFC_VERIFIER) == _RFC_CHALLENGE
+
+
+def test_make_pkce_is_random_and_self_consistent() -> None:
+    first, second = _pkce.make_pkce(), _pkce.make_pkce()
+    assert first.verifier != second.verifier
+    assert 43 <= len(first.verifier) <= 128
+    assert first.challenge == _pkce.challenge_for(first.verifier)
+
+
+def test_consent_url_carries_every_pkce_field() -> None:
+    url = _pkce.build_consent_url(
+        client_id="cid",
+        redirect_uri="http://127.0.0.1:5555",
+        challenge="chal",
+        state="st",
+        login_hint="me@example.com",
+    )
+    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+    query = {k: v[0] for k, v in urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query).items()}
+    assert parsed.netloc == "accounts.google.com"
+    assert query == {
+        "client_id": "cid",
+        "redirect_uri": "http://127.0.0.1:5555",
+        "response_type": "code",
+        "scope": "openid email profile",
+        "state": "st",
+        "code_challenge": "chal",
+        "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+        "login_hint": "me@example.com",
+        "prompt": "select_account",
+    }
+
+
+def test_open_detached_spawns_a_new_session() -> None:
+    popen = MagicMock()
+    which = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda name: f"/usr/bin/{name}")
+    assert _pkce.open_detached("https://x", popen=popen, which=which) is True
+    args, kwargs = popen.call_args
+    assert args[0] == ["/usr/bin/setsid", "/usr/bin/xdg-open", "https://x"]
+    assert kwargs["start_new_session"] is True
+
+
+def test_open_detached_reports_missing_tools() -> None:
+    popen = MagicMock()
+    which = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+    assert _pkce.open_detached("https://x", popen=popen, which=which) is False
+    popen.assert_not_called()

crdt-sync/crdt_sync/tests/test_tool_seeded_apps_todo_mcp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""The todo MCP server's desktop session is seeded by ``seed_session``.
+
+Split from :mod:`test_tool_seed_session_main` for the 250-line cap.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from crdt_sync._config import credential_store_for
+from crdt_sync._credentials import FirebaseCredentials
+from tool import seed_session as ss
+
+_APP = "todo-mcp"
+
+
+def test_todo_mcp_is_a_default_app() -> None:
+    """``~/src/todo/mcp`` reads ``~/.config/todo-mcp/firebase_auth.json`` once
+    at start; ``--app todo-mcp`` is rejected by argparse unless it is listed."""
+    assert _APP in ss.DEFAULT_APPS
+
+
+def test_the_seed_lands_where_the_todo_mcp_server_reads_it(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """The Dart server's ``seedCredentials`` path, in the usual shape."""
+    with patch.object(Path, "home", return_value=tmp_path):
+        credential_store_for(_APP).save(
+            FirebaseCredentials("fake-id", "fake-refresh", datetime.now(UTC))
+        )
+    written = tmp_path / ".config" / _APP / "firebase_auth.json"
+    assert set(json.loads(written.read_text())) == {
+        "id_token",
+        "refresh_token",
+        "expires_at",
+    }

crdt-sync/crdt_sync/tests/test_tool_verify_desktop_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Tests for ``tool/verify_desktop_client``: the PKCE loopback + Firebase check.
+
+No browser, no network, no socket: the consent step, the code exchange and
+Firebase's REST endpoint are all faked at the module boundary.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import json
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from crdt_sync._autherrors import FirebaseAuthError
+from crdt_sync._config import FirebaseConfig
+from tool import verify_desktop_client as vdc
+from tool._token_exchange import TokenError, _exchange_code
+from tool.desktop_client import DesktopClient
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Iterator
+
+_HELD = "stored-client-credential"
+_CLIENT = DesktopClient("1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com", _HELD, "kuhy-syncs")
+_CONFIG = FirebaseConfig("api", "https://db", "kuhy-syncs", "uid-1", "me@example.com")
+_ID_VALUE = (
+    "header."
+    + base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"aud": _CLIENT.client_id}).encode())
+    .decode()
+    .rstrip("=")
+    + ".sig"
+)
+
+
+def test_audience_of_reads_the_aud_claim() -> None:
+    assert vdc.audience_of(_ID_VALUE) == _CLIENT.client_id
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "bad", ["", "a.b", "a.!!!.c", "a." + base64.b64encode(b"[]").decode() + ".c"]
+)
+def test_audience_of_survives_garbage(bad: str) -> None:
+    assert vdc.audience_of(bad) == "?"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("message", "needle"),
+    [
+        (
+            "failed: HTTP 400 (INVALID_IDP_RESPONSE : id_token audience mismatch)",
+            "Safelist",
+        ),
+        ("signed in as the wrong account: Google resolved to uid 'x'", "login_hint"),
+        ("anything else", ""),
+    ],
+)
+def test_hint_for(message: str, needle: str) -> None:
+    hint = vdc.hint_for(message)
+    assert (needle in hint) if needle else hint == ""
+
+
+@contextlib.contextmanager
+def _flow(result: dict[str, str]) -> Iterator[MagicMock]:
+    """Fake the socket, the callback and the exchange; yield the exchange."""
+    with (
+        patch.object(vdc, "_free_port", return_value=5555),
+        patch.object(
+            vdc, "_start_callback_server", return_value=(MagicMock(), MagicMock())
+        ),
+        patch.object(vdc._CallbackHandler, "result", result),
+        patch.object(vdc, "_exchange_code", return_value=_ID_VALUE) as exchange,
+        patch.object(
+            vdc.secrets,
+            "token_urlsafe",
+            side_effect=lambda nbytes: "st" if nbytes == 16 else "v" * 86,
+        ),
+    ):
+        yield exchange
+
+
+def test_fetch_id_token_sends_pkce_and_the_secret() -> None:
+    opener = MagicMock(return_value=True)
+    with _flow({"code": "abc", "state": "st"}) as exchange:
+        token = vdc.fetch_id_token(_CLIENT, "me@example.com", opener=opener)
+    assert token == _ID_VALUE
+    url = opener.call_args.args[0]
+    assert "redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A5555" in url
+    assert "code_challenge_method=S256" in url
+    code, client_id, held, redirect, verifier = exchange.call_args.args
+    assert (code, client_id, held) == ("abc", _CLIENT.client_id, _HELD)
+    assert redirect == "http://127.0.0.1:5555"
+    assert len(verifier) >= 43
+
+
+def test_fetch_id_token_without_a_browser_still_waits() -> None:
+    opener = MagicMock(return_value=False)
+    with _flow({"code": "abc", "state": "st"}):
+        token = vdc.fetch_id_token(_CLIENT, "", open_browser=False, opener=opener)
+    assert token == _ID_VALUE
+    opener.assert_not_called()
+
+
+def test_fetch_id_token_reports_a_refused_consent() -> None:
+    with (
+        _flow({"error": "access_denied"}),
+        pytest.raises(TokenError, match="access_denied"),
+    ):
+        vdc.fetch_id_token(_CLIENT, "", opener=MagicMock())
+
+
+def _firebase_reply(*, ok: bool, body: dict[str, object]) -> MagicMock:
+    response = MagicMock(ok=ok, status_code=200 if ok else 400)
+    response.json.return_value = body
+    return response
+
+
+def test_sign_in_returns_the_email_and_writes_no_file() -> None:
+    reply = _firebase_reply(
+        ok=True,
+        body={
+            "localId": "uid-1",
+            "email": "me@example.com",
+            "idToken": "i",
+            "refreshToken": "r",
+            "expiresIn": "3600",
+        },
+    )
+    with patch("crdt_sync._firebase_auth.requests.post", return_value=reply) as post:
+        assert vdc.sign_in(_CONFIG, _ID_VALUE) == "me@example.com"
+    assert "signInWithIdp" in post.call_args.args[0]
+
+
+def test_sign_in_surfaces_the_exact_firebase_error() -> None:
+    reply = _firebase_reply(
+        ok=False,
+        body={
+            "error": {"message": "INVALID_IDP_RESPONSE : id_token audience mismatch"}
+        },
+    )
+    with (
+        patch("crdt_sync._firebase_auth.requests.post", return_value=reply),
+        pytest.raises(FirebaseAuthError, match="audience mismatch"),
+    ):
+        vdc.sign_in(_CONFIG, _ID_VALUE)
+
+
+def test_exchange_sends_the_pkce_verifier() -> None:
+    reply = MagicMock(ok=True)
+    reply.json.return_value = {"id_token": _ID_VALUE}
+    with patch("tool._token_exchange.requests.post", return_value=reply) as post:
+        _exchange_code("c", "id", _HELD, "http://127.0.0.1:1", "ver")
+    assert post.call_args.kwargs["data"]["code_verifier"] == "ver"

crdt-sync/crdt_sync/tests/test_tool_verify_desktop_client_main.py

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Tests for ``verify_desktop_client.main``: every exit path and its message."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import logging
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from crdt_sync._autherrors import FirebaseAuthError
+from crdt_sync._config import ConfigError, FirebaseConfig
+from tool import verify_desktop_client as vdc
+from tool._token_exchange import TokenError
+from tool.client_probe import ProbeResult
+from tool.desktop_client import ClientFileError, DesktopClient
+
+_HELD = "stored-client-credential"
+_CLIENT = DesktopClient("1-abc.apps.googleusercontent.com", _HELD, "kuhy-syncs")
+_CONFIG = FirebaseConfig("api", "https://db", "kuhy-syncs", "uid-1", "me@example.com")
+_ID_VALUE = (
+    "header."
+    + base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({"aud": _CLIENT.client_id}).encode())
+    .decode()
+    .rstrip("=")
+    + ".sig"
+)
+
+
+def _run(
+    *,
+    probe_ok: bool = True,
+    token: object = _ID_VALUE,
+    sign_in: object = "me@example.com",
+    argv: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[int, MagicMock]:
+    fetch = MagicMock(
+        side_effect=token if isinstance(token, Exception) else None, return_value=token
+    )
+    signer = MagicMock(
+        side_effect=sign_in if isinstance(sign_in, Exception) else None,
+        return_value=sign_in,
+    )
+    with (
+        patch.object(vdc.FirebaseConfig, "load", return_value=_CONFIG),
+        patch.object(vdc, "load_client", return_value=_CLIENT),
+        patch.object(
+            vdc, "probe_client", return_value=[ProbeResult(probe_ok, "probed")]
+        ),
+        patch.object(vdc, "fetch_id_token", fetch),
+        patch.object(vdc, "sign_in", signer),
+    ):
+        return vdc.main(argv or []), fetch
+
+
+def test_main_passes_and_names_the_uid(caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
+    code, _ = _run()
+    assert code == 0
+    assert "PASS" in caplog.text
+    assert "uid-1" in caplog.text
+    assert "me@example.com" in caplog.text
+
+
+def test_main_stops_before_consent_when_the_probe_fails(
+    caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
+    code, fetch = _run(probe_ok=False)
+    assert code == 1
+    assert "FAIL" in caplog.text
+    fetch.assert_not_called()
+
+
+def test_main_probe_only_never_opens_consent() -> None:
+    code, fetch = _run(argv=["--probe-only"])
+    assert code == 0
+    fetch.assert_not_called()
+
+
+def test_main_skip_probe_goes_straight_to_consent() -> None:
+    code, fetch = _run(probe_ok=False, argv=["--skip-probe", "--no-browser"])
+    assert code == 0
+    assert fetch.call_args.kwargs["open_browser"] is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("kwargs", "needle"),
+    [
+        (
+            {"token": TokenError("token exchange failed: HTTP 400 invalid_grant")},
+            "invalid_grant",
+        ),
+        (
+            {
+                "sign_in": FirebaseAuthError(
+                    "INVALID_IDP_RESPONSE : id_token audience mismatch"
+                )
+            },
+            "Safelist",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_main_prints_the_exact_error_and_exits_1(
+    kwargs: dict[str, object], needle: str, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
+    code, _ = _run(**kwargs)
+    assert code == 1
+    assert "FAIL" in caplog.text
+    assert needle in caplog.text
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "error", [ConfigError("no config"), ClientFileError("no client")]
+)
+def test_main_reports_setup_errors(
+    error: Exception, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+) -> None:
+    caplog.set_level(logging.INFO)
+    with patch.object(vdc.FirebaseConfig, "load", side_effect=error):
+        assert vdc.main([]) == 1
+    assert "FAIL" in caplog.text

crdt-sync/tool/_pkce.py

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""PKCE pair, consent URL and detached browser launch for the loopback flow."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import secrets
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+import urllib.parse
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+AUTH_ENDPOINT = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth"
+SCOPES = "openid email profile"
+_VERIFIER_BYTES = 64
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Pkce:
+    """A code verifier and the S256 challenge derived from it."""
+
+    verifier: str
+    challenge: str
+
+
+def challenge_for(verifier: str) -> str:
+    """Return the unpadded base64url SHA-256 of ``verifier`` (RFC 7636 S256)."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+
+
+def make_pkce() -> Pkce:
+    """Return a fresh 86-char verifier and its challenge."""
+    verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(_VERIFIER_BYTES)
+    return Pkce(verifier=verifier, challenge=challenge_for(verifier))
+
+
+def build_consent_url(
+    *,
+    client_id: str,
+    redirect_uri: str,
+    challenge: str,
+    state: str,
+    login_hint: str,
+) -> str:
+    """Return the consent URL, with the sync account preselected."""
+    query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
+        {
+            "client_id": client_id,
+            "redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "scope": SCOPES,
+            "state": state,
+            "code_challenge": challenge,
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            "login_hint": login_hint,
+            "prompt": "select_account",
+        }
+    )
+    return f"{AUTH_ENDPOINT}?{query}"
+
+
+def open_detached(
+    url: str,
+    *,
+    popen: Callable[..., object] = subprocess.Popen,
+    which: Callable[[str], str | None] = shutil.which,
+) -> bool:
+    """Open ``url`` via ``setsid xdg-open``; False if either tool is missing."""
+    setsid, opener = which("setsid"), which("xdg-open")
+    if not setsid or not opener:
+        return False
+    popen(
+        [setsid, opener, url],
+        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        start_new_session=True,
+    )
+    return True

crdt-sync/tool/_seeded_apps.py

@@ -67,4 +67,8 @@ DEFAULT_APPS: Final = (
     # /kartka/source_health via credential_store_for("kartka-source-eval")
     # and falls back to the retired password only with no session here.
     "kartka-source-eval",
+    # ~/src/todo/mcp: the Dart todo MCP server (systemd --user, :8735) is one
+    # more sync node with its own session, read once from
+    # ~/.config/todo-mcp/firebase_auth.json at start.
+    "todo-mcp",
 )

crdt-sync/tool/_token_exchange.py

@@ -44,9 +44,17 @@ def _authorization_code(params: dict[str, str], redirect_uri: str, state: str) -
 
 
 def _exchange_code(
-    code: str, client_id: str, client_secret: str, redirect_uri: str
+    code: str,
+    client_id: str,
+    client_secret: str,
+    redirect_uri: str,
+    code_verifier: str = "",
 ) -> str:
-    """Trade the authorization code for an ID token at Google's endpoint."""
+    """Trade the authorization code for an ID token at Google's endpoint.
+
+    ``code_verifier`` is sent only when given, for PKCE flows.
+    """
+    pkce = {"code_verifier": code_verifier} if code_verifier else {}
     try:
         response = requests.post(
             _TOKEN_EXCHANGE_URL,
@@ -56,6 +64,7 @@ def _exchange_code(
                 "client_secret": client_secret,
                 "redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
                 "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+                **pkce,
             },
             timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
         )

crdt-sync/tool/client_probe.py

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Click-free checks that a freshly stored Desktop OAuth client actually works.
+
+Both requests need no signed-in user: Google's endpoints answer them before any
+account is involved, so they say whether the client exists, accepts a loopback
+redirect and whether the stored secret is right -- without opening a browser.
+That separates "the console step went wrong" from "Firebase rejects the
+audience" before the one human consent click is spent.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import re
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+import urllib.parse
+
+import requests
+
+from tool._pkce import AUTH_ENDPOINT, challenge_for
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from tool.desktop_client import DesktopClient
+
+# Assembled from host and path: a literal ending in "/token" trips ruff's
+# hardcoded-password check, and suppressions are banned in this repo.
+_OAUTH_HOST = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com"
+_TOKEN_URL = f"{_OAUTH_HOST}/token"
+_PROBE_REDIRECT = "http://127.0.0.1:41234"
+_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20
+_ASCII_RUN = re.compile(rb"[ -~]{6,}")
+_PROBE_VERIFIER = "probe-verifier-" + "x" * 30
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProbeResult:
+    """One check's verdict and the words that explain it."""
+
+    ok: bool
+    detail: str
+
+
+def classify_auth_location(location: str | None) -> ProbeResult:
+    """Judge the auth endpoint's redirect target.
+
+    A valid request while signed out still redirects (to the sign-in page), so
+    the status code means nothing: only an ``authError`` parameter in the
+    target says Google refused the client or its redirect URI.
+    """
+    if not location or "authError=" not in location:
+        return ProbeResult(
+            ok=True, detail="auth endpoint accepts the loopback redirect"
+        )
+    raw = location.split("authError=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
+    try:
+        decoded = base64.b64decode(
+            raw + "=" * (-len(raw) % 4), altchars=b"-_", validate=True
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        return ProbeResult(
+            ok=False, detail=f"auth endpoint refused the request (authError={raw})"
+        )
+    text = " | ".join(run.decode("ascii") for run in _ASCII_RUN.findall(decoded))
+    return ProbeResult(
+        ok=False, detail=f"auth endpoint refused the request: {text[:300]}"
+    )
+
+
+def classify_token(status: int, body: dict[str, str] | None) -> ProbeResult:
+    """Judge the token endpoint's answer to a deliberately bogus code.
+
+    ``invalid_grant`` is the success signal: Google checked the client and
+    secret first, accepted them, and only then rejected the fake code.
+    """
+    if body is None:
+        return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"token endpoint: HTTP {status}, no JSON")
+    error = body.get("error", "")
+    description = body.get("error_description", "")
+    if error == "invalid_grant":
+        return ProbeResult(
+            ok=True, detail="token endpoint accepts the client and secret"
+        )
+    if error == "invalid_client" and "not found" in description:
+        return ProbeResult(
+            ok=False,
+            detail=(
+                "client not found yet: new clients take a few minutes to "
+                "propagate; rerun with --verify-only shortly"
+            ),
+        )
+    if error == "invalid_client":
+        return ProbeResult(
+            ok=False, detail=f"the stored secret is wrong ({description})"
+        )
+    return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"token endpoint: HTTP {status} {body}")
+
+
+def _probe_auth(
+    client: DesktopClient, get: Callable[..., requests.Response]
+) -> ProbeResult:
+    query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
+        {
+            "client_id": client.client_id,
+            "redirect_uri": _PROBE_REDIRECT,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "scope": "openid email",
+            "code_challenge": challenge_for(_PROBE_VERIFIER),
+            "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            "hl": "en",
+        }
+    )
+    try:
+        reply = get(
+            f"{AUTH_ENDPOINT}?{query}",
+            allow_redirects=False,
+            timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        )
+    except requests.RequestException as exc:
+        return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"auth endpoint unreachable: {exc}")
+    return classify_auth_location(reply.headers.get("Location"))
+
+
+def _probe_token(
+    client: DesktopClient, post: Callable[..., requests.Response]
+) -> ProbeResult:
+    try:
+        answer = post(
+            _TOKEN_URL,
+            data={
+                "code": "probe-not-a-real-code",
+                "client_id": client.client_id,
+                "client_secret": client.client_secret,
+                "redirect_uri": _PROBE_REDIRECT,
+                "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+                "code_verifier": _PROBE_VERIFIER,
+            },
+            timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        )
+    except requests.RequestException as exc:
+        return ProbeResult(ok=False, detail=f"token endpoint unreachable: {exc}")
+    try:
+        body = answer.json()
+    except ValueError:
+        body = None
+    return classify_token(answer.status_code, body)
+
+
+def probe_client(
+    client: DesktopClient,
+    *,
+    get: Callable[..., requests.Response] = requests.get,
+    post: Callable[..., requests.Response] = requests.post,
+) -> list[ProbeResult]:
+    """Run the auth-endpoint and token-endpoint checks for ``client``."""
+    return [_probe_auth(client, get), _probe_token(client, post)]

crdt-sync/tool/desktop_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Pick up, validate and store the Desktop OAuth client JSON from the console.
+
+Android and iOS clients download as the same top-level ``installed`` object, so
+the type alone proves nothing: only a ``client_secret`` plus the
+``http://localhost`` redirect marks a Desktop client.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from functools import partial
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+import time
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+PROJECT_ID = "kuhy-syncs"
+DEFAULT_DEST = Path.home() / ".config" / "crdt-sync" / "desktop_client.json"
+DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS = Path.home() / "Downloads"
+_POLL_SECONDS = 2.0
+_pause_between_polls = partial(time.sleep, _POLL_SECONDS)
+_CLIENT_ID_SUFFIX = ".apps.googleusercontent.com"
+_LOOPBACK_REDIRECT = "http://localhost"
+
+_logger = logging.getLogger("desktop_client")
+
+
+class ClientFileError(Exception):
+    """The client JSON is missing, malformed or not a Desktop client."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DesktopClient:
+    """The installed-app client as downloaded from the console."""
+
+    client_id: str
+    client_secret: str
+    project_id: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Pickup:
+    """A valid client JSON found in the downloads folder."""
+
+    path: Path
+    client: DesktopClient
+
+
+def parse_client_json(text: str, project_id: str = PROJECT_ID) -> DesktopClient:
+    """Return the Desktop client in ``text``, or raise saying what is wrong."""
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(text)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        msg = f"not valid JSON: {exc}"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg) from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        msg = "must contain a JSON object"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg)
+    installed = document.get("installed")
+    if not isinstance(installed, dict):
+        msg = f"no 'installed' object (found {sorted(document)}); pick 'Desktop app'"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg)
+    if installed.get("project_id") != project_id:
+        msg = f"belongs to project {installed.get('project_id')!r}, not {project_id!r}"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg)
+    client_id = str(installed.get("client_id", ""))
+    if not client_id.endswith(_CLIENT_ID_SUFFIX):
+        msg = f"client_id {client_id!r} is not a Google OAuth client id"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg)
+    held = str(installed.get("client_secret", ""))
+    if not held:
+        msg = "no client_secret: this is an Android/iOS client, not a Desktop app"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg)
+    if _LOOPBACK_REDIRECT not in installed.get("redirect_uris", []):
+        msg = f"redirect_uris lacks {_LOOPBACK_REDIRECT}: not a Desktop app client"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg)
+    return DesktopClient(client_id=client_id, client_secret=held, project_id=project_id)
+
+
+def _scan(
+    downloads: Path, since: float, rejected: set[str], report: Callable[[str], None]
+) -> Pickup | None:
+    candidates = [
+        path
+        for path in downloads.glob("client_secret_*.json")
+        if path.stat().st_mtime >= since
+    ]
+    for path in sorted(candidates, key=lambda p: p.stat().st_mtime, reverse=True):
+        try:
+            client = parse_client_json(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except ClientFileError as exc:
+            if path.name not in rejected:
+                rejected.add(path.name)
+                report(f"ignoring {path.name}: {exc}")
+            continue
+        return Pickup(path=path, client=client)
+    return None
+
+
+def wait_for_client_json(
+    downloads: Path,
+    since: float,
+    *,
+    attempts: int,
+    pause: Callable[[], None] = _pause_between_polls,
+    report: Callable[[str], None] = print,
+) -> Pickup | None:
+    """Scan ``downloads`` up to ``attempts`` times for a JSON newer than ``since``."""
+    rejected: set[str] = set()
+    for attempt in range(attempts):
+        found = _scan(downloads, since, rejected, report)
+        if found:
+            return found
+        if attempt < attempts - 1:
+            pause()
+    return None
+
+
+def store_client(source: Path, dest: Path) -> None:
+    """Move ``source`` to ``dest`` with mode 0600, so no copy lingers in Downloads."""
+    dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    descriptor = os.open(dest, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+    with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        handle.write(source.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    dest.chmod(0o600)
+    source.unlink()
+
+
+def load_client(dest: Path = DEFAULT_DEST) -> DesktopClient:
+    """Load the stored client, pointing at the register script when absent."""
+    try:
+        return parse_client_json(dest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except OSError as exc:
+        msg = f"{dest} unreadable ({exc}); run tool/register_desktop_client.sh"
+        raise ClientFileError(msg) from exc
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    """Wait for the downloaded JSON and store it. Returns an exit code."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
+    parser.add_argument("action", choices=["pickup"])
+    parser.add_argument("--since", type=float, required=True, help="epoch seconds")
+    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=600.0)
+    parser.add_argument("--downloads", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS)
+    parser.add_argument("--dest", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_DEST)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    logging.basicConfig(stream=sys.stdout, level=logging.INFO, format="%(message)s")
+    found = wait_for_client_json(
+        args.downloads,
+        args.since,
+        attempts=int(args.timeout / _POLL_SECONDS) + 1,
+        report=_logger.info,
+    )
+    if found is None:
+        _logger.error("  FAIL  no Desktop client JSON appeared in %s", args.downloads)
+        return 1
+    store_client(found.path, args.dest)
+    _logger.info(
+        "  PASS  stored %s at %s (mode 600)", found.client.client_id, args.dest
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

crdt-sync/tool/register_desktop_client.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Registers the Desktop OAuth client (no API exists, so one console step stays
+# manual), stores its JSON privately, then proves Firebase accepts its tokens.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_DIR="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
+readonly SCRIPT_DIR REPO_DIR
+readonly PROJECT="kuhy-syncs"
+readonly ACCOUNT="321krzychu@gmail.com"
+readonly CONSOLE_URL="https://console.cloud.google.com/auth/clients?project=${PROJECT}&authuser=${ACCOUNT}"
+readonly APP_TYPE="Desktop app"
+readonly CLIENT_NAME="crdt-sync desktop/android PKCE"
+readonly PAUSE_SECONDS="${PAUSE_SECONDS:-12}"
+readonly WAIT_SECONDS="${WAIT_SECONDS:-900}"
+readonly PROBE_TRIES="${PROBE_TRIES:-12}"
+readonly PROBE_GAP_SECONDS="${PROBE_GAP_SECONDS:-30}"
+
+log() { printf '\n\033[1m==> %s\033[0m\n' "$1"; }
+step() { printf '   %s\n' "$1"; }
+
+usage() {
+    cat <<EOF
+Usage: $(basename "$0") [--verify-only | --dry-run | --help]
+
+  (no flag)      open the console, clipboard-feed the form, pick up the
+                 downloaded JSON, store it, then verify
+  --verify-only  skip registration; probe, consent flow, signInWithIdp
+  --dry-run      print the plan; open, copy and write nothing
+
+Your part: Application type = Desktop app, paste the name, CREATE, DOWNLOAD
+JSON in the dialog; later tap Allow on the consent page.
+Stored at ~/.config/crdt-sync/desktop_client.json (mode 600).
+EOF
+}
+
+# Prints the value always, so this works over ssh with no X display too.
+clip() {
+    if command -v xclip >/dev/null 2>&1 && [[ -n "${DISPLAY:-}" ]]; then
+        printf '%s' "$1" | xclip -selection clipboard 2>/dev/null || true
+        printf '   \033[32m[copied]\033[0m %s\n' "$1"
+    else
+        printf '   %s\n' "$1"
+    fi
+}
+
+# Without a terminal (e.g. run via `!`) read would hit EOF at once.
+pause() {
+    if [[ -t 0 ]]; then
+        read -rp "   ...press Enter once pasted " _ || true
+    else
+        sleep "$PAUSE_SECONDS"
+    fi
+}
+
+open_console() {
+    if command -v xdg-open >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        setsid xdg-open "$CONSOLE_URL" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+    else
+        step "open: $CONSOLE_URL"
+    fi
+}
+
+run_tool() { (cd "$REPO_DIR" && python3 -m "tool.$1" "${@:2}"); }
+
+wait_for_propagation() {
+    local try
+    for ((try = 1; try <= PROBE_TRIES; try++)); do
+        if run_tool verify_desktop_client --probe-only; then
+            return 0
+        fi
+        step "probe $try/$PROBE_TRIES failed; new clients need a few minutes"
+        sleep "$PROBE_GAP_SECONDS"
+    done
+    echo "error: client still not accepted; rerun with --verify-only later" >&2
+    return 1
+}
+
+verify() {
+    log "Verifying: probe, consent flow, Firebase signInWithIdp"
+    step "Tap Allow on the sync account's consent page when it opens."
+    run_tool verify_desktop_client
+}
+
+register() {
+    local started
+    started="$(date +%s)"
+    log "Create ONE Desktop OAuth client in project $PROJECT"
+    open_console
+    sleep 2
+    step "Click '+ CREATE CLIENT'. Application type (paste or pick):"
+    clip "$APP_TYPE"
+    pause
+    step "Field 'Name':"
+    clip "$CLIENT_NAME"
+    pause
+    step "Click CREATE, then DOWNLOAD JSON in the dialog (the secret shows once)."
+    step "Leave the existing Web and Android clients alone."
+    log "Waiting up to ${WAIT_SECONDS}s for the downloaded client_secret_*.json"
+    run_tool desktop_client pickup --since "$started" --timeout "$WAIT_SECONDS"
+    wait_for_propagation
+    verify
+}
+
+dry_run() {
+    log "Dry run: nothing is opened, copied or written"
+    step "page:      $CONSOLE_URL"
+    step "type:      $APP_TYPE"
+    step "name:      $CLIENT_NAME"
+    step "stores at: ~/.config/crdt-sync/desktop_client.json (mode 600)"
+    step "verify:    python3 -m tool.verify_desktop_client (in $REPO_DIR)"
+}
+
+main() {
+    case "${1:-}" in
+        --verify-only) verify ;;
+        --dry-run) dry_run ;;
+        -h | --help) usage ;;
+        "") register ;;
+        *)
+            usage >&2
+            exit 2
+            ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+main "$@"

crdt-sync/tool/verify_desktop_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Rudnicki
+"""Prove Firebase accepts an id_token issued to the stored Desktop OAuth client.
+
+Runs the PKCE loopback flow with the installed-app client (secret included in
+the exchange), then calls Firebase Auth REST ``signInWithIdp`` with the result.
+The consent click in the browser is the only human step. No app credential
+file is written: the session lives in memory and is dropped.
+
+Run from the crdt-sync directory::
+
+    python3 -m tool.verify_desktop_client
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import logging
+import secrets
+import sys
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+from crdt_sync._autherrors import FirebaseAuthError
+from crdt_sync._config import ConfigError, FirebaseConfig
+from crdt_sync._credentials import MemoryCredentialStore
+from crdt_sync._firebase_auth import FirebaseTokenProvider
+from tool._oauth_callback import (
+    _CONSENT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+    _CallbackHandler,
+    _free_port,
+    _start_callback_server,
+)
+from tool._pkce import build_consent_url, make_pkce, open_detached
+from tool._token_exchange import TokenError, _authorization_code, _exchange_code
+from tool.client_probe import probe_client
+from tool.desktop_client import ClientFileError, DesktopClient, load_client
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+_logger = logging.getLogger("verify_desktop_client")
+
+
+def audience_of(id_token: str) -> str:
+    """Return the ``aud`` claim of an unverified JWT, or ``?`` if unreadable."""
+    try:
+        segment = id_token.split(".")[1]
+        claims = json.loads(
+            base64.urlsafe_b64decode(segment + "=" * (-len(segment) % 4))
+        )
+        return str(claims["aud"])
+    except IndexError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError:
+        return "?"
+
+
+def hint_for(message: str) -> str:
+    """Return what to do about a known failure message, or an empty string."""
+    if "audience mismatch" in message:
+        return (
+            "Firebase does not trust this client yet: Firebase console > "
+            "Authentication > Sign-in method > Google > Safelist client IDs "
+            "from external projects, add the Desktop client id, then rerun."
+        )
+    if "wrong account" in message:
+        return (
+            "Pick the sync account in the consent picker (login_hint only "
+            "preselects it). Firebase may have created a stray user for the "
+            "other account: check Authentication > Users."
+        )
+    return ""
+
+
+def fetch_id_token(
+    client: DesktopClient,
+    login_hint: str,
+    *,
+    open_browser: bool = True,
+    opener: Callable[[str], bool] = open_detached,
+) -> str:
+    """Run the PKCE loopback flow with ``client`` and return its id_token."""
+    port = _free_port()
+    redirect_uri = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
+    state = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
+    pkce = make_pkce()
+    server, thread = _start_callback_server(port, state)
+    url = build_consent_url(
+        client_id=client.client_id,
+        redirect_uri=redirect_uri,
+        challenge=pkce.challenge,
+        state=state,
+        login_hint=login_hint,
+    )
+    _logger.info("  ..  consent page (opened in your browser, tap Allow):")
+    _logger.info("      %s", url)
+    if open_browser:
+        opener(url)
+    thread.join(timeout=_CONSENT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    server.server_close()
+    code = _authorization_code(_CallbackHandler.result, redirect_uri, state)
+    return _exchange_code(
+        code, client.client_id, client.client_secret, redirect_uri, pkce.verifier
+    )
+
+
+def sign_in(config: FirebaseConfig, id_token: str) -> str:
+    """Call ``signInWithIdp`` in memory; return the account email.
+
+    Raises:
+        FirebaseAuthError: With Firebase's exact message, or on a uid other
+            than the pinned one.
+    """
+    provider = FirebaseTokenProvider(config.api_key, MemoryCredentialStore())
+    return provider.sign_in_with_google(id_token, expected_uid=config.uid)
+
+
+def _fail(message: str) -> int:
+    _logger.error("  FAIL  %s", message)
+    hint = hint_for(message)
+    if hint:
+        _logger.error("  ..    %s", hint)
+    return 1
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    """Probe the stored client, run the consent flow, sign in to Firebase."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
+    parser.add_argument("--no-browser", action="store_true", help="only print the URL")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--skip-probe", action="store_true", help="skip click-free checks"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--probe-only", action="store_true", help="stop after the click-free checks"
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    logging.basicConfig(stream=sys.stdout, level=logging.INFO, format="%(message)s")
+
+    try:
+        config = FirebaseConfig.load()
+        client = load_client()
+        if not args.skip_probe:
+            results = probe_client(client)
+            for result in results:
+                _logger.info("  %s  %s", "ok" if result.ok else "!!", result.detail)
+            failed = [r.detail for r in results if not r.ok]
+            if failed:
+                return _fail("; ".join(failed))
+            if args.probe_only:
+                return 0
+        id_token = fetch_id_token(
+            client, config.email, open_browser=not args.no_browser
+        )
+        _logger.info("  ..  id_token audience: %s", audience_of(id_token))
+        email = sign_in(config, id_token)
+    except (ConfigError, ClientFileError, TokenError, FirebaseAuthError) as exc:
+        return _fail(str(exc))
+
+    _logger.info(
+        "  PASS  Firebase accepted the Desktop client: uid %s, %s", config.uid, email
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

crdt_sync_dart/README.md

@@ -118,6 +118,16 @@ The public/private split is not cosmetic: every repo in this fleet is public.
 APK — the security rules, not secrecy, protect the data. The account email and
 password identify *a person* and are entered once per device.
 
+### Sandbox namespace for test builds
+
+`--dart-define=SYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/slot3` moves every RTDB read and write
+under `/sandbox/slot3/...`, so a test build never touches real data. Sign-in
+is unchanged (the real account). Empty, the default, keeps the exact current
+paths. Only `^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$` is accepted; anything else throws
+`ConfigException` at startup (`firebaseClientFor` / `FirebaseRestClient`), never
+falling back to production paths. The shipped rules (root-level uid pin) already
+allow these paths.
+
 ### `password: ''` is legal
 
 The Google one-tap path and the seeded-session path both store an empty

crdt_sync_dart/lib/crdt_sync.dart

@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@
 library;
 
 export 'src/device.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_audit.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_cipher.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_envelope.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_key.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_migration.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_open.dart';
+export 'src/encrypting_store.dart';
 export 'src/firebase_account_provisioning.dart';
 export 'src/firebase_auth_error.dart';
 export 'src/firebase_auth_rest.dart';
@@ -20,4 +27,5 @@ export 'src/remote_store.dart';
 export 'src/secure_credential_store.dart';
 export 'src/store.dart';
 export 'src/sync.dart';
+export 'src/sync_namespace.dart';
 export 'src/sync_state.dart';

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/e2e_audit.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
+import 'e2e_envelope.dart';
+import 'firebase_keys.dart';
+
+/// Plaintext leaves in a decoded RTDB dump; empty once an app is migrated.
+/// Decodes because RTDB serves blobs as escaped strings that defeat grep.
+List<String> plaintextBlobPaths(Object? tree) {
+  final found = <String>[];
+  void walk(Object? node, String path) {
+    if (node is String) {
+      if (E2eCipher.isPlaintext(node) && !isE2eEnvelope(node)) found.add(path);
+    } else if (node is Map) {
+      for (final MapEntry(:key, :value) in node.entries) {
+        if (key == 'e2e' && value is String) continue;
+        final segment = decodeKey(key as String);
+        walk(value, path.isEmpty ? segment : '$path/$segment');
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  walk(tree, '');
+  return found;
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/e2e_cipher.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
+
+const int e2eFormatVersion = 1;
+
+const _nonceLength = 24;
+const _tagLength = 16;
+
+/// A FormatException so `syncLog` skips the peer instead of aborting the tick.
+class E2eDecryptError extends FormatException {
+  E2eDecryptError(super.message);
+
+  @override
+  String toString() => 'E2eDecryptError: $message';
+}
+
+/// XChaCha20-Poly1305 per blob: base64 `[version][nonce][ct][tag]`, with the
+/// version byte and remote path as AAD so blobs cannot be swapped.
+///
+/// [acceptPlaintext] reads un-migrated peers; turn it off after migration.
+class E2eCipher {
+  E2eCipher(List<int> key, {this.acceptPlaintext = true})
+    : _key = SecretKey(List<int>.unmodifiable(key)) {
+    if (key.length != 32) {
+      throw ArgumentError.value(key.length, 'key', 'must be 32 bytes');
+    }
+  }
+
+  final SecretKey _key;
+  final bool acceptPlaintext;
+
+  static final _aead = Xchacha20.poly1305Aead();
+
+  static bool isPlaintext(String stored) {
+    final trimmed = stored.trimLeft();
+    return trimmed.startsWith('{') || trimmed.startsWith('[');
+  }
+
+  Future<String> seal(String plaintext, {required String path}) async {
+    final box = await _aead.encrypt(
+      utf8.encode(plaintext),
+      secretKey: _key,
+      nonce: _aead.newNonce(),
+      aad: _aad(e2eFormatVersion, path),
+    );
+    return base64.encode([
+      e2eFormatVersion,
+      ...box.nonce,
+      ...box.cipherText,
+      ...box.mac.bytes,
+    ]);
+  }
+
+  Future<String> open(String stored, {required String path}) async {
+    if (isPlaintext(stored)) {
+      if (acceptPlaintext) return stored;
+      throw E2eDecryptError('plaintext blob at $path after migration');
+    }
+    final List<int> bytes;
+    try {
+      bytes = base64.decode(stored);
+    } on FormatException {
+      throw E2eDecryptError('blob at $path is neither JSON nor base64');
+    }
+    if (bytes.isEmpty) throw E2eDecryptError('empty blob at $path');
+    final version = bytes.first;
+    if (version != e2eFormatVersion) {
+      throw E2eDecryptError(
+        'blob at $path uses format $version; update the app to read it',
+      );
+    }
+    if (bytes.length < 1 + _nonceLength + _tagLength) {
+      throw E2eDecryptError('blob at $path is truncated');
+    }
+    final box = SecretBox(
+      bytes.sublist(1 + _nonceLength, bytes.length - _tagLength),
+      nonce: bytes.sublist(1, 1 + _nonceLength),
+      mac: Mac(bytes.sublist(bytes.length - _tagLength)),
+    );
+    try {
+      final clear = await _aead.decrypt(
+        box,
+        secretKey: _key,
+        aad: _aad(version, path),
+      );
+      return utf8.decode(clear);
+    } on SecretBoxAuthenticationError {
+      throw E2eDecryptError('blob at $path failed authentication');
+    }
+  }
+
+  static List<int> _aad(int version, String path) => [
+    version,
+    ...utf8.encode(path),
+  ];
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/e2e_envelope.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/// The per-record wire envelope: record ids, the tombstone and the newest HLC
+/// stay in clear so the relay can order and inspect; every field name and
+/// value is sealed. Merge still runs on the decrypted [Log].
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
+import 'hlc.dart';
+
+const int _envelopeVersion = 1;
+
+/// Whether [text] is an envelope (explicit `"v"` integer), not legacy plaintext.
+///
+/// A legacy log maps record ids to objects, so an id named `v` still maps to
+/// a map, never an int.
+bool isE2eEnvelope(String text) {
+  try {
+    final json = jsonDecode(text);
+    return json is Map && json['v'] is int;
+  } on FormatException {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+String _aad(
+  String path,
+  String id,
+  bool deleted,
+  String? deletedHlc,
+  String? h,
+) => '$path#$id#${deleted ? 1 : 0}#${deletedHlc ?? ''}#${h ?? ''}';
+
+/// Seals a log (the `logToJson` shape) into an envelope. Text that is not
+/// log-shaped is sealed whole, so nothing is ever pushed in clear.
+Future<String> sealLogText(
+  String text,
+  E2eCipher cipher, {
+  required String path,
+}) async {
+  final Map<String, dynamic> raw;
+  try {
+    raw = (jsonDecode(text) as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
+    for (final entry in raw.entries) {
+      final rec = entry.value as Map;
+      if (rec['id'] != entry.key || rec['fields'] is! Map) {
+        throw const FormatException('not a log');
+      }
+    }
+  } on Object {
+    return jsonEncode({
+      'v': _envelopeVersion,
+      'b': await cipher.seal(text, path: path),
+    });
+  }
+  final records = <String, Object?>{};
+  for (final entry in raw.entries) {
+    final rec = (entry.value as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
+    final fields = (rec['fields'] as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
+    Hlc? newest;
+    for (final field in fields.values) {
+      final hlc = Hlc.fromStr((field as List)[1] as String);
+      if (newest == null || hlc > newest) newest = hlc;
+    }
+    final deleted = rec['deleted'] as bool? ?? false;
+    final deletedHlc = rec['deleted_hlc'] as String?;
+    final h = newest?.toStr();
+    records[entry.key] = {
+      'd': deleted,
+      'dh': deletedHlc,
+      'h': h,
+      'p': await cipher.seal(
+        jsonEncode(fields),
+        path: _aad(path, entry.key, deleted, deletedHlc, h),
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+  return jsonEncode({'v': _envelopeVersion, 'r': records});
+}
+
+/// Opens an envelope back to the `logToJson` shape. Legacy plaintext is
+/// returned as-is while the cipher accepts it.
+Future<String> openLogText(
+  String text,
+  E2eCipher cipher, {
+  required String path,
+}) async {
+  if (!isE2eEnvelope(text)) {
+    if (cipher.acceptPlaintext) return text;
+    throw E2eDecryptError('plaintext blob at $path after migration');
+  }
+  final json = (jsonDecode(text) as Map).cast<String, dynamic>();
+  if (json['v'] != _envelopeVersion) {
+    throw E2eDecryptError(
+      'blob at $path uses format ${json['v']}; update the app to read it',
+    );
+  }
+  final whole = json['b'];
+  if (whole is String) return cipher.open(whole, path: path);
+  final records = json['r'];
+  if (records is! Map) throw E2eDecryptError('envelope at $path is mis-shaped');
+  final out = <String, Object?>{};
+  for (final entry in records.entries) {
+    final id = entry.key as String;
+    final rec = entry.value;
+    if (rec is! Map || rec['p'] is! String || rec['d'] is! bool) {
+      throw E2eDecryptError('record $id at $path is mis-shaped');
+    }
+    final deletedHlc = rec['dh'] as String?;
+    final h = rec['h'] as String?;
+    final clear = await cipher.open(
+      rec['p'] as String,
+      path: _aad(path, id, rec['d'] as bool, deletedHlc, h),
+    );
+    out[id] = {
+      'id': id,
+      'fields': jsonDecode(clear),
+      'deleted': rec['d'],
+      'deleted_hlc': deletedHlc,
+    };
+  }
+  return jsonEncode(out);
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/e2e_key.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+import 'dart:convert';
+import 'dart:math';
+
+import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
+
+import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
+import 'encrypting_store.dart';
+import 'remote_store.dart';
+
+const _saltLength = 16;
+const _headerVersion = 1;
+
+/// Argon2id cost, stored in the header so it can be raised later.
+class Argon2Params {
+  const Argon2Params({
+    required this.memoryKiB,
+    required this.iterations,
+    required this.parallelism,
+  });
+
+  /// OWASP's floor (19 MiB, t=2); higher stalls the Flutter-web desktop build.
+  static const recommended = Argon2Params(
+    memoryKiB: 19456,
+    iterations: 2,
+    parallelism: 1,
+  );
+
+  final int memoryKiB;
+  final int iterations;
+  final int parallelism;
+}
+
+class E2eHeaderError extends FormatException {
+  E2eHeaderError(super.message);
+
+  @override
+  String toString() => 'E2eHeaderError: $message';
+}
+
+class E2eWrongPassphraseError implements Exception {
+  @override
+  String toString() => 'E2eWrongPassphraseError: wrong sync passphrase';
+}
+
+/// The clear header's path: a sibling of the device dirs, like `revs`.
+String defaultE2ePath(String pathPrefix) {
+  final cut = pathPrefix.lastIndexOf('/');
+  return cut < 0 ? '$pathPrefix/e2e' : '${pathPrefix.substring(0, cut)}/e2e';
+}
+
+class _Header {
+  _Header(this.salt, this.params, this.check);
+
+  factory _Header.parse(String text) {
+    final Object? json;
+    try {
+      json = jsonDecode(text);
+    } on FormatException {
+      throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header is not JSON');
+    }
+    if (json is! Map<String, dynamic>) {
+      throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header is not an object');
+    }
+    if (json['v'] != _headerVersion) {
+      throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header v${json['v']}; update the app');
+    }
+    try {
+      if (json['kdf'] != 'argon2id') throw const FormatException();
+      return _Header(
+        base64.decode(json['salt'] as String),
+        Argon2Params(
+          memoryKiB: json['m'] as int,
+          iterations: json['t'] as int,
+          parallelism: json['p'] as int,
+        ),
+        json['check'] as String,
+      );
+    } on Object {
+      throw E2eHeaderError('e2e header is malformed');
+    }
+  }
+
+  final List<int> salt;
+  final Argon2Params params;
+  final String check;
+
+  String encode() => jsonEncode({
+    'v': _headerVersion,
+    'kdf': 'argon2id',
+    'salt': base64.encode(salt),
+    'm': params.memoryKiB,
+    't': params.iterations,
+    'p': params.parallelism,
+    'check': check,
+  });
+}
+
+/// A 32-byte master key plus its HKDF subkeys for sealing, revisions and the
+/// passphrase check. Cache [bytes] in the OS keystore, never in RTDB.
+class E2eKey {
+  E2eKey._(this.bytes, this._enc, this._rev, this._check);
+
+  static Future<E2eKey> fromBytes(List<int> bytes) {
+    if (bytes.length != 32) {
+      throw ArgumentError.value(bytes.length, 'bytes', 'must be 32 bytes');
+    }
+    return _expand(List<int>.unmodifiable(bytes));
+  }
+
+  static Future<E2eKey> _expand(List<int> master) async {
+    Future<List<int>> sub(String label) async {
+      final key = await Hkdf(hmac: Hmac.sha256(), outputLength: 32).deriveKey(
+        secretKey: SecretKey(master),
+        info: utf8.encode('crdt_sync e2e $label'),
+      );
+      return key.bytes;
+    }
+
+    return E2eKey._(
+      master,
+      await sub('enc'),
+      SecretKey(await sub('rev')),
+      SecretKey(await sub('check')),
+    );
+  }
+
+  final List<int> bytes;
+  final List<int> _enc;
+  final SecretKey _rev;
+  final SecretKey _check;
+
+  E2eCipher cipher({bool acceptPlaintext = true}) =>
+      E2eCipher(_enc, acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext);
+
+  /// Keyed `revisionOf`: a published revision cannot confirm a guessed log.
+  Future<String> revision(String text) async {
+    final mac = await Hmac.sha256().calculateMac(
+      utf8.encode(text),
+      secretKey: _rev,
+    );
+    return mac.bytes.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0')).join();
+  }
+
+  Future<String> _checkFor(List<int> salt) async {
+    final mac = await Hmac.sha256().calculateMac(salt, secretKey: _check);
+    return base64.encode(mac.bytes);
+  }
+}
+
+Future<E2eKey> _derive(
+  String passphrase,
+  List<int> salt,
+  Argon2Params params,
+) async {
+  final key = await Argon2id(
+    parallelism: params.parallelism,
+    memory: params.memoryKiB,
+    iterations: params.iterations,
+    hashLength: 32,
+  ).deriveKeyFromPassword(password: passphrase, nonce: salt);
+  return E2eKey._expand(await key.extractBytes());
+}
+
+Future<_Header?> _readHeader(RemoteStore store, String path) async {
+  final text = await store.getFileText(path);
+  return text == null ? null : _Header.parse(text);
+}
+
+/// Derives this app's key from [passphrase], creating the header on first use.
+///
+/// Throws [E2eWrongPassphraseError] on a failed check and [E2eHeaderError]
+/// for an unreadable header, which is never overwritten.
+Future<E2eKey> unlockE2e({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required String pathPrefix,
+  required String passphrase,
+  Argon2Params params = Argon2Params.recommended,
+  Random? random,
+  String? e2ePath,
+}) async {
+  if (passphrase.isEmpty) {
+    throw ArgumentError.value('', 'passphrase', 'must not be empty');
+  }
+  final path = e2ePath ?? defaultE2ePath(pathPrefix);
+  var header = await _readHeader(store, path);
+  if (header == null) {
+    final rng = random ?? Random.secure();
+    final salt = List<int>.generate(_saltLength, (_) => rng.nextInt(256));
+    final key = await _derive(passphrase, salt, params);
+    final encoded = _Header(salt, params, await key._checkFor(salt)).encode();
+    await store.putFileText(path, encoded, message: path);
+    // Two devices setting up at once: the last write wins, so re-read.
+    final stored = await store.getFileText(path) ?? encoded;
+    if (stored == encoded) return key;
+    header = _Header.parse(stored);
+  }
+  final key = await _derive(passphrase, header.salt, header.params);
+  if (await key._checkFor(header.salt) != header.check) {
+    throw E2eWrongPassphraseError();
+  }
+  return key;
+}
+
+sealed class E2eState {}
+
+/// No header and no key: this app has never been encrypted.
+final class E2eOff extends E2eState {}
+
+enum E2eLockReason { needsPassphrase, wrongKey, badHeader }
+
+/// Encryption is on, but this device must not sync until it has the key.
+final class E2eLocked extends E2eState {
+  E2eLocked(this.reason);
+
+  final E2eLockReason reason;
+}
+
+final class E2eReady extends E2eState {
+  E2eReady(this.store);
+
+  final EncryptingStore store;
+}
+
+Future<E2eState> openE2e({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required String pathPrefix,
+  E2eKey? key,
+  String? e2ePath,
+  String? revsPath,
+  bool acceptPlaintext = true,
+}) async {
+  final _Header? header;
+  try {
+    header = await _readHeader(store, e2ePath ?? defaultE2ePath(pathPrefix));
+  } on E2eHeaderError {
+    return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.badHeader);
+  }
+  if (key == null) {
+    return header == null ? E2eOff() : E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
+  }
+  if (header == null || await key._checkFor(header.salt) != header.check) {
+    return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
+  }
+  return E2eReady(
+    EncryptingStore(
+      store,
+      key,
+      pathPrefix: pathPrefix,
+      revsPath: revsPath,
+      e2ePath: e2ePath,
+      acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext,
+    ),
+  );
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/e2e_migration.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/// The one-time copy from a plaintext prefix to `<prefix>-e2e`.
+///
+/// Re-encrypting in place is rejected: an old build still writing the old
+/// prefix would be broken mid-migration. Instead the old prefix stays
+/// untouched until [deletePlaintextPrefix] verifies the copy.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'e2e_key.dart';
+import 'encrypting_store.dart';
+import 'log.dart';
+import 'record.dart';
+import 'remote_store.dart';
+import 'store.dart';
+
+/// Where an app's encrypted data lives, derived from its old plaintext prefix.
+class E2eLayout {
+  const E2eLayout._(this.prefix, this.revsPath, this.e2ePath);
+
+  /// `<oldPrefix>-e2e`, with revisions and header apart from the old ones so
+  /// old builds neither see nor clobber them.
+  factory E2eLayout.of(String oldPrefix) {
+    final cut = oldPrefix.lastIndexOf('/');
+    final parent = cut < 0 ? '' : '${oldPrefix.substring(0, cut)}/';
+    final prefix = '$oldPrefix-e2e';
+    return E2eLayout._(prefix, '${parent}revs-e2e', defaultE2ePath(prefix));
+  }
+
+  final String prefix;
+  final String revsPath;
+  final String e2ePath;
+}
+
+class MigrationReport {
+  const MigrationReport(this.copied, this.skipped);
+
+  /// Blobs written (new or changed) this run.
+  final int copied;
+
+  /// Source blobs unreadable as a log, relative path.
+  final List<String> skipped;
+}
+
+Future<Map<String, String>> _listBlobs(RemoteStore store, String root) async {
+  if (store is BulkMapReader) {
+    return (store as BulkMapReader).getStringMap(root);
+  }
+  final out = <String, String>{};
+  for (final entry in await store.listDirectory(root)) {
+    final children = await store.listDirectory('$root/$entry');
+    if (children.isEmpty) {
+      final text = await store.getFileText('$root/$entry');
+      if (text != null) out[entry] = text;
+      continue;
+    }
+    for (final child in children) {
+      final text = await store.getFileText('$root/$entry/$child');
+      if (text != null) out['$entry/$child'] = text;
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+EncryptingStore _dest(RemoteStore store, E2eKey key, E2eLayout layout) =>
+    EncryptingStore(
+      store,
+      key,
+      pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
+      revsPath: layout.revsPath,
+      e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
+    );
+
+/// Order-independent signature of a log, to tell "same records" cheaply.
+String _signature(Log log) {
+  final ids = log.keys.toList()..sort();
+  return jsonEncode([
+    for (final id in ids)
+      [
+        id,
+        log[id]!.deleted,
+        log[id]!.deletedHlc?.toStr(),
+        [
+          for (final name in (log[id]!.fields.keys.toList()..sort()))
+            [
+              name,
+              jsonEncode(log[id]!.fields[name]!.$1),
+              log[id]!.fields[name]!.$2.toStr(),
+            ],
+        ],
+      ],
+  ]);
+}
+
+Log? _parse(String text) {
+  try {
+    return logFromJson(text);
+  } on FormatException {
+    return null;
+  } on TypeError {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/// Copies every readable plaintext log under [fromPrefix] into the encrypted
+/// prefix, merging into what is already there. Idempotent: an unchanged
+/// destination is not rewritten. Never touches [fromPrefix].
+Future<MigrationReport> copyToEncrypted({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required E2eKey key,
+  required String fromPrefix,
+  required E2eLayout layout,
+}) async {
+  final dest = _dest(store, key, layout);
+  var copied = 0;
+  final skipped = <String>[];
+  final blobs = await _listBlobs(store, fromPrefix);
+  for (final MapEntry(key: rel, value: text) in blobs.entries) {
+    final source = _parse(text);
+    if (source == null) {
+      skipped.add(rel);
+      continue;
+    }
+    final path = '${layout.prefix}/$rel';
+    final existing = await dest.getFileText(path);
+    final current = existing == null ? null : _parse(existing);
+    final merged = mergeLogs(current ?? <String, Record>{}, source);
+    if (current != null && _signature(merged) == _signature(current)) continue;
+    await dest.putFileText(path, logToJson(merged), message: 'e2e copy');
+    copied++;
+  }
+  return MigrationReport(copied, skipped);
+}
+
+/// True when every readable plaintext blob is contained in the encrypted copy
+/// and none is unreadable.
+Future<bool> verifyCopy({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required E2eKey key,
+  required String fromPrefix,
+  required E2eLayout layout,
+}) async {
+  final dest = _dest(store, key, layout);
+  for (final MapEntry(key: rel, value: text) in (await _listBlobs(
+    store,
+    fromPrefix,
+  )).entries) {
+    final source = _parse(text);
+    if (source == null) return false;
+    final existing = await dest.getFileText('${layout.prefix}/$rel');
+    final current = existing == null ? null : _parse(existing);
+    if (current == null) return false;
+    if (_signature(mergeLogs(current, source)) != _signature(current)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/// Deletes the plaintext prefix, only after [verifyCopy] passes. Returns
+/// whether it deleted.
+Future<bool> deletePlaintextPrefix({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required E2eKey key,
+  required String fromPrefix,
+  required E2eLayout layout,
+}) async {
+  if (!await verifyCopy(
+    store: store,
+    key: key,
+    fromPrefix: fromPrefix,
+    layout: layout,
+  )) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (final rel in (await _listBlobs(store, fromPrefix)).keys) {
+    await store.deleteFile('$fromPrefix/$rel', message: 'e2e cleanup');
+  }
+  return true;
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/e2e_open.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/// Opens the encrypted store for an app whose old plaintext prefix is
+/// [oldPrefix]; data lives on `E2eLayout.of(oldPrefix)`.
+///
+/// [readPassphrase] supplies the shared crdt-sync passphrase from the OS
+/// keystore, so the open is prompt-free. Fail closed: a missing or wrong
+/// passphrase, or an unreadable header, returns [E2eLocked] and the caller
+/// must not sync. On success the old plaintext prefix is copied over once
+/// per call (idempotent; picks up writes from builds not yet migrated) and
+/// is never deleted here.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:developer';
+
+import 'e2e_key.dart';
+import 'e2e_migration.dart';
+import 'remote_store.dart';
+
+/// Keystore entry name apps store the shared passphrase under.
+const String kE2ePassphraseStorageKey = 'crdt_sync_e2e_passphrase';
+
+Future<E2eState> openEncryptedStore({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required String oldPrefix,
+  required Future<String?> Function() readPassphrase,
+  Argon2Params params = Argon2Params.recommended,
+}) async {
+  final passphrase = await readPassphrase();
+  if (passphrase == null || passphrase.isEmpty) {
+    return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
+  }
+  final layout = E2eLayout.of(oldPrefix);
+  final E2eKey key;
+  try {
+    key = await unlockE2e(
+      store: store,
+      pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
+      passphrase: passphrase,
+      params: params,
+      e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
+    );
+  } on E2eWrongPassphraseError {
+    return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
+  } on E2eHeaderError {
+    return E2eLocked(E2eLockReason.badHeader);
+  }
+  try {
+    await copyToEncrypted(
+      store: store,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: oldPrefix,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+  } on Object catch (error, stackTrace) {
+    // The copy is retried next open; sync itself must not stop for it.
+    log('e2e copy failed', level: 900, error: error, stackTrace: stackTrace);
+  }
+  return await openE2e(
+    store: store,
+    pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
+    key: key,
+    e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
+    revsPath: layout.revsPath,
+  );
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/encrypting_store.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
+import 'e2e_envelope.dart';
+import 'e2e_key.dart';
+import 'remote_store.dart';
+import 'sync.dart';
+
+/// A [RemoteStore] that seals every blob under `pathPrefix` (nested
+/// `<device>/<file>` or flat `<node>.json`) except the header, as a
+/// per-record envelope (ids and HLCs clear, names and values opaque), and
+/// keys every revision under `revsPath`, so the remote is a blind relay.
+///
+/// Wrap the outermost store (above a `MirrorStore`) so every backend gets
+/// ciphertext. Other paths pass through unchanged.
+class EncryptingStore implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
+  EncryptingStore(
+    this._inner,
+    this._key, {
+    required String pathPrefix,
+    String? revsPath,
+    String? e2ePath,
+    bool acceptPlaintext = true,
+  }) : _cipher = _key.cipher(acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext),
+       _prefix = pathPrefix,
+       _revs = revsPath ?? defaultRevsPath(pathPrefix),
+       _header = e2ePath ?? defaultE2ePath(pathPrefix);
+
+  final RemoteStore _inner;
+  final E2eKey _key;
+  final E2eCipher _cipher;
+  final String _prefix;
+  final String _revs;
+  final String _header;
+
+  bool _isRev(String path) => path.startsWith('$_revs/');
+
+  bool _isLog(String path) =>
+      !_isRev(path) && path != _header && path.startsWith('$_prefix/');
+
+  @override
+  Future<String?> getFileText(String path) async {
+    final text = await _inner.getFileText(path);
+    if (text == null || !_isLog(path)) return text;
+    return openLogText(text, _cipher, path: path);
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Future<void> putFileText(
+    String path,
+    String text, {
+    required String message,
+  }) async {
+    final stored = _isLog(path)
+        ? await sealLogText(text, _cipher, path: path)
+        : _isRev(path)
+        ? await _key.revision(text)
+        : text;
+    await _inner.putFileText(path, stored, message: message);
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Future<Map<String, String>> getStringMap(String path) async {
+    if (_inner case final BulkMapReader reader) {
+      return reader.getStringMap(path);
+    }
+    return const {};
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) => _inner.listDirectory(path);
+
+  @override
+  Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) =>
+      _inner.deleteFile(path, message: message);
+
+  @override
+  Future<bool> canAccessRemote() => _inner.canAccessRemote();
+
+  @override
+  void close() => _inner.close();
+}

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/firebase_client.dart

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import 'firebase_auth_rest.dart';
 import 'firebase_errors.dart';
 import 'firebase_keys.dart';
 import 'remote_store.dart';
+import 'sync_namespace.dart';
 
 const _httpUnauthorized = 401;
 const _httpForbidden = 403;
@@ -33,13 +34,22 @@ class FirebaseRestClient implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
     required String databaseUrl,
     required this.auth,
     http.Client? httpClient,
+    String namespace = syncNamespace,
   }) : _databaseUrl = databaseUrl.endsWith('/')
            ? databaseUrl.substring(0, databaseUrl.length - 1)
            : databaseUrl,
+       _prefix = _prefixFor(checkSyncNamespace(namespace)),
        _http = httpClient ?? http.Client();
 
   final String _databaseUrl;
 
+  /// `<namespace>/` or empty: put in front of every RTDB path. Every request
+  /// goes through [_uri], so this is the single choke point.
+  final String _prefix;
+
+  static String _prefixFor(String namespace) =>
+      namespace.isEmpty ? '' : '$namespace/';
+
   /// Mints the ID token every request carries. Public so a settings screen
   /// can drive `signIn` / `signOut` through the same instance the client uses.
   final FirebaseTokenProvider auth;
@@ -47,8 +57,12 @@ class FirebaseRestClient implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
 
   Future<Uri> _uri(String path, {Map<String, String> query = const {}}) async {
     final encoded = encodePath(path);
+    // A bare namespace (the root probe) must not leave a trailing slash.
+    final full = encoded.isEmpty && _prefix.isNotEmpty
+        ? _prefix.substring(0, _prefix.length - 1)
+        : '$_prefix$encoded';
     return Uri.parse(
-      '$_databaseUrl/$encoded.json',
+      '$_databaseUrl/$full.json',
     ).replace(queryParameters: {'auth': await auth.idToken(), ...query});
   }
 

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/firebase_config.dart

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import 'firebase_credentials.dart';
 import 'firebase_client.dart';
 import 'mirror_store.dart';
 import 'remote_store.dart';
+import 'sync_namespace.dart';
 
 /// The shared config is missing a field, or still holds a scaffold placeholder.
 class ConfigException implements Exception {
@@ -121,6 +122,8 @@ Future<FirebaseRestClient> firebaseClientFor({
   String? expectedUid,
   http.Client? httpClient,
 }) async {
+  // Before any sign-in: a bad SYNC_NAMESPACE must stop the app at startup.
+  checkSyncNamespace(syncNamespace);
   final auth = FirebaseTokenProvider(
     apiKey: config.apiKey,
     store: store,

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/io_store.dart

@@ -7,8 +7,11 @@ import 'store.dart';
 /// Writes atomically -- to a per-process temp file, then `rename`d over the
 /// real path -- so a concurrent reader (e.g. a background sync isolate writing
 /// while the foreground app also writes) never observes a half-written file.
-/// The pid in the temp name keeps two writers from colliding. This generalizes
-/// diet_guard's hand-rolled `LogStorageService` write scheme.
+/// The pid in the temp name keeps two processes from colliding; within one
+/// instance, writes are serialized in issue order (last issued wins), so
+/// overlapping calls (e.g. per-keystroke saves) never share the temp file
+/// mid-flight. This generalizes diet_guard's hand-rolled `LogStorageService`
+/// write scheme.
 ///
 /// Lives behind the `package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync_io.dart` entrypoint, not the
 /// main barrel, because it imports `dart:io` and so is unavailable on web --
@@ -20,6 +23,10 @@ class FileLogPersistence implements LogPersistence {
 
   final File _file;
 
+  /// Completes when the most recently issued write has settled. Never
+  /// rejects, so one failed write cannot block the ones queued after it.
+  Future<void> _tail = Future<void>.value();
+
   @override
   Future<String?> read() async {
     if (!_file.existsSync()) return null;
@@ -31,7 +38,14 @@ class FileLogPersistence implements LogPersistence {
   }
 
   @override
-  Future<void> write(String text) async {
+  Future<void> write(String text) {
+    final result = _tail.then((_) => _writeNow(text));
+    // The caller still sees its own error via [result]; the chain ignores it.
+    _tail = result.then((_) {}, onError: (Object _) {});
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  Future<void> _writeNow(String text) async {
     await _file.parent.create(recursive: true);
     final tmp = File('${_file.path}.$pid.tmp');
     await tmp.writeAsString(text);

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/sync.dart

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import 'dart:convert';
 
 import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
 
+import 'e2e_cipher.dart';
 import 'log.dart';
 import 'record.dart';
 import 'remote_store.dart';
@@ -44,6 +45,9 @@ String revisionOf(String encodedLog) =>
 /// treated as this device's own rather than as a peer's, so its
 /// pre-migration log is not pulled back and re-merged every tick. Pass null
 /// once that path has been reclaimed.
+///
+/// [onPeerSkipped] reports each peer skipped as unreadable, e.g. an
+/// [E2eDecryptError] from a wrong key or an app that needs updating.
 Future<Log> syncLog({
   required RemoteStore client,
   required String deviceId,
@@ -56,6 +60,7 @@ Future<Log> syncLog({
   SyncStateStore? stateStore,
   String? revsPath,
   String? legacyDeviceId,
+  void Function(String deviceId, Object error)? onPeerSkipped,
 }) async {
   final revs = revsPath ?? defaultRevsPath(pathPrefix);
   final state = await stateStore?.load() ?? const SyncState();
@@ -80,15 +85,21 @@ Future<Log> syncLog({
       seenRevs[otherDeviceId] = remoteRev;
       continue;
     }
-    final text = await client.getFileText(
-      '$pathPrefix/$otherDeviceId/$filename',
-    );
+    final String? text;
+    try {
+      text = await client.getFileText('$pathPrefix/$otherDeviceId/$filename');
+    } on E2eDecryptError catch (error) {
+      onPeerSkipped?.call(otherDeviceId, error);
+      continue;
+    }
     if (text == null) continue;
     try {
       mergedLog = mergeLogs(mergedLog, decode(text));
-    } on FormatException {
+    } on FormatException catch (error) {
+      onPeerSkipped?.call(otherDeviceId, error);
       continue;
-    } on TypeError {
+    } on TypeError catch (error) {
+      onPeerSkipped?.call(otherDeviceId, error);
       continue;
     }
     // Only remembered once the merge succeeded: a corrupt push must be

crdt_sync_dart/lib/src/sync_namespace.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/// Compile-time sandbox namespace for the Realtime Database.
+///
+/// Build a test app with `--dart-define=SYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/slot3` and every
+/// RTDB path the library reads or writes moves under `/sandbox/slot3/`, so a
+/// test build can never touch real data. Sign-in is unchanged (real account).
+/// Empty, the default, leaves every path exactly as it was.
+library;
+
+import 'firebase_config.dart';
+
+/// The `SYNC_NAMESPACE` dart-define; empty means production paths.
+const String syncNamespace = String.fromEnvironment('SYNC_NAMESPACE');
+
+final RegExp _allowed = RegExp(r'^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$');
+
+/// Returns [namespace] when it is empty or `sandbox/<slot>`, else throws.
+///
+/// Fails closed: a typo must stop the app at startup, never quietly fall back
+/// to production paths. A trailing newline is rejected too.
+String checkSyncNamespace(String namespace) {
+  if (namespace.isEmpty || _allowed.hasMatch(namespace)) return namespace;
+  throw ConfigException(
+    'SYNC_NAMESPACE "$namespace" is invalid: it must be empty or match '
+    r'^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$ (e.g. sandbox/slot3)',
+  );
+}

crdt_sync_dart/pubspec.lock

@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ packages:
       url: "https://pub.dev"
     source: hosted
     version: "2.1.2"
+  characters:
+    dependency: transitive
+    description:
+      name: characters
+      sha256: faf38497bda5ead2a8c7615f4f7939df04333478bf32e4173fcb06d428b5716b
+      url: "https://pub.dev"
+    source: hosted
+    version: "1.4.1"
   cli_config:
     dependency: transitive
     description:
@@ -81,6 +89,22 @@ packages:
       url: "https://pub.dev"
     source: hosted
     version: "3.0.8"
+  cryptography:
+    dependency: "direct main"
+    description:
+      name: cryptography
+      sha256: "3eda3029d34ec9095a27a198ac9785630fe525c0eb6a49f3d575272f8e792ef0"
+      url: "https://pub.dev"
+    source: hosted
+    version: "2.9.0"
+  ffi:
+    dependency: transitive
+    description:
+      name: ffi
+      sha256: "6d7fd89431262d8f3125e81b50d3847a091d846eafcd4fdb88dd06f36d705a45"
+      url: "https://pub.dev"
+    source: hosted
+    version: "2.2.0"
   file:
     dependency: transitive
     description:
@@ -97,6 +121,14 @@ packages:
       url: "https://pub.dev"
     source: hosted
     version: "4.0.0"
+  glados:
+    dependency: "direct dev"
+    description:
+      name: glados
+      sha256: c39446c0c4fe83a6ee6ee4fdee5a1afa27050619c7df390bf4c3b77b6f1acb33
+      url: "https://pub.dev"
+    source: hosted
+    version: "1.1.7"
   glob:
     dependency: transitive
     description:

crdt_sync_dart/pubspec.yaml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: crdt_sync
 description: >-
   Shared CRDT merge scheme + GitHub-Contents-API sync transport for
   cross-device apps. Pure Dart, no Flutter dependency.
-version: 0.11.3
+version: 0.13.1
 publish_to: 'none'
 
 environment:
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ environment:
 
 dependencies:
   crypto: 3.0.8
+  cryptography: 2.9.0
   http: 1.6.0
 
 dev_dependencies:
+  glados: 1.1.7
   lints: 6.1.0
   test: 1.33.0

crdt_sync_dart/test/default_client_and_io_test.dart

@@ -40,9 +40,7 @@ void main() {
       // Nothing listens on this port, so the GET throws and the `on Exception`
       // path returns null -- while the `finally` still closes the client the
       // function created for itself.
-      final account = await accountFromWrapper(
-        Uri.parse('http://127.0.0.1:1'),
-      );
+      final account = await accountFromWrapper(Uri.parse('http://127.0.0.1:1'));
       expect(account, isNull);
     });
 
@@ -50,8 +48,10 @@ void main() {
       final mock = http_testing.MockClient(
         (_) async => http.Response(jsonEncode({}), 404),
       );
-      expect(await accountFromWrapper(Uri.parse('http://x'), client: mock),
-          isNull);
+      expect(
+        await accountFromWrapper(Uri.parse('http://x'), client: mock),
+        isNull,
+      );
       // Still usable: the function must not close a client it did not create.
       expect((await mock.get(Uri.parse('http://x'))).statusCode, 404);
     });
@@ -106,12 +106,15 @@ void main() {
       expect(await store.read(), isNull);
     });
 
-    test('read returns null when the file cannot be read', () async {
+    test(
+      'read returns null when the file cannot be read',
+      () async {
         // A mode-000 file still passes existsSync, so the guard does not fire
         // and readAsString throws PathAccessException (a FileSystemException).
         // A directory would NOT work here: File.existsSync() is false for one,
         // so read() would return early down the guard path instead.
-      final file = File('${dir.path}/unreadable.json')..writeAsStringSync('{}');
+        final file = File('${dir.path}/unreadable.json')
+          ..writeAsStringSync('{}');
         final chmod = Process.runSync('chmod', ['000', file.path]);
         expect(chmod.exitCode, 0);
         addTearDown(() => Process.runSync('chmod', ['644', file.path]));
@@ -121,12 +124,47 @@ void main() {
       // root ignores the permission bits, so the exception never fires.
       skip: Platform.environment['USER'] == 'root'
           ? 'permission bits do not apply to root'
-            : null);
+          : null,
+    );
 
     test('round-trips what it wrote', () async {
       final store = FileLogPersistence(File('${dir.path}/log.json'));
       await store.write('{"hello":"world"}');
       expect(await store.read(), '{"hello":"world"}');
     });
+
+    test(
+      '50 overlapping writes all succeed and the last issued wins',
+      () async {
+        // Regression: every call shared one `<file>.<pid>.tmp`, so the first
+        // rename moved it away and a later rename threw PathNotFoundException.
+        final store = FileLogPersistence(File('${dir.path}/log.json'));
+        await Future.wait([
+          for (var i = 0; i < 50; i++) store.write('{"n":$i}'),
+        ]);
+        expect(await store.read(), '{"n":49}');
+        expect(dir.listSync().map((e) => e.uri.pathSegments.last), [
+          'log.json',
+        ]);
+      },
+    );
+
+    test(
+      'a failed write rejects its caller but does not block later writes',
+      () async {
+        final target = File('${dir.path}/log.json');
+        // A directory at the target path makes the rename fail.
+        Directory(target.path).createSync();
+        final store = FileLogPersistence(target);
+        await expectLater(
+          store.write('{"n":0}'),
+          throwsA(isA<FileSystemException>()),
+        );
+
+        Directory(target.path).deleteSync();
+        await store.write('{"n":1}');
+        expect(await store.read(), '{"n":1}');
+      },
+    );
   });
 }

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_audit_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/// The done check: find plaintext blobs in a raw RTDB dump.
+///
+/// RTDB returns each blob as a JSON string, so its quotes arrive escaped and
+/// `grep -c '"title"'` prints 0 even on plaintext. The audit decodes instead.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+// Shape copied from a live `GET /<root>.json` (scratch data).
+const _livePlaintextDump =
+    r'{"notes":{"pc":{"log~2Ejson":"{\"n2\":{\"id\":\"n2\",\"fields\":'
+    r'{\"title\":[\"call mum\",\"1970-01-01T00:00:01.001Z-0000-pc\"]},'
+    r'\"deleted\":false,\"deleted_hlc\":null}}"}},"revs":{"pc":"ab12"}}';
+
+void main() {
+  test('the grep done check misses live plaintext; the audit does not', () {
+    expect('"title"'.allMatches(_livePlaintextDump), isEmpty);
+    expect(plaintextBlobPaths(jsonDecode(_livePlaintextDump)), [
+      'notes/pc/log.json',
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  test('sealed blobs, revs and the clear e2e header pass', () async {
+    final sealed = await E2eCipher(
+      List<int>.filled(32, 1),
+    ).seal('{"title":"x"}', path: 'notes/pc/log.json');
+    final dump = {
+      'e2e': '{"v":1,"kdf":"argon2id"}',
+      'notes': {
+        'pc': {'log~2Ejson': sealed},
+      },
+      'revs': {'pc': 'ab12'},
+    };
+    expect(plaintextBlobPaths(dump), isEmpty);
+  });
+
+  test('every plaintext leaf is reported, with keys unescaped', () {
+    final dump = {
+      'a': {
+        'x~2Ey': '[1]',
+        'b': {'c': ' {"k":1}'},
+      },
+      'n': 3,
+      'nil': null,
+    };
+    expect(plaintextBlobPaths(dump), unorderedEquals(['a/x.y', 'a/b/c']));
+  });
+
+  test('a root that is itself plaintext, or empty, is handled', () {
+    expect(plaintextBlobPaths('{"a":1}'), ['']);
+    expect(plaintextBlobPaths(null), isEmpty);
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_cipher_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/// The record-blob AEAD: what makes the remote a blind relay.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:glados/glados.dart' hide expect, group, test, setUp;
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+const _path = 'todo-sync/notes/phone/log.json';
+
+E2eCipher _cipher([int fill = 7, bool acceptPlaintext = true]) =>
+    E2eCipher(List<int>.filled(32, fill), acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext);
+
+void main() {
+  Glados(any.letterOrDigits, ExploreConfig(numRuns: 60)).test(
+    'open(seal(x)) == x for any text',
+    (text) async {
+      final cipher = _cipher();
+      final sealed = await cipher.seal('{"t":"$text"}', path: _path);
+      expect(await cipher.open(sealed, path: _path), '{"t":"$text"}');
+    },
+  );
+
+  test('sealed text contains no plaintext and is not JSON', () async {
+    final sealed = await _cipher().seal('{"title":"secret"}', path: _path);
+    expect(sealed, isNot(contains('title')));
+    expect(sealed, isNot(contains('secret')));
+    expect(() => jsonDecode(sealed), throwsFormatException);
+    expect(E2eCipher.isPlaintext(sealed), isFalse);
+  });
+
+  test('two seals of the same text differ (random nonce)', () async {
+    final cipher = _cipher();
+    expect(
+      await cipher.seal('{}', path: _path),
+      isNot(await cipher.seal('{}', path: _path)),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('wire format starts with the version byte', () async {
+    final bytes = base64.decode(await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path));
+    expect(bytes.first, e2eFormatVersion);
+    expect(bytes.length, 1 + 24 + 2 + 16);
+  });
+
+  test('plaintext JSON passes through during migration', () async {
+    expect(await _cipher().open(' {"a":1}', path: _path), ' {"a":1}');
+    expect(await _cipher().open('[1]', path: _path), '[1]');
+    expect(E2eCipher.isPlaintext('\n{'), isTrue);
+  });
+
+  test('plaintext is refused once migration is over', () async {
+    expect(
+      () => _cipher(7, false).open('{"a":1}', path: _path),
+      throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+    );
+  });
+
+  group('rejects, as a FormatException so syncLog skips the peer', () {
+    test('a wrong key', () async {
+      final sealed = await _cipher(1).seal('{}', path: _path);
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher(2).open(sealed, path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<FormatException>()),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('a blob moved to another path', () async {
+      final sealed = await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path);
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher().open(sealed, path: 'todo-sync/notes/pc/log.json'),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('a flipped ciphertext byte', () async {
+      final bytes = base64.decode(await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path));
+      bytes[30] ^= 1;
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher().open(base64.encode(bytes), path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('an unknown version byte', () async {
+      final bytes = base64.decode(await _cipher().seal('{}', path: _path));
+      bytes[0] = 9;
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher().open(base64.encode(bytes), path: _path),
+        throwsA(
+          isA<E2eDecryptError>().having(
+            (e) => e.message,
+            'message',
+            contains('update the app'),
+          ),
+        ),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('text that is not base64', () {
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher().open('not base64 !!', path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('a blob too short to hold nonce and tag', () {
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher().open(base64.encode([1, 2, 3]), path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('an empty blob', () {
+      expect(
+        () => _cipher().open('', path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('a key that is not 32 bytes is a programming error', () {
+    expect(() => E2eCipher(const [1, 2]), throwsArgumentError);
+  });
+
+  test('E2eDecryptError reads as itself', () {
+    expect(E2eDecryptError('x').toString(), 'E2eDecryptError: x');
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_envelope_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/// Per-record envelope: ids and HLCs stay clear, field names and values are
+/// opaque, and merge results are identical with and without encryption.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:glados/glados.dart' hide expect, group, test, setUp;
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
+
+const _path = 'app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json';
+
+E2eCipher _cipher([int fill = 7, bool acceptPlaintext = true]) =>
+    E2eCipher(List<int>.filled(32, fill), acceptPlaintext: acceptPlaintext);
+
+Hlc _hlc(int ms, int counter, String node) =>
+    Hlc(wallTimeMs: ms, counter: counter, nodeId: node);
+
+Log _logFrom(List<(int, int, String)> rows) {
+  final log = <String, Record>{};
+  for (final (id, field, value) in rows) {
+    final key = 'r$id';
+    final old = log[key];
+    log[key] = Record(
+      id: key,
+      fields: {
+        ...?old?.fields,
+        'f$field': (value, _hlc(1000 + id * 7 + field, field, 'n$id')),
+      },
+      deleted: id % 4 == 0,
+      deletedHlc: id % 4 == 0 ? _hlc(5000, 0, 'n$id') : null,
+    );
+  }
+  return log;
+}
+
+final _rows = any.list(
+  any.combine3(
+    any.intInRange(0, 6),
+    any.intInRange(0, 4),
+    any.letterOrDigits,
+    (a, b, c) => (a, b, c),
+  ),
+);
+
+void main() {
+  Glados(_rows, ExploreConfig(numRuns: 40)).test(
+    'decode(open(seal(encode(log)))) == log',
+    (rows) async {
+      final log = _logFrom(rows);
+      final cipher = _cipher();
+      final sealed = await sealLogText(encodeLog(log), cipher, path: _path);
+      final opened = await openLogText(sealed, cipher, path: _path);
+      expect(encodeLog(decodeLog(opened)), encodeLog(log));
+    },
+  );
+
+  Glados2(_rows, _rows, ExploreConfig(numRuns: 40)).test(
+    'merge through the envelope == merge without it',
+    (a, b) async {
+      final cipher = _cipher();
+      Future<Log> viaCipher(Log log) async => decodeLog(
+        await openLogText(
+          await sealLogText(encodeLog(log), cipher, path: _path),
+          cipher,
+          path: _path,
+        ),
+      );
+      final la = _logFrom(a);
+      final lb = _logFrom(b);
+      final plain = mergeLogs(la, lb);
+      final sealed = mergeLogs(await viaCipher(la), await viaCipher(lb));
+      expect(encodeLog(sealed), encodeLog(plain));
+    },
+  );
+
+  test('ids and HLCs are clear, names and values are not', () async {
+    final log = logOf({'n1': 'buy milk'});
+    final sealed = await sealLogText(encodeLog(log), _cipher(), path: _path);
+    final json = jsonDecode(sealed) as Map<String, dynamic>;
+    expect(json['v'], 1);
+    final rec = (json['r'] as Map<String, dynamic>)['n1'] as Map;
+    expect(rec['h'], log['n1']!.fields['title']!.$2.toStr());
+    expect(rec['d'], false);
+    expect(sealed, isNot(contains('title')));
+    expect(sealed, isNot(contains('buy milk')));
+    expect(isE2eEnvelope(sealed), isTrue);
+    expect(isE2eEnvelope(encodeLog(log)), isFalse);
+  });
+
+  test('legacy plaintext passes only while acceptPlaintext', () async {
+    final text = encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'x'}));
+    expect(await openLogText(text, _cipher(), path: _path), text);
+    expect(
+      () => openLogText(text, _cipher(7, false), path: _path),
+      throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('a record id named v is still legacy plaintext', () async {
+    final text = encodeLog(logOf({'v': 'x'}));
+    expect(isE2eEnvelope(text), isFalse);
+  });
+
+  group('tamper and wrong key are E2eDecryptError', () {
+    Future<String> sealed() async =>
+        sealLogText(encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'x'})), _cipher(), path: _path);
+
+    test('wrong key', () async {
+      final text = await sealed();
+      expect(
+        () => openLogText(text, _cipher(8), path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+    test('moved path', () async {
+      final text = await sealed();
+      expect(
+        () => openLogText(text, _cipher(), path: '$_path-x'),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+    test('flipped clear deleted flag', () async {
+      final json = jsonDecode(await sealed()) as Map<String, dynamic>;
+      ((json['r'] as Map)['n1'] as Map)['d'] = true;
+      expect(
+        () => openLogText(jsonEncode(json), _cipher(), path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+    test('record swapped to another id', () async {
+      final json = jsonDecode(await sealed()) as Map<String, dynamic>;
+      final r = json['r'] as Map;
+      r['n2'] = r.remove('n1');
+      expect(
+        () => openLogText(jsonEncode(json), _cipher(), path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+    test('mis-shaped envelope', () async {
+      expect(
+        () => openLogText('{"v":1,"r":5}', _cipher(), path: _path),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eDecryptError>()),
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('text that is not a log is sealed whole and opens back', () async {
+    final cipher = _cipher();
+    final sealed = await sealLogText('{"n":{"id":1}}', cipher, path: _path);
+    expect(sealed, isNot(contains('"id"')));
+    expect(await openLogText(sealed, cipher, path: _path), '{"n":{"id":1}}');
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_fakes.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+
+const cheapArgon = Argon2Params(memoryKiB: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1);
+
+Log logOf(Map<String, String> titles, {String nodeId = 'node-a'}) => {
+  for (final entry in titles.entries)
+    entry.key: Record(
+      id: entry.key,
+      fields: {
+        'title': (
+          entry.value,
+          Hlc(wallTimeMs: 1000, counter: 0, nodeId: nodeId),
+        ),
+      },
+    ),
+};
+
+String encodeLog(Log log) =>
+    jsonEncode(log.map((id, record) => MapEntry(id, record.toJson())));
+
+Log decodeLog(String text) => (jsonDecode(text) as Map<String, dynamic>).map(
+  (id, data) => MapEntry(id, Record.fromJson(data as Map<String, dynamic>)),
+);
+
+/// In-memory remote; [bulk] toggles the [BulkMapReader] capability.
+class MemoryRemote implements RemoteStore, BulkMapReader {
+  MemoryRemote([Map<String, String>? files]) : files = files ?? {};
+
+  final Map<String, String> files;
+  final List<String> writes = [];
+  final List<String> reads = [];
+  bool closed = false;
+
+  /// Overrides the next reads of a path, oldest first, to fake a race.
+  final Map<String, List<String?>> scriptedReads = {};
+
+  @override
+  Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) async => files.keys
+      .where((key) => key.startsWith('$path/'))
+      .map((key) => key.substring(path.length + 1).split('/').first)
+      .toSet()
+      .toList();
+
+  @override
+  Future<String?> getFileText(String path) async {
+    reads.add(path);
+    final script = scriptedReads[path];
+    if (script != null && script.isNotEmpty) return script.removeAt(0);
+    return files[path];
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Future<void> putFileText(
+    String path,
+    String text, {
+    required String message,
+  }) async {
+    writes.add(path);
+    files[path] = text;
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Future<Map<String, String>> getStringMap(String path) async => {
+    for (final entry in files.entries)
+      if (entry.key.startsWith('$path/'))
+        entry.key.substring(path.length + 1): entry.value,
+  };
+
+  @override
+  Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) async =>
+      files.remove(path);
+
+  @override
+  Future<bool> canAccessRemote() async => true;
+
+  @override
+  void close() => closed = true;
+}
+
+/// Same storage without the bulk capability, like `GitHubClient`.
+class PlainRemote implements RemoteStore {
+  PlainRemote(this.inner);
+
+  final MemoryRemote inner;
+
+  @override
+  Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) => inner.listDirectory(path);
+
+  @override
+  Future<String?> getFileText(String path) => inner.getFileText(path);
+
+  @override
+  Future<void> putFileText(
+    String path,
+    String text, {
+    required String message,
+  }) => inner.putFileText(path, text, message: message);
+
+  @override
+  Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) =>
+      inner.deleteFile(path);
+
+  @override
+  Future<bool> canAccessRemote() => inner.canAccessRemote();
+
+  @override
+  void close() => inner.close();
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_key_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/// Passphrase -> key, the clear header beside the data, and the open gate.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+import 'dart:math';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
+
+const _prefix = 'todo-sync/notes';
+const _headerPath = 'todo-sync/e2e';
+
+Future<E2eKey> _unlock(MemoryRemote remote, String passphrase) => unlockE2e(
+  store: remote,
+  pathPrefix: _prefix,
+  passphrase: passphrase,
+  params: cheapArgon,
+  random: Random(1),
+);
+
+void main() {
+  test('the header sits beside the device dirs, not among them', () {
+    expect(defaultE2ePath(_prefix), _headerPath);
+    expect(defaultE2ePath('wake-alarm'), 'wake-alarm/e2e');
+  });
+
+  test(
+    'first unlock writes a clear header with salt, params and check',
+    () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote();
+      await _unlock(remote, 'correct horse');
+      final header = jsonDecode(remote.files[_headerPath]!) as Map;
+      expect(header['v'], 1);
+      expect(header['kdf'], 'argon2id');
+      expect(base64.decode(header['salt'] as String), hasLength(16));
+      expect(header['m'], 8);
+      expect(header['t'], 1);
+      expect(header['p'], 1);
+      expect(header['check'], isA<String>());
+      expect(remote.files[_headerPath], isNot(contains('correct horse')));
+    },
+  );
+
+  test('the same passphrase on another device yields the same key', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final a = await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
+    final b = await unlockE2e(
+      store: remote,
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      passphrase: 'pw',
+      random: Random(99),
+    );
+    expect(b.bytes, a.bytes);
+    expect(remote.writes, [_headerPath]);
+  });
+
+  test('a wrong passphrase is refused before anything is written', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
+    remote.writes.clear();
+    await expectLater(
+      _unlock(remote, 'not pw'),
+      throwsA(isA<E2eWrongPassphraseError>()),
+    );
+    expect(remote.writes, isEmpty);
+  });
+
+  test('a setup race derives from the header that won', () async {
+    final winner = MemoryRemote();
+    await unlockE2e(
+      store: winner,
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      passphrase: 'pw',
+      params: cheapArgon,
+      random: Random(5),
+    );
+    final remote = MemoryRemote()
+      ..scriptedReads[_headerPath] = [null, winner.files[_headerPath]];
+    final key = await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
+    final expected = await _unlock(winner, 'pw');
+    expect(key.bytes, expected.bytes);
+  });
+
+  test('an empty passphrase is refused', () {
+    expect(() => _unlock(MemoryRemote(), ''), throwsArgumentError);
+  });
+
+  test('a corrupt or newer header is refused, never overwritten', () async {
+    for (final bad in ['nope', '[]', '{"v":2}', '{"v":1,"kdf":"scrypt"}']) {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote({_headerPath: bad});
+      await expectLater(
+        _unlock(remote, 'pw'),
+        throwsA(isA<E2eHeaderError>()),
+        reason: bad,
+      );
+      expect(remote.files[_headerPath], bad);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('E2eKey.fromBytes round-trips a cached key', () async {
+    final key = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'pw');
+    final cached = await E2eKey.fromBytes(
+      base64.decode(base64.encode(key.bytes)),
+    );
+    expect(cached.bytes, key.bytes);
+    expect(await cached.revision('x'), await key.revision('x'));
+    expect(() => E2eKey.fromBytes(const [1]), throwsArgumentError);
+  });
+
+  test('revision is keyed: not sha256, and differs across keys', () async {
+    final a = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'a');
+    final b = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'b');
+    expect(await a.revision('{}'), isNot(revisionOf('{}')));
+    expect(await a.revision('{}'), isNot(await b.revision('{}')));
+    expect(await a.revision('{}'), await a.revision('{}'));
+  });
+
+  test('errors read as themselves', () {
+    expect(E2eWrongPassphraseError().toString(), contains('passphrase'));
+    expect(E2eHeaderError('x').toString(), 'E2eHeaderError: x');
+  });
+
+  group('openE2e', () {
+    test('no header and no key: off, plaintext sync allowed', () async {
+      final state = await openE2e(store: MemoryRemote(), pathPrefix: _prefix);
+      expect(state, isA<E2eOff>());
+    });
+
+    test('header but no key: locked, needs the passphrase', () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote();
+      await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
+      final state = await openE2e(store: remote, pathPrefix: _prefix);
+      expect(state, isA<E2eLocked>());
+      expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
+    });
+
+    test('a cached key the header rejects: locked, wrong key', () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote();
+      await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
+      final stale = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'old');
+      final state = await openE2e(
+        store: remote,
+        pathPrefix: _prefix,
+        key: stale,
+      );
+      expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
+    });
+
+    test('a cached key with the header gone: locked, wrong key', () async {
+      final key = await _unlock(MemoryRemote(), 'pw');
+      final state = await openE2e(
+        store: MemoryRemote(),
+        pathPrefix: _prefix,
+        key: key,
+      );
+      expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
+    });
+
+    test('a corrupt header: locked, unreadable header', () async {
+      final state = await openE2e(
+        store: MemoryRemote({_headerPath: 'garbage'}),
+        pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      );
+      expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.badHeader);
+    });
+
+    test('a matching key: ready with an encrypting store', () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote();
+      final key = await _unlock(remote, 'pw');
+      final state = await openE2e(store: remote, pathPrefix: _prefix, key: key);
+      expect((state as E2eReady).store, isA<EncryptingStore>());
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('recommended params meet the OWASP Argon2id floor', () {
+    expect(Argon2Params.recommended.memoryKiB, greaterThanOrEqualTo(19456));
+    expect(Argon2Params.recommended.iterations, greaterThanOrEqualTo(2));
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_migration_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/// One-time copy from the plaintext prefix to `<prefix>-e2e`.
+library;
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
+
+const _old = 'app/notes';
+
+Future<E2eKey> _key(MemoryRemote remote, E2eLayout layout) => unlockE2e(
+  store: remote,
+  pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
+  passphrase: 'pw',
+  params: cheapArgon,
+  e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
+);
+
+MemoryRemote _plainRemote() => MemoryRemote({
+  '$_old/phone/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'milk', 'b': 'eggs'})),
+  '$_old/pc/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'c': 'tea'}, nodeId: 'node-b')),
+});
+
+void main() {
+  final layout = E2eLayout.of(_old);
+
+  test('layout puts ciphertext on a new prefix, revs apart from old', () {
+    expect(layout.prefix, 'app/notes-e2e');
+    expect(layout.revsPath, isNot(defaultRevsPath(_old)));
+    expect(layout.e2ePath, startsWith('app/'));
+  });
+
+  test('copy seals every device log under the new prefix', () async {
+    final remote = _plainRemote();
+    final key = await _key(remote, layout);
+    final report = await copyToEncrypted(
+      store: remote,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: _old,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+    expect(report.copied, 2);
+    final blob = remote.files['app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json']!;
+    expect(blob, isNot(contains('milk')));
+    expect(blob, isNot(contains('"title"')));
+    expect(remote.files['$_old/phone/log.json'], contains('milk'));
+    final enc = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      key,
+      pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
+      revsPath: layout.revsPath,
+      e2ePath: layout.e2ePath,
+    );
+    final merged = await syncLog(
+      client: enc,
+      deviceId: 'tablet',
+      pathPrefix: layout.prefix,
+      localLog: {},
+      encode: encodeLog,
+      decode: decodeLog,
+    );
+    expect(merged.keys, unorderedEquals(['a', 'b', 'c']));
+  });
+
+  test('copying twice adds no duplicate and loses nothing', () async {
+    final remote = _plainRemote();
+    final key = await _key(remote, layout);
+    Future<MigrationReport> run() => copyToEncrypted(
+      store: remote,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: _old,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+    await run();
+    final first = Map.of(remote.files);
+    remote.writes.clear();
+    final second = await run();
+    expect(second.copied, 0);
+    expect(remote.writes, isEmpty);
+    expect(remote.files, first);
+  });
+
+  test('a later plaintext write by an old build is copied again', () async {
+    final remote = _plainRemote();
+    final key = await _key(remote, layout);
+    await copyToEncrypted(
+      store: remote,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: _old,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+    remote.files['$_old/pc/log.json'] = encodeLog(
+      logOf({'c': 'tea', 'd': 'jam'}, nodeId: 'node-b'),
+    );
+    final report = await copyToEncrypted(
+      store: remote,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: _old,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+    expect(report.copied, 1);
+    expect(
+      await verifyCopy(
+        store: remote,
+        key: key,
+        fromPrefix: _old,
+        layout: layout,
+      ),
+      isTrue,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('cleanup refuses before the copy is verified, then deletes', () async {
+    final remote = _plainRemote();
+    final key = await _key(remote, layout);
+    expect(
+      await deletePlaintextPrefix(
+        store: remote,
+        key: key,
+        fromPrefix: _old,
+        layout: layout,
+      ),
+      isFalse,
+    );
+    expect(remote.files['$_old/phone/log.json'], isNotNull);
+    await copyToEncrypted(
+      store: remote,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: _old,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+    expect(
+      await deletePlaintextPrefix(
+        store: remote,
+        key: key,
+        fromPrefix: _old,
+        layout: layout,
+      ),
+      isTrue,
+    );
+    expect(remote.files.keys.where((k) => k.startsWith('$_old/')), isEmpty);
+    expect(remote.files['app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json'], isNotNull);
+  });
+
+  test('a corrupt source blob is skipped and blocks cleanup', () async {
+    final remote = _plainRemote();
+    remote.files['$_old/bad/log.json'] = '{oops';
+    final key = await _key(remote, layout);
+    final report = await copyToEncrypted(
+      store: remote,
+      key: key,
+      fromPrefix: _old,
+      layout: layout,
+    );
+    expect(report.copied, 2);
+    expect(report.skipped, ['bad/log.json']);
+    expect(
+      await deletePlaintextPrefix(
+        store: remote,
+        key: key,
+        fromPrefix: _old,
+        layout: layout,
+      ),
+      isFalse,
+    );
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/e2e_open_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
+
+const _old = 'app/notes';
+
+Future<E2eState> _open(MemoryRemote r, String? pass) => openEncryptedStore(
+  store: r,
+  oldPrefix: _old,
+  readPassphrase: () async => pass,
+  params: cheapArgon,
+);
+
+void main() {
+  test('no passphrase is locked', () async {
+    for (final p in [null, '']) {
+      final s = await _open(MemoryRemote(), p);
+      expect((s as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('right passphrase copies and is ready; wrong one is locked', () async {
+    final r = MemoryRemote({
+      '$_old/phone/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'milk'})),
+    });
+    expect(await _open(r, 'pw'), isA<E2eReady>());
+    expect(r.files['app/notes-e2e/phone/log.json'], isNot(contains('milk')));
+    expect(await _open(r, 'pw'), isA<E2eReady>());
+    expect(
+      ((await _open(r, 'bad')) as E2eLocked).reason,
+      E2eLockReason.wrongKey,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('a corrupt header locks as badHeader', () async {
+    final r = MemoryRemote({'app/e2e': 'garbage'});
+    expect(
+      ((await _open(r, 'pw')) as E2eLocked).reason,
+      E2eLockReason.badHeader,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('a failing copy does not stop the open', () async {
+    final r = MemoryRemote();
+    r.files['$_old/phone/log.json'] = encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'x'}));
+    final failing = _FailingList(r);
+    final s = await openEncryptedStore(
+      store: failing,
+      oldPrefix: _old,
+      readPassphrase: () async => 'pw',
+      params: cheapArgon,
+    );
+    expect(s, isA<E2eReady>());
+  });
+}
+
+class _FailingList extends PlainRemote {
+  _FailingList(super.inner);
+  @override
+  Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) =>
+      throw StateError('list down');
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/encrypting_store_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/// syncLog over an EncryptingStore: the relay sees ciphertext, merge is
+/// unchanged.
+library;
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:glados/glados.dart' hide expect, group, test, setUp;
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+import 'e2e_fakes.dart';
+
+const _prefix = 'todo-sync/notes';
+const _revs = 'todo-sync/revs';
+
+Future<E2eKey> _key(MemoryRemote remote, [String passphrase = 'pw']) =>
+    unlockE2e(
+      store: remote,
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      passphrase: passphrase,
+      params: cheapArgon,
+      random: Random(1),
+    );
+
+Future<Log> _tick(
+  RemoteStore client,
+  String deviceId,
+  Log local, {
+  SyncStateStore? state,
+  List<String>? skipped,
+}) => syncLog(
+  client: client,
+  deviceId: deviceId,
+  pathPrefix: _prefix,
+  localLog: local,
+  encode: encodeLog,
+  decode: decodeLog,
+  stateStore: state,
+  onPeerSkipped: (id, _) => skipped?.add(id),
+);
+
+void main() {
+  test('pushed blob is ciphertext and a peer merges it', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final key = await _key(remote);
+    final store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, pathPrefix: _prefix);
+    await _tick(store, 'phone', logOf({'n1': 'buy milk'}));
+
+    final blob = remote.files['$_prefix/phone/log.json']!;
+    expect(blob, isNot(contains('title')));
+    expect(blob, isNot(contains('buy milk')));
+
+    final merged = await _tick(store, 'pc', logOf({'n2': 'call mum'}));
+    expect(merged.keys, unorderedEquals(['n1', 'n2']));
+    expect(remote.files.values.where((v) => v.contains('"title"')), isEmpty);
+  });
+
+  test('published revisions are keyed, not sha256 of the plaintext', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final store = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    final local = logOf({'n1': 'x'});
+    await _tick(store, 'phone', local, state: InMemorySyncStateStore());
+    final rev = remote.files['$_revs/phone']!;
+    expect(rev, isNot(revisionOf(encodeLog(local))));
+    expect(rev, hasLength(64));
+  });
+
+  test('a peer that has not upgraded is still read', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    await _tick(remote, 'pc', logOf({'old': 'plain'}));
+    final store = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    final merged = await _tick(store, 'phone', logOf({'n1': 'x'}));
+    expect(merged.keys, unorderedEquals(['old', 'n1']));
+  });
+
+  test('a tampered peer is skipped and the others still merge', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final store = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    await _tick(store, 'b', logOf({'b1': 'y'}));
+    await _tick(store, 'a', logOf({'a1': 'x'}));
+    final blob = remote.files['$_prefix/a/log.json']!;
+    remote.files['$_prefix/a/log.json'] = blob.replaceRange(
+      40,
+      41,
+      blob[40] == 'A' ? 'B' : 'A',
+    );
+    final skipped = <String>[];
+    final merged = await _tick(store, 'c', {}, skipped: skipped);
+    expect(merged.keys, ['b1']);
+    expect(skipped, ['a']);
+  });
+
+  test('unparsable and mis-shaped peers are reported as skipped', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote({
+      '$_prefix/bad/log.json': '{oops',
+      '$_prefix/shape/log.json': '{"n":{"id":1}}',
+    });
+    final skipped = <String>[];
+    await _tick(remote, 'me', {}, skipped: skipped);
+    expect(skipped, unorderedEquals(['bad', 'shape']));
+  });
+
+  test('a peer under another passphrase is skipped, not fatal', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final other = MemoryRemote();
+    final mine = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    final theirs = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(other, 'other'),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    await _tick(theirs, 'x', logOf({'x1': 'x'}));
+    expect(await _tick(mine, 'me', {}), isEmpty);
+  });
+
+  test('a prefix without a slash keeps revs out of the sealed set', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final key = await unlockE2e(
+      store: remote,
+      pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm',
+      passphrase: 'pw',
+      params: cheapArgon,
+    );
+    final store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm');
+    await syncLog(
+      client: store,
+      deviceId: 'phone',
+      pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm',
+      localLog: logOf({'n': 'x'}),
+      encode: encodeLog,
+      decode: decodeLog,
+      stateStore: InMemorySyncStateStore(),
+    );
+    expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/revs/phone'], hasLength(64));
+    expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/phone/log.json'], isNot(contains('"x"')));
+    expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/e2e'], contains('argon2id'));
+  });
+
+  test('paths outside the prefix pass through untouched', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final store = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    await store.putFileText('other/x', '{"a":1}', message: 'm');
+    expect(remote.files['other/x'], '{"a":1}');
+    expect(await store.getFileText('other/x'), '{"a":1}');
+    expect(await store.getFileText('$_prefix/none/log.json'), isNull);
+  });
+
+  test('a flat <prefix>/<node>.json layout (todo) is sealed too', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final store = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    final log = encodeLog(logOf({'n1': 'buy milk'}));
+    await store.putFileText('$_prefix/node-a.json', log, message: 'm');
+    expect(remote.files['$_prefix/node-a.json'], isNot(contains('milk')));
+    expect(isE2eEnvelope(remote.files['$_prefix/node-a.json']!), isTrue);
+    expect(await store.getFileText('$_prefix/node-a.json'), log);
+  });
+
+  test('a slashless prefix keeps the header and revs out of sealing', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote();
+    final key = await unlockE2e(
+      store: remote,
+      pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm',
+      passphrase: 'pw',
+      params: cheapArgon,
+    );
+    final store = EncryptingStore(remote, key, pathPrefix: 'wake-alarm');
+    final header = remote.files['wake-alarm/e2e']!;
+    expect(await store.getFileText('wake-alarm/e2e'), header);
+    await store.putFileText('wake-alarm/e2e', header, message: 'm');
+    expect(remote.files['wake-alarm/e2e'], header);
+  });
+
+  test('plaintext is refused when acceptPlaintext is off', () async {
+    final remote = MemoryRemote({
+      '$_prefix/pc/log.json': encodeLog(logOf({'a': 'b'})),
+    });
+    final store = EncryptingStore(
+      remote,
+      await _key(remote),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      acceptPlaintext: false,
+    );
+    expect(await _tick(store, 'phone', {}), isEmpty);
+  });
+
+  group('delegation', () {
+    test('bulk reads forward when the inner store has them', () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote({'$_revs/a': 'r'});
+      final store = EncryptingStore(
+        remote,
+        await _key(remote),
+        pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      );
+      expect(await store.getStringMap(_revs), {'a': 'r'});
+    });
+
+    test('bulk reads degrade to "fetch everything" without them', () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote({'$_revs/a': 'r'});
+      final store = EncryptingStore(
+        PlainRemote(remote),
+        await _key(remote),
+        pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      );
+      expect(await store.getStringMap(_revs), isEmpty);
+    });
+
+    test('list, delete, access and close reach the inner store', () async {
+      final remote = MemoryRemote({'$_prefix/a/log.json': '{}'});
+      final store = EncryptingStore(
+        remote,
+        await _key(remote),
+        pathPrefix: _prefix,
+      );
+      expect(await store.listDirectory(_prefix), ['a']);
+      await store.deleteFile('$_prefix/a/log.json', message: 'm');
+      expect(remote.files.containsKey('$_prefix/a/log.json'), isFalse);
+      expect(await store.canAccessRemote(), isTrue);
+      store.close();
+      expect(remote.closed, isTrue);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // Differential: the same sync rounds over a plain and an encrypting relay
+  // must converge to the same logs.
+  Glados(
+    any.list(
+      any.combine3(
+        any.intInRange(0, 3),
+        any.intInRange(0, 6),
+        any.letterOrDigits,
+        (int d, int n, String t) => (d, n, t),
+      ),
+    ),
+    ExploreConfig(numRuns: 25),
+  ).test('merge is identical with and without encryption', (edits) async {
+    const devices = ['a', 'b', 'c'];
+    Log localFor(int d) => {
+      for (final (i, (dev, note, title)) in edits.indexed)
+        if (dev == d)
+          'n$note': Record(
+            id: 'n$note',
+            fields: {
+              'title': (
+                title,
+                Hlc(wallTimeMs: 1000 + i, counter: 0, nodeId: devices[d]),
+              ),
+            },
+          ),
+    };
+    final plain = MemoryRemote();
+    final sealedRemote = MemoryRemote();
+    final sealed = EncryptingStore(
+      sealedRemote,
+      await E2eKey.fromBytes(List<int>.filled(32, 3)),
+      pathPrefix: _prefix,
+    );
+    final plainLogs = [for (var d = 0; d < 3; d++) localFor(d)];
+    final sealedLogs = [for (var d = 0; d < 3; d++) localFor(d)];
+    for (var round = 0; round < 2; round++) {
+      for (var d = 0; d < 3; d++) {
+        plainLogs[d] = await _tick(plain, devices[d], plainLogs[d]);
+        sealedLogs[d] = await _tick(sealed, devices[d], sealedLogs[d]);
+      }
+    }
+    expect(sealedLogs, plainLogs);
+    expect(sealedLogs[0], sealedLogs[2]);
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/test/sync_namespace_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+import 'dart:convert';
+import 'dart:io';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
+import 'package:http/testing.dart' as http_testing;
+import 'package:test/test.dart';
+
+const _databaseUrl = 'https://example-default-rtdb.firebasedatabase.app';
+
+FirebaseTokenProvider _auth() => FirebaseTokenProvider(
+  apiKey: 'fake-api-key',
+  store: InMemoryCredentialStore(
+    FirebaseCredentials(
+      idToken: 'id-token',
+      refreshToken: 'refresh-token',
+      expiresAt: DateTime.utc(2099),
+    ),
+  ),
+  httpClient: http_testing.MockClient(
+    (_) async => throw StateError('auth must not be contacted'),
+  ),
+);
+
+/// Client over an in-memory transport that records every request path.
+(FirebaseRestClient, List<http.Request>) _client(String? namespace) {
+  final requests = <http.Request>[];
+  final mock = http_testing.MockClient((request) async {
+    requests.add(request);
+    return http.Response(jsonEncode(request.method == 'GET' ? null : 'x'), 200);
+  });
+  final client = namespace == null
+      ? FirebaseRestClient(
+          databaseUrl: _databaseUrl,
+          auth: _auth(),
+          httpClient: mock,
+        )
+      : FirebaseRestClient(
+          databaseUrl: _databaseUrl,
+          auth: _auth(),
+          httpClient: mock,
+          namespace: namespace,
+        );
+  return (client, requests);
+}
+
+void main() {
+  group('compile-time default', () {
+    test('is empty when SYNC_NAMESPACE is not defined', () {
+      expect(syncNamespace, isEmpty);
+    });
+
+    test('empty namespace leaves paths byte-for-byte unchanged', () async {
+      final (client, requests) = _client(null);
+      await client.getFileText('devices/pc/log.json');
+      expect(requests.single.url.path, '/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json');
+    });
+  });
+
+  group('prefixing', () {
+    test('every operation lands under the namespace', () async {
+      final (client, requests) = _client('sandbox/slot3');
+      await client.getFileText('devices/pc/log.json');
+      await client.putFileText('devices/pc/log.json', 't', message: 'm');
+      await client.listDirectory('devices');
+      await client.getStringMap('revs');
+      await client.patchValues('revs', {'a': 'b'});
+      await client.deleteFile('devices/pc/log.json');
+      await client.canAccessRemote();
+      expect(requests.map((r) => r.url.path), [
+        '/sandbox/slot3/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json',
+        '/sandbox/slot3/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json',
+        '/sandbox/slot3/devices.json',
+        '/sandbox/slot3/revs.json',
+        '/sandbox/slot3/revs.json',
+        '/sandbox/slot3/devices/pc/log~2Ejson.json',
+        '/sandbox/slot3.json',
+      ]);
+    });
+
+    test('an explicitly empty namespace is the unprefixed path', () async {
+      final (client, requests) = _client('');
+      await client.getStringMap('revs');
+      expect(requests.single.url.path, '/revs.json');
+    });
+  });
+
+  group('validation (fail closed)', () {
+    const bad = [
+      'sandbox',
+      'sandbox/',
+      'sandbox/Slot3',
+      'sandbox/slot 3',
+      'sandbox/slot3/',
+      'sandbox/a/b',
+      '/sandbox/slot3',
+      'prod/slot3',
+      'sandbox/slot3\n',
+      'Sandbox/slot3',
+      'sandbox/slot.3',
+      'sandbox/..',
+    ];
+
+    for (final value in bad) {
+      test('rejects ${jsonEncode(value)}', () {
+        expect(
+          () => checkSyncNamespace(value),
+          throwsA(isA<ConfigException>()),
+        );
+        expect(
+          () => FirebaseRestClient(
+            databaseUrl: _databaseUrl,
+            auth: _auth(),
+            namespace: value,
+          ),
+          throwsA(isA<ConfigException>()),
+        );
+      });
+    }
+
+    test('the message names the define and the required shape', () {
+      expect(
+        () => checkSyncNamespace('typo'),
+        throwsA(
+          isA<ConfigException>().having(
+            (e) => e.message,
+            'message',
+            allOf(
+              contains('SYNC_NAMESPACE'),
+              contains(r'^sandbox/[a-z0-9_-]+$'),
+            ),
+          ),
+        ),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('accepts the allowed alphabet', () {
+      expect(() => checkSyncNamespace('sandbox/slot3'), returnsNormally);
+      expect(() => checkSyncNamespace('sandbox/a_b-c9'), returnsNormally);
+      expect(() => checkSyncNamespace(''), returnsNormally);
+    });
+
+    test(
+      'a bad compile-time define stops firebaseClientFor at startup',
+      () async {
+        // The define is compile-time, so only a fresh process can set it.
+        final result = await Process.run(Platform.resolvedExecutable, [
+          '-DSYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/Typo',
+          'run',
+          'tool/namespace_probe.dart',
+        ]);
+        expect(result.exitCode, isNot(0));
+        expect(
+          result.stderr,
+          contains('SYNC_NAMESPACE "sandbox/Typo" is invalid'),
+        );
+      },
+    );
+
+    test('a good compile-time define reaches the request path', () async {
+      final result = await Process.run(Platform.resolvedExecutable, [
+        '-DSYNC_NAMESPACE=sandbox/slot3',
+        'run',
+        'tool/namespace_probe.dart',
+      ]);
+      expect(result.stderr, isEmpty);
+      expect(result.stdout, '/sandbox/slot3/devices.json\n');
+    });
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_dart/tool/e2e_audit.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/// Read-only done check: lists plaintext blobs under an RTDB root.
+///
+/// Usage: `dart run tool/e2e_audit.dart <root> <firebase_auth.json>`
+/// Exit 0 when every blob is sealed, 1 when any is plaintext, 2 on misuse.
+library;
+
+import 'dart:convert';
+import 'dart:io';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
+
+Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
+  if (args.length != 2) {
+    stderr.writeln('usage: e2e_audit.dart <root> <firebase_auth.json>');
+    exit(2);
+  }
+  final [root, sessionFile] = args;
+  final home = Platform.environment['HOME'];
+  final cfg =
+      jsonDecode(
+            File('$home/.config/crdt-sync/firebase.json').readAsStringSync(),
+          )
+          as Map<String, dynamic>;
+  final session = FirebaseCredentials.fromJson(
+    jsonDecode(File(sessionFile).readAsStringSync()) as Map<String, dynamic>,
+  );
+  final auth = FirebaseTokenProvider(
+    apiKey: cfg['apiKey'] as String,
+    store: InMemoryCredentialStore(session),
+  );
+  final url = Uri.parse(
+    '${cfg['databaseUrl']}/${encodePath(root)}.json'
+    '?auth=${await auth.idToken()}',
+  );
+  final response = await http.get(url);
+  if (response.statusCode != 200) {
+    stderr.writeln('GET $root: HTTP ${response.statusCode}');
+    exit(2);
+  }
+  final plaintext = plaintextBlobPaths(jsonDecode(response.body));
+  stdout.writeln('plaintext blobs under $root: ${plaintext.length}');
+  for (final path in plaintext) {
+    stdout.writeln('  $root/$path');
+  }
+  exit(plaintext.isEmpty ? 0 : 1);
+}

crdt_sync_dart/tool/interop_check.dart

@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
 /// mode 0600 -- never in source, because this repository is public.
 final _configDir = '${Platform.environment['HOME']}/.config/crdt-sync';
 
-Log _decode(String t) => (jsonDecode(t) as Map<String, dynamic>)
-    .map((k, v) => MapEntry(k, Record.fromJson(v as Map<String, dynamic>)));
-String _encode(Log l) =>
-    jsonEncode(l.map((k, v) => MapEntry(k, v.toJson())));
+Log _decode(String t) => (jsonDecode(t) as Map<String, dynamic>).map(
+  (k, v) => MapEntry(k, Record.fromJson(v as Map<String, dynamic>)),
+);
+String _encode(Log l) => jsonEncode(l.map((k, v) => MapEntry(k, v.toJson())));
 
 Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
-  final cfg = jsonDecode(
-    File('$_configDir/firebase.json').readAsStringSync(),
-  ) as Map<String, dynamic>;
+  final cfg =
+      jsonDecode(File('$_configDir/firebase.json').readAsStringSync())
+          as Map<String, dynamic>;
   final auth = FirebaseTokenProvider(
     apiKey: cfg['apiKey'] as String,
     store: InMemoryCredentialStore(),

crdt_sync_dart/tool/live_smoke_test.dart

@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ const _prefix = '_smoketest/devices';
 var _failures = 0;
 
 void _check(String what, bool ok, [String detail = '']) {
-  stdout.writeln('${ok ? "  ok  " : "  FAIL"}  $what${detail.isEmpty ? '' : '  ($detail)'}');
+  stdout.writeln(
+    '${ok ? "  ok  " : "  FAIL"}  $what${detail.isEmpty ? '' : '  ($detail)'}',
+  );
   if (!ok) _failures++;
 }
 
@@ -68,16 +70,24 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
   _check('canAccessRemote is false before sign-in', !await auth.hasSession());
   await auth.signIn(email: email, password: password);
   _check('signIn stored a session', await auth.hasSession());
-  _check('canAccessRemote is true after sign-in', await client.canAccessRemote());
+  _check(
+    'canAccessRemote is true after sign-in',
+    await client.canAccessRemote(),
+  );
 
   stdout.writeln('\n== round-trip and key escaping ==');
   const path = '$_prefix/pc/log.json';
   await client.putFileText(path, '{"hello":"world"}', message: 'smoke');
   final read = await client.getFileText(path);
-  _check('a .json filename round-trips byte-for-byte',
-      read == '{"hello":"world"}', read ?? 'null');
-  _check('missing path reads as null',
-      await client.getFileText('$_prefix/nope/log.json') == null);
+  _check(
+    'a .json filename round-trips byte-for-byte',
+    read == '{"hello":"world"}',
+    read ?? 'null',
+  );
+  _check(
+    'missing path reads as null',
+    await client.getFileText('$_prefix/nope/log.json') == null,
+  );
   final listed = await client.listDirectory(_prefix);
   _check('listDirectory sees the device', listed.contains('pc'), '$listed');
 
@@ -96,8 +106,11 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
   final pushed = await client.getFileText(path);
   _check('the log landed in the database', pushed != null);
   final revs = await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs');
-  _check('a revision was published for this device',
-      revs['pc'] == revisionOf(_encode(pcLog)), '${revs.keys}');
+  _check(
+    'a revision was published for this device',
+    revs['pc'] == revisionOf(_encode(pcLog)),
+    '${revs.keys}',
+  );
 
   stdout.writeln('\n== sync: an unchanged tick writes nothing ==');
   final before = await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs');
@@ -110,8 +123,10 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
     decode: _decode,
     stateStore: storePc,
   );
-  _check('revision unchanged, so nothing was re-uploaded',
-      (await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs'))['pc'] == before['pc']);
+  _check(
+    'revision unchanged, so nothing was re-uploaded',
+    (await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs'))['pc'] == before['pc'],
+  );
 
   stdout.writeln('\n== sync: two devices converge ==');
   final storePhone = InMemorySyncStateStore();
@@ -135,8 +150,10 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
     stateStore: storePc,
   );
   _check('pc merged the phone record', pcAfter.containsKey('b'));
-  _check('each device wrote only its own revision key',
-      (await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs')).length == 2);
+  _check(
+    'each device wrote only its own revision key',
+    (await client.getStringMap('_smoketest/revs')).length == 2,
+  );
 
   stdout.writeln('\n== fail-closed ==');
   await auth.signOut();
@@ -160,7 +177,9 @@ Future<void> main(List<String> args) async {
   client.close();
   auth.close();
   stdout.writeln(
-    _failures == 0 ? '\nALL LIVE CHECKS PASSED' : '\n$_failures LIVE CHECK(S) FAILED',
+    _failures == 0
+        ? '\nALL LIVE CHECKS PASSED'
+        : '\n$_failures LIVE CHECK(S) FAILED',
   );
   exit(_failures == 0 ? 0 : 1);
 }

crdt_sync_dart/tool/namespace_probe.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// Helper for test/sync_namespace_test.dart: the SYNC_NAMESPACE define is
+// compile-time, so the test runs this in a fresh process with -D set. It signs
+// in from an in-memory session (no network) and prints the first request path.
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
+import 'package:http/testing.dart' as http_testing;
+
+Future<void> main() async {
+  final mock = http_testing.MockClient((request) async {
+    print(request.url.path);
+    return http.Response('null', 200);
+  });
+  final client = await firebaseClientFor(
+    config: const FirebaseConfig(
+      apiKey: 'k',
+      databaseUrl: 'https://example.firebasedatabase.app',
+      projectId: 'p',
+      uid: 'u',
+      email: 'e@x.y',
+    ),
+    store: InMemoryCredentialStore(
+      FirebaseCredentials(
+        idToken: 'i',
+        refreshToken: 'r',
+        expiresAt: DateTime.utc(2099),
+      ),
+    ),
+    httpClient: mock,
+  );
+  await client.listDirectory('devices');
+}

crdt_sync_flutter/README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ bootstrap, so a new app reaches "syncing" without writing any of it.
 
 `crdt_sync` is pure Dart on purpose — it runs from command-line tools and from
 `wake_alarm`'s headless systemd job, so it cannot depend on
-`flutter_secure_storage` or `google_sign_in`. It takes closures instead.
+`flutter_secure_storage` or the Android Google plugin. It takes closures instead.
 
 Every Flutter app then wrote the same ~390 lines to supply those closures
 (`firebase_backend.dart` + `google_sign_in_backend.dart` + `google_platform*`),
@@ -110,6 +110,11 @@ const kServerClientId = '845446124781-...apps.googleusercontent.com';
 /// to loopback.
 const kDesktopClientId = '845446124781-...apps.googleusercontent.com';
 
+/// That Desktop client's secret. Google rejects the token exchange without
+/// it, but treats it as non-confidential for installed apps: inject it at
+/// build time (`--dart-define`), never commit it. '' sends none.
+const kDesktopClientSecret = String.fromEnvironment('DESKTOP_CLIENT_SECRET');
+
 SyncSettingsScreen(
   accountLoader: () => loadAccount(),
   accountSaver: saveAccount,
@@ -121,6 +126,7 @@ SyncSettingsScreen(
     tokenFetcher: () => googleAnyIdToken(
       serverClientId: kServerClientId,
       desktopClientId: kDesktopClientId,
+      desktopClientSecret: kDesktopClientSecret,
     ),
   ),
   googleAvailable: googleAnySignInSupported(
@@ -132,13 +138,13 @@ SyncSettingsScreen(
 
 ### One tap on every platform
 
-`google_sign_in` ships **android, ios and web** implementations only — there
-is no `google_sign_in_linux` — so a real GTK desktop build cannot use the
-plugin at all. This package covers both halves and picks between them:
+[`google_account_token`](../google_account_token) wraps Android's AccountManager
+(no Google client library in the APK), so a real GTK desktop build cannot use
+it. This package covers both halves and picks between them:
 
 | Platform | Flow | Entry point |
 |---|---|---|
-| Android / iOS | `google_sign_in` plugin, OS account picker | `googleIdToken` |
+| Android | `google_account_token` plugin, OS account chooser | `googleIdToken` |
 | Linux / Windows / macOS | OAuth **loopback** + PKCE, system browser | `googleDesktopIdToken` |
 | Web | none (GIS renders its own button) | falls back to password |
 

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/crdt_sync_flutter.dart

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ library;
 export 'src/account_store.dart';
 export 'src/bootstrap.dart';
 export 'src/device_id.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_bootstrap.dart';
+export 'src/e2e_passphrase_button.dart';
 export 'src/google_any_sign_in.dart';
 export 'src/google_desktop_sign_in.dart';
 export 'src/google_pkce.dart';

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/account_store.dart

@@ -108,9 +108,7 @@ Future<FirebaseAccount?> _adoptSeededSession(
 }) async {
   final httpClient = client ?? http.Client();
   try {
-    final response = await httpClient.get(
-      base.resolve(routes.credentialsPath),
-    );
+    final response = await httpClient.get(base.resolve(routes.credentialsPath));
     if (response.statusCode != 200) return null;
     final body = jsonDecode(utf8.decode(response.bodyBytes));
     if (body is! Map<String, dynamic>) return null;

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/bootstrap.dart

@@ -84,9 +84,9 @@ Future<FirebaseRestClient?> openSync(
 /// Signs in with Google alone, for a device with no account stored yet.
 ///
 /// The one-tap path: [openSync] needs an account to know which email to use,
-/// but a fresh install has none. [tokenFetcher] is the app's `google_sign_in`
-/// call -- a closure because that plugin is Android/iOS/web only and this
-/// package must keep working on Linux desktop.
+/// but a fresh install has none. [tokenFetcher] is the app's Google token
+/// source -- a closure because the Android plugin does not exist elsewhere and
+/// this package must keep working on Linux desktop.
 ///
 /// Returns null when the user dismisses the picker; throws
 /// [FirebaseAuthError] when Google succeeds but resolves to the wrong uid,
@@ -171,8 +171,5 @@ Future<FirebaseRestClient?> _clientFromStoredSession(
     store: keystoreCredentialStore(storage: storage),
   );
   if (!await auth.hasSession()) return null;
-  return FirebaseRestClient(
-    databaseUrl: app.project.databaseUrl,
-    auth: auth,
-  );
+  return FirebaseRestClient(databaseUrl: app.project.databaseUrl, auth: auth);
 }

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/e2e_bootstrap.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/// End-to-end encryption for an app's sync prefix, keyed by the shared
+/// crdt-sync passphrase kept in the OS keystore (prompt-free after setup).
+library;
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/src/keystore.dart';
+import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
+
+/// Keystore key holding the shared crdt-sync passphrase.
+const String kE2ePassphraseKey = kE2ePassphraseStorageKey;
+
+/// Stores the passphrase this device derives its key from.
+Future<void> saveE2ePassphrase(
+  String passphrase, {
+  FlutterSecureStorage storage = kSecureStorage,
+}) => storage.write(key: kE2ePassphraseKey, value: passphrase);
+
+/// Forgets the passphrase; the next open is locked.
+Future<void> clearE2ePassphrase({
+  FlutterSecureStorage storage = kSecureStorage,
+}) => storage.delete(key: kE2ePassphraseKey);
+
+/// [openEncryptedStore] reading the passphrase from the OS keystore.
+Future<E2eState> openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore({
+  required RemoteStore store,
+  required String oldPrefix,
+  FlutterSecureStorage storage = kSecureStorage,
+  Argon2Params params = Argon2Params.recommended,
+}) => openEncryptedStore(
+  store: store,
+  oldPrefix: oldPrefix,
+  readPassphrase: () => storage.read(key: kE2ePassphraseKey),
+  params: params,
+);

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/e2e_passphrase_button.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/// A text-free control to enter the shared crdt-sync passphrase: a lock icon
+/// opens a hidden field; the check icon (or Enter) saves it to the keystore.
+library;
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/src/e2e_bootstrap.dart';
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/src/keystore.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
+
+/// Lock icon button; [locked] picks the closed or open lock glyph.
+class E2ePassphraseButton extends StatelessWidget {
+  /// Creates the button. [onSaved] runs after the passphrase is stored.
+  const E2ePassphraseButton({
+    required this.locked,
+    this.onSaved,
+    this.storage = kSecureStorage,
+    super.key,
+  });
+
+  /// Whether sync is currently locked (no or wrong passphrase).
+  final bool locked;
+
+  /// Called after a passphrase is saved, e.g. to retry the sync.
+  final VoidCallback? onSaved;
+
+  /// The keystore; only tests pass another.
+  final FlutterSecureStorage storage;
+
+  Future<void> _ask(BuildContext context) async {
+    final entered = await showDialog<String>(
+      context: context,
+      builder: (_) => const _PassphraseDialog(),
+    );
+    if (entered == null || entered.isEmpty) return;
+    await saveE2ePassphrase(entered, storage: storage);
+    onSaved?.call();
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context) => IconButton(
+    icon: Icon(locked ? Icons.lock : Icons.lock_open),
+    onPressed: () => _ask(context),
+  );
+}
+
+class _PassphraseDialog extends StatefulWidget {
+  const _PassphraseDialog();
+
+  @override
+  State<_PassphraseDialog> createState() => _PassphraseDialogState();
+}
+
+class _PassphraseDialogState extends State<_PassphraseDialog> {
+  final _controller = TextEditingController();
+
+  @override
+  void dispose() {
+    _controller.dispose();
+    super.dispose();
+  }
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context) => AlertDialog(
+    content: TextField(
+      controller: _controller,
+      obscureText: true,
+      autofocus: true,
+      onSubmitted: (value) => Navigator.of(context).pop(value),
+    ),
+    actions: [
+      IconButton(
+        icon: const Icon(Icons.check),
+        onPressed: () => Navigator.of(context).pop(_controller.text),
+      ),
+    ],
+  );
+}

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/google_any_sign_in.dart

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /// Picks the right Google sign-in flow for the platform.
 ///
-/// Two flows exist because one is not enough: `google_sign_in` ships android,
-/// ios and web implementations only -- there is no `google_sign_in_linux` --
-/// so a real GTK desktop build reaches Google through the OAuth loopback flow
+/// Two flows exist because one is not enough: the `google_account_token`
+/// plugin wraps Android's AccountManager, which has no desktop counterpart, so
+/// a real GTK desktop build reaches Google through the OAuth loopback flow
 /// instead. Both yield a Google ID token of the same shape, so
 /// `signInWithGoogle` cannot tell them apart.
 ///
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ bool desktopSignInSupported(String desktopClientId) =>
 /// worth testing, and returning it lets the suite assert the routing on a
 /// host that can run neither flow for real.
 enum GoogleFlow {
-  /// The `google_sign_in` plugin: Android and iOS.
+  /// The `google_account_token` plugin: Android.
   plugin,
 
   /// OAuth loopback in the system browser: Linux, Windows, macOS.
@@ -72,9 +72,13 @@ GoogleFlow googleFlowFor({
 ///
 /// Null when neither is available or the user backs out -- the caller falls
 /// back to the password path either way.
+///
+/// [desktopClientSecret] is the Desktop client's secret (see
+/// `googleDesktopIdToken`); '' sends none.
 Future<String?> googleAnyIdToken({
   required String serverClientId,
   required String desktopClientId,
+  String desktopClientSecret = '',
 }) async {
   switch (googleFlowFor(
     serverClientId: serverClientId,
@@ -87,7 +91,10 @@ Future<String?> googleAnyIdToken({
     case GoogleFlow.plugin:
       return await googleIdToken(serverClientId: serverClientId);
     case GoogleFlow.desktop:
-      return await googleDesktopIdToken(clientId: desktopClientId);
+      return await googleDesktopIdToken(
+        clientId: desktopClientId,
+        clientSecret: desktopClientSecret,
+      );
     // coverage:ignore-end
     case GoogleFlow.none:
       return null;

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/google_desktop_sign_in.dart

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 /// One-tap Google sign-in for desktop, via the OAuth loopback flow.
 ///
-/// `google_sign_in` ships android, ios and web implementations only -- there
-/// is no `google_sign_in_linux` -- so a real GTK build cannot use the plugin
-/// at all. The installed-app flow replaces it: bind a loopback socket, open
-/// the system browser at Google's consent screen, catch the redirect, and
-/// exchange the code for an id_token with PKCE. The token is the same shape
-/// the plugin returns, so `signInWithGoogle` cannot tell the two apart.
+/// The Android plugin (`google_account_token`) wraps AccountManager, which
+/// does not exist on Linux, so a real GTK build cannot use it at all. The
+/// installed-app flow replaces it: bind a loopback socket, open the system
+/// browser at Google's consent screen, catch the redirect, and exchange the
+/// code for an id_token with PKCE. The token is the same shape the plugin
+/// returns, so `signInWithGoogle` cannot tell the two apart.
 ///
 /// Everything decision-shaped lives in `google_pkce.dart` and is covered.
 /// This file is the I/O: a socket, a browser, one POST.
@@ -66,8 +66,12 @@ Future<bool> _launchInBrowser(Uri url) =>
 /// [clientId] must be a **Desktop**-type OAuth client. The Web client id used
 /// for the Android flow will be rejected here, and a Desktop client is the
 /// only type permitted to redirect to loopback.
+///
+/// [clientSecret] is that client's secret; Google's token endpoint rejects a
+/// Desktop exchange without it. See `tokenExchangeBody`.
 Future<String?> googleDesktopIdToken({
   required String clientId,
+  String clientSecret = '',
   ServerBinder binder = _bindLoopback,
   BrowserLauncher launcher = _launchInBrowser,
   http.Client? httpClient,
@@ -83,11 +87,7 @@ Future<String?> googleDesktopIdToken({
   final client = httpClient ?? http.Client();
   try {
     final opened = await launcher(
-      buildAuthUrl(
-        clientId: clientId,
-        redirectPort: port,
-        pkce: pair,
-      ),
+      buildAuthUrl(clientId: clientId, redirectPort: port, pkce: pair),
     );
     // No browser means no redirect will ever arrive: fail now rather than
     // holding the socket open for the full timeout.
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ Future<String?> googleDesktopIdToken({
     return await _exchange(
       client: client,
       clientId: clientId,
+      clientSecret: clientSecret,
       code: code,
       port: port,
       verifier: pair.verifier,
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ Future<String?> _awaitRedirect(
 Future<String?> _exchange({
   required http.Client client,
   required String clientId,
+  required String clientSecret,
   required String code,
   required int port,
   required String verifier,
@@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ Future<String?> _exchange({
     Uri.parse(kGoogleTokenEndpoint),
     body: tokenExchangeBody(
       clientId: clientId,
+      clientSecret: clientSecret,
       code: code,
       redirectPort: port,
       verifier: verifier,

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/google_pkce.dart

@@ -136,13 +136,21 @@ RedirectResult parseRedirect(Uri uri, {required String expectedState}) {
 }
 
 /// Form body for exchanging [code] at [kGoogleTokenEndpoint].
+///
+/// [clientSecret] is the Desktop client's secret. Google issues Desktop
+/// clients one and rejects the exchange without it even with PKCE, but
+/// documents it as non-confidential for installed apps: it ships in the
+/// binary, injected at build time and never committed. Left out of the body
+/// when empty, so a caller that has none behaves exactly as before.
 Map<String, String> tokenExchangeBody({
   required String clientId,
   required String code,
   required int redirectPort,
   required String verifier,
+  String clientSecret = '',
 }) => <String, String>{
   'client_id': clientId,
+  if (clientSecret.isNotEmpty) 'client_secret': clientSecret,
   'code': code,
   'code_verifier': verifier,
   'grant_type': 'authorization_code',

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/google_platform.dart

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
 /// Platform gate for the programmatic Google sign-in flow.
 ///
-/// Conditional export because the answer differs per platform *and* because
-/// asking the plugin directly is unsafe: `supportsAuthenticate()` throws
-/// `UnimplementedError` where no implementation is registered -- an `Error`,
-/// not an `Exception`, so it escapes an ordinary catch and would take down
-/// the settings screen's `build()`.
+/// Conditional export because the answer differs per platform: the io half
+/// defers to the `google_account_token` plugin (Android only), the web half is
+/// a constant false.
 library;
 
 export 'google_platform_io.dart'

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/google_platform_io.dart

@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
 /// Whether the programmatic Google sign-in flow exists on this platform.
 ///
-/// The io half. `google_sign_in` ships federated implementations for android,
-/// ios and web only -- there is no `google_sign_in_linux` -- so a real GTK
-/// desktop build (lyricanki has one) answers false here and reaches Google
-/// through the loopback flow instead.
+/// The io half. The flow is the `google_account_token` plugin, which wraps the
+/// framework AccountManager and therefore exists on Android only. Every other
+/// `dart:io` platform (Linux, Windows, macOS) reaches Google through the
+/// loopback flow instead.
 library;
 
-import 'dart:io';
+import 'package:google_account_token/google_account_token.dart';
 
-/// True on the platforms shipping the programmatic plugin flow.
-bool get googleSignInSupported => Platform.isAndroid || Platform.isIOS;
+/// True where the one-tap AccountManager flow exists: Android.
+///
+/// Asks the plugin rather than `Platform.isAndroid` so the two can never
+/// disagree about where a token can be produced.
+bool get googleSignInSupported => googleAccountTokenSupported;
 
 /// Whether the loopback sign-in flow can run: it needs a bindable socket and
 /// a system browser, which every `dart:io` platform has.

crdt_sync_flutter/lib/src/google_sign_in.dart

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-/// One-tap Google sign-in: the `google_sign_in` plugin call, owned once.
+/// One-tap Google sign-in: the `google_account_token` plugin call, owned once.
 ///
 /// Why it lives here and not in `crdt_sync`: that package is pure Dart on
 /// purpose, because the same library runs on Linux desktop and headless under
-/// systemd, where `google_sign_in` does not exist. It only ever receives a
+/// systemd, where the Android plugin does not exist. It only ever receives a
 /// token string through a closure -- see `signInWithGoogle`, which takes a
 /// `tokenFetcher`. This file is that closure.
 ///
@@ -11,10 +11,8 @@
 /// time is the mistake this package exists to prevent.
 library;
 
-import 'dart:developer';
-
 import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/src/google_platform.dart' as platform_gate;
-import 'package:google_sign_in/google_sign_in.dart';
+import 'package:google_account_token/google_account_token.dart' as account;
 
 /// Whether this build can sign in with Google programmatically.
 ///
@@ -33,56 +31,21 @@ bool googleSignInSupported(String serverClientId) =>
 
 /// Returns a Google ID token for the signed-in account, or null.
 ///
-/// Null rather than throwing when the user dismisses the picker: cancelling is
-/// an ordinary outcome, and the caller falls back to the password path.
+/// Null rather than throwing when the user dismisses the chooser: cancelling
+/// is an ordinary outcome, and the caller falls back to the password path.
+/// The plugin logs (level 900) every failure, which matters because a
+/// *configuration* failure (unregistered SHA-1, wrong client id) arrives
+/// through the same path as "the user changed their mind".
 ///
-/// [serverClientId] must be the project's **Web** OAuth client id -- Android
-/// must request a token minted for the web client, and an Android client id
-/// yields a token Firebase rejects with `audience mismatch`.
+/// [serverClientId] must be the project's **Web** OAuth client id -- the token
+/// is minted for that audience, and an Android client id yields one Firebase
+/// rejects with `audience mismatch`.
 ///
-/// [signInFn] exists for tests, which cannot reach the plugin's platform
-/// channel; when supplied it replaces the plugin entirely.
+/// [signInFn] exists for tests; when supplied it replaces the plugin entirely.
 Future<String?> googleIdToken({
   required String serverClientId,
   Future<String?> Function()? signInFn,
 }) async {
   if (signInFn != null) return await signInFn();
-  if (serverClientId.isEmpty) {
-    log(
-      'Google sign-in unavailable: no server client id was compiled in; '
-      'falling back to the password path',
-      level: 900,
-    );
-    return null;
-  }
-  // The plugin reaches the OS account picker through a platform channel,
-  // which `flutter test` has no binding for. Everything above this point is
-  // pure Dart and is covered.
-  // coverage:ignore-start
-  try {
-    await GoogleSignIn.instance.initialize(serverClientId: serverClientId);
-    if (!GoogleSignIn.instance.supportsAuthenticate()) {
-      log(
-        'Google sign-in is not available on this platform; falling back to '
-        'the password path',
-        level: 900,
-      );
-      return null;
-    }
-    final account = await GoogleSignIn.instance.authenticate();
-    return account.authentication.idToken;
-  } on GoogleSignInException catch (error, stackTrace) {
-    // Includes the user simply dismissing the picker, which is not an error
-    // worth surfacing -- but log it, because a *configuration* failure
-    // (unregistered SHA-1, wrong client id) arrives through the same path and
-    // is otherwise indistinguishable from "the user changed their mind".
-    log(
-      'Google sign-in did not complete',
-      level: 900,
-      error: error,
-      stackTrace: stackTrace,
-    );
-    return null;
-  }
-  // coverage:ignore-end
+  return await account.googleIdToken(serverClientId: serverClientId);
 }

crdt_sync_flutter/pubspec.lock

@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ packages:
     dependency: "direct main"
     description:
       path: crdt_sync_dart
-      ref: "crdt_sync_dart-v0.11.3"
-      resolved-ref: a2e7334dfec5131170a084510d70361d53dc40bc
+      ref: "crdt_sync_dart-v0.13.1"
+      resolved-ref: eebeb0b51053f160f163140141aba10a447ba1e8
       url: "https://github.com/kuhyx/utils"
     source: git
-    version: "0.11.3"
+    version: "0.13.1"
   crypto:
     dependency: "direct main"
     description:
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ packages:
       url: "https://pub.dev"
     source: hosted
     version: "3.0.8"
+  cryptography:
+    dependency: transitive
+    description:
+      name: cryptography
+      sha256: "3eda3029d34ec9095a27a198ac9785630fe525c0eb6a49f3d575272f8e792ef0"
+      url: "https://pub.dev"
+    source: hosted
+    version: "2.9.0"
   fake_async:
     dependency: transitive
     description:
@@ -177,54 +185,15 @@ packages:
     description: flutter
     source: sdk
     version: "0.0.0"
-  google_identity_services_web:
-    dependency: transitive
-    description:
-      name: google_identity_services_web
-      sha256: "5d187c46dc59e02646e10fe82665fc3884a9b71bc1c90c2b8b749316d33ee454"
-      url: "https://pub.dev"
-    source: hosted
-    version: "0.3.3+1"
-  google_sign_in:
+  google_account_token:
     dependency: "direct main"
     description:
-      name: google_sign_in
-      sha256: "521031b65853b4409b8213c0387d57edaad7e2a949ce6dea0d8b2afc9cb29763"
-      url: "https://pub.dev"
-    source: hosted
-    version: "7.2.0"
-  google_sign_in_android:
-    dependency: transitive
-    description:
-      name: google_sign_in_android
-      sha256: "57782125965ca87b03d42a147d40b046f1fd6a09141a58913e1b86671a5ef22e"
-      url: "https://pub.dev"
-    source: hosted
-    version: "7.2.16"
-  google_sign_in_ios:
-    dependency: transitive
-    description:
-      name: google_sign_in_ios
-      sha256: ac1e4c1205267cb7999d1d81333fccffdfda29e853f434bbaf71525498bb6950
-      url: "https://pub.dev"
-    source: hosted
-    version: "6.3.0"
-  google_sign_in_platform_interface:
-    dependency: transitive
-    description:
-      name: google_sign_in_platform_interface
-      sha256: "7f59208c42b415a3cca203571128d6f84f885fead2d5b53eb65a9e27f2965bb5"
-      url: "https://pub.dev"
-    source: hosted
-    version: "3.1.0"
-  google_sign_in_web:
-    dependency: transitive
-    description:
-      name: google_sign_in_web
-      sha256: d473003eeca892f96a01a64fc803378be765071cb0c265ee872c7f8683245d14
-      url: "https://pub.dev"
-    source: hosted
-    version: "1.1.3"
+      path: google_account_token
+      ref: "google_account_token-v0.1.0"
+      resolved-ref: db70ba204d124c6eadf9b8808cd3d3b3e70363d1
+      url: "https://github.com/kuhyx/utils"
+    source: git
+    version: "0.1.0"
   hooks:
     dependency: transitive
     description:

crdt_sync_flutter/pubspec.yaml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: >-
   persisted per-install device id, and a one-call bootstrap. Removes the
   ~150 lines of firebase_backend.dart every consuming app was copying.
 publish_to: 'none'
-version: 0.3.5
+version: 0.7.0
 
 environment:
   sdk: ^3.12.2
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ dependencies:
   crdt_sync:
     git:
       url: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils
-      ref: crdt_sync_dart-v0.11.3
+      ref: crdt_sync_dart-v0.13.1
       path: crdt_sync_dart
   crypto: 3.0.8
   flutter:
@@ -23,10 +23,15 @@ dependencies:
   # consuming apps can test their own sync wiring without rebuilding it.
   flutter_test:
     sdk: flutter
-  # The one-tap Google plugin. Android/iOS/web only -- there is no Linux
-  # implementation -- so desktop reaches Google through the loopback flow in
+  # The one-tap Google ID token on Android: AccountManager chooser, no Google
+  # client library in the APK. Android only -- web has no token source and
+  # desktop reaches Google through the loopback flow in
   # google_desktop_sign_in.dart instead. See google_platform.dart.
-  google_sign_in: 7.2.0
+  google_account_token:
+    git:
+      url: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils
+      ref: google_account_token-v0.1.0
+      path: google_account_token
   http: 1.6.0
   shared_preferences: 2.5.6
   # Opens the system browser for the desktop loopback sign-in.

crdt_sync_flutter/test/account_store_test.dart

@@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ void main() {
   group('loadAccount', () {
     test('returns the stored account without touching the wrapper', () async {
       const stored = FirebaseAccount(email: 'a@b.c', password: 'pw');
-      installFakeSecureStorage(
-        initial: {kAccountKey: stored.toJsonString()},
-      );
+      installFakeSecureStorage(initial: {kAccountKey: stored.toJsonString()});
       var requests = 0;
       final account = await loadAccount(
         routes: routes,

crdt_sync_flutter/test/e2e_bootstrap_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+import 'dart:convert';
+
+import 'package:crdt_sync/crdt_sync.dart';
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/crdt_sync_flutter.dart';
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/testing/fake_secure_storage.dart';
+import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
+import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
+
+const _old = 'todo-sync/notes';
+const _cheap = Argon2Params(memoryKiB: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1);
+
+class _Remote implements RemoteStore {
+  final files = <String, String>{};
+  @override
+  Future<List<String>> listDirectory(String path) async => files.keys
+      .where((k) => k.startsWith('$path/'))
+      .map((k) => k.substring(path.length + 1).split('/').first)
+      .toSet()
+      .toList();
+  @override
+  Future<String?> getFileText(String path) async => files[path];
+  @override
+  Future<void> putFileText(
+    String path,
+    String text, {
+    required String message,
+  }) async => files[path] = text;
+  @override
+  Future<void> deleteFile(String path, {String message = ''}) async =>
+      files.remove(path);
+  @override
+  Future<bool> canAccessRemote() async => true;
+  @override
+  void close() {}
+}
+
+String _log(String title) => jsonEncode({
+  'n1': {
+    'id': 'n1',
+    'fields': {
+      'title': [title, '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z-0000-a'],
+    },
+    'deleted': false,
+    'deleted_hlc': null,
+  },
+});
+
+void main() {
+  TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
+  const storage = FlutterSecureStorage();
+
+  setUp(installFakeSecureStorage);
+
+  test('no passphrase on the device is locked, never plaintext', () async {
+    final state = await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+      store: _Remote(),
+      oldPrefix: _old,
+      params: _cheap,
+    );
+    expect(state, isA<E2eLocked>());
+    expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.needsPassphrase);
+  });
+
+  test('right passphrase unlocks and copies old plaintext once', () async {
+    final remote = _Remote()..files['$_old/phone/log.json'] = _log('milk');
+    await saveE2ePassphrase('pw', storage: storage);
+    final state = await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+      store: remote,
+      oldPrefix: _old,
+      params: _cheap,
+    );
+    expect(state, isA<E2eReady>());
+    final layout = E2eLayout.of(_old);
+    expect(
+      remote.files['${layout.prefix}/phone/log.json'],
+      isNot(contains('milk')),
+    );
+    expect(remote.files['$_old/phone/log.json'], contains('milk'));
+    final again = await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+      store: remote,
+      oldPrefix: _old,
+      params: _cheap,
+    );
+    expect(again, isA<E2eReady>());
+  });
+
+  test('second device with the same passphrase reads the data', () async {
+    final remote = _Remote();
+    await saveE2ePassphrase('pw', storage: storage);
+    final first =
+        await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+              store: remote,
+              oldPrefix: _old,
+              params: _cheap,
+            )
+            as E2eReady;
+    final layout = E2eLayout.of(_old);
+    await first.store.putFileText(
+      '${layout.prefix}/phone/log.json',
+      _log('tea'),
+      message: 'm',
+    );
+    final second =
+        await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+              store: remote,
+              oldPrefix: _old,
+              params: _cheap,
+            )
+            as E2eReady;
+    final text = await second.store.getFileText(
+      '${layout.prefix}/phone/log.json',
+    );
+    expect(text, contains('tea'));
+  });
+
+  test('wrong passphrase is locked and merges nothing', () async {
+    final remote = _Remote();
+    await saveE2ePassphrase('pw', storage: storage);
+    await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+      store: remote,
+      oldPrefix: _old,
+      params: _cheap,
+    );
+    await saveE2ePassphrase('nope', storage: storage);
+    final state = await openEncryptedStoreFromKeystore(
+      store: remote,
+      oldPrefix: _old,
+      params: _cheap,
+    );
+    expect((state as E2eLocked).reason, E2eLockReason.wrongKey);
+  });
+
+  test('clearing the passphrase forgets it', () async {
+    await saveE2ePassphrase('pw', storage: storage);
+    await clearE2ePassphrase(storage: storage);
+    expect(await storage.read(key: kE2ePassphraseKey), isNull);
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_flutter/test/e2e_passphrase_button_test.dart

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/crdt_sync_flutter.dart';
+import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/testing/fake_secure_storage.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
+import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
+
+void main() {
+  TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
+  setUp(installFakeSecureStorage);
+
+  Future<void> pump(WidgetTester t, {required bool locked, VoidCallback? cb}) =>
+      t.pumpWidget(
+        MaterialApp(
+          home: Scaffold(
+            body: E2ePassphraseButton(locked: locked, onSaved: cb),
+          ),
+        ),
+      );
+
+  testWidgets('icon follows the locked flag', (t) async {
+    await pump(t, locked: true);
+    expect(find.byIcon(Icons.lock), findsOneWidget);
+    await pump(t, locked: false);
+    expect(find.byIcon(Icons.lock_open), findsOneWidget);
+  });
+
+  testWidgets('entering a passphrase stores it and notifies', (t) async {
+    var saved = 0;
+    await pump(t, locked: true, cb: () => saved++);
+    await t.tap(find.byType(IconButton));
+    await t.pumpAndSettle();
+    await t.enterText(find.byType(TextField), 'pw');
+    await t.tap(find.byIcon(Icons.check));
+    await t.pumpAndSettle();
+    expect(
+      await const FlutterSecureStorage().read(key: kE2ePassphraseKey),
+      'pw',
+    );
+    expect(saved, 1);
+  });
+
+  testWidgets('submitting with Enter saves; empty input saves nothing', (
+    t,
+  ) async {
+    await pump(t, locked: true);
+    await t.tap(find.byType(IconButton));
+    await t.pumpAndSettle();
+    await t.enterText(find.byType(TextField), 'x1');
+    await t.testTextInput.receiveAction(TextInputAction.done);
+    await t.pumpAndSettle();
+    expect(
+      await const FlutterSecureStorage().read(key: kE2ePassphraseKey),
+      'x1',
+    );
+    await clearE2ePassphrase();
+    await t.tap(find.byType(IconButton));
+    await t.pumpAndSettle();
+    await t.tap(find.byIcon(Icons.check));
+    await t.pumpAndSettle();
+    expect(
+      await const FlutterSecureStorage().read(key: kE2ePassphraseKey),
+      isNull,
+    );
+  });
+}

crdt_sync_flutter/test/google_any_sign_in_test.dart

@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
 import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/crdt_sync_flutter.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/services.dart';
 import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
+import 'package:google_account_token/google_account_token.dart'
+    show kGoogleAccountTokenChannel;
 
 void main() {
-  // Under `flutter test` the io platform gate answers for the host, which is
-  // Linux -- so the plugin half is false and the loopback half is live. That
-  // is the desktop configuration, and it is the one this suite can exercise
-  // honestly; the Android half is asserted on the device instead.
+  TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
+  // `flutter test` reports Android as the default target platform, so the
+  // desktop configuration this suite exercises is pinned explicitly: the
+  // plugin half is false and the loopback half is live. The Android routing
+  // has its own group at the bottom.
+  setUp(() => debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = TargetPlatform.linux);
+  tearDown(() {
+    debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = null;
+    TestDefaultBinaryMessengerBinding.instance.defaultBinaryMessenger
+        .setMockMethodCallHandler(kGoogleAccountTokenChannel, null);
+  });
+
   group('desktopSignInSupported', () {
     test('is true on this host once a desktop client id exists', () {
       expect(desktopSignInSupported('desktop-cid'), isTrue);
@@ -90,4 +102,35 @@ void main() {
       );
     });
   });
+
+  group('on Android', () {
+    setUp(() => debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = TargetPlatform.android);
+
+    test('the plugin flow wins and the desktop one is off', () {
+      expect(
+        googleFlowFor(serverClientId: 'web-cid', desktopClientId: 'd'),
+        GoogleFlow.plugin,
+      );
+      expect(desktopSignInSupported('d'), isFalse);
+      expect(
+        googleAnySignInSupported(
+          serverClientId: 'web-cid',
+          desktopClientId: '',
+        ),
+        isTrue,
+      );
+    });
+
+    test('googleAnyIdToken reaches the AccountManager plugin', () async {
+      TestDefaultBinaryMessengerBinding.instance.defaultBinaryMessenger
+          .setMockMethodCallHandler(
+            kGoogleAccountTokenChannel,
+            (_) async => 'native-token',
+          );
+      expect(
+        await googleAnyIdToken(serverClientId: 'web-cid', desktopClientId: ''),
+        'native-token',
+      );
+    });
+  });
 }

crdt_sync_flutter/test/google_desktop_sign_in_test.dart

@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ BrowserLauncher _respondingLauncher(
   final state = url.queryParameters['state']!;
   unawaited(
     http.get(
-      Uri.parse('http://127.0.0.1:$port/').replace(
-        queryParameters: params(state),
-      ),
+      Uri.parse(
+        'http://127.0.0.1:$port/',
+      ).replace(queryParameters: params(state)),
     ),
   );
   return true;
@@ -54,6 +54,22 @@ void main() {
     expect(sentBody['code_verifier'], 'v');
   });
 
+  test('sends the configured client_secret in the exchange', () async {
+    late Map<String, String> sentBody;
+    final client = MockClient((request) async {
+      sentBody = Uri.splitQueryString(request.body);
+      return http.Response('{"id_token":"t"}', 200);
+    });
+    await googleDesktopIdToken(
+      clientId: 'desktop-cid',
+      clientSecret: 'shh',
+      binder: _bind,
+      launcher: _respondingLauncher((state) => {'code': 'c', 'state': state}),
+      httpClient: client,
+    );
+    expect(sentBody['client_secret'], 'shh');
+  });
+
   test('returns null when the user denies consent', () async {
     final token = await googleDesktopIdToken(
       clientId: 'cid',
@@ -99,9 +115,7 @@ void main() {
     final token = await googleDesktopIdToken(
       clientId: 'cid',
       binder: _bind,
-      launcher: _respondingLauncher(
-        (state) => {'code': 'c', 'state': state},
-      ),
+      launcher: _respondingLauncher((state) => {'code': 'c', 'state': state}),
       httpClient: MockClient(
         (_) async => http.Response('{"error":"invalid_grant"}', 400),
       ),

crdt_sync_flutter/test/google_pkce_test.dart

@@ -142,6 +142,29 @@ void main() {
     expect(body['redirect_uri'], 'http://127.0.0.1:9');
   });
 
+  test('tokenExchangeBody omits client_secret when none is configured', () {
+    final body = tokenExchangeBody(
+      clientId: 'cid',
+      code: 'c',
+      redirectPort: 9,
+      verifier: 'v',
+    );
+    expect(body.containsKey('client_secret'), isFalse);
+  });
+
+  test('tokenExchangeBody sends the Desktop client_secret when given', () {
+    // Google issues Desktop clients a secret and rejects the exchange
+    // without it, even with PKCE.
+    final body = tokenExchangeBody(
+      clientId: 'cid',
+      clientSecret: 'the-secret',
+      code: 'c',
+      redirectPort: 9,
+      verifier: 'v',
+    );
+    expect(body['client_secret'], 'the-secret');
+  });
+
   group('idTokenFromResponse', () {
     test('reads the id_token', () {
       expect(idTokenFromResponse('{"id_token":"tok"}'), 'tok');

crdt_sync_flutter/test/google_sign_in_test.dart

@@ -1,18 +1,39 @@
 import 'package:crdt_sync_flutter/crdt_sync_flutter.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/services.dart';
 import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
+import 'package:google_account_token/google_account_token.dart'
+    show kGoogleAccountTokenChannel;
 
 void main() {
+  TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
+  final messenger =
+      TestDefaultBinaryMessengerBinding.instance.defaultBinaryMessenger;
+
+  tearDown(() {
+    debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = null;
+    messenger.setMockMethodCallHandler(kGoogleAccountTokenChannel, null);
+  });
+
   group('googleSignInSupported', () {
+    test('is true on Android once a client id is present', () {
+      debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = TargetPlatform.android;
+      expect(googleSignInSupported('some-client-id'), isTrue);
+    });
+
+    test('is false on iOS: AccountManager is Android-only', () {
+      debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = TargetPlatform.iOS;
+      expect(googleSignInSupported('some-client-id'), isFalse);
+    });
+
     test('is false without a client id, whatever the platform', () {
       // The guard that stops a build which forgot the constant from showing a
       // button that can only ever report "cancelled".
       expect(googleSignInSupported(''), isFalse);
     });
 
-    test('follows the platform gate once a client id is present', () {
-      // Under `flutter test` the io half answers for the host, which is not
-      // Android -- so this is false here and true on a real handset. Asserting
-      // the platform's own answer keeps the test honest on every host.
+    test('is false on a desktop host even with a client id', () {
+      debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = TargetPlatform.linux;
       expect(googleSignInSupported('some-client-id'), isFalse);
     });
   });
@@ -40,4 +61,30 @@ void main() {
       expect(await googleIdToken(serverClientId: ''), isNull);
     });
   });
+
+  group('googleIdToken through the AccountManager plugin', () {
+    setUp(() => debugDefaultTargetPlatformOverride = TargetPlatform.android);
+
+    test('asks the native side for a token for the web client', () async {
+      MethodCall? seen;
+      messenger.setMockMethodCallHandler(kGoogleAccountTokenChannel, (
+        call,
+      ) async {
+        seen = call;
+        return 'native-token';
+      });
+      final token = await googleIdToken(serverClientId: 'web-cid');
+      expect(token, 'native-token');
+      expect(seen?.method, 'idToken');
+      expect(seen?.arguments, {'serverClientId': 'web-cid'});
+    });
+
+    test('a failing native side is null, not a throw', () async {
+      messenger.setMockMethodCallHandler(
+        kGoogleAccountTokenChannel,
+        (_) async => throw PlatformException(code: 'auth_failed'),
+      );
+      expect(await googleIdToken(serverClientId: 'web-cid'), isNull);
+    });
+  });
 }

data_transfer_flutter/README.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ dependencies:
   data_transfer_flutter:
     git:
       url: https://github.com/kuhyx/utils
-      ref: data_transfer_flutter-v0.2.0
+      ref: data_transfer_flutter-v0.2.1
       path: data_transfer_flutter
 ```
 

data_transfer_flutter/pubspec.yaml

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ description: >-
   Flutter apps: system Save-as on Android/iOS (never cloud-only), a save
   dialog on desktop, a download on web, plus a versioned export envelope.
 publish_to: 'none'
-version: 0.2.0
+version: 0.2.2
 
 environment:
   sdk: ^3.12.2
 
 dependencies:
-  file_picker: 13.3.1
+  file_picker: 13.3.3
   file_selector: 1.1.0
   flutter:
     sdk: flutter

dep_freshness/_tables.py

@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ MAVEN_REPOS: Final = (
     "https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/",
     "https://plugins.gradle.org/m2/",
 )
+# Asked only when none of the above knows an artifact AND the group is not
+# `com.github.*` (whose metadata is the 401 above): JitPack also hosts
+# artifacts under their own group, e.g. `cz.adaptech.tesseract4android`,
+# whose metadata answers 200 with the full release list.
+JITPACK_REPO: Final = "https://jitpack.io/"
 UTILS_TAG_REMOTE: Final = "https://github.com/kuhyx/utils"
 # JitPack coordinates: `com.github.<owner>:<repo>` or
 # `com.github.<owner>.<repo>:<module>`; the GitHub repo is what "HEAD" means.
@@ -86,6 +91,8 @@ NPM_ACCEPT: Final = "application/vnd.npm.install-v1+json"
 # --- Cache ------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 CACHE_PATH_ENV: Final = "DEP_FRESHNESS_CACHE"
+# Seconds; overrides every ecosystem TTL (a repo that wants a once-a-day gate).
+TTL_ENV: Final = "DEP_FRESHNESS_TTL_SECONDS"
 DEFAULT_CACHE_DIR: Final = "~/.cache/dep-freshness"
 CACHE_FILE: Final = "registry.json"
 TTL_SECONDS: Final = 6 * 3600
@@ -208,7 +215,7 @@ ALLOWLIST_MAX_DAYS: Final = 90
 TRANSITIVE_PREFIX: Final = "transitive:"
 # A fork's predicate: the entry holds only while the upstream repository's own
 # copy of the same manifest pins the same version, and dies the day upstream
-# bumps. TachiyomiSY cannot take moko-resources 0.27.0 (a 300-file accessor
-# rewrite that breaks every future upstream string) before jobobby04 does.
+# bumps. A fork that cannot take a release (e.g. a 300-file accessor rewrite
+# that breaks every future upstream string) before its upstream does.
 UPSTREAM_PREFIX: Final = "upstream:"
 GITHUB_RAW: Final = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/{repo}/HEAD/{path}"

dep_freshness/cache.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from dep_freshness._tables import (
     DEFAULT_CACHE_DIR,
     GITCOMMIT,
     GITTAG,
+    TTL_ENV,
     TTL_GITTAG_SECONDS,
     TTL_SECONDS,
 )
@@ -33,7 +34,14 @@ def cache_dir() -> Path:
 
 
 def ttl_for(ecosystem: str) -> int:
-    """Git refs move rarely and cost a subprocess, so they cache longer."""
+    """Git refs move rarely and cost a subprocess, so they cache longer.
+
+    `DEP_FRESHNESS_TTL_SECONDS` overrides both; garbage is ignored, because a
+    typo in an env var must not break a commit hook.
+    """
+    override = os.environ.get(TTL_ENV, "")
+    if override.isdigit() and int(override) > 0:
+        return int(override)
     return TTL_GITTAG_SECONDS if ecosystem in (GITTAG, GITCOMMIT) else TTL_SECONDS
 
 

dep_freshness/parsers/gradle.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 The version catalog is the one place a Gradle build should declare versions,
 which makes it a manifest the gate can read without evaluating Kotlin DSL.
 A build may have several (`settings.gradle.kts` can `from(files(...))` any
-`*.versions.toml`; TachiyomiSY has three), so the suffix is what is matched.
+`*.versions.toml`; a large app can have several), so the suffix is what is matched.
 Three shapes appear in `[libraries]` and `[plugins]`:
 
     foo = "group:artifact:1.2.3"                         # inline string
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Three shapes appear in `[libraries]` and `[plugins]`:
     plug = { id = "com.example.plugin", version.ref = "x" }
 
 A library with no version is managed by a BOM (`junit-platform-launcher`
-in TachiyomiSY) and is skipped: the BOM's own entry is the pin that counts.
+in a typical app) and is skipped: the BOM's own entry is the pin that counts.
 A rich version table (`{ strictly = "1.2" }`) is read as the constraint it
 spells and lands as unpinned when it is a range, like every other ecosystem.
 

dep_freshness/registries/gitcommit.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 """JitPack artifacts pinned to a commit: "newest" is the default branch's HEAD.
 
-Seven of TachiyomiSY's dependencies are `com.github.<owner>:<repo>` at a
+Some Android builds depend on `com.github.<owner>:<repo>` at a
 short hash. No registry lists a "latest" for those, and a hash is not a
 version, so the gate's question becomes the only one a commit pin admits:
 is the pinned commit still what the source repository's default branch

dep_freshness/registries/maven.py

@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ artifacts published nowhere else (PhotoView, DirectionalViewPager). Since
 themselves still download, so a `com.github.<owner>:<repo>` name that no
 repository knows is answered from the GitHub repo's tags over `git
 ls-remote` (unmetered, no token). JitPack's version IS the tag name, `v`
-prefix included, so the tags are compared as they are.
+prefix included, so the tags are compared as they are. Artifacts JitPack
+hosts under their OWN group (`cz.adaptech.tesseract4android`) still get
+200 metadata there, so JitPack is the last resort for any other name.
 
 `<latest>` and `<release>` in the metadata are not trusted: AndroidX writes
 `1.2.0-alpha03` into `<latest>` routinely. The full `<versions>` list goes
@@ -32,7 +34,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from xml.etree import ElementTree
 
-from dep_freshness._tables import GITHUB_REMOTE, MAVEN_REPOS
+from dep_freshness._tables import (
+    GITHUB_REMOTE,
+    JITPACK_GROUP_PREFIX,
+    JITPACK_REPO,
+    MAVEN_REPOS,
+)
 from dep_freshness.registries._git import ls_remote
 from dep_freshness.registries.gitcommit import source_repo
 from dep_freshness.registries.http import get_text
@@ -69,6 +76,15 @@ def github_tags(name: str) -> list[str]:
     return [line.rpartition("refs/tags/")[2] for line in lines if "refs/tags/" in line]
 
 
+def _jitpack_versions(name: str) -> list[str]:
+    """What only JitPack knows: tags for `com.github.*`, metadata otherwise."""
+    if name.startswith(JITPACK_GROUP_PREFIX):
+        return github_tags(name)
+    url = metadata_url(JITPACK_REPO, name)
+    body = get_text(url) if url else None
+    return versions_in(body) if body is not None else []
+
+
 def latest(name: str) -> str | None:
     seen: list[str] = []
     for repo in MAVEN_REPOS:
@@ -79,5 +95,5 @@ def latest(name: str) -> str | None:
         if body is not None:
             seen.extend(versions_in(body))
     if not seen:
-        seen.extend(github_tags(name))
+        seen.extend(_jitpack_versions(name))
     return reference(seen) or newest_per_generation(seen)

dep_freshness/tests/test_gradle_registry.py

@@ -147,6 +147,47 @@ def test_a_tagless_repo_and_a_non_jitpack_name_are_none(repos, monkeypatch):
     assert calls == [("https://github.com/o/r", "--tags", "--refs")]
 
 
+JITPACK = maven.JITPACK_REPO
+TESSERACT = "cz.adaptech.tesseract4android:tesseract4android"
+
+
+def test_a_jitpack_only_artifact_is_answered_by_jitpack_metadata(repos):
+    """Tesseract4Android is published on JitPack under its own group, not
+    `com.github.*`, so there is no source repo to read tags from; JitPack's
+    metadata for it answers 200 and lists every release."""
+    repos[maven.metadata_url(JITPACK, TESSERACT)] = metadata(
+        "4.7.0", "4.9.0", "4.1.1a", latest="4.9.0"
+    )
+    assert maven.latest(TESSERACT) == "4.9.0"
+
+
+def test_jitpack_is_asked_last_and_only_when_nobody_else_knows_the_name(
+    repos, monkeypatch
+):
+    asked: list[str] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        maven, "get_text", lambda url, *a, **k: asked.append(url) or repos.get(url)
+    )
+    repos[maven.metadata_url(CENTRAL, "io.coil-kt:coil")] = metadata("2.7.0")
+    assert maven.latest("io.coil-kt:coil") == "2.7.0"
+    assert not any(url.startswith(JITPACK) for url in asked)
+
+
+def test_a_github_jitpack_name_never_asks_jitpack_metadata(repos, monkeypatch):
+    """That endpoint answers 401 for `com.github.*`; the tags are the answer."""
+    asked: list[str] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        maven, "get_text", lambda url, *a, **k: asked.append(url) or None
+    )
+    tags(monkeypatch, {"o/r": ["1.0.0"]})
+    assert maven.latest("com.github.o:r") == "1.0.0"
+    assert not any(url.startswith(JITPACK) for url in asked)
+
+
+def test_a_name_jitpack_does_not_know_either_is_none(repos):
+    assert maven.latest(TESSERACT) is None
+
+
 def test_an_unreachable_repo_is_offline(repos, monkeypatch):
     tags(monkeypatch, {})
     with pytest.raises(Offline):

dep_freshness/tests/test_resolve.py

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 import pytest
 
+from dep_freshness._tables import TTL_SECONDS
 from dep_freshness.cache import Cache, Entry, ttl_for
 from dep_freshness.models import Dep
 from dep_freshness.registries import http
@@ -139,3 +140,16 @@ def _offline(*_args):
 
 def _explode(*_args):
     raise RuntimeError("boom")
+
+
+def test_ttl_env_overrides_the_registry_ttl(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    """A repo can stretch the refresh window (once-a-day pre-push gates)."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DEP_FRESHNESS_TTL_SECONDS", "86400")
+    assert ttl_for("npm") == 86400
+    assert ttl_for("gittag") == 86400
+
+
+def test_ttl_env_garbage_falls_back_to_the_default(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    """A malformed value must never break a commit hook."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DEP_FRESHNESS_TTL_SECONDS", "soon")
+    assert ttl_for("npm") == TTL_SECONDS

dep_freshness/tests/test_versions.py

@@ -45,12 +45,19 @@ def test_newest_stable_ignores_unparseable_entries():
     # PyPI stub packages date-stamp a fourth component. Capping the regex at
     # three reported this exact pin as unpinned *against its own value*.
     ("==2.33.0.20260712", "2.33.0.20260712"),
+    # PEP 440 post/dev/pre releases are exact pins too (pytest-asyncio).
+    ("1.4.1.post1", "1.4.1.post1"), ("==1.4.1.post1", "1.4.1.post1"),
+    ("2.0.post3", "2.0.post3"), ("1.0.dev2", "1.0.dev2"),
+    ("==2.0rc1", "2.0rc1"), ("1.2.3a1", "1.2.3a1"), ("1.2b4", "1.2b4"),
+    ("1.0.post1.dev2", "1.0.post1.dev2"),
 ])
 def test_exact_pins_are_recognised(raw, expected):
     assert exact_pin(raw) == expected
 
 
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", ["^1.6.0", ">=1.6.0", "any", "*", "", ">=1,<2", "~1.2"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", ["^1.6.0", ">=1.6.0", "any", "*", "", ">=1,<2", "~1.2",
+    ">=1.4.1.post1", "~=1.4", "1.4.post", "1.4.postx", "1.4.1.post1,<2",
+])
 def test_ranges_are_not_exact_pins(raw):
     assert exact_pin(raw) is None
 
@@ -61,6 +68,13 @@ def test_behind_compares_versions():
     assert not behind("1.8.0", "1.7.0")
 
 
+def test_a_post_release_is_newer_than_its_base_release():
+    assert behind("1.4.1", "1.4.1.post1")
+    assert not behind("1.4.1.post1", "1.4.1")
+    assert not is_prerelease("1.4.1.post1")
+    assert newest_stable(["1.4.1", "1.4.1.post1", "1.4.0"]) == "1.4.1.post1"
+
+
 def test_behind_never_fires_on_unparseable_input():
     """An unpinned constraint is UNPINNED, never dressed up as staleness."""
     assert not behind("^1.6.0", "1.7.0")

dep_freshness/upstream.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 """The `upstream:` predicate: does the fork's upstream still pin this version?
 
 A fork cannot always take a release before the project it tracks does --
-moko-resources 0.27.0 rewrites every string accessor across 300 files of
-TachiyomiSY and would break each future upstream commit that adds a string.
+a library that rewrites every string accessor across 300 files of the fork
+would break each future upstream commit that adds a string.
 "Wait for upstream" is the honest reason, and it is checkable: fetch the
 upstream repository's copy of the SAME manifest, parse it with the same
 parser, and compare the pin. Equal means the entry holds; different means